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This thesis attempts a paradigmatic shift in the focus of ballad study towards 
embodiment, moving from ‘representation’ towards ‘experience’ and with an emphasis 
on ‘process,’ as opposed to ‘product.’ The originality lies in the development of a new 
approach which explores words, music and embodied aesthetic experience as they come 
together and create meaning in performance, conceived of as ‘presence’ (Porter 2009).  
Ideas from philosophy are connected with concepts from ethnomusicology and folklore 
and brought to bear upon broad issues in the study of expressive culture. While the 
focus here is on the ballad experience in a Scottish context, ultimately the questions 
asked attend to dimensions of experience that do not emphasise cultural-boundedness. 
The emphasis is not on my experience as a fieldworker, nor on fieldwork descriptions, 
but rather on the development of new theoretical methodologies that can be extended 
and applied to other cultural forms. To that end, I am little concerned with texts, 
variants and versions, transcriptions and collections which traditionally constitute the 
subject matter of ballad studies. What is presented is a convergence of contemporary 
disciplinary approaches, pushing the boundaries of the existing framework of ballad and 
folksong studies to include dimensions of cultural experience rarely considered in this 
field. 
Working within the wider interpretative framework of hermeneutic 
phenomenology, theories of embodiment are used as a means to introduce ideas from 
embodied cognition. The development of ideas is concerned with describing how our 
embodied experience of the world informs the processes of meaning-making, how human 
cognitive capacities are at work in the experience of ballad singing and how the 
structure of the ballad reflects and shapes these capacities. Embodied philosophy and 
contemporary theories of metaphor are central in this endeavour. Ultimately, this work 
seeks to find a legitimate way of talking about the ephemeral, intangible yet real quality 
of embodied aesthetic experience—the shivers and chills of the Maysie—that avoids 
metaphysical explanations and that makes sense in a secular, humanistic framework. The 
aim is not to demystify experience in a reductionist sense, but to offer an interpretation 







Prologue: A ‘Mindful Approach’ 
 
In the past, researchers were exposed to a restricted set of techniques that 
were the designated research methods of their discipline. This is no longer the case. 
Today’s emerging research environment is characterised by plurality and diversity, 
where disciplines overlap and where postmodernism has broken down the 
traditional unitary model of research. The sheer diversity of approaches inevitably 
raises the question of what constitutes a legitimate and valid contribution to 
knowledge.  
The climate of current research is uniquely confusing and disorientating. In 
the preliminary stages of this research, I found myself overwhelmed by the mass of 
available information. The internet provided access to more people, more words, and 
more facts that any one mind can fruitfully absorb.  I was confronted with a vast 
array of different possible research methods, which made it difficult difficult to find 
both the confidence to decide which path to take. At the same, being faced with 
such freedom of choice was also thrilling and exciting because of the sheer potential 
and possibility for new ideas to emerge.  
The need for understanding and the ability to justify what makes something 
count as valuable knowledge in such a pluralist context requires more than deep 
exploration of the paradigms underlying contemporary methods and inquiry. 
Choosing a research method necessarily requires a conscious choice, reflection and 
an awareness of possible limitations and constraints. It is a situation that demands 
the integration of personal and intellectual self-awareness and self-reflection.  I soon 
discovered, for me, that the best way to overcome this challenge was through an 
approach that Bentz and Shapiro have called ‘mindful inquiry’ (1998). I found 
mindful inquiry to be an antidote to this very postmodern situation, in that it ‘helps 
the researcher sustain his or her personal identity amid the onslaught of the 
information age’ (36). My understanding of music and prior knowledge and training 
in literary theory and ethnographic methods did help me evaluate the quality of 
information I encountered—to make informed selections of quality material—but 
mindful inquiry enabled me to delimit my research and create boundaries so that I 
became in control of my work, rather than vice versa.  
Mindful inquiry is not a research ‘method’ that one must adopt in order to 
engage in research, it is a choice. Taking responsibility not only for producing 
knowledge but for knowing why it is valuable has deepened my own experience of 
the meaning, value and richness of life. The emphasis placed here on theories of 
embodiment is a direct consequence of my own personal experience. Working in the 
purely intellectual arena leaves one feeling almost entirely alienated from oneself. 
While on a mindfulness mediation course, I realised that it is quite possible to 
comprehend a concept on an intellectual level, and yet not understand it, bodily. That 
is to say that there is often a disjunction between intellect and emotion, between 
body and mind. The clear problem with the purely theoretical is that explanations 
vi 
 
for experience become overly intellectualised and at a remove from the actual lived 
reality we make attempts to understand. Theories and ideas presented here come 
from my own conviction and from the truth of my own experience.  
In a philosophical sense, I chose to view this research not as a disembodied, 
programmed activity but rather as a part of the way in which I engage with the 
world. Mindful inquiry has resulted, for me, in a personally meaningful and 
rewarding experience; it suited my being-in-the-world as a researcher and at the 
same time facilitated my search for an answer to life questions. Mindful inquiry was 
certainly able to help me connect—in a meaningful way—myself as a researcher, my 
inner self, my research interests, the world in which I live, my philosophical 
convictions and my moral and political values, helping turn my project into a 
positive contribution to my personal development as a whole.  
The Maysie is a phenomenon that captured my imagination and that 
continues to fascinate me. As I experience the ballads, my being is filled with 
beautiful and haunting melodies and powerful poetic imagery. In my attempt to 
understand the meanings that come out of the ballads, my experience of them has 
widened my horizons of understanding and their truths have deepened and enriched 





























CHAPTER ONE 1 
Introduction: 
 “I had ta’en oot that heart o’ flesh, Put in a heart o’ stane”1 
 
 
The thesis explores the ballad singing event in which ‘sensation, memory and 
imagination coalesce in a memorable experience’ (Rice 1994: 305, my italics). 
Following Lillis Ó Laoire’s (2005: xiii) aspirations for the study of song in Ireland, it 
is my hope that this work will encourage others to explore approaches in the 
development of theoretical models for the analysis of the ballad as song in a Scottish 
context. This chapter will define and elucidate the terms used in the title, describing 
the remarkable fieldwork experience that inspired this research. The aims and 
objectives will be set in the context of the emerging paradigms in the study of 
expressive arts, ethnomusicology and folklore. The central research questions will be 
set out, with problems and concerns identified and addressed. The research design 
and chosen methods will be outlined briefly. It will be argued that in order to 
understand the Maysie and the ‘ballad experience,’ a shift in the traditional focus of 
ballad studies from representation towards an understanding of embodied 
experience is necessary. The final section presents a chapter by chapter summary. 
Where studies of the ballad exist, they have tended, until very recently at 
least, to utilise literary, historical or folkloric approaches. Ballads are often regarded 
as de-contextualised products or artefacts; the lived embodied experience of singing 
receives little attention. This is evidenced in the long history of ballad and folksong 
scholarship, where questions of origin, transmission, variation, and repertoire tend 
                                                          
1 This is a reference to my favourite Scottish ballad, ‘Tam Lin’ (Child #39). The Queen of the fairy folk 
is furious at Janet, who has taken Tam away from her. Here she rages and regrets not turning Tam’s 
heart to stone. 
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to attract the most attention. Studies of popular ballads have conventionally 
focussed mainly on the features of the ‘traditional’ examples of the type collected 
and collated by Francis James Child in his classic edition of The English and Scottish 
Popular Ballads (1882–98). To many ballad scholars, the task of ballad scholarship is 
still to illuminate these historical texts. I suggest here a paradigmatic shift in terms 
of the way in which the ballad is understood. What is presented is a convergence of 
contemporary disciplinary approaches, pushing the boundaries of the existing 
framework of ballad and folksong studies to include dimensions of cultural 
experience seldom considered in this field. 
The ballad is folklore. With folklore defined as ‘expressive culture,’2 it is 
arguably the aesthetic, sensual, corporeal, ineffable dimension that endows cultural 
forms most powerfully with affective potential. Expressive culture has always 
attracted interdisciplinary attention, and while it has received the most focused 
attention from scholars in the fields of folklore and ethnology, this thesis takes the 
liberty of ignoring disciplinary boundaries and acknowledges instead that the 
theoretical basis from which scholars of expressive culture draw are located in 
disciplines such as anthropology, literary studies and the philosophy of language and 
art. Historically, a more accurate account would acknowledge that all of these fields 
and subfields have been inspired by an intellectual (and likely more than just 
intellectual) interest in the vernacular, which arguably precedes their disciplinary 
formation. 
                                                          
2 The term ‘expressive culture’ is used by scholars in a wide range of disciplines to refer to any type of 
social behaviour with an aesthetic dimension. This includes genres traditionally studied in the 




That said, this work contributes primarily to the field of ethnomusicology. In 
Cooley and Barz’ view (2008: 3),  
Ethnomusicology today enjoys advantages of being an inherently 
interdisciplinary discipline, seemingly in a perpetual state of experimentation 
that gains strength from a diversity and plurality of approaches. 
 
This is an intellectual arena in which scholars increasingly favour a multiplicity of 
explanatory possibilities, asking nearly every conceivable question about musical 
forms in culture (Rice 2003). Ruth Stone (2008) has argued that ethnomusicology in 
the twenty-first century, rather than constituting a discipline in itself, is really a 
platform for the development of different approaches to answering the questions of 
understanding music in culture. As a consequence of this multiplicity of explanatory 
possibilities, ethnomusicologists are in a unique position to question established 
methods and explore new perspectives, drawing on the convergence of insights from 
various different fields considered to bring the best understanding to the study at 
hand. These new perspectives are not just for ethnomusicologists but also for all 
ethnographic disciplines (Cooley & Barz 2008: 3). 
This thesis hopes to raise the level of philosophical enquiry in ballad studies 
by presenting a more holistic analysis of this intense and complex traditional 
cultural experience, aiming for depth of perception in an attempt to reveal the 
phenomenological and cognitive underpinnings of the ballad as song. It is an attempt 
to take ideas from philosophy, connect them with concepts from ethnomusicology 
and folklore and make them speak to broad issues in the study of expressive culture. 
To that end, I am less concerned with texts, variants and versions, transcriptions 
and collections which traditionally constitute the subject matter of ballad studies. 
Ballads are not words on a page, but are embodied acts of musical and verbal 
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communication between people who have a visceral experience affecting both mind 
and body.  
Following others who have taken a similar approach in other fields, I suggest 
that processes at work in the ballad experience can be understood on two levels: the 
phenomenological and the cognitive. Working within the wider interpretative 
framework of hermeneutic phenomenology, theories of embodiment are used as a 
means to introduce ideas from embodied cognition insofar as they help to elucidate 
the ballad experience. This is possible because embodiment is one of the hallmarks 
of contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Most crucially, the 
methodology, theoretical models and explanations developed here can be adapted 
and used by others to understand the ballad’s modern counterparts and other sung 
genres to some extent. In this case, for reasons of scope and delimitation, the focus is 
on the Scottish traditional ballads. There is no particularly ‘Scottish’ slant to my 
explorations, however. Subject matter was acquired ‘on the ground’ in a Scottish 
context, but the questions asked about that material attend to ‘dimensions of 
experience that do not emphasise cultural-boundedness’ (Fatone 2010: 396).  
 
The Ballad  
 The traditional ballad is one of the richest, most enduring expressions of 
Scottish culture, ‘among the finest products of human creativity’ (McKean 2003). 
Susanne Gilbert, in her article ‘Scottish Ballads an Popular Culture’ (2009: 1) writes, 
The ballad is rooted deeply in Scottish popular culture: in the hills of the 
Borders, the fishing villages of the northeast, the berry fields of Perthshire, the 
broadside collections of the national archives, and the venues of Glasgow’s 
Celtic Connections folk festival. The ballad’s significance for Scotland has been 




Perhaps surprisingly, ballads have survived ‘through varying fashions and cultural 
changes…and maintain a fierce existence in the modern world, coming again into 
bloom when sung’ (McKean 2003: 2, my emphasis). There has been a lot of 
speculation as to why the ballad has remained popular and part of life for so long. It 
is, of course, difficult to empirically substantiate the claim that ballads are in any 
way extraordinary; suffice to say that many people the world over continue to testify 
to their enduring power. In a BBC news report from 2008, the claim was made that, 
‘[The ballads] are right at the cornerstone of major cultural influences, globally.’3 
Scholars have long striven for a definition of the ballad since the early days of 
ballad scholarship.4  It is not the case that the ballad is simply verse set to music or 
indeed vice-versa. Today, many ballad scholars admit that the term ‘ballad’ can mean 
many different types of sung verse.5 The ballad is often defined simply as ‘narrative 
song’; however, renowned ballad scholar and ethnomusicologist James Porter (2009: 
15) warns us to be ‘cautious about making any hard-and-fast stipulations as to 
where ballads with an explicit narrative begin and other styles of oral or sung poetry 
end.’ As well as blurring the boundary between sung poetry and narrative song, the 
ballad straddles the realms of both song and story, partaking of both genres while 
remaining distinct. While the ballad is first and foremost a form of traditional 
narrative, it is unlike any other form of storytelling because it is carried by a melody. 
                                                          
3 BBC News Radio Broadcast. Friday, 27 June 2008 
4 The Oxford English Dictionary online defines the ballad as, ‘a narrative poem in short stanzas, esp. one 
that tells a popular story’; the Grove Dictionary of Music as, ‘a popular song that may contain a narrative 
element, that combines narrative, dramatic dialogue and lyrical passages in stanzaic form sung to a 
rounded tune, and often includes a recurrent refrain’ (Porter).  
5 The Kommission für Volksdichtung—an international association of song scholars, founded in 1966 (in 
Freiburg, Germany)—offer a broader definition to deal with the range of subject matter and approach 
to the ballad genre across cultural lines. They suggest that ‘a song that tells a story’ is perhaps the 
simplest, most usable definition for their purposes.  
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This means that any attempts to elucidate the ballad must engage with theories 
concerning both narrative folklore and musical phenomena. Arguably, the very fact 
that the ballad escapes definition makes the study of it potentially challenging and 
necessary, and certainly ripe for academic enquiry.  
           Perhaps surprisingly, ballads remain meaningful in a context when they should 
be considered fundamentally anachronistic. They embody the fascinating quality of 
being at once ancient and immediately contemporary. In terms of their subject 
matter, ballads deal with fundamental human concerns. They dramatise the 
importance of human relationships and the transient nature of human life—the 
central themes are death and love in the context of gender and power relations. They 
speak to us not of a distant past, but of issues always present. As Tom McKean 
(2003: 3) notes, just looking at the news today confirms our enduring concern with 
such themes: the abuse of power; violent crime; injustice; gender rivalries; jealousy; 
betrayal; vengeance; family politics—the stark facts of human conflict. The ballad 
aesthetic seeks to make the harsh realities of human existence into a story, a song, a 
work of art. In the modern world, there is surely  
a need to examine the persistence of allegedly outmoded forms of 
particularism...that have not only proved resistant to the melting pot but 
continue to provide people with essential psychological and spiritual resources 
(Lasch 1981: 9).  
 
Many events today provide singers with opportunities for performing, both formally 
on the stage and informally in singing sessions. Ballads are sung not only in the 
traditional unaccompanied style but also with modern accompanied arrangements 
by professional groups, who have brought them to international audiences across 
the world. While it is true to say that the occasions for ballad singing in the modern 
7 
 
day might not be quite as ubiquitous as they once were, this thesis rests on the 
knowledge that these transient moments of shared experience still do occur, 
existing with powerful effect. Ó Laoire (2006: 102) talks of ‘the success of the 
heightened expression embarked upon in singing a song,’ and the ‘perfect, ineffable, 
moment of performance.’ This is the moment where, he writes, ‘the phrase “you 
could hear a pin drop” springs to mind.’  
 
What is the ‘Ballad Experience’? 
And they used to say, that in these waves, up here, floats yer melody, and down 
here floats yer words; so ye’ve got the melody and the words, and the space that’s 
in between is where the Maysie lives—Maysie is the Traveller name for the muse. So 
if you invoke the muse, you will have a ballad experience. And people listenin’ to you 
will have a ballad experience. And you’ll get a shiver, a frisson comes doon your 
spine when the muse is present (Robertson 2008). 
 
These words were spoken to me in a fieldwork encounter with Stanley Robertson—
Scottish Traveller, storyteller and ballad singer—in June 2008. Sadly, Stanley passed 
away in August of 2009.6 During this meeting, I myself had a particularly powerful 
‘ballad experience.’ Half way through the interview, Stanley stood up, closed his 
eyes, took a few deep breaths and started to sing the ballad, ‘The Dowie Dens of 
Yarrow’ (Child # 214).When he sang he stood straight and tall, with his eyes closed, 
in a manner that was almost trancelike, almost ecstatic. I did not know quite what 
to think; I just sat and listened deeply and intently. The way in which he performed 
the song was haunting, verging on unpleasant, with the melody wavering. It was 
                                                          
6 Stanley Robertson (8 June 1940 – 2 August 2009) was a Scottish storyteller and ballad singer. He 
was born in Aberdeenshire in 1940 into a Traveller family which had settled there. His family 
background was rich in tradition, and from his aunt, folk singer Jeannie Robertson, he inherited a 
huge repertoire of North East ballads.  
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excruciating—he was giving everything of a performance to me. I felt shivers on my 
spine. He sang slowly and deliberately. I followed his voice and listened to the story 
unfold; I felt completely hypnotised by it. He hooked me in so that I was completely 
in the ballad world, inside the story. I knew the story—I knew the ballad very well—I 
knew what was coming, but in this case, it felt like I had never heard it sung before. 
It was so intense—I felt pain, emotional pain, I almost cried. I think it was something 
to do with the really deliberate way in which Stanley was singing and 
communicating the ballad story to me. Even though I knew where I was and was 
aware of everything around me, it felt like I had been transported to the world of the 
ballad, connected to something beyond myself. I lost a sense of myself, and became 
certainly less aware of my immediate surroundings. It was a very intense, strange 
and overwhelming experience. It was altogether quite unnerving, because I certainly 
was not actively seeking out such an experience. When he finally finished, I realised 
I had no conception of time having passed. The song is long, but I could not tell you 
how long he was singing for. I felt myself return to the reality of the situation with a 
start and make an attempt to carry on with the interview.  
I did not realise it at the time, but this experience, coupled with Stanley’s 
explanations of the Maysie, had a profound effect on my thinking. I had experienced 
emotional instances of ballad singing before, but this encounter really forced me to 
reflect and wonder. ‘…So if you invoke the muse, you will have a ballad experience.’ His 
words stayed with me and lead me to question what exactly characterises such a 
‘ballad experience,’ and to ask questions about the power and magic of stories in 




Studying the Ballad as Experience 
Historically, academic writing about the ballad often fails to engage the ballad 
as ‘experience’:  
Something ineffable is always missing [in the work of the ballad scholars] 
about the emotional or visual or aural experience of singing or hearing a ballad 
(Wilentz & Marcus 2004: x, my italics).  
 
Scholars who are interested in what expressive culture means for its performers and 
audiences rarely account for ineffable experience seriously in research. It is 
dismissed as idiosyncratic, something opposed to the shared frameworks of culture 
that make the work of scholarly interpretation possible at all. Harris Berger (2009: 
x), by chance, uses the situation of a traditional singer performing ballads for a large 
group of people to illustrate the conventional approaches to understanding 
expressive arts at large: 
An English literature scholar may interpret the meaning of the ballad’s words 
and place the performance in its social context. A music scholar might explore 
the melody of the compositions and the performer’s treatment of timbre and 
ornamentation, and a performance studies scholar may attend to the 
performer’s stage demeanour, or the larger meaning of the notion of 
performance in this culture. 
For many scholars in these fields, ‘experience’—that most difficult and subtle of key 
words—is not always a welcome theoretical concept. It is seen as such an amorphous 
and ephemeral substance that rigorously accounting for its role in meaning is viewed 
as either impossible or unnecessary (Berger 2009: ix–x).  
That said, there are few ethnologists who would say they are not interested in 
experience. The anthropologist Donald Polkinghorne (1983: 280–1) makes the point 
that the problem is that experience is incredibly resistant to careful study:   
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This realm is closest to us, yet it is most resistant to our attempt to grasp it 
with understanding…Serious and rigorous re-searching of the human realm is 
required. 
It is incontrovertible that performed vernacular arts have the power to make the 
scalp tingle, the spine shiver and the pulse increase. The potential pitfalls of relying 
on tingling scalps and indefinable experiences notwithstanding, it is surely this very 
dimension of expressive culture that is central to the power and value of such 
expressive cultural forms. To turn away from these affective responses and elusive 
experiences, in my view, is to deny what gives cultural forms meaning, value and 
purpose.  
The social scientists Braud and Anderson (1998: 2) believe that  
many of the most significant and exciting life events and extraordinary 
experiences—moments of clarity, illumination—have been systematically 
excluded from conventional research. 
What seems to be behind this comment is not that such experiences have been 
‘systematically excluded,’ but rather that some areas of human experience are 
thought by many scientists to be unsuitable topics of empirical study. Problems of 
measurement have often been the excuse offered for their exclusion. However, such 
excuses are becoming less valid, and we should begin to take notice of an expanding 
range of approaches now being made available. This thesis seeks not to quantify such 
experiences, but rather explore the creative processes of meaning-making that 









           The highly elusive dimension of experience has been acknowledged in studies 
of the humanities at large, but the task of actually defining the object of analysis can 
be a challenge in itself. A large part of this thesis is devoted to exploring the 
phenomenon which Stanley calls the Maysie, and which I call ‘presence,’ 
appropriated from Porter’s recent work on ballads, to be discussed shortly. These 
phenomena contribute to what is here called the total ‘ballad experience.’ Choosing 
the ‘ballad experience’ as the main object of study is justified following the 
anthropologists Valle and Mohs’ (1998: 98) claim that 
Any meaningful human experience that can be articulated in our everyday 
language such that a reasonable number of individuals would recognize and 
acknowledge the experience described can form the basis of study.7  
 
          The ability to experience intense emotional feelings when listening to music in 
is a common experience among listeners. In the context of expressive arts in general, 
it would seem that many people encounter a kind of extra-ordinary experience 
(extra-ordinary being an experience that sets itself apart from the ordinary in some 
                                                          
7 As a precursor to beginning my doctoral research, I created and distributed an online questionnaire, 
which was loosely based on a model developed for ground-breaking research into significant 
experiences of music more generally as part of a current project at the University of New South 
Wales (See Atkins, unpublished PhD thesis). I asked: ‘Have you ever had an experience of ballad 
singing that was really emotional or powerful? Have you ever been deeply moved by a particular song 
or performance?’ It was assumed that all respondents had experienced ballad singing and had an 
understanding of what the ballad as a cultural form actually is, without a need to impose unfamiliar 
categories of thought. The response was overwhelming. In less than three months I had over 50 
responses, with ages ranging from 19 to 65 and an average age of 34. Just over half of the respondents 
were female. Participants came from the following countries of origin: Scotland, England, Ireland, 
USA, France, Australia and Canada. If anything, the results proved that the demographic of the ballad 




way.) Such experiences happen on a continuum, ranging from the subtle to the 
overwhelming.  In extreme instances, people are moved to tears. Many of us have 
experienced something near to Stanley’s description of a ‘ballad experience,’ or at 
least some of the characteristics in relation to musical listening or musical 
performing; or indeed other oral performances of expressive art forms. If not, such an 
experience is not so out of the ordinary that most of us cannot imagine what this 
experience might be like. As such, the ‘ballad experience’ is justifiably chosen as the 
object of this study. 
The ‘ballad experience’ can be defined as the phenomenon of being ‘deeply 
moved’ in response to ballad singing. However, this description is itself fraught with 
complexities. The simplest part of the definition is the last: ‘in response to the 
ballad.’ This assumes that the ballad itself is at least strongly implicated in, if not 
entirely causative of, the experience being undergone. A major factor, of course, is 
the very powerful influence of the singer themselves: 
A song is not a song unless it is sung, without a voice it is just words on a page. 
The artists involved belong to that rare group of singers who are able to do full 
justice to a traditional song. These singers will challenge you to listen to the 
words and feel the emotions.8 
 
Sometimes the singer has a particularly powerful personality which draws out the 
power of the words they are singing; sometimes it is their voice alone, sometimes 
they are the perfect channel for a particular song at a particular moment in time. 
Quite a lot has been written about particular singers, their personalities and their 
styles—a good example is McKean’s (2007) article ‘Getting the Way O a Sang: 
Creativity in Ballad Singing.’ An outstanding book length text is the biographical 
                                                          
8 See http://www.thetraditionbearers.co.uk/ 
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work by Porter and Gower of the singer Jeannie Robertson, Emergent Singer, 
Transformative Voice (1995). While the singer still remains in my view the primary 
factor, this work looks to the role of the embodied cognitive response of the 
listening subject and the process of meaning-making that gives truth to experience 
in context. 
Some people may say that they experience the Maysie from recordings. I do 
not doubt that they do, but it is argued here that the physical presence, shared space 
and active listening in the context of live performance makes for a more immediate 
and powerful experience of the Maysie. What makes the ballad experience distinctive 
is the performance: the immediacy of the actual singing event, the direct 
communication of a ballad by means of a particular time and place between singer 
and a live, receptive audience. While in many ways comparable to the event of live 
storytelling and even some forms of theatre performance, the ballad experience is 
fundamentally different for two main reasons. Firstly, storytelling lacks the musical 
dimension. Secondly, unlike other forms of traditional narrative, ballads are 
characterised by indeterminacy, incompleteness, and fragmentation; their aesthetic 
is one of impersonality and ambiguity (features that will be explored and explained 
later in this work). This means that in order to make sense of the ballad narratives, 
we are required to ‘fill in the gaps’ in order to create meaning for ourselves. It is this 
inherent indeterminacy that invites both ballad singer and audience to actively 
participate in the ballad experience—to re-create and becomes co-creators 
themselves. The workings of this process will be explored at length in the course of 
this thesis.  
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The musical experience of performers and listeners, of professionals and 
amateurs, doubtless differs in many important ways. However, they share crucial 
physiological responses, responses that suggest continuity or commonality between 
professional and amateur musical perception. In order to engage with the ballad to a 
deep level, it is likely that there will be a degree of familiarity with the genre. That 
said, it is perfectly possible that someone who is not well versed in ballad singing or 
performance may have a ballad experience on encountering the form for the very first 
time.  Certainly our immediate subjective state will be an important contibuting 
factor; also significant is the context in which a ballad is both performed and heard. 
This said, we cannot write off the intrinsic qualities of the ballad itself as a major 
determining factor in the effectiveness of its affective quality. There is a continuum 
of experience, which is experienced to differing degrees and dependent on a number 
of variables. In each individual case, there will be a variety of factors that contribute 
to this process—for example, the contextual situation, a person’s subjective complex 
of feelings and their personal history. That is to say that during the event of the 
ballad singing experience, each subject has an individual bodily experience 
completely separate from those around them. Paradoxically it would seem that the 




The very first questions asked at the creation and inception of this research 
project were: Why are ballads they so captivating? How do people engage with the 
sounds and images of a performance to make them come alive in sensuous, lived 
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experience? What actually happens when people experience a ballad in its lived 
reality, when it is being sung? What is involved in this process that thrills the body 
and transports and transforms our consciousness?  How do the immediate situation 
and larger social contexts influence the meanings that people find in ballads as story 
songs? This research centres on the three following primary research questions: 
 What elements coalesce to create a powerful ‘ballad experience’?  
 
 How is meaning created in the context of the ephemeral and intangible 
nature of the ballad performance?  
 
 How do we explain the Maysie? 
 
In an attempt to answer these questions, we necessarily touch upon what it is to be 
human, the relationship between culture and consciousness, between mind and 
body and a sense of humanity beyond the limitations of the self. 
 
Problems and Concerns 
A study of this nature is necessarily fraught with difficulties due to the 
ephemeral and deeply personal nature of the phenomena under study. In attending 
to these research questions, we need to find a way to talk about the ballad 
experience in a way that is not wholly disembodied, and to find a methodology for 
exploration appropriate for a somatic focus on such a seemingly non-rational topic.  
The ballad experience takes place in irretrievable and ephemeral spaces and 
times. The intangible nature of performance cannot be captured, and will never 
manifest itself in the same way twice. The inherent problems in choosing such an 
ephemeral study object should be immediately apparent.  There are huge obstacles in 
the way of any attempt to assess cultural experience, not least because of the high 
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degree of variability. However, this does not make the enquiry any less valid or 
worthwhile. Explanations certainly must not violate the importance we place on 
human emotion and interpretations, or undermine any sense of meaning (Becker 
2004: 12). Such a study must be very careful—as many singers and ballad 
appreciators would agree—to ‘save the phenomenon’ (Taylor 1985).  
 
Research Methods 
Do we have ineffable knowledge of certain kinds of nuances in expressive 
forms that we cannot express in words? If we are to understand the transitions 
between the individual, cultural and transcultural dimensions of aesthetic 
experience, research methods are needed that are capable of grasping ‘the most 
profound type of knowledge [which] is not spoken of at all and thus inaccessible to 
ethnographic observation or interview’ (Bloch 1998: 46).  
 The chief value of fieldwork-generated data is to illustrate and emphasise 
the theoretical application and explanations of particular features of the ballad 
singing experience. Ethnography is concerned with capturing, interpreting, and 
explaining the way in which people live, experience and make sense of the world 
around them. Ethnographic inquiry is located on a continuum that extends from 
pure description at one end to the use of such description for theoretical models and 
explanations of features of cultural life at the other. Theoretical generalisations are 
usually exemplified by reference to the researcher’s own fieldwork, data from 
ethnographic literature, or archival sources. In contrast, philosophers often 
construct hypothetical examples to make their arguments, or discuss observations 
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from their own lives. I have drawn on both approaches here, citing field data and 
archival resources as well as discussing my own experiences.  
Examples from fieldwork can help to show the diversity of human experience 
and the wide range of ways in which expressive culture manifests itself in different 
social contexts. While personal examples might be limited by the culturally situated 
imagination of the researcher, they offer the advantage that they can be crafted and 
shaped to make clear exactly the point under discussion, and allow for more critical 
and philosophical questions to be asked. While interview techniques can help 
scholars and their research participants share the meaning of an experience, and 
while participant observation ethnography can provide profound insights, deeper 
understandings are possible if we attend to the culturally specific ways in which 
structures of experience contribute to the lived meanings of expressive culture. 
 
Research Design 
          Choosing the ‘ballad experience’ as the focus of study made it very difficult to 
find the necessary solid ground for research. The first query any reader may have is, 
how is such a study possible? One of the major questions is, ‘can the study of the 
ballad experience be approached in a formal way?’             
It would appear that such an enquiry is not so impossibly obscure as it 
would first seem. Fortunately for this researcher, one of the world’s most pre-
eminent ballad scholars, James Porter, already mentioned, recently published the 
book Genre, Conflict, Presence: Traditional ballads in a Modernising World (2009) in which he 
advocates a direction of study ‘that moves ballad study away from conventional 
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paths to awareness of ballads as a living voice, a dramatic, transforming 
“presence”’(54). After many years’ experience of writing on the ‘genre’ of traditional 
song, Porter suggests a developing theory of ‘presence’ to explain the transient, 
magical and mysterious character of ballads. 
In Porter’s view, in order to reach new understanding, research requires a 
style open to exploration, and to be free from the need for specific answers. At the 
same time, it demands a consistency of analytical approach, but without becoming a 
rigid or closed system. A developing theory  
At the very least must involve the findings of more recent philosophical work 
by which truth and meaning as well as content and structure of a ballad singing 
event are negotiated among scholars, performers and active listeners...it must 
consider currents in both “practice anthropology” and literary theory. To 
effect all of these considerations, of course, might be thought a tall order (188, 
my italics). 
 
To this end, this work is set within the framework of philosophical work of 
hermeneutic phenomenology, where truth and meaning are central concerns. I have 
negotiated with singers and listeners alike, participating in live singing sessions, 
workshops, festivals and events, serving to ground my research in real, lived 
experience. As well as taking into consideration new currents in literary theory and 
practice theory, the most recent and innovative methods for studying somatic 
aesthetic experience have also been considered. However, while theory is central to 
my endeavour, the clear problem with the purely theoretical is that explanations for 
experience become overly intellectualised and at a remove from the actual lived 
reality we make attempts to understand. In taking Porter’s theory forward, there is a 
need to find a way to talk about presence in embodied terms. Porter’s work will be 




The ‘Space Between’: The Hermeneutic Encounter and Liminality 
In Stanley’s explanations, the Maysie exists in the ‘space between.’ Theories of 
interstitality and ‘liminality’ are therefore central to the development of ideas in this 
thesis. The term ‘liminality’ gained currency in twentieth century anthropology by 
Victor Turner (1974), himself influenced by Arnold van Gennep. Turner was 
interested in the state experienced by persons as they pass over the threshold from 
one stage of life to another (limen, in Latin, means ‘threshold’). During the liminal 
stage in ritual, for example, our status becomes ambiguous: we are ‘neither here nor 
there,’ we are ‘betwixt and between all fixed points of classification’ and thus the 
form and rules of both our earlier state and our state-to-come are suspended (Turner 
1974: 232). A human being in the liminal stage or state has the potentialities of 
a human being but is suspended between, existing at the ‘crack between the worlds.’ 
During transitional periods we are an outsider: we are on the margins, in an 
indeterminate state.  
The meaning of the word ‘hermeneutic’—interpretation—is itself closely tied to 
the idea of the ‘space between.’ To exist hermeneutically as a human being is to 
participate in the endless chain of interpretation that makes up the history of 
understanding. The continental philosopher Martin Heidegger, in his work On the 
Way to Langauge (1971), believes that part of the destiny of man is precisely to stand in 
a hermeneutical relation to our being here and now and to our heritage, to our past. 
This is an interesting idea in relation to the process of research itself and the 
discovery of new ideas. In the view of Richard Palmer (1980: 3, my italics), a scholar 
of hermeneutics and Heidegger, 
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The human being stands in this gap [between past and present], this zone of 
disclosure. One does not so much act as respond, does not so much speak as 
listen, does not so much interpret as understand the thing that is unveiled. The 
primary movement here is understanding as an emergence of being. 
In my view, there is a parallel between this ‘zone of disclosure’ and Turner’s state of 
liminality. The interstitial is a source of both creativity and critique of the prevailing 
forms of thought and being. Turner argues that it is from the standpoint of this 
marginal zone that the great artists, writers, and social critics have been able to look 
past the social forms in order to see society from the outside and to bring in a 
message from beyond it.  
There is a wonderful myth-metaphor for this hermeneutic process in the 
Greek figure of Hermes, a sort of shaman—god of boundaries and roads, music, 
playful thought and a running imagination. The ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Dionysian’ are the 
two central principles in Greek culture: Apollo, as the sun-god, represents light, 
clarity, rationality and form; Dionysus, the wine-god, is the anti-rational half-brother 
of Apollo, who represents enthusiasm, drunkenness and ecstasy. In a Dionysian 
state, man gives up his individuality and submerges himself in a greater whole.9 
Nietzsche, in the The Birth of Tragedy (1872), argued that to offer a new philosophy, we 
need a way of thinking that is not an Apollonian, but Dionysian. In our own age, 
where the light of Apollo burns so brightly as to almost obliterate the night sky, 
Apollonian certainties have become forced into a science and technology that has 
created systems so complex that they are blind to their own growing shadow. The 
tools of the scientific mind are fast outpacing our ability to manage them, and much 
less comprehend them. It is in this shadow that Hermes is found, dancing with 
                                                          
9 It is often argued that music is the most Dionysian of the arts, since it appeals directly to our 
instinctive, chaotic emotions and not to our formally reasoning mind.   
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Dionysius. The alternatives to Apollonian complexity are therefore either descending 
into an anti-rational chaos, or thinking our way through from the playful borderland of 
Hermes. Richard Palmer, (1980: 1), writes, 
“By a playful thinking that is more persuasive than the rigor of science,” 
Heidegger tells us, the Greek words for interpreting and interpretation—
hermeneuein, hermeneia—can be traced back to the god Hermes…As a god of 
sudden magic and mystery and sudden good luck, Hermes is the god of sudden 
interpretive insights that come from an ability to approach daytime reality with 
liminal freedom. 
Sudden interpretive insights come from an ability to approach life as lived with 
‘liminal freedom.’ It would seem to be the essence of hermeneutics to be liminal, to 
mediate between realms of being, whether the conscious and unconscious, the 
visible and invisible. As a god of roads, Hermes protects the traveller willing to cross 
borders, punishing those who refuse to help those who had lost their way. His staff 
is twined with the two antithetical branches (or snakes) of diplomacy and magic, 
brilliant thought and dark speech. His style of thinking is playful, unwilling to play 
by rigid rational rules and yet always arising from them.  
According to Heidegger (1971: 138), interpretation as hermeneutics should be 
‘world-shaking.’ Only an interpretation that goes outside the prevailing 
conceptualities can move toward what he has in mind: ‘a transformation of 
thinking.’ The French philosophers Deleuze and Guattari (1987) advocate ‘nomadic 
thought’—the kind of thinking that operates outside the conceptual structures 
endorsed by the established order. This is the kind of thinking which may have the 
effect of transforming the whole. Deleuze (1988: 116) believes that thinking always 
starts in the middle, at the point of intersection between two series, events, or 
process that, however temporarily, share a mileu.  
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Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing 
to another and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal 
movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or 
end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 25). 
 
In order to think nomadically, the middle is the privileged point from which to 
begin: it is where thought unravels itself. In my view, in order to understand the 
Maysie and the ballad experience, a paradigmatic shift in thinking is required. 
 
Paradigm Shift 
The dominant paradigms in the study of folklore and expressive arts are 
linguistic in nature and tend to be dismissive of the dimensions of experience and 
cognition. What has mattered in research has not been process, action or embodied 
experience, but rather the object, product, or artefact that is fixed. We are also 
working in a disciplinary trajectory that holds to the ontological assumption that 
mind is hierarchically superior to and separate from embodied experience. From 
such a perspective, to be properly knowledgeable is to repudiate transience and flux, 
the personal and the subjective, the here-and-now experience. To counter this view, 
one of the central aims of this thesis is to consider ballads as ‘process’ as opposed to 
‘product.’  
In the context of trying to recapture the ‘truth of experience’ as a locus for 
research in the human sciences, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Truth and Method (1960), is 
especially critical of the historicist approach. Studies in the field of ballad 
scholarship often emphasise the historicity of the traditional ballad; it is viewed as a 
historical narrative that can tell us something about the traditional ‘past.’ But to 
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investigate the background of a work, Gadamer argues, ‘is to move out of the actual 
experience of it’ (2004: 105).10  In this process, the ballad is lost to us as immediate 
aesthetic experience and leads to merely the discovery of a ‘dead meaning’ (148–
49). Rather than concern ourselves with the historical or cultural placement of a 
work, Gadamer prefers to analyse that moment when past and present are united in 
experience: 
The text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim that it is 
uttering something true. We think we understand when we...place ourselves in 
the historical situation and seek to reconstruct the historical horizon. In fact, 
however, we have given up the claim to find, in the past, any truth valid and 
intelligible to ourselves (270).  
 
This powerful statement of the consequences of understanding a tradition or text 
primarily in historical or ethnographic terms concerns nothing less than the loss of 
its claim to ‘truth.’ Berger (2009: ix) insists on the importance of experiencing 
cultural forms as ‘texts’ in relation to ourselves: 
When placed before a reader, viewer or a listener, the text does not spring 
whole cloth into his or her [let us say her] experience. People engage with texts 
to make them meaningful and must actively bring them into their lived 
experience. In other words, the meaning that scholars seek to study is not the 
product of texts; it is the product of texts in experience.  
 
 If this experiential dimension is excluded from the study of the ballad, we are surely 
at risk of also excluding the ways of knowing and sensing the world that exist in the 
very practice of the tradition under study. The ballad scholar and folklorist Mary 
Ellen Brown (2004: 70) suggests that 
If we are able to reconfigure and separate our object of study from the fanciful 
and intriguing imagined past…we might reinstate the ballad as a fluid, dynamic 
practice more nearly reflecting its lived reality. 
 
                                                          
10 Unless otherwise stated, all future references in this text refer to the 2004 reprint edition. 
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As Timothy Rice (1994) notes, by turning music and music making into an abstract 
object, we necessarily reduce the infinitely rich, emotionally intense, ever-changing 
experience that caused us to want to think more about it in the first place, into 
studies that lie flat on the page.  By placing the ‘ballad experience’ at the core of this 
research, I hope to keep alive the sense of wonder that our interaction with the 
ballad tradition provides us.  
 
Embodiment 
In order to reinstate the place of the ballad in scholarship as a dynamic and 
living cultural phenomenon, a paradigmatic shift in understanding must be 
attempted. In Western scholarship, with a few notable exceptions, there is the 
undeclared assumption of the Cartesian dichotomy of the mind and body. We must 
overcome this dichotomy if we are to account for the complexity and meaningfulness 
the ballad experience. In my view, literature about the ballad suffers from a 
detachment from the actual embodiment that creates meaning in ballad 
performances—the very ‘moment’ where past and present are united in experience.  
Something that has struck me is that little scholarship on the ballad takes 
into consideration the embodied dimension of the ballad performance. It has 
neglected the appreciation of somatic awareness, of reflective corporeal engagement 
with the cultural form in lived experience. Our bodies are the primary instrument for 
singing ballads, and bodies are the basic irreplaceable medium for their appreciation. 
Music and song are only possible because human bodily movements can be 
manifested into sound: sounds enter the body and are sensed, felt and experienced in 
a way that, on the whole, the media of other artistic and cultural forms are not. 
25 
 
Many people would acknowledge the truth of the conviction that we experience 
music viscerally with our bodies, with our pulse rates and with our emotions. To 
ignore these dimensions of experience is to fail to acknowledge their true nature. 
However, in a context where mind and body occupy two completely different 
domains, there is no ready conceptual framework with which to describe the 
contribution of the body to our thought and experience. 
In order to understand human experience, we need to widen our horizons 
and encompass non-Western philosophical traditions of reflection upon experience. 
Scientific research is recognised as one of our many ways of knowing, but this needs 
to be connected with the other ways. Polkinghorne’s idea of ‘re-searching’(1983: 
280–1), mentioned previously, is crucial here. It relates to the ‘planetary thinking’ 
advocated by Heidegger (1958), which involves a re-examination of the Western 
worldview and, drawing upon Eastern ideas in order to achieve a worldview that is 
planetary in scope, takes better account of human nature, and overcomes some 
negative effects of our instrumental, technological, consumption-oriented culture. 
Lakoff and Johnson in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought (1999) call for a thorough rethinking of the Western philosophical 
tradition. Richard Shusterman’s philosophy of ‘somaesthetics’ draws on eastern 
philosophical ideas to understand the bodily dimension of aesthetic experience and 
has been invaluable to the cultivation of ideas for this work; so too has Varela et al.’s 
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1993), advocating that a full 
appreciation of philosophy and its importance for human experience requires that 
we examine its role in cultures other than our own. In our culture, cognitive science 
has caused great excitement among philosophers because it has enabled them to see 
26 
 
their tradition in a new light, and vice versa. Such a perspective is viewed by some as 
an antidote to what they see as ‘postmodern nihilism’ and ‘armchair theorising’ in 
studies of the arts. This is because cognitive science can help the humanities with 
questions of perception, imagination, emotions, interpretation, language, narration 
and perhaps most pertinently, studies of the ‘ineffable.’ Varela et al. (1993) also draw 
on the Buddhist idea of ‘mindfulness.’ Scientific research is recognised as one of our 
many ways of knowing, but this needs to be connected with the other ‘ways.’ The 
idea of bringing ‘mindfulness’ into disciplined inquiry will be further explored in 
Chapter Three.  
 
Total Somatic Experience 
 The revered ethnomusicologist John Blacking (1977) believes that the power 
of music lies in the ‘total somatic experience,’ that is, the sum of all emotional, 
physiological and cognitive responses. Wayne Bowman (2004: 41), an advocate for a 
‘somaesthetics of music,’ captures this idea well: 
We feel melodies in our muscles as much as we process them in our brains—or 
perhaps more accurately, our brains process them as melodies only to the extent 
our bodily extended schemata render that possible. And people make or listen 
to music not for what they know through it…but for the way it is experienced, 
bodily. 
 
Porter too (1976: 17, my italics) has expressed a similar sentiment in reference to ballad 
singing: 
The singing of a ballad cannot be viewed simply as an act in which a text…is set 
in motion by a singer with a tune, but as a complex, existential process in which 




The ballad experience as a process is simultaneously physical and psychological, 
somatic and cognitive. Such an experience involves what has been called ‘resonance,’ 
an embodied state of mind that is cognitive and at the same time, affective and 
corporeal (Bresler 2006). Ethnographic ‘thick description’11 goes some way in 
documenting this complex existential process, but some other means of description 




There is a growing field of study which clearly demonstrates the importance of 
embodied knowledge to our conceptualisations of aesthetic experience as well as the 
centrality of metaphor to our elaboration of those conceptualisations. This research 
explores the role of metaphor in how we perceive and experience our world and 
shows that seemingly abstract theories are in fact grounded in our basic experience. 
Understanding ‘how the body is in the mind’ offers a way to understanding that 
‘offers us a way to trace the shapes left by the departure of that which is deepest 
within us’ (Zbikowski 2000: 11). The effort to seriously consider embodied cognition 
in studies in the humanities has, in my own view, been the catalyst for much 
exciting and novel research in recent years, and insights from such research are 
                                                          
11 Clifford Geertz (1973) coined this term to describe his own method of doing ethnography. A ‘thick 
description’ of a human behaviour is one that explains not just the behaviour, but its context as well, 
such that the behaviour becomes meaningful to an outsider. Since then, the term and the 




illuminating in their possible application to the study of the ballad experience 
(discussed further in Chapter Two). Many scholars today are realising that such 
insights have great potential for our investigation and understanding of the creation, 
interpretation, and appreciation of artworks in all mediums. In the same way, the 
experiences intrinsic to artistic creation and experience warrant serious attention 
from those who propose to investigate and explain the human mind. For example, 
Bowman (2004: 31) notes that  
Music is a valuable cognitive resource not because of what it teaches us about 
the disembodied metaphysical realm of feeling, but what it shows us about the 
profoundly embodied and socioculturally-situated character of all human 
knowledge and being.  
 
The 2010 edition of the journal Ethnomusicology includes an article that advocates an 
embodied cognitive approach. Gina Fatone (2010: 418) suggests that 
ethnomusicologists are well positioned to provide evidence and support to theories 
of embodied cognition: 
Trained to work ‘from the ground up’ our insights and questions regarding how 
people think musically that are derived from our own fieldwork experience can 
provide highly contextualised perspective on cognition.  
 
In order to elucidate the contours and complexities of the ballad experience 
where cognitive and affective dimensions coalesce, I propose an inquiry on two 
levels: the phenomenological and the cognitive. At the phenomenological level, it 
will be explained how theories of embodied existence inform aesthetic experience; 
on the cognitive level, the notion of imaginative integration and projection will be 
explored. Following Lakoff and Johnson (1999), it is understood here that our 
conceptual systems and our capacity for reflection are shaped by the nature of our 
bodies and our bodily interactions. In order to clarify an understanding of the 
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embodied mind I appeal to Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s understanding of 
embodied existence (1993), Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor (1980), 
Johnson’s theory of image schemata (1987) and Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) 
discussion of ‘conceptual blending’ (a modification and extension of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s work on image schemata).  In this sense, the exploration and analysis 
presented is based on the metaphorical representation of embodied processes 
especially as it might be construed from a cognitive viewpoint. At the most abstract 
level, all these elements are subsumed by and integrate within the concept of 
embodiment. 
Studying within this paradigm has allowed me to realise how much is still to 
be done in order to expunge old scholarly contradictions, assumptions and 
misunderstandings and to recover certain dimensions of experience from scholarly 
ostracism. The impetus for this work stems from the need to redress the inevitable 
shortcomings of ballad studies, by building upon valuable insights about the 
profound inter-reliance and inextricable relatedness of body and mind and by 
acknowledging the existential aspects of embodied communication. In a sense, the 
Cartesian dichotomy functions here as a metaphor for the need in a wider context to 
mediate between or even transcend entrenched dialectical concerns and to strive for 
productive dialogue between theoretical perspectives in order to find a more holistic 
lens through which to view the world.  
 
Words, Music, Song  
As an art form, the ballad embodies both narrative and poetic power as 
well as musical power, which come together to create meaning in the context of 
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the ephemeral and intangible nature of musical performance. The relationship 
between words and music is central to the study of the ballad, but is also 
enigmatic, indeed often neglected completely. Studies will often focus on one 
element or the other, examples of which will be detailed in the next chapter. 
Analysis must take into account all elements that coalesce to create a powerful 
and significant experience of song. Porter and Gower (1995) make it absolutely 
clear that in order to understand the ballad fully, these boundaries must yield to 
the greater imperative of understanding the traditional creative communicative 
‘process’. They make it clear that ‘to discuss these [elements] separately, rather 
than as fused in performative unity, is to miss the artistic impulse, the creative 
singing gesture that binds them together’ (xiv). 
In an attempt to transcend the ‘words versus music’ dichotomy that has 
hampered ballad studies for generations, this thesis explores and develops a new 
approach in the relatively new field of ‘cognitive musicology’ which to looks to how 
words and music come together to create meaning. Scholars here make a case for 
‘cross domain mapping’, ‘conceptual blending’ and ‘cross modal transfer’—
relationships that are essentially metaphorical—in order to explain the way we in 
which we understand and experience music and song. A considerable degree of 
research has been undertaken in an attempt to understand the process of making-
sense-of-music in the context of Western Classical art music; but as yet, these ideas 
and concepts have not been brought to bear upon traditional music and song. The 
process of making-sense-of-music in this context remains unexplained and will 
break new ground in the field of ballad and folksong studies. It is not claimed that 
the discoveries of cognitive science can capture the essence of the ballad experience. 
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However, with its mutually informative relationship with embodied philosophy, 
what theories of embodied cognition can provide is a more holistic framework for 
explaining some issues thrown up by study of the expressive arts. Certain 
perspectives point the way to a fuller understanding of the ballad singing experience 
and provide us with new frameworks within which to describe the embodied and 
dynamic processes of human experience and imagination. 
 
‘Presencing’ Imagined Worlds 
Aesthetic forms like the ballad arouse strong responses emotionally, 
cognitively and even bodily. A theme central to the development of ideas here is the 
imagination. A source of my own fascination is the realm of story. Stories present and 
populate a world of the imagination that is separate from the world we inhabit in 
our ordinary lives, but that interpenetrates with it in every conceivable way. My 
own fascination with the Scottish ballads has, above all, to do with the realm of the 
imagined worlds they create: the world of Tam Lin; the Cruel Sister; Lord Thomas 
and Fair Eleanor or the Selkie of Sule Skerry. The overarching hypothesis here is that 
the ‘ballad experience’ has the power to create an imaginative world beyond lived 
reality.   
 This raises the fundamental question of where meaning resides, and how, why 
and where meanings are created. New meanings are continually being created with 
every new act of performance, which creates a powerful dialectic between old and 
new. According to Gadamer, this is a continual process in any tradition; where old 
and new combine into exciting entities of living value.  Every age has to understand a 
culturally transmitted text in its own way, in order to create new meanings and 
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transform understandings of both external and internal worlds. Arnold Berleant 
(2004: 92), a philosopher of aesthetic theory and the arts, believes that there is ‘yet 
something more’ at work: 
Somehow, despite their apparent autonomy, the arts transcend their realm, 
bursting past the limits of expectation and convention to surpass the 
established boundaries of the self, of society, of knowledge, indeed of art itself. 
There is a touch of the wondrous in this, for the creative act illuminates the 
possibilities of human transcendence that we all share when we engage with 
art. How is this to be explained? To overlook this special force in our account of 
art is to turn poetry into plain speech, to render it clear by making it 
transparent. 
Throughout history, people have often attributed sensations of heightened or 
‘transcendent’ experiences to external forces, whether it be a divine entity, or in the 
case of Stanley’s explanation of the ballad experience, the presence of the Maysie. 
Somewhat detrimentally, the words ‘spiritual’ and ‘transcendent’ are inherently 
problematic terms which, in my view, have been misappropriated by ‘New Age’ self-
help discourse. This misappropriation (to many people the terms are cringe-worthy) 
has undermined what is, essentially, a fundamental aspect of being human. There is a 
huge body of literature that attempts to define what ‘spiritual’ means; what is 
needed is an alternative conception of embodied spirituality that at least begins to 
do justice to what people actually experience.  Ideas presented here seek to move 
beyond the idea of the ‘numinous’ that was so popular in twentieth century thought, 
separating this experience from the idea of the ‘divine’ and the ‘supernatural’.12 In 
order to make a tentative effort toward rescuing ‘spirituality’, Lakoff and Johnson re-
                                                          
12 The idea of the ‘numinous’ was popularised in the early twentieth century by the German 
theologian Otto (1917), influential among the intellectuals of the subsequent generation. The 
numinous evokes a sense of the transcendent, mystical or sublime; a numinous experience is filled 
with or characterised by a sense of a presence of mystery beyond the sense of the self. The idea is not 
necessarily a religious one: noted atheists have discussed the importance of separating the numinous 
from the supernatural. 
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imagine the idea of ‘transcendence’ as ‘imaginative empathic projection’ (1999). They 
argue that the concept of spirituality in our culture has been defined mostly in terms 
of disembodiment and transcendence of this world, and argue that the very idea of 
disembodiment is a metaphorical concept. In empathetic projection, we imagine 
ourselves in the body of another. While it remains a form of ‘transcendence,’ there is 
nothing inherently ‘mystical’ about it. According to an emergent, enactive, embodied 
account of human cognition  
Mind, culture, body and action partake each of the other, co-constructing the 
only ‘realities’ available to human experience, through the creation of new 
narratives and imagined worlds (Bowman 2004: 48, my italics)  
 
Such a view does not deny the existence of other realms, but rather points to the 
existence of multiple phenomenological realities that we actively construct in our 
embodied consciousness, that is, through the intermediary of the body. This 
worldview, its origins and implications will be explored in Chapter Three. Such a 
perspective, in my view, sheds light on Porter’s own (2009: 160, my italics) 
explanation of the ineffable ballad ‘presence’: 
The singing of ballads ... the phenomenal recreation of experience … embodies 
and intensifies emotional depth … at a single stroke it incorporates tradition 
and social structure into the ritual process. It is a way, in other words, of 
distilling the life-world and its experiences in a gesture that compresses the 
relationship of feeling, cognition and volition....Why? The cause lies in the 
need…to test the limits of experience and consciousness… How? By joining 
present with past, the living with the dead, and the here-and-now with 
imagined, transcendental worlds. 
This explanation of ‘presence,’ along with an emergent, enactive and embodied 
account of cognition, informs the title of this thesis, ‘Presencing Imagined Worlds.’  
We humans willingly and frequently partake collectively in the suspension of 
disbelief; it would seem to be an innate human desire to engage in such imaginative 
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activities. One might well argue that this is merely a form of escapism, focussing our 
attention away from the quotidian world to our inner experience. How then is the 
‘ballad experience’ to be seen as different from the experience of other narrative-
based cultural forms—literature, theatre, film and TV, even computer games—that 
are not so fundamentally anachronistic?  Such a question is one that this thesis seeks 
to elucidate. 
It’s the layered story, no doubt, its internal drama, deceptive directness and, 
just as important, how it is told—especially in face-to-face situations—that 
count in traditional balladry…The means of telling that story are just as 
important as the story itself, otherwise ballads would have given way a long 
time ago to prose narratives of different types (Porter 2009: 145). 
 
In the case of song, ideas from cognitive musicology suggest that by joining text and 
music in a metaphorical process, we can enter into a created imaginary domain, a 
new ‘space.’ In an attempt to understand the Maysie, such an inquiry is imperative, as 
Stanley put it:  
In these waves, up here, floats yer melody, and down here floats yer words; so 
ye’ve got the melody and the words, and the space that’s in between is where the 
Maysie lives. 
 
Ultimately, metaphor has a fundamental power in constructing the world we 
perceive: it enables us to create and recreate meaning, and makes possible the 
creation of entirely new worlds of imagination. Stories are ‘no more, but also no less, 
than a source of metaphor,’ which is ‘demonstrably central to the operation of 







This thesis does not present a collection and comparison of personal 
narrative descriptions of the ‘ballad experience.’ Although this originally formed part 
of the research plan, it soon became clear that such material was not necessary in 
order to achieve the aims of this research. There are simply not enough words in a 
doctoral thesis to develop a new theoretical approach and apply it to any great 
extent. If I were to collect such narratives, it would be necessary to deconstruct the 
different worldviews and individual personal backgrounds that shape each example. 
This would be a fascinating ethnographic project in its own right, but before a solid 
theoretical framework is established (as is the aim here) this would remain a 
collection of singular descriptions with no unifying thread or overarching 
framework.13 Moreover, there would be no conceivable end to such a project. Before 
the project of collecting narrative experiences can take place, theoretical models for 
analysis are needed to understand how we process and conceptualise our experience 
and how we express such experience in language. The emphasis here is, therefore, on 
the development of new theoretical methodologies informed by the most recent 
developments in the twin fields of philosophy and cognitive science, opening up the 
possibility for future work. 
A researcher might ask why a study of the structures of experience is a job 
for scholars of expressive culture, rather than for psychologists or cognitive 
scientists. The reason is that experience is directly relevant to meaning. If we are 
interested in the meaning of song, music, narrative or any kind of verbal art for a 
                                                          
13 This kind of research could be undertaken in future work. 
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particular group of people, we cannot just study their texts or performances in 
context; we must understand how such texts and performances, however 
contextualised, emerge in the experience of those people.  
Lastly, this work is not an attempt to produce the definitive narrative of the 
‘ballad experience’ in contemporary Scotland. It would be foolish to claim that one 
can tackle this topic and expect to be satisfied; any attempt to explain the ballad 
experience will not be able to do justice to the complexity of this phenomenon. I am 
not looking for ‘the answer,’ but to show that there is a multitude of answers. Ó 
Laoire (2005: 3) shows how Paul Ricouer’s terminology is particularly useful in this 
regard. Ricouer considers as ‘fiction’ any new text configured from older elements. 
He does not view such a fiction as a lie, but a product which can tell us something 
new. The task of hermeneutic interpretation, by definition, contains a fictional 
element. It is only one telling of a part of a much larger story, of ‘the endless work of 
distancing and renewing out historical substance’ (Ricouer 1981: 246). Clifford and 
Marcus (1986: 18) also critique the absolutism of writing within anthropology, 
declaring, ‘cultures are not scientific objects...Culture, and our views of it are 
produced historically and are actively contested. There is no whole picture that can 
be ‘filled in,’ since the perception and filling in of a gap leads to an awareness of other 
gaps. Following Ó Laoire’s admonition of his own work, if this study fills in one gap 
in our knowledge about the understanding of the ballad experience, it certainly 
opens up many others. It is my hope that this work may provide at least partial 
answers to some basic questions about what lies at the heart of the ballad 




Chapter by Chapter Summary 
 Chapter Two comprises the Literature Review, presenting a critical 
discussion of published works in the relevant fields of ballad studies, folklore and 
expressive arts and the ‘new ethnomusicology.’ An argument for holism and a call for 
the need for interdisciplinary work to understand experience will be justified and 
defended. The theoretical framework and chosen theoretical methodologies will be 
set out in Chapter Three, divided into two parts: the first will outline the embodied 
philosophical worldview informing the development of ideas and practice; the 
second will introduce and lay the foundations for developing contemporary theories 
of metaphor and embodied thought to be applied to the ballad experience on several 
levels in the succeeding chapters.  
Chapter Four, ‘Developing a Theory of Ballad ‘Presence’’ takes time to define 
and explore Porter’s notion of ballad ‘presence’ (2009). The gaps and potential areas 
for development and expansion in Porter’s theory will be identified. The Scottish 
Traveller’s notion of the conniach will be introduced—best described as the ‘feeling’ it 
elicits in those who hear songs—to give meaning to ideas in context. Heightened 
aesthetic experience will be then explored from an embodied perspective, 
considering Shusterman’s philosophy of ‘somaesthetics.’ The nature of such 
experiences will be discussed using insights from Gadamer, whose work seeks to 
articulate the very question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art from 
humanist conceptions and show how these aesthetic formulations of truth lead to 
the question of experience itself. In extending Porter’s theory, ideas about aesthetic 
temporality will be discussed in this context and in light of recent phenomenological 
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ideas about the time as a shared experience. All chapters work towards an 
understanding of the Maysie and the central idea of presencing imagined worlds. 
 Chapter Five, ‘Deep Listening and the Ballad Experience’ is based on a paper 
presented at the ICTM conference in Derry, Ireland, February 2011. In an attempt to 
further understand presence, this chapter turns to the relationship between 
presence and our experience of sound. Ethnomusicology has only recently begun to 
take seriously the role of the listener. The tendencies and consequences of 
privileging the visual in scholarship will be discussed and challenged; and as a 
response, post-phenomenological ideas about listening will be developed to inform a 
theory of ‘deep listening’ (Becker 2004) as co-participation in presence. Descriptions 
from personal experience will be included. 
 Chapter Six, ‘Constellations of Meaning’: Ambiguity, Polysemy and the 
Productive Power of Metaphor in the Ballad Experience’ looks to the productive 
power of metaphor and the role of ambiguity in the creation of meaning. The first 
half of this chapter explores the figurative language and the ‘essential metaphoricity 
of folksong’ (Toelken 1995) re-imagined from an embodied cognitive perspective. 
Ideas from reception theory, most pertinently the notion of ‘indeterminacy’ will be 
developed and applied. The second part will build upon Ó Laoire’s (2005) theories of 
the productive power of metaphor. The ideas developed here are necessary 
grounding for the development of theoretical ideas developed in chapters Seven and 
Eight. 
 Chapter Seven, ‘Words, Music, Ballad’ builds on the ideas of metaphorical 
mapping from Chapter Six and explores the possible application of conceptual 
blending theory applied to the ballad as song (Zbikowski 2002). The relationship 
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between words and music—the ‘twa sisters of balladry’14—is central to the study, and 
as such the differences and similarities between the two will be debated. Questions 
asked include, how do words and music work together in song? How do they 
interact in performance and how do we make sense of this? It will be argued here 
that melody and text can be understood to constitute two separate domains of 
experience which blend together in performance, and that this metaphorical process 
creates new space of for the play of the imagination.  
Chapter Eight, ‘Embodiment, Somatic Presence and the ‘Ballad Gesture’ as 
Being Between’ investigates metaphorical mapping from sound to body. The idea of 
intersubjectivity as intercorporeality will be introduced, forming the basis of the 
exploration of shared experience. The ‘intermodal’ processes of perception and the 
sharing of bodily gestures in the ballad experience will be explored in an attempt to 
build up a holistic picture of presence conceived of as the ‘ballad gesture,’ further 
extending Porter’s theory of presence. It will be argued that ultimately, an 
intercorporeal relationship is built upon sharing simultaneously different 
dimensions of time, and to that end, ideas first introduced in Chapter Four will be 
revisited and extended. 
Chapter Nine, the penultimate chapter, will bring together ideas and theories 
developed in the preceding chapters and show how they merge into a meaningful 
whole. In a final search for the Maysie, this chapter will reflect in more depth on 
theories of interstitality, the idea of ‘imaginative empathic projection’ in affective 
encounters, the non-rational dimension of such encounters and the transformative 
power of stories in song. In the final and concluding chapter, Chapter Ten, the main 
                                                          
14 McLane (2011) discussed this idea in the SWINC public lecture, ‘Border Trouble: 'World 
Literature' and the Case of Scottish Balladry’ UoE, 17th March. 
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contribution to this emerging field will be recapitulated, and directions for future 
work will be suggested. It will be argued that while the ballad form is distinctive, 
the theories and models developed here can be applied to other forms of expressive 
arts.  
Each chapter will introduce new theoretical ideas, building on what has 
come before and seeking to work towards a more holistic understanding of the 
Maysie and the ballad experience.  A general problem in the development of ideas in 
this thesis is the difficulty of pragmatically separating strands of thought for 
discussion and analysis. In adopting such a holistic approach, ideas connect and 
overlap, and speaking of one idea in isolation is extremely difficult. This may seem 
problematic, but it is seen here as a strength rather than a weakness. It reflects the 
ontological assumptions driving this thesis: the experience of being-in-the-world is 
always firstly being-with; mind and body, self and world, and self and other are 
intertwined in a unitary whole. A useful metaphor to evoke is that of the ballad form 
itself: the cyclical nature of the tune creates an insistence on the relationships 
between each new verse and the whole. Cumulative layers of complexity will be 
built into the argument as new dimensions of experience are introduced into the 
process. 
Chapter Nine, the penultimate chapter, will bring together ideas and theories 
developed in the preceding chapters and show how they merge into a meaningful 
whole. In a final search for the Maysie, this chapter will reflect in more depth on 
theories of interstitality, the idea of ‘imaginative empathic projection’ in affective 
encounters, the non-rational dimension of such encounters and the transformative 
power of stories in song. In the final and concluding chapter, Chapter Ten, the main 
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contribution to this emerging field will be recapitulated, and directions for future 
work will be suggested. It will be argued that while the ballad form is distinctive, 
the theories and models developed here can be applied to other forms of expressive 
arts.  
While some music may be seen as a mere diversion or simple pleasure, the 
significant experience of certain forms of musical expression would seem to ‘lie at 
the heart of what is means to be human’ (Sager 2006: 143). The ethnomusicologist 
Blacking (1973: 50, my italics) goes as far as make the grand claim that, 
There is a difference between music that is occasional and music that enhances 
human consciousness, music that is simply for having and music that is for 
being. 
The ballad as a form is remarkable for its simplicity, intensity and profound 
capability to express something true of human experience. Indeed, ballads have been 
described as ‘unbelievably truthful songs.’15 In them we can find immense 
compassion, imagination, and insight into of the human condition. While the 
occasions for ballad singing may well be few and far between, transient moments of 
shared experience and created meaning still happen, and that is wonder enough. The 
ballad is certainly one of the greatest sources and products of man’s imaginative, 
musical and artistic capabilities, the continued study of which has the potential to 
open a window onto the understanding of our cultural traditions and of ourselves. 
This thesis examines the ballad experience ever more closely, hoping to illuminate 
the magical transient process whereby ‘a static, rhythmic accretion of words becomes 
a living song through the addition of melody, a dynamic of performance, and a 
personalised, internalised emotional expression’ (McKean 2006: 5). It is my hope 
                                                          
15 This comment was made in a review in the Scotland on Sunday newspaper, of Lyle’s collection, 
Scottish Ballads (1994). See http://www.scottishradiance.com/book/life11.htm 
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that the ideas presented here will offer a modest contribution to our understanding 
of this cultural form and its relation to body, mind and culture. 
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CHAPTER TWO  2 
Literature Review 
  
 The previous chapter outlined the research questions, aims and objectives of 
this work and situated this research firmly within new emergent paradigms in the 
study of expressive arts, ethnomusicology and folklore. This chapter presents a 
critical discussion, synthesis and analysis of published works in the relevant fields of 
research. While I aim to show insight and awareness of differing arguments, theories 
and approaches, the central concern of this review is to show how the ideas 
developed in this thesis relate to and build upon previous studies. The level of 
analysis reflects the weight and importance of the works that have influenced this 
study.  
 The first section looks to works in the immediate field of ballad studies as it 
has emerged. It is not helpful here to present a history of the trajectory of ballad 
scholarship at large; rather, the most recent developments in the field will be 
highlighted and related to the emergent trends and recent scholarly shift in the 
wider fields of folklore and interdisciplinary ethnomusicology. Both of these look to 
the study of vernacular expressive arts. Ethnomusicology is considered as it is 
conceived of in the twenty-first century: as a platform for new ideas. Hermeneutic, 
phenomenological and cognitive approaches will be explored, and those works 
which engage with philosophical theories of embodiment will be emphasised. 
Recent works in the field of cognitive musicology, particularly those grounded in 
theories of embodied cognition as well as studies that explore the connection 
between metaphor and musical experience, will be introduced. Finally, I hope to 
show that the kind of holism aimed for in this thesis is achievable by assessing those 
exemplary works that succeed in utilising interdisciplinary perspectives. Appealing 
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to the folklorist Köstlin’s (1997) essay ‘Passion for the Whole,’ I argue for the 
responsibility to tackle life as lived, in contrast to disciplines that purposely confine 
their specialisation to a narrow slice of ‘the whole.’ This passion for ‘wholeness’ 
takes on its contours only in the face of modernity and all its ambiguity, and our 
disciplinary horizons expand when this is perceived as a challenge. 
 
Ballad Studies  
 ‘Ballad studies’ is seen to constitute a discipline in and of itself, with its 
beginnings in nineteenth century scholarship, but which since has never followed a 
unified path of development. The Kommission für Volksdichtung is an international 
association of ballad and song scholars, founded in Germany in 1966. Ballads are the 
primary focus of research, but studies also include others genres of traditional 
song. The Kommission brings together academics, performers, and enthusiasts from a 
wide variety of theoretical perspectives to discuss themes and motifs, questions of 
gender and national identity, orality and performance, computer methods of 
classification and the intellectual history of the discourse. The ballad is certainly a 
difficult genre to approach from a scholarly perspective, requiring a range of 
disciplines to elucidate it, including literary, linguistic, historical, ethnographical, 
folkloristic and musicological. This is because ballads are notoriously difficult to pin 
down: they are found in many shapes and forms, in both written and oral traditions 
and are not are restricted to any specific geographical area. The study of the music of 
the ballads has been neglected relative to the study of the ballads as poetry. An 
attempt to study the ballad as song did not come about seriously until Bronson’s The 
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Traditional Tunes of the Child Ballads (1959-72). This issue will be explored in more 
depth in Chapter Seven. 
Since the late nineteenth century, research in this field has encountered 
dialectical concerns and even, in some cases, deep philosophical schisms. Scholars 
have long viewed folksong in terms of an opposition between oral and written forms, 
in the belief that a song from oral tradition differs in some intrinsic way from one in 
print.16 Historically, the analysis of folklore genres in general reflects a split between 
literary textualists on one hand, and those involved with contextual aspects, giving 
rise to a debate which was later labelled the ‘Text/Context Controversy.’17 A notable 
trend in folklore studies mid-century was the huge methodological shift from older 
philological concerns to the study of creativity and performance.18 Sydow, as early as 
1934, recognised that ‘investigators have, to far too great an extent, been content 
with extracts, instead of seeing their information as part of a natural, living whole 
(in McKean 2003: 5). From the late 70s, a very different perspective was developing 
in interpretative anthropology, with an emphasis on enactment and interaction 
rather than the mediated results of these.19 While mediated products, i.e. the texts 
and tunes extrapolated from singing occasions, are valuable for the information they 
provide, focus on enactment, interaction and reflexivity focuses attention not only 
on the events recounted in the song, the song’s function and meaning, or even the 
                                                          
16 Finnegan (1977: 168) makes the point clearly: 
The modes of transmission, distribution and publication of oral poetry turn out to be 
complicated, and not, as used to be commonly supposed, confined neatly to two 
distinct traditions, one oral, and the other written...One always has to envisage the 
possibility of more complex interactions between many different modes of transmission 
and distribution. 
Orality and literacy are ‘better considered not as mutually exclusive cultures but as mutually 
supportive mental habits’ (Atkinson 2002: 18). 
17 This debate involved scholars such as Wilgus (1973) and Ben Amos (1971). 
18 Barry’s (1961) article was perhaps forward thinking for his time, foregrounding future research. 
19 See Abrahams (1977).    
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singers view of the song (epistemics) but also, critically, to the observer’s perception 
of the song and existential relationship to it.20   
Performer and performance-orientated studies pushed the study of the text 
to the periphery, where contextual and performance information was seen 
increasingly as essential to interpretation. Theories of performance are vital in the 
elucidation of cultural forms; all the ethnological evidence we have points to a living, 
breathing tradition rather than a closed account found in two-dimensional text. A 
purely synchronic approach to ballad studies, however, resulted in the relinquishing 
of item-centred scholarship in favour of research into the creativity of the song 
makers, levels of function and context, and the conceptual boundaries of folksong 
genres.21  
 In the light of years of contextual and performance studies, Wilgus, in an 
article ‘The Text is the Thing’ (1973) made a case for the re-affirmation of the 
centrality of the study of textual meaning. The influence of literary criticism, 
especially that of the deconstructionists (Barthes, Derrida and others) has meant 
that any conceptual schema, as an object of study and interpretation, can be called a 
‘text,’ even a person. Wilgus suggested broadening the word to include not just the 
verbal but also the musical component in any song, so that the transcribed music 
would also be part of the ‘text.’ What is interesting about Wilgus is that he held that 
experience confronts us with phenomena that lead to conflicting attitudes and to 
problems that call for reconstructions and for new meanings. Although he believed 
that data on singers, context, the transmission process, cultural meanings all had 
relevance, for him they were secondary to what he called the ‘ballad idea,’ and 
                                                          
20 See Porter (1986).  
21 The culmination of such a perspective is epitomised in the work of Glassie (1982), supposedly 
written as context for two fiddle tunes. 
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‘narrative themes’ in an almost platonic sense. What is key here is that Wilgus 
refused to perpetuate the dichotomy of textual versus contextual factions, claiming 
that they are mutually enriching modes of criticism. Traditional products do have 
aesthetic and functional qualities that make them worthy of study: the two modes 
must be seen as mutually illuminating, but neither can claim exclusive access to the 
truth about any traditional genre, including balladry.  
In recent years, and in light of many years of contextual and performance 
analysis, scholars have again seen a new need to bridge the gap between fieldwork 
and literary explication. In order to effect reconciliation between the two modes of 
study with different goals and means, Porter and Gower (1995) suggest that the 
question might be reconceived as: can we study how and why the product is achieved 
or constructed, as well as what it is?  One such work is Barre Toelken’s Morning Dew 
and Roses: Nuance, Metaphor and Meaning in Folk Songs (1995). Here, Toelken raises the 
level of discussion to one of the essential metaphoricity of folksongs. He attempts to 
clarify the precise nature and function of metaphor within song, seeking to explore 
the boundaries of how and why metaphors are established and understood. Toelken 
skilfully exploits his own direct experience of fieldwork, working outwards from 
detailed ethnographic observations of singers and listeners within their immediate 
contextual and performance situations, giving us an insightful analysis of the 
function, within folksong performances, of vernacular imagery. He highlights the 
fact that ‘some ballads are not stories about an event itself, but are dramas of events 
in which narrative structure provides location for metaphorical images expressing 
the ironies and ambiguities of life’s greatest puzzles,’ exploring not only how ‘singers 
and their audiences have continued to respond to well-articulated, culturally shared 
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metaphors and dramatisations of human stress, frustrations, joy and anxiety’ (102–3) 
but also how those performances actively construct, and thus are participatory in or 
are contestive of the social relations and the basis of such emotion. One particular 
commendation regarding this work is Toelken’s affirmation that the study of music 
is key in establishing meaning in song texts (20–23). Regrettably, he does not engage 
in the kind of music-to-text performance analysis that would give substance to this 
idea.  
 
 From ‘Product’ to ‘Process’ 
In a Scottish context, scholarship still has a general tendency to focus on songs 
as ‘artefacts’—as decontextualised, disembodied cultural products. This is not true 
elsewhere. In Ireland, scholars have moved beyond this and have begun to conceive 
of song as ‘process.’ A seminal article in the study of Gaelic song is Ó Madagain’s 
‘Functions of Irish Folksong in the Nineteenth Century’ (1985), which followed 
Merriam’s ten function paradigm as laid out in The Anthropology of Music (1964). A key 
text in this area is Ó Laoire’s invaluable study On a Rock in the Middle of the Ocean 
(2005), which will be discussed in more depth below. Ó Laoire maintains that ‘the 
cultural process, with its situated meanings…is crucial to any full understanding of 
the working of oral poetry’ (28). He realises the dynamic capacity for using poetical 
power described by Toelken (1995) and extends the productive power of 
metaphorical thought beyond its traditionally perceived role, conceiving of song as ‘a 
metaphorical discourse which mediates the conflicts and perplexities of social 
existence’ (207). Ó Laoire’s emphasis here is on the process of making-sense-of-
music as it reflects community values. Building on his ideas, this thesis looks to 
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insights from embodied cognition and cognitive metaphorical processes and 
explores the idea that the actual experience of the ballad is a metaphorical embodied 
process. 
 One exceptional example of this shift in focus in a Scottish context is Porter 
and Gower’s epic study of a ballad singer, Jeannie Robertson: Emergent Singer, 
Transformative Voice (1995). In terms of its theoretical perspectives, this book is of 
great value, built on a confluence of disciplines influenced by both phenomenology 
and critical theory. The first section of the book is largely biographical; part two 
presents the texts and tunes of eighty of Jeannie’s songs with annotations. The 
analysis and fieldwork here is purely speculative, based on tapes and recordings and 
not direct experience with Jeannie in the field. Part Three, ‘Commentary,’ raises the 
level of analysis to a deeply philosophical one, attending to questions about music, 
life, experience and meaning:  
The meanings were not just abstractions of experience; they were experience, 
they embodied it.... (Porter and Gower 1995). 
 
What the question seems to really be about is the way in which meaning is derived 
from cultural communication. This is an area that ballad studies has only recently 
begun to address over the last decade or so (McKean 2003: 7). Where does meaning 
lie? In the singer’s mind? In the listener’s? In the fieldworker’s perceptions? In a 
recorded or transcribed version? Or the shared space where all of these different 
manifestations interact? Meaning cannot be deduced absolutely; new meanings are 
created at each intersection of time, performance and reception.  
Atkinson, in The English Traditional Ballad, Theory, Method and Practice (2002) has 
shown how insights from fields of reception theory and communication theory can 
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be extended to the study of ballads, focussing on audience reception and the role of 
the subject in the creation of meaning. However, again he offers no musical analysis. 
As study which considers only how the language of texts might be understood is to 
grossly underestimate the power of song. Atkinson argues that the reader is required 
to ‘fill in the gaps’ of the ballad narrative, and that the ballad’s poetic power plays on 
this recreation. Constantine and Porter in Fragments and Meaning in Traditional Song 
(2003) suggest that extended narrative with no gaps may be tedious to the listener, 
who expects to participate in the meaning. Constantine and Porter only see meaning 
in a song through the act of interpreting its text, however. In my view, for every song 
that has lines, verses or a whole story that is meaningful to the listener, there is 
another one for which the meaning is evocative—reminding the singer or hearer of a 
person or an event that does not have a literal connection with the text, and this is 
the fundamental problem with textual analysis in attempts to understand truth and 
meaning. Most singers possess a depth of cultural background, personal experience 
and history an understanding of the dynamics of the tradition, and an awareness of 
technique and style, but listeners too must also have these layers of experience and 
knowledge for singers and listeners to ‘understand each other,’ to enable them to 
understand a performance on the terms in which it is represented. In Toelken’s view 
(1999), any traditional listening audience actively seeks out meaning. Traditional 
listeners do more than just hear a ballad: they ‘glean’ it.   
The most recent published work in the field of ballad studies takes the form 
of collected essays and conference papers, such as The Flowering Thorn: International 
Ballad Studies (2003) and various publications by the B.A.S.E series, including Ballads 
and Diversity: Perspectives on Gender, Ethos, Power and Play (Peere and Topp 2004), Emily 
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Lyle: The Persistent Scholar (Fischer and Rieuwerts 2007) and Genre, Conflict, Presence: 
Traditional Ballads in a Modernizing World (Porter 2009). These works focus on internal 
and external aspects of the ballad tradition, such as song and context, performance 
and repertoire and structure and motif. Such work gives support to the view that an 
interdisciplinary approach adds value to its subject. The Flowering Thorn (2003) 
presents the latest trends in ballad scholarship, and McKean’s introduction is a 
useful overview of the ‘multidisciplinary nature of the field today’ (1). Here he argues 
that ‘the future of ballad studies lies in performance, communication, and the study 
of the complex, multilayered interplay of melody and text’ (10). It is this very 
complex, multilayered interplay in the very moment of embodied performance that 
this thesis seeks to understand. 
 
Study of Expressive Culture: Recent Scholarly Shift 
Historically, the embodied dimension of experience and culture has been 
marginalised; affective response had no place in the growing canons of folklore 
scholarship. Dundes’ ‘Text, Texture, Context’ (Dundes 1964), while important in 
breaking the textual focus within the study of verbal arts, was intent on heightening 
the scholarly respectability of a discipline. He was critical of the view that 
something can be seen to hold inherent value because ‘you know by the feel, by a 
tingling of your scalp, by an indefinable something inside you when you hear the 
song sung, or the tale told, or the tune played’ (Chase in Dundes 1964), arguing that 
such value judgements really require the stamp of approval from a professional 
folklorist. Such a disciplined framework left absolutely no space for a consideration 
of affective response, and we are left today with a marked paucity of 
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interdisciplinary vocabulary to address this dimension of experience. This situation 
is the result of years of working in a multi-yet-compartmentalised context which 
holds inherited assumptions about the relationship between body and mind. 
Ultimately, such a trajectory has impoverished much of the extant ethnographic 
record of the experience of the expressive vernacular arts. 
It has been noted that academic writing about the ballad often fails to engage 
the ballad as ‘experience’ and that something ineffable is missing in scholarship as 
regards the emotional, visual or aural experience of singing or hearing a ballad; and 
that intangible yet real experiences have been systematically excluded from 
conventional scholarship simply because they constitute parts of the world of 
human life that are too difficult and too excessive to theorise. Such a marginalisation 
is becoming increasingly untenable and ethnographers are beginning to recover 
sensuality and corporeality as a vital part of understanding expressive culture. Deirdre 
Sklar (1994) discusses how ethnographers are ‘coming to their senses.’ She advocates 
‘kinaesthetic empathy’ in research approaches, making the case that it is the 
embodied aesthetic dimension that is most important for such affective potential.  
However, some contemporary scholars still believe that the analysis of the text 
in the traditional sense is the only true empirical foundation to build upon: 
 I urge only that we take our mission the task of explaining, not “expressive 
enactments,” not “cultural processes” but folksong. To do so in an effective, 
convincing and collective way we must recenter our studies in the materials 
that once gave us great strength but that we self-defeatingly abandoned in an 
obsessive search for new ideas at the expense of seeking truly to understand 
our subject matter (Renwick 2001: vii; xi–xii  in McKean 2003: 8).  
  
It could be argued that to textualise, transcribe or even to record expressive culture 
in preparation for study advocated by Renwick serves to eliminate from 
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consideration all the levels of perception and associated experience that are real and 
true in lived experience. Historically, the implications of technical means of 
recording vernacular culture were that the tools used—print, and later recording 
devices—actually served to transform the disciplines themselves. The technologies 
available to us as researchers have fundamentally shaped the way in which we are 
able to conceptualise our work; the technologies have likewise fundamentally 
shaped the subject matter itself. This problem is discussed in Brady’s A Spiral Way: 
How the Phonograph Changed Ethnography (Brady 1999).  
 This problem of technology affecting subject matter is certainly true of the 
field of ballad studies. There are few who dispute that ballads belong firstly to the 
oral tradition and that printed ballads came at a later stage in cultural evolution. The 
study of ballads in their collected textual forms is an entirely different pursuit to an 
understanding of the lived experience of ballads in culture. This is not to say that the 
work of the early collectors was not invaluable; if scholars had not collected ‘items’ 
of folklore in such a fashion, we would have nothing with which to work in the 
present. In their written form they can be considered to constitute a literary genre of 
sorts, but it could easily be argued that text-centred literary analysis of folkloric 
forms fails to address how we are moved by expressive arts and at best ‘skirts the 
issue of the culturally divergent pleasures of listening and embodied experience 
(Bendix 2000). In a wider context, ‘a certain dilettantism, or more precisely perhaps 
a helplessness in the face of very complex phenomena’ has been attested to by 
various European ethnologists (Burckhardt-Seebass 1992:62 in Bendix 2000 42) 
 Perhaps the reluctance to study the difficult dimensions of cultural 
experience is lodged in disciplinary separation and specialisation. For example, in 
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understanding song as a genre of folklore, the temptation to deal with verbal and 
musical materials as if they were divorced from each other, as well as from the 
singers’ performance of them or indeed the listeners’ understandings, is a strong one 
that reflects disciplinary divergences and the established boundaries of academic 
fields. This split began in the early days of the disciplinary development. Herder’s 
best known contribution to the study of folklore is the collection of songs—without 
musical notation—and subsequently, text and music went their increasingly 
separate academic paths. During the period of textualising vernacular practices that 
Herder helped to initiate, it was always the words and not the musical or gestural 
medium carrying them that was emphasised. Yet, for the realisation of Romantic 
ideology—the expression of national sentiment—the fusion of text and music in 
performance was (and remains) of the utmost importance. But in the consideration 
of music, traditional musicology has attached itself to ‘high culture,’ analogous to 
literary fields, relying on an esoteric system of notation until a breakthrough into 
ethnomusicological interest became more acceptable in the latter part of the 
twentieth century. Interdisciplinary rapprochement, until recently at least, has been 
difficult and sporadic, as anyone not conversant in musicological terms and notation 
hesitates to participate in the discourse or defers to the authority of someone who is.
 The gaps in literature in comprehending expressive culture resulting from 
textualising practices have been felt in recent years—a fact that is evidenced in the 
current trends in the literature. A great deal of reflexive ethnographic work has been 
searching for a way to legitimately include the ‘sensing self’ in scholarly work, with 
experience of sound leading the way (Feld 1982; Stoller 1984, 1997; Baumann 1997, 
1999).  Preceding this ‘reflexive turn,’ Hyme’s ‘Ethnography of Speaking’ (1962) 
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rethought in his ‘Toward Ethnographies of Communication’(1972) broke through 
the confines of textual and etic understandings of expressive forms, clearly seeking a 
fuller, contextually located subject. However, this work focused in on the diversity 
of speech rules, speech performance and culturally located ideologies of language 
rather than attending to the affective experience of sound itself.  
 Bendix’s article ‘The Pleasures of the Ear: Towards an Ethnography of 
Listening’ in the journal Cultural Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Folklore and 
Popular Culture (2000) sketches the implications of the successive exclusion of 
sentimentality and sensuality from scholarship concerned with folklore. She puts 
forward the claim that the property of sound is intimately related to the affective 
powers of expressive forms and therefore deserves attention in its own right (the 
importance of the study of sound and listening is considered in Chapter Six). Bendix 
is credited by the editors for ‘opening up brand new theoretical terrain.’ She calls on 
scholars to examine both the historical implications and consequences of the tension 
between listeners’ delight and investigators’ objectivity, corporeality and textuality 
in ethnographic disciplines. She too suggests that we take steps towards the study 
of the senses, their linkages to cognition and their collaboration in providing us with 
aesthetic pleasure. Pursuing this direction of study will, she claims, out of necessity, 
‘lead into the kinds of territories and areas of study that join cognition, experience and 
culture’ (40, my italics). She concludes that ‘nearly every promising point of entry 
requires cross-disciplinarity’ (40). 
 In studies of musical forms, Feld and Fox’s (1994: 43–44, my italics) 
comprehensive assessment of the analytic dissonances and convergences of 
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musicology and linguistics arrive at a conclusion that should, in my own view, be the 
springboard for further inquiry: 
Paying attention to the social immanence of music’s supreme mystery, the 
grooving redundancy of elegant structuring that affectively connects the 
singularity of form to the multiplicity of senses. 
 
This ‘mystery’ is experienced along an as-yet-to-be-properly-understood spectrum 
from great individual variety to cultural specificity to human commonality, and 
lodged in the whole gamut of aesthetically shaped culture. Aesthetic thrills and 
chills of the present warrant scholarly attention because they are ubiquitous in, and 
central to, human experience. There are a variety of approaches that grapple with 
the ineffable, ill-defined, and idiosyncratic nature of aesthetic experience. Some 
approaches seek to transform the ineffable aspects of these experiences into precise 
representations, producing systems that are well-defined and testable but may miss 
the fullness of the experienced phenomenon. Insights are to be found from looking to 
ethnography, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, aesthetics, history, religion, 
linguistics, musicology, psychoanalysis, cognitive science (as it has recently 
emerged), physiology, neuroscience and no doubt numerous other fields which can 
bring new understandings to human experience.  
 
Research Ground: A Study of ‘Presence’ 
The centrality of Porter’s Genre, Conflict, Presence: Traditional Ballads in a 
Modernising World (2009) has already been stressed. In the preface to this work, 
Rieuwerts describes this as ‘a key text in this history of ballad scholarship.’ The 
novel idea of ‘presence’ attempts to convey the intangible quality of the ballad, or 
rather, the ballad in performance.  
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Traditional ballads impinge on our consciousness: captivating in their imagery, 
transient, dramatic, of course, but also magical in the way that embodies a 
sense of “presence” (Porter 2009: 7) 
This focus is surely a reflection of the emergent zeitgeist described above in 
scholarship on expressive arts at large.  
It has been suggested that the notion of ‘presence’ is perhaps Porter’s way of 
explaining and defining the intangible nature of what is defined here as the ‘ballad 
experience.’ The idea of ‘presence’ conveys the notion that the performance of 
traditional ballads and their modern counterparts can only be effective in the 
context of exchange between audience and singer, in a two-way communicative 
relationship that cannot be realised through recorded and digital productions or 
printed ballad texts. Porter is at pains to make clear that he appreciates that in 
recent decades the rapid advancement of technology has radically affected how we 
receive cultural forms. For example, it is now possible to have an experience of 
storytelling or ballad singing visually and aurally almost instantly across continents 
via the internet. Porter argues that the immediacy of human contact and the sensory 
presence of the enactment are essential for the psycho-physiological impact of 
performance in a social setting; and that it is the responsive nature of the genre that 
makes it real and come alive. Sensory presence is also essential for transmission. This 
is something that John Niles (1999) also recognises: 
The physical occasions of performance, with their special and powerful 
intimacies, both create and stir up memories that will not be forgotten. 
Televisions and movie theatres are not likely to do this readily, whatever else 
they provide. This is an important distinction and one that the culture industry 
seeks to hide (61).  
 
The very context of media is active on only one direction. We cannot internalise and 
reproduce a movie, but we can with a ballad. Memory has been shown to be context 
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dependent in many cases. To recall a memory, it helps to be in the same situation, or 
psycho-somatic state.  
              ‘Presence’ is conceived of by Porter as ‘something to be conveyed,’ but at the 
same time it is understood as a quality of performance—a charged atmosphere—that 
can manifest itself given the right conditions. Porter believes that the development of 
a theory of presencing can go beyond an outdated performance theory and help to 
resolve the two modes of enquiry discussed earlier—text and performance based 
studies—and the inherent problems of such a dichotomy.  
Porter’s ‘Epilogue,’ ‘Steps to a Theory of Ballad Presence,’ offers up the 
beginnings of a methodology designed for future research. His work undoubtedly 
serves to ground my own and helps justify this avenue of research in the field of 
ballad studies. Chapter Four concentrates on unpacking this theory and identifying 
ways and means to take it forward. 
 
Oral Narrative: The Maysie 
John Niles’ Homo Narrans: The Poetics and Anthropology of Oral Literature (1999) puts 
the Scottish ballad in the wider context of oral narrative, weaving together the study 
of Anglo-Saxon literature and culture with the author’s own engagements in the 
field with some of the greatest twentieth-century singers in Scotland. Niles’ work is 
valuable in this context in that he places particular emphasis on the somatic nature 
of oral literature—physical presence and social communication—in the experience of 
storytelling and stresses the importance of this dimension for the play of the ‘magic 
kingdom’ of the imagination. Most importantly, Niles dedicates some time to a 
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discussion of the Maysie, and as yet I have not discovered any other academic work 
that discusses this folkloric phenomenon.  
Niles describes a fieldwork experience with Scottish tradition bearer Lizzie 
Higgins, Traveller and ballad singer, very similar to my own with Stanley Robertson. 
Niles describes her performances as ‘uncanny’ and recounts what was ‘an intense 
and emotionally demanding experience’ (52): 
As she sang she seemed to be letting her soul out, transformed by some ineffable 
means into a unitary sound made up of a fusion of words, rhythm, timbre, tune 
and vocal ornamentation (51). 
 
In the following passage, he describes the physical effects he felt while witnessing 
Lizzie perform: ‘It takes the form of a sort of chill.  There are shivers at the spine, and 
the small hairs on your body start to rise and move’ (51). Like Stanley, Lizzie herself 
referred to her intense experiences of singing as invoking the Maysie, a kind of magic. 
She derived the word from ‘muse’ and said the experience has to do with inspiration 
(53). Niles speculates that the word has hybridised from the verb ‘amaze’ but 
decides that the exact etymology does not matter. More important is what the 
Maysie does to both performer and audience: 
If a singer, storyteller, or musician has the power to bring about such a state, 
then one of the muses is at hand. One is not just amused, however; one is also 
amazed and inspired (53). 
 
Niles decides that a performer wishing to produce a lasting effect between an 
audience and themselves must make an honest effort to summon the Maysie. The 
power of words, he argues, depends on the skill, intent, and level of engagement 
with experience on the part of the person communicating the work of art. Niles 
maintains that the best and most creative cooperation that arises between the 
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Maysie, the performer, and the audience is accomplished through ‘wordpower.’ 
According to Niles, wordpower travels through the performer to the audience, in 
turn investing its members with this power. That is to say, members of an audience 
may take a poet’s language into the body of their own language, where they apply it 
to shaping the stories of their own lives, perhaps creating something altogether new, 
though directly related to the original experience. This process of meaning creation 
is something this thesis seeks to elucidate. Some people might argue that any 
literature, whether meant for performance or to be read in solitude, can invoke the 
Maysie to some degree. I argue in this thesis that the Maysie in the case of the ballad 
experience is a sonic phenomenon, and has its roots in the embodied sharing of 
sound. 
 In my view, Niles’ theories are ‘wordpower’-heavy. His focus is purely on the 
oral dimension of balladry, using ballad singing as an example of contemporary 
storytelling. It was never his intention to comment on the role of singing or melody:  
Unless one’s interest is primarily musicological, what is the point of isolating 
songs from oral narrative in general? Do not both songs and ‘prose’ narratives 
tell the same kinds of stories? (36). 
 
I disagree with Niles on this point. Ballads partake of both wordpower and musical 
power, beyond words. Finnegan (1977) has shown that it is extremely difficult to 
define the differences between kinds of song and oral poetry completely, preferring 
to view them on a continuum. She offers a useful summary of approaches and 
disparate methodologies outlining their strengths and weaknesses for dealing with 
what she calls the ‘verbal arts’ (1997: 25–52).  
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The skill and personality of the performer, the nature of the reaction of the 
audience, the context, the purpose—these are essential aspects of the artistry 
and meaning of the oral poem (1977: 28).  
 
Other key texts in the field of oral poetry that are worthy of mention are John Miles 
Foley’s Singer of Tales in Performance  (Foley 1995) and How to Read an Oral Poem (Foley 
2002) which apply the concept of ‘traditional referentiality,’ or idiomatic meaning 
based on reference to an implied tradition, as it informs several different oral or oral-
derived traditions. The subtleties and nuances involved in making clear-cut 
distinctions between song and poetry and the difficulty of talking about ‘song’ as a 
genre is explored in detail in Chapter Seven. This thesis seeks to build upon Niles’ 
theory of the Maysie, recognising the power of music in this equation, and applying 
insights from phenomenological and cognitive approaches in an attempts to strive 
for a more holistic explanation. 
   
Ethnomusicology in the 21st Century 
In order to bring musical understandings and explanations to the event of 
the Maysie in the ballad experience, it was crucial to turn to contemporary ideas in 
the field of ethnomusicology. I was first drawn into the study of ethnomusicology 
years ago upon reading Blacking’s Music, Culture, and Experience (Blacking 1973) and his 
work How Musical is Man? (1974). Where Niles (1995) centres narrative at the centre of 
culture itself, Blacking was deeply committed to the idea that music-making is a 
fundamental and universal attribute of the human species. He attempted to 
document the ways in which music-making expresses the human condition, how it 
transcends social divisions, and how it can be used to improve the quality of human 
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life. Insights from Niles and Blacking combined to insipre exciting new ideas for my 
own thinking in the world of narrative and music-making respectively.     
Ethnomusicology is generally understood to be the study of music as, or in, 
culture. As a discipline, it leans heavily towards anthropology; theoretically, it has 
been closer to anthropology than musicology. Ethnomusicological works have 
already been referred to here in the context of research into folklore and the 
expressive arts. It would not be fruitful to document and survey the breadth and 
diversity of ethnomusicological approaches; rather, works are selected that are 
directly relevant to this research—those that utilise hermeneutic, phenomenological 
and cognitive approaches, with an emphasis on the most recent works that look to 
theories of embodiment in understanding experience of music and most particularly 
the experience of song. Recent work suggests the importance of continuing 
interdisciplinary engagement to answer the questions of ethnomusicology. 
‘Conscious engagement with literatures and ideas outside of ethnomusicology 
allows us to build on, rather than reinvent, foundations for understanding’ (Fatone 
2010).  
 Two recent texts which outline contemporary theoretical and 
methodological approaches respectively are Stone’s Theory for Ethnomusicology (2007) 
and Barz and Cooley’s now well-known edited second edition on research methods 
in the discipline, Shadows in the Field: New Perspectives for Fieldwork in Ethnomusicology 
(2008).  Stone’s guide covers ethnomusicological theory, exploring some of the 
underpinnings of different approaches and analysing differences and commonalities 
in these orientations and addressing how ethnomusicologists have used and applied 
these theories in ethnographic research. Shadows in the Field deliberately shifts the 
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focus of ethnomusicology and of ethnography in general from ‘representation’ to 
‘experience.’ Ethnomusicological fieldwork has significantly changed since the end 
of the 20th century. The focus has traditionally centred around analyses and 
ethnographic representations of musical cultures, rather than on the personal world 
of understanding and experience. The shift in interest away from music as an object, 
towards music as culture and then as cultural practice has resulted in reflexive, non-
objectivist scholarship. 
In relation to the discussion above regarding the recent shift in focus towards 
the sensuality and corporeality in knowledge and experience, it would be foolish to 
overlook some of most interesting works in ethnomusicology. Stoller (1984), 
working with the Songhay of West Africa, learned—through his native teachers’ 
disappointment—of his own inability to hear what they heard, and that ‘sound is a 
dimension of experience in and of itself’ (567). A number of ethnomusicologists in 
turn have in very different ways uncovered connections between sound and music 
perception—emotions such as grief (Feld 1982), and other aspects of culture such as 
narrative and healing (Seeger 1986), or have tried to demonstrate that in some 
cultures, it is hearing, not seeing, that ‘constitutes the pivotal sensory channel’ 
(Menezez Bastos 1999). Furthermore, some of the focus on hearing and listening that 
has become a bigger part of ethnomusicological inquiry has been turned back onto 
the performers themselves, such as Brinner’s (1995) work on Gamelan, which 
integrates literature on cognition with ethnographic research to develop a complex 
and holistic model of musical knowledge. Much of this work has, however, been 
carried out among so-called tribal, often isolated cultures. There is surely a potential 




Hermeneutic and Phenomenological Approaches 
For some, phenomenology would seem to be an outdated style of philosophy 
and critical discourse. Increasingly, however, scholars have become more interested 
in phenomenological approaches that examine and account for how experience 
informs subjective understanding.22 Stone’s Let the Inside Be Sweet (1982) forged the 
path for phenomenological ethnomusicology, and laid out the key themes in this line 
of scholarship: the music event as a situated, cultural interaction in which 
participants actively make meaning. The ethnomusicologist’s Stance: Ideas about 
Emotion, Style and Meaning for the Study of Expressive Culture (2009) is a significant new 
contribution to scholarship in this tradition, providing fresh and interesting 
approaches for studying elements involved in creative musical practices, such as 
practice, meaning, affect, value and experience. How we grapple with the meaning of 
some aspect of expressive culture and bring it into our own experience for 
interpretation forms the basis of taking a ‘stance’ in and towards expressive culture. 
He asks, why does music move us? How do the immediate situation and larger social 
contexts influence the meanings that people find in stories, rituals, or films? How do 
people engage with the images and sounds of a performance to make them come 
alive in sensuous, lived experience? The book reveals dimensions of lived experience 
that everyone is aware of but that scholars rarely account for.  
Berger begins with the chapter, ‘What Phenomenology Can Do for the Study 
of Expressive Culture.’ In a phenomenological context, the body is the first access to 
                                                          
22 Since the 1980s, a number of scholars in ethnomusicology have used ideas from phenomenology. 
Stone (1982, 1988);  Titon (1998, 2008); Rice (1994, 2008); Berger (1997, 1999, 2009); Wolf (2006). 
65 
 
the world. The meanings that people find in music do not depend solely on their 
musical practices, but also on their experiences from other domains of practice as 
well—their work and home lives, their social lives, their experiences in families, 
schools, sites of public debate, education, health, the whole of their existence. In 
such a way, this method solves any elitist problem with the study of ‘native 
perspective’ (the implication that there is only one local view of things, a view that is 
identical across ‘others’, different from our own and fully discoverable by the all-
knowing ethnographer). Most importantly, a phenomenological understanding of 
musical experience sees fieldwork as an attempt to partially share experience by 
placing the researcher on the same plane as the research participant and engaging in 
a dialogic agenda. In this way, ‘truth’ is negotiated through dialogue. Titon’s analysis 
of blues music (1995) maintains that knowledge occurs in the dialogue between the 
researcher and his or her people: ‘this is the world, the intersubjective reality, that 
the fieldworker comes to know; and this is the only world one can truly reconstruct 
in one’s interpretative writings—if one comes to any understanding at all’ (Titon 
1998: 13). Such a dialectic also helps to remove the distinction of ‘native’ and ‘ethnic’ 
concepts; it goes beyond a difference of categories or a mere exchange of views, and 
as such results in important descriptions as well as explanations. 
 Another strand in the phenomenological tradition is hermeneutic 
phenomenology, which depicts musical interpretation as an open-ended process. 
Titon (1988) uses Ricouer’s work to inform the ‘interpretative dialogies’  to explore 
the process by which people interpret music and verbal art and make them integral 
to their lives. Rice’s May it Fill Your Soul (1994) draws more heavily on Gadamer for its 
portrayal of music making in Bulgaria and its broader reflections on musical 
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understanding. Both Titon and Rice discuss the relevance of hermeneutics for 
ethnomusicology in their chapters in Shadows in the Field (Barz &Cooley 2008). The 
philosophical framework for Ó Laoire’s study On a Rock in the Middle of the Ocean 
(2005), mentioned above, was influenced by Gadamer and Ricoeur, the developers of 
modern phenomenological hermeneutics. This work opened the door to a world of 
possibilities for my own; it was the first context in which I realised how a 
phenomenological hermeneutics adapted for the study of ethnomusicology can bring 
a whole new dimension to the field of study. If the hermeneutic philosophers are 
correct, experience involves the history of the individual’s encounter with the world 
of symbols in which he or she finds themselves, and any effort to understand the 
experience of ballads must bring both time and the individual to the centre of the 
enquiry (Ricouer 1981). Ó Laoire looks to the embodied event of performance and the 
meanings created, taking as his subject the small Gaelic-speaking community of 
Tory Island off the Donegal coast of Ireland. His thesis tries to answer the 
deceptively simple question of why people sing. He focuses on aspects of song 
transmission and performance, showing how early exposure to musical culture leads 
certain individuals to be singled out and given special encouragement to express 
themselves. He also presents a meticulous exposition of the links between music, 
text, and performance. In a special study of one song, Ó Laoire shows how the song 
itself emerges as a mediator of dilemmas and tensions in island life. Comparisons are 
drawn to support his argument that the interpretation of songs reveals particular 
‘worlds’ of meaning, and that is a widespread human activity found in similar 
configurations at both global and local levels.  
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Rice’s ethnography May it Fill Your Soul: Experiencing Bulgarian Music (1994) 
proved invaluable because of the philosophical underpinnings and approach to 
fieldwork methods. Rice’s final chapter entitled ‘Truth and Music’ reflects on his 
own experience and refers back to the writings of Gadamer. Rice offers up an article 
‘Toward a Mediation of Field Methods and Field Experience in 
Ethnomusicology’(1997) where he mediates between dialectical concerns. He 
explores explanations of music-making based on method (epistemological) versus 
understanding based on experience (ontological), between music ‘in its own terms’ 
and music as culture, and between insider and outsider positions. He puts forward 
the idea that ‘instead of bracketing experience while focussing on experiment as our 
methods require—or glorifying experience while abandoning method—Ricoeur’s 
phenomenological hermeneutics suggests bringing experiment within the 
framework created by experience’ (61).  
Both Ó Laoire and Rice adopt a particular ontological stance which 
prioritises ways of being over ways of knowing; a stance that is, in my view, crucial 
to a truer understanding of the processes of meaning making in the experience of 
expressive forms. As Ó Laoire (2005: xiii) makes clear, ‘such a position foregrounds 
our being in the world and contends that our conception of reality is always 
conditioned by our embodied existence.’ The application of these ideas to the study 
of the ballad experience will be explored fully in the next chapter. 
 
Cognitive Ethnomusicology 
 Porter (2009), Bendix (2004), and others discussed above have pointed out 
that studies into the mystery of cultural experience must include the cognitive as 
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well as affective dimensions, and consequently will necessarily lead to areas of study 
that join cognition, experience and culture. Cognitive science in its widest sense is 
an emerging discipline that brings together work in philosophy, linguistics, 
psychology and neuroscience.  
Most research in music perception and cognition has focused on a very narrow 
band of human musical phenomena, namely the tonal concert music of the pre-20th-
century Western Europe, as filtered through contemporary European-derived 
performance practices. Recent research on music that embodies a cognitive 
perspective has coalesced around a broader set of issues. Cross’ ‘Music Analysis and 
Music Perception’ (Cross 1998) presents a survey of techinques and approaches,  as 
does Purwin and Hardoon’s ‘Trends and Perspectives in Music Cognition Research 
and Technology’ (Purwins and Hardoon 2009). Jourdain’s Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy: 
How Music Captures Our Imagination (1997) explores the intimate connections humans 
form with their favourite types of music and the physical and mental reactions music 
produces in us. 
Until recently, cognitive musicological studies have focused on musical 
perception within Western music and have been largely ethnocentric in nature. A 
special issue of the Journal of New Music Research presents a selection of the different 
approaches and methodologies for the cognitive study of music. Moisala’s article 
‘Cognitive Study of Music as Culture — Basic Premises for “Cognitive 
Ethnomusicology’ (1995) relates ethnomusicological ideas to the mainstream of 
cognitive music research. As early as 1987, Kippen published an article ‘An 
Ethnomusicological Approach to the Analysis of Musical Cognition’ in the journal 
Music Perception. The question of cognitive ethnomusicology is how to connect 
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current cognitive approaches with the study of music as culture: that is, musical 
practice as social process. It consists, so far, of very distinct studies applying various 
adopted theories and methods, borrowed from the mutually informative fields of 
philosophy and cognitive science at large.  
The reason why insights from experimental studies in cognitive science have 
not until recently been integrated into ethnographical studies in music is because of 
the perceived lack of attention paid to the historical and cultural contexts that 
might frame central research questions. Ethnomusicology has more often than not 
shunned any claims to science, reckoning itself a thoroughly humanistic endeavour 
beyond the reach of empirical study, ‘firmly committed to the importance of human 
meanings, human evaluations and human motivations’ (Becker 2004: 7). Conversely, 
music cognition as practised by many theorists is derived from models in which 
music comes to be symbolically represented in the brain and then subjected to 
formal processes. Tolbert’s exploratory article, ‘Theories of Meaning and Music 
Cognition: An Ethnomusicological Approach’ (1992) raises the central issue of 
reductionism in cognitive approaches to musical meaning: 
Can one determine anything about musical meaning by reducing musical 
experience to an explanation of perceptual and cognitive processes? From the 
point of view of most ethnomusicologists, the nature of musical meaning is 
considered to be inappropriate by empirical studies especially in light of 
ethnomusicological work that demonstrates the close relationship of musical 
meaning to its cultural and historical context (7). 
 
In traditional cognitive science, the emphasis on things ‘mental’ has been at the 
expense of the physical, and the disproportionate attention paid to ‘the rational’ has 
often occurred in opposition to the emotional and the intuitive. In my view, many 
studies in cognitive musicology exclude the body and focus on generic musical 
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processes. Such an approach neglects what it is to have a musical experience. Judith 
Becker articulates this point in her theoretical methodology for Deep Listeners (2004), 
a work that will be further discussed towards the end of this review: 
We experience music with our skins, with our pulse rates, and with our body 
temperature. To subscribe to a theory of musical cognition which cannot deal 
with the embodiment of music, of the involvement of the senses, the visceral 
system, and the emotions is to maintain a Cartesian approach of mind/body 
dualism’ (6).  
 
Metaphor and Embodied Thought  
Early work in cognitive science rarely, if ever, engaged with the issue of 
‘meaning.’23 The general assumption was that thought amounted to the mechanical 
manipulation of abstract symbols, and that the mind was an abstract machine, 
manipulating symbols by algorithmic computation in the way a computer does. All 
meaning arose via correspondences between symbols (words, mental 
representations) and things in the external world; these symbols formed internal 
representations of external reality, independent of any limitations of the human 
body. The mind was seen as a mirror of nature, and human thought as abstract and 
disembodied; human bodies and their environments were seen to be incidental to 
the nature of meaningful concepts or reason. This view does not take into 
consideration any awareness of the relationship between self and the world, not to 
mention creativity, physical coordination, or even emotion.  
                                                          
23 Turner (1994: 91–91) writes of this perspective, 
Meaning is conceived…as essentially anchored in states of affairs in objective reality, 
with the consequence that the meaning of an utterance must be the reality to which is 
refers. This leaves the human person out of the loop altogether: A semantic express 
train shoots straight from…symbols to an objective reality without passing through the 
human brain.  
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Recent conceptual developments in cognitive science have moved towards the 
inclusion of the body in our understanding of the mind, and an appreciation of the 
role of culture and embodiment (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991).  In particular, 
cognitive scientists have begun to infer connections between the structure of mental 
processes and physical embodiment (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). The basis of much of 
this work rests on the notion that metaphoric thinking (i.e thinking of one thing in 
terms of another) permeates both conscious and unconscious thought to an extent 
previously unrecognised. In my view, the appeal for making a place for the body in 
theories for understanding expressive arts is absolutely necessary if we are to 
reconcile theoretical accounts with the range and affective power of expression. The 
importance of the body in the neuroscience of consciousness has also recently come 
to light  (Edelman 1992; Damasio 1999). Such an embodied perspective is even 
claimed to unite efforts in these and other related fields into what is sometimes 
called ‘second generation cognitive science’ (Gallese and Lakoff 2005). The result has 
been a version of cognitive science that fits much better with the interest of the 
humanities, a version that can not only encompass meaning but that also more easily 
acknowledges the way cultural context and historical moment shape human 
knowledge.  
The role that the body plays in shaping thought has influenced the field of 
cognitive linguistics through a contemporary theory of metaphor (Lakoff 1987; 
Johnson 1987). A notion closely associated with the contemporary theory of 
metaphor that would prove important for music scholars was Johnson’s theory of 
‘image schemata’ (1987), which will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter. 
This theory has particularly influenced music scholars because it provides a 
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theoretical basis for metaphorical descriptions of music grounded in embodied 
experience. 
There is ample evidence in ethnomusicological literature that human 
constructs of music point to the existence of general patterns of thought specific for 
music. Feld’s research (1981) into the musical traditions of the Kaluli of Papua New 
Guinea is the earliest example of the approach using metaphor as a basis for musical 
thought. Drawing on the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Feld argued that the 
metaphorical descriptions used by the Kaluli were a reflection of key aspects of their 
everyday experience. Feld’s work pointed toward a new approach to metaphor and 
music that was based on two important assumptions: the first was that metaphor 
was not simply a literary device but was instead a basic structure of understanding; 
the second was that music constituted a conceptual domain that was, in some 
measure, independent of language.  Such studies are valuable not for their subject 
matter but for their applied theoretical approaches: they suggest not only ways to 
study how metaphor structures our understanding of music, but also ways to 
investigate how metaphorical processes operate in non-linguistic domains.   
An issue of the journal Theory and Practice (1997–1998) was given over to the 
connections between music theory and embodied knowledge. Saslaw (1997) 
explores Johnson’s theory of body-derived image schemata in theories of 
conceptualising Western classical music and seeks to prove that embodied 
experience is central in the conceptualisation of music. For example, our 
understanding of the notion of tension and release in music is grounded in repeated 
patterns of bodily experience. Applying the image associated with these sensations 
in the body to music allows us to describe the relatively abstract and ephemeral 
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domain of sound in terms of concrete physical experiences. Johnson and Larson’s 
essay ‘Something in the Way She Moves’—Metaphors of Musical Motion’ (2003) 
provides an example of how an approach based on embodied cognition can be 
integrated with a theory of musical meaning. Fatone’s article on bagpiping (2010) in 
the Society for Ethnomusicology’s journal, draws on Larson and Johnson’s ideas in 
her examination of non-physical to physical cross modal transfer and the role that 
sounds and rhythm play in the production of musical meaning.  
Another important and prominent work is Lawrence Zbikowski’s 
Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis (2007), which takes as its 
starting point the idea that that meaning is grounded in embodied experience. The 
broad-based approach advocated by Zbikowski adopts a generalised view of 
metaphor as a kind of cross-domain mapping and proposes that music represents a 
conceptual domain that can be drawn into such mappings. He utilises and applies 
Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of ‘conceptual blending’ (2002) to extend Johnson’s 
original insights regarding image schemata, proposing that language and music may 
simply offer different resources for structuring thought: that language excels at 
capturing objects, events and relations that hold between them, but is less good at 
representing dynamic processes (this idea will be further discussed in Chapter 
Seven). Zbikowski is not an ethnomusicologist (his preliminary work on the idea of 
conceptual blends was focussed on the possibilities of meaning construction in 
nineteenth century art songs) but his work offers important insights for 
musicologists as well as for ethnomusicologists, and presents a significant step in 
the exploration of connections between the study of cognition and the study of art. 
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Zbikowki’s theories of ‘song’ and the text-music relation have proved invaluable to 
explaining the ballad experience. This theory will be developed in Chapter Seven. 
 
Cognition as Embodied Action 
One of the central problems for a cognitive ethnomusicology, as I have 
suggested, is the lack of attention paid to the historical and cultural contexts. 
Recent developments in the field of cognitive science have moved towards the idea 
that cognition is an activity that is not only structured by the body but also by its 
situatedness in its environment—that is, as embodied action. In contrast to 
cognitivist theories, embodied accounts of cognition construe mind as an actively 
emergent form, structured by and never wholly separable from the material facts of 
bodily experience. Bowman’s article ‘Cognition and the Body: Perspectives from 
Music Education’ in Bresler’s Knowing Bodies, Moving Minds: Towards Embodied Teaching 
and Learning (2004) appeals to theories of cognition as embodied action and the 
phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty’s theories of the body and phenomenology. The 
worldview and philosophical assumptions inherent in this text reflect the deeper 
ideas underpinning the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Three. Bowman 
(2010) also edited a collection of articles in the journal Action, Criticism & Theory for 
Music Education exploring the idea of Shusterman’s philosophy of a ‘somaesthetics’ for 
music, an idea that will be developed in Chapter Four. 
 An account of how musical knowledge is embodied and situated is presented 
by Ole Kühl (2007) in his work Musical Semantics. As he sees it, cognitive musicology 
should be concerned with describing how human cognitive capacities are specified 
for music, how the structure of music reflects and shapes those capacities, and with 
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giving an account of the role of music within human cultures. The book is in two 
parts: the first part considers the biological foundations of music and their cognitive 
manifestations in order to establish a groundwork for speaking of music in generic, 
cross-cultural terms. The second part develops the semantic aspect of music as an 
embodied, emotively grounded and cognitively structured expression of human 
experience. His approach is driven by how music is shaped by and shapes human 
cultural interactions, and throws open the entire range of human musical expression 
for investigation. He explores the importance of sharing time, in which we also share 
feelings, gestures and narratives.  This is the semantic aspect of music: how can 
something like an auditory stream of structured sound evoke such a strong reaction 
in the listener? Kühl also takes into consideration the relationship between music 
and emotion, basing his perspective on researchers such as Damasio (1999; 2003) 
and using such a perspective to further evidence his claim for the embodied aspect of 
musical meaning. He also offers another perspective on how music is used to create 
meaning.  Of course, the changes evoked by music transform our internal emotional 
landscape—transform our consciousness—which then conditions our subsequent 
experience.  Kühl proposes that this process provides a way of bringing emotion into 
an account of musical meaning that includes embodied experience and an awareness 
of that embodied experience through cognitive processes (130–131). Kühl’s main 
point is that a thorough account of musical meaning requires an integrative 
approach, which is evident from the variety of sources he has drawn upon to create 
his model. This is a perfectly reasonable way to organise an argument—after all, the 
resources that cognitive science has to offer the humanities can prompt as many 
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questions as they might resolve. His ideas will be extended, related and applied to 
the ballad experience in Chapter Eight. 
 
Bridging the Gap 
 Contemporary literature on vernacular expressive arts points to the idea that 
pursuing the affective dimensions of the experience of expressive art necessarily 
joins cognition, experience and culture. In anthropologist Bloch’s (1998) terms, this 
direction will force scholars to overcome the rift that has developed between those 
who, in the wake of the ‘writing culture movement’ (1986) see anthropology above 
all as a ‘literary enterprise [and] criticise the ‘objectivist’ and scientific pretensions of 
the field,’ and those who are ‘interested in cognition [and] who are often impatient 
with the lack of scientific rigor in traditional ethnographic writing’ (40). He argues 
that an interest and understanding of cognitive science does not constitute a relapse 
into ‘naive, dubious and politically devastating reductionism,’ but contributes to an 
essential aim of ethnography: 
If we are to probe the contours of sensory perception and reception and seek to 
understand the transitions between the individual, cultural and transcultural 
dimensions, as I am urging here, then research methods will be needed that are 
capable of grasping “the most profound type of knowledge [which] is not 
spoken of at all” and thus inaccessible to ethnographic observation or interview 
(46). 
 
Rice (1994), previously referred to, believes that at the heart of the problem in 
understanding musical experience lies a gap between the descriptive, scientific, 
language encoded methods used to study music, and the vivid, deeply moving, often 
unarticulated inner experiences we have performing or listening to it. . 
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Finally in this review, I wish to draw attention to an excellent piece of work, 
Judith Becker’s Deep Listeners: Emotion Music and Trancing (2004). Becker attempts to 
get at the ‘extra-musical’ qualities of the experience of ‘trancing’ in music—altered 
states of consciousness—in various traditions around the world. She claims that 
people who experience deep emotions when listening to music are akin to those 
who trance within the context of religious rituals, viewing certain arcane cultural 
rituals as being in the mainstream of spiritual development and arguing that trance-
like states may relate to the basic fabric of emotions and consciousness. Her work 
encompasses an impressive body of literature on the subject, bridging disciplines in 
an entirely new way, skilfully synthesising disparate kinds of studies on musical 
experience. My approach differs to Becker in that she bridges traditional study with 
cognitive neuro-scientific theories of emotion in trancing, where I use theories of 
embodiment as a vehicle to introduce ideas about cognitive mapping and processes 
of meaning creation. Her methodology aims at bridging science and musical 
cognition theories together with the traditional commitment to human meanings, 
human evaluations and human motivation in the ‘intellectual lineage of history, 
philosophy, aesthetics and cultural anthropology’(7). She writes, 
I believe that it is not necessary to make a scientific description stand in 
opposition to humanistic or religious explanations of what it means to be 
human’ (9).  
 
Panksepp, a respected neuroscientist, calls this ‘a fascinating thesis and a timely 
synthesis.’ That it is viewed highly in both scientific and cultural contexts makes it 
an example of a successful interdisciplinary piece of research; one that tackles head 
on the ‘hard’ questions of the ineffable and the very parts of the world of human 
experience that are all too often considered too difficult and too problematic to 
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theorise. In the case of the ballad singing experience, some other means is needed to 
explain the intangible and at times powerful phenomenon of ‘presence.’  
 
Conclusion 
It is something of a synchronistic quirk in research that any attempt to bring 
about a paradigmatic shift in a field of study is often not achieved in isolation. 
Rather than being entirely new, it would seem that the research aims of this thesis 
reflect something of an emergent zeitgeist. Across literature in the humanities at 
large, there has been a shift in focus from ‘representation’ towards ‘experience’ and 
an emphasis on stressing ‘process’ as opposed to ‘product.’ Rather than concentrate 
on cultural objects, questions have turned to the role and experience of the subject 
in the creation of meaning. How we meet expressive culture and make sense of it are 
obviously important to the work we do as scholars of culture. A central emergent 
theme is the role of embodiment, emphasised in the recent shift in scholarship to 
consider corporeality and sensual experience that fosters aesthetic comprehension. 
The importance of embodiment theory is also central to new developments in 
cognitive science, which has a direct bearing on cultural enquiries that look to these 
insights for inspiration and direction. A survey of literature highlights the 
importance of continuing interdisciplinary engagement to answer the questions of 
ethnomusicology—of the role of music in culture—and that an interdisciplinary 
approach adds value to its subject. Pursuing this direction of study—opening up 
brand new theoretical terrain—out of necessity leads into areas of study that join 
cognition, experience and culture, with every point of entry requiring cross-
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disciplinarity. The folklorist Köstlin (1997) writes that the passion for the whole can 
produce pain, but keeps alive premonitions of how life could be: 
It could be the attempt to keep the whole in view, not to extinguish the flame, 
which makes the field of Volkskunde attractive. It is a field trying to view all at 









CHAPTER THREE   3 
Theory and Methodology: 
Ontological Understandings and Methodological Explanations 
 
Rice (2008: 42–61) argues that ‘there is a need in contemporary 
ethnomusicological research for a mediation between the epistemological, 
methodological work of explanation…with the ontological understandings of human 
musical experience.’ For this reason, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
will outline the philosophical worldview informing the development of ideas, laying 
the foundations for understanding the ballad experience. We will explore the 
phenomenological roots of embodied cognition and show how a theory of enaction 
based in hermeneutics informs ‘radical reflection’ in fieldwork practice.  Part two 
introduces the fundamentals for the methodical process chosen for explanation. Ideas 
from contemporary theories of metaphor and embodied thought will be introduced 
with a view to orienting the reader to the very basics of the theories, before 
developing their application to the ballad experience on several levels in the 
following chapters.  
 
Horizon of Enquiry 
For continuity, it is useful here to reiterate the primary research questions: 
What elements coalesce to create a powerful ‘ballad experience’? How is meaning 
created in the context of the ephemeral and intangible nature of musical 
performance? How do we understand the Maysie? In tackling the research questions, 
we need to find a grounded way of talking about the ballad experience as a ‘total 
82 
 
somatic experience’—one that affects both body and mind; to find a way of talking 
about the intangible nature of the ballad experience in a secular humanistic 
framework; and lastly to find a way to talk about an experience that is paradoxically 
both highly individual and simultaneously always a shared experience.  
According to hermeneutic theory, the self-conscious task of bringing new 
understandings forward involves the hermeneutic circle, or arc of understanding. 
Gadamer (2004: 302, my italics) proposes that understanding is an ‘act of 
participation’ in a tradition in which we have our own subjective ‘horizon of 
understanding’:  
 A person who has an horizon knows the relative significance of everything 
within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small. Similarly, working 
out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of enquiry for the 
questions evoked by the encounter with the tradition. 
 
Part of the difficulty in developing a research design, then, is acquiring the right 
horizon of enquiry. The process of understanding can be understood as a spiralling 
progression in which we examine our own understandings from within our own 
historical traditions, in order to identify our prejudices. I have taken my cue from 
research and practice in the post-modern world where the intermingling of 
traditions and a wide range of critiques offers a sense of exploration, as well as the 
possibility of expansion and development of ideas and theories. My own intellectual 
awareness, personal values and reflection are inescapably woven into this research. 
Being part of a department that specialises in traditional culture, folklore and 
ethnology has no doubt influenced my interest and research perspective, and my 
training in literary theory has given me an awareness of the complexities of working 
with language and meaning. The influence of my particular interest in the 
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philosophy of mindfulness, embodiment and truth became clearer as the theoretical 
ideas evolved.  
Following Porter’s (2009) direction of ballad study that moves ‘away from 
conventional paths to awareness of ballads as a living voice, a dramatic, transforming 
“presence,”’ this work is set within the wider interpretative framework of 
hermeneutic phenomenology, where truth and meaning are central concerns. In 
order to reinstate the place of the ballad in scholarship as a dynamic and living 
cultural phenomenon, a paradigmatic shift towards embodiment is embraced. 
Embodiment is identified at two levels: the phenomenological and the cognitive 
unconscious. At the first level, we are conscious of our feelings and actions; at the 
second level, the body informs our processes of abstract thought and 
reasoning. Together, inescapably, these two levels of enquiry encompass conflicting 
claims. Some scholars argue that the paradigm of embodiment allows us to 
‘transcend’ different methodologies (Csordas 1990: 5). I seek not to transcend but 
rather to mediate between: a double-level theoretical methodology can make attempts 
to faithfully describe and accept contradictions and ambiguities rather than aiming 
to explain or resolve them. The methodological principles that drive this thesis 
instantiate a tension that does not weaken but rather gives power to articulating the 











Worldview and Philosophical Assumptions 
It has been noted that at the heart of the problem of writing about experience 
lies a gap between the objective, descriptive, scientific, language encoded methods 
used to study music, and the vivid, deeply moving, often unarticulated inner 
experiences we actually experience through performing or listening (Rice 1994). 
The truth that music embodies and symbolically represents is not a 
propositional logical truth, verifiable by the niceties of epistemological 
reflection and explanation, but an existential, ontological truth that sensation, 
memory and imagination coalesce into a memorable experience (Rice 1994: 305, my 
italics). 
 
The questions asked in this research attend to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the ballad 
experience.  As such, they resist representation, presenting a challenge to objectivist 
epistemology. This is because within an objectivist view of the world, there is no 
way to describe experience as a first-person event. Objectivism is the modern-era 
science paradigm that conceives of human culture as wholly objectively observable, 
described by philosopher Bernstein (2008) as inhering in the basic conviction that 
there is, or must be, a permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can 
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, and 
reality. According to this view, reality exists as an absolute, and there exists a pre-
given world that exists ‘out there’ and is internally recovered in the form of 
representation.  
In a modern scholarly context, the antagonism between objectivity and 
subjectivity has been undermined by philosophical and hermeneutic 
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phenomenology, as developed in a stream of thought from Heidegger to Gadamer 
and Ricouer. Hermeneutic philosophy argues that there can be no objective position 
to view the world because we are ‘thrown’ into a world that gives us the symbols 
through which we come to understand that world. Because we use language to 
construct theory and represent data, we necessarily employ words to stand for or 
represent the musical performance we seek to understand. It is important to 
recognise our limitations and appreciate that any attempt at explanation will be 
mediated through language.  
Phenomenology begins with the assumption that we are conscious beings 
and that everything we know is something that we know only in and through 
experience. The central research concern is with the processual and constantly 
evolving multiple meanings that emanate and are created from social interaction 
over time. It attempts to get at and describe lived experience; its focus is our 
consciousness as it encounters the world, and of cultural objects as perceived by 
consciousness. Phenomenology becomes hermeneutical when it becomes 
interpretive rather than purely descriptive. Gadamer’s belief is that the scientific 
‘facts’ of lived experience are always already meaningfully, or hermeneutically, 
experienced: they need to be captured in language, which is inevitably an 
interpretive process. Examining the ballad experience, then, requires a 
phenomenological sensitivity to lived experience and realities; and a hermeneutic 
ability to make interpretative sense of the phenomena of those constructed realities.  
Contemporary hermeneutic phenomenology focuses on meaning that arises 
from the interpretive interaction between historically produced ‘texts’ and the 
interpreter. Ricouer (1981) explores the possibility of considering ‘human action as 
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text,’ maintaining that the framework of the human sciences is ultimately not very 
different from the analysis of written texts; and despite the distinctions that exist 
between written texts and socially enacted behaviour, in a human context, they are 
both symbolic activities. 
In phenomenology, the concept of meaning is considered to be ‘emergent’: that 
is, it cannot be predicted but changes course as particular interactions coalesce. In 
the study of the ballad experience, where ‘sensation, memory and imagination 
coalesce into a memorable experience’ (Rice 1994: 306) what is interesting is the 
emergent meaning created. Hermeneutic phenomenology must be the primary route 
to understanding, and thus forms the philosophical backbone to this work. As it will 
be shown, many of the primary hermeneutic and phenomenological ideas lend 
themselves to interpretation from the viewpoint of cognitive science; specifically the 
ideas of embodied cognition, which locate cognition as interaction with a world that 
is continually shaped by its environment. Contemporary theories of embodied 
cognition have their roots in phenomenological thought, and as we move forward 
towards new understanding, these disciplines can be seen as mutually informative. 
 
Embodied Philosophy: Phenomenological Roots 
The idea of incorporating complex models based in phenomenology is not 
welcomed by those who default to traditional, objectivist models. In seeking to 
refute objectivism, embodied philosophy maintains that reality is not pre-given, but 
rather that human cognition and consciousness can only be understood in terms of 
the structures in which they arise—namely the body (understood both as a biological 
system and as personally, phenomenologically experienced) and the physical world 
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with which the body interacts. According to this worldview, consciousness, world, 
and the human body as a perceiving thing are intricately intertwined and mutually 
engaged:  
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing 
but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but 
from a world which the subject itself projects (Varela et al. 1991: 7) 
 
This worldview, in which the human individual and his or her surrounding 
environment are regarded as intertwined, has its roots in phenomenological thought. 
Re-conceptualising consciousness as constituted through action and interaction 
with a ‘world’ owes much to the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
Heidegger’s rethinking of philosophy was an attempt to step away from 
ontotheological explanations and the ‘metaphysics of presence.’ Such a conception of 
‘presence’ refers to presence as a ‘now’ and also a presence as eternal, always present, 
as one might associate with God or the ‘eternal’ of laws of science. The metaphysics 
of presence, in my view, is arguably the central mistake of Western philosophy since 
Plato and especially of Descartes, whose cogito severed mind from body. From the 
standpoint of existential phenomenology, Heidegger’s rethinking of ontology 
proposed that our ‘being’ presents itself as a ‘being-in-the-world’ (the term ‘being-
in-the-word’ seeks to emphasise the relationship between self and world as a unitary 
whole). Heidegger’s central insight was that perception is dependent on the 
properties of the perceiver and their physical interaction with a world, that 
perception and action are fundamentally inseparable and that together they are 
constitutive of a ‘world.’ In this sense, phenomenology rests upon the radical 
conviction that meaning is neither in the mind alone, nor in the world alone, but in 
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the ‘intentional’24 relationship between the two. Hermeneutics holds this same view. 
Gadamer makes clear that we do not miraculously stand outside the relationship 
between language and world: we stand within a common space of intelligibility and 
meaning, a common intelligible space that penetrates the world, our experience, and 
our languages (Dorstal 2002: 78).  
 
Finite Provinces of Meaning: Multiple Realities 
The interpretative framework of phenomenology supports the ontological 
perspective of the belief in the existence of not just one reality, but of multiple 
realities that are constructed and continually modified by each individual. The idea 
of the lebenswelt or ‘lifeworld’ is central to phenomenological interpretation (Husserl 
[1936] 1970). The phenomenological experience of ‘being-in-the-world’ is an 
extension of the idea of the ‘lifeworld.’ Everyday lifeworld is the world of daily life—
the world which existed before our birth, experienced and interpreted by others, 
given to our own experience and interpretation. All interpretation of this world is 
therefore based upon a stock of previous experiences of it. This allows for a plurality 
of attitudes, which again are possible experiential relations that all human beings 
can stand in with respect to the world, actualised by particular circumstances.  
The social phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1945) contends that our ‘realities’ 
are nothing other than ‘finite provinces of meaning’ insofar as it is our experience 
that determines what is to be taken as ‘real’ and in what sense. In his essay ‘On 
Multiple Realities’ he claims that we experience many realities: everyday reality, 
dream reality, musical reality, workaday reality, erotic reality, reality of writing, 
                                                          
24 ‘Intentionality,’ in phenomenological discourse, refers to the notion that consciousness is always 
the consciousness of something.  
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reality of relationships, reality of mystical experience. Each of these shares a specific 
cognitive style and is internally coherent. It is obviously possible to move from one 
province to another in an instant, because provinces are not permanent ontological 
structures but merely the results of diverse tensions in the same consciousness. We 
can live simultaneously in various realms of reality, or even on different layers of the 
same province. It will later be argued that the ‘ballad world’ constitutes a particular 
lebenswelt, which we actively construct. 
In Schütz’s view, our lifeworld is structurally and radically connected to time; 
and time is a constitutive part of meaning. Accordingly, our lifeworld divides itself 
into the dimensions of time, space, the social world and various reality spheres 
which form the boundaries that the self has to understand. Thus, in Schütz’s view, 
the private and the public are not ontologically discrete domains, but simply terms 
that capture two experienced extremes. This implies that, on one hand, that this 
world is not private but common to all of us; on the other hand it implies that within 
this world there must exist others. Lived experience, then, is always and necessarily 
co-present. We can directly assure ourselves only of the existence of the other’s body 
but not of their consciousness. We can, however, apprehend the other’s lived 
experience at the same time as we are going through our own experience. In this 
sense, it is time structure that performs a decisive role in the basic process of 
understanding the other.  
 
Paradigm of Embodiment 
  For the last two decades, social theorists have grown increasingly interested 
in the body. Theories of embodiment begin from the methodological assumption that 
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the body is not an object to be studied in relation to culture, but is to be considered 
as the subject of culture. According to Thomas Csordas (1994: 269), bodily 
experience makes up the ‘existential ground of culture.’ It is important, however, to 
distinguish between ‘body’ and ‘embodiment’:  
If embodiment is an existential condition in which the body is the subjective 
source or intersubjective ground of experience, then studies under the rubric of 
embodiment are not ‘about’ the body per se. Instead they are about culture and 
experience insofar as these can be understood from the standpoint of bodily 
‘being-in-the-world’ (Csordas 1999: 143).  
 
This to say that this thesis is about culture and the ballad experience as understood 
as a finite province of bodily being-in-the-world, an idea that is fundamentally 
grounded in hermeneutic phenomenology. It is also important to make clear, as 
Becker (2004: 8) explains, that the term ‘embodiment’ is understood in different 
senses in various disciplines, none of which can be separated cleanly from others. 
She cites three major formulations: 
    1.The body as a physical structure in which emotion and cognition happen 
2.The body as the site of first person, unique inner life 
3.The body as involved with other bodies in the phenomenal world, that is, as 
being-in-the-world 
 
It is arguable that each of the three can provide special insights into our aesthetic 
experience. The first formulation above is found in mainstream studies of cognition 
and neuroscience and looks to brain structures. The second is the realm of the inner 
life—the traditional domain of the arts and humanities—which was taken up by 
phenomenology in an attempt to bring scientific rigour to its study. The third sense 
is the least reinforced in the arts and in the intellectual tradition in which we work: 
self and world and self and other are intertwined in a unitary whole (Becker 2004: 
8–9). The term ‘embodiment’ in its usage in the context of this thesis includes a 
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whole array of factors that are not merely peripheral but that incorporate culture, 
history, and personal experience. It refers to all three of the above formulations, but 
mostly concentrates on the latter two. 
When the term ‘body’ is used I do not intend to perpetuate the Cartesian 
dichotomy but rather to imply the notion of the ‘bodymind’ understood as a totality. 
That such a perspective is necessary for furthering understanding has become 
increasingly obvious from recent work in cognitive science and mutually informative 
studies in the theory of mind, which suggest that conceiving of the notion of mind 
divorced from body is not only indefensible, but that the very division between mind 
and body has become so obscured as to become meaningless. Varela et al. (1991) 
claim that our body is the ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge. The 
French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty made this central to his philosophy in 
Phenomenology of Perception ([1945] 2002: 169):  
The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted 
to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits 
around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary 
actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests 
through them a core of new significance...Sometimes, finally, the meaning 
aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s natural means; it must then build 
itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world.  
 
Questioning the assumption of a pre-given world might seem absurd, but there is 
accumulating evidence to the contrary. The dilemma in freely accepting that there is 
no pre-given world has its roots in the Cartesian anxiety and one of the more 
entrenched assumptions of our scientific heritage: that the world is independent of 
the knower. If we are forced to admit that cognition cannot be properly understood 
without common sense, and that common sense is none other than our bodily and 
social history, then the inevitable conclusion is that knower and known—mind and 
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worlds—stand in relation to each other through dependent co-origination. Instead of 
an objective independent world, we enact a world that is inseparable from the 
structure embodied by the cognitive system.  
 
Embodied Cognition  
We all have a constant phenomenological experience that reinforces the 
illusion of a disembodied mind. Universal embodied experiences give rise to the 
metaphors of the subject and the self which produce in our cognitive unconscious a 
concept of a subject as an independent entity, which is in no way dependent on the 
body for its existence. These metaphors express a common phenomenological 
experience we all have: in virtually all of our acts of perception, the bodily organs of 
perception (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin) are not what we are attending to. For 
example, when we look at a view, we are not normally attending to our eyes, much 
less to the visual system of our brains. The fact that what we attend to is rarely what 
we perceive with gives the illusion that mental acts occur independently of the 
unnoticed body. Because this experience is universal, the idea has risen 
spontaneously around the world. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 563) maintain that 
‘anything that both thinks and is free-floating is a myth. It cannot exist.’ The concept 
of a mind separate from the body can instead be understood as a metaphorical 
concept (561).  
Cognition is generally understood today as a complex social phenomenon, 
distributed among mind, body, activity and culturally organised settings, including 
other actors (Lave 1988: 1). Varela et al. (1991) construe mind as an actively emergent 
form, structured by and never wholly separable from the material facts of bodily 
94 
 
experience. Sensory processes (perception) and motor processes (action), having 
evolved together, are seen therefore as fundamentally inseparable, mutually 
informative, and structured so as to ground our conceptual systems (1991: 173).  
To the extent that these neural pathways and cognitive schemata arise from a 
body’s interaction with an experience-shaping environment, mind extends 
beyond the physical body into the social and cultural environments that exert 
major influence upon the body and shape all human experience. Thus, both 
body and culture are implicated in and constitutive of mind. The body is 
minded, the mind is embodied, and both body and mind are culturally mediated 
(Bowman 2004: 36–37). 
 
According to this model, mind and body are a whole and the perceptions and actions 
of the individuals are entwined with their cognitive construction of the world, 
dependent upon experiences based in having a body with sensory-motor capacities 
which are embedded in an encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural 
context. 
Cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind 
but is rather an enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the 
variety of actions that a being-in-the-world performs (Varela et al. 1991: 9, my 
italics). 
 
Relating ideas of embodied cognition to the study of cultural forms, Varela et al. 
(1991: 178–179, my italics) ask, 
Where is the locus of cultural knowledge such as folktales…? Is it in the mind of 
the individual? Great leverage for anthropological theory might be obtained by 
considering the knowledge to be found in the interface between mind, society 
and culture rather than in one or in all of them. The knowledge does not pre-
exist in any one place or form but it is enacted in particular situations—when a 
folktale is told. 
 
A possible and fruitful extension of this view is not just to the field of anthropology 
but also to the field of ethnomusicology, and from there directly to the study of the 
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‘ballad experience.’ Transferred to the immediate context of this thesis, we can 
consider meaning be to found in the interface between mind and culture, enacted in 
the particular event of ballad singing.  
 
Post-Phenomenology: Ontology of the Singular Plural 
Following new paradigms in theories of embodiment, Nancy (2000) 
reformulates early phenomenological ideas, starting with Heidegger’s notion of 
being-in-the world. Nancy’s fundamental argument is that being is always ‘being-
with,’ that ‘I’ is not prior to ‘we,’ and that there is no existence without co-existence. 
Heidegger’s order of ontological exposition is reversed, the ‘with’ placed at the heart 
of being: ‘existence is with: otherwise nothing exists’ (2000: 4, original emphasis). 
Nancy’s grande idée25 is that individuals are in no way fundamentally separated from 
one another. We always already exist in relations with one another; there is no 
singular self that pre-exists our relations with others. In Nancy’s view, this is the 
‘minimal ontological premise’ (27). As such, being-there is already always a necessary 
being-with because there is no isolated given ‘I’ without others. His ontology is a 
‘singular-plural co-existence.’ This places the tension between self and world at the 
heart of being.26 
It is, each time, the punctuality of a ‘with’ that establishes a certain origin of 
meaning and connects it to an infinity of other possible origins. Therefore, it is, 
                                                          
25 Langer’s (1957) notion of grande idée is that certain ideas that burst upon the intellectual landscape 
with an extraordinary force. Promising to resolve many fundamental problems at once, these ideas 
become the conceptual centre point around which a comprehensive system of analysis can be built 
(Geertz 1973: 3). 
26 Nancy’s philosophical achievement is to remind us of our singular-plural existence in the light of 
recent postmodern confusion about the fragmentation of the self. Watkin (2009) explores the work 
of Nancy in relation to Merleau-Ponty and Ricouer, showing how a phenomenological tradition much 
wider and richer than Heideggerean thought alone can take account of Derrida’s critique of ontology 




one and the same time…the two together. The individual is an intersection of 
singularities, the discrete exposition of their simultaneity, an exposition that is 
both discrete and transitory (Nancy 2000: 85). 
 
Moreover, in Nancy’s ontology, nothing pre-exists, ‘only what exists exists’ (28–29). 
This suggests a turning away from an understanding that art-forms such as song 
hold some kind of transcendent value—a value that is held outwith experience. This 
kind of theory is less about ‘transcendence’ and more about the creative processes 
present in encounters with cultural forms; it is not what it is, but how it perpetually 
comes to be and the emergent meanings that are produced. This ontology provides a 
framework for analysing and understanding the ballad experience without resorting 
to metaphysical explanations.  
 
Being-with: Intersubjectivity 
Phenomenology embraces the notion of ‘intersubjectivity’ as a way of 
explaining human perceptual experience of the world. From the perspective of 
embodied philosophy, 
Embodiment is an existential condition in which the body is the subjective 
source or intersubjective ground of experience’ (Csordas 1999: 143).  
 
Recent work in ethnography has become increasingly concerned with how we 
understand the ‘subject.’ This work has revolved around a critique of the ways in 
which the ‘subject’ has been traditionally understood: as a mental entity existing 
prior to experience. However, this work has yet to think through the implications of 
this critique for how we understand intersubjective relations. Nancy (2000) 
suggests a subject that is always already implicated in the ‘with’ of its being; an 
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always emergent subject. He conceives of intersubjectivity as ‘movements of 
presencing’ whereby the subject is always undergoing the emergent process of 
becoming, moving towards itself and others, but is never actually reached, never ‘self 
present.’ In this view, our everyday world is an intersubjective world of culture, in 
which we are bound to others, understanding them, and being the object of 
understanding for others.  
In finding a way to talk about an experience that is paradoxically both highly 
individual and simultaneously always a shared experience, the utility of Nancy’s 
ontology of the singular plural becomes clear. According this principle, people are 
not self-contained subjects experiencing an outer, objective world; every person is an 
experiencing subject where there is reciprocity through an engagement with one 
another. Moreover, the notion of intersubjectivity is fundamentally inseparable from 
the concept of experience: experience is not an inner phenomenon accessible only 
via introspection to the one having the experience, but rather experience begins 
with interaction with a world and with others.  
 
Paradox of Experience   
Inherent in the worldview and paradigm of embodiment outlined above is a 
fundamental ambiguity. Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 2002: 6) asserts that we must 
‘recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon.’ This indeterminacy is 
characterised as the human ‘genius for ambiguity which might serve to define man’ 
(220). With this grand declaration, he attempts to overcome the philosophical habit 
of opposing self and world and perpetuating dualisms in which the ultimate 
foundation of ‘truth’ invariably resides in whichever term of the duality a given 
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thinker deems more fundamental than the other. Rather, ‘ambiguity is the essence of 
human existence’ since ‘ambiguity is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its 
fundamental structure’ (169). This ‘structure’ is consciousness itself, or more 
precisely, that of embodied consciousness (that is, through the intermediary of the 
body.) The body is the general medium of our existence, but it is never wholly 
available to us (Bowman 2004). This unavailability is one of the body’s more salient 
features.  
There are several apparent paradoxes here. From the perspective of embodied 
cognition, we perceive reality only as experienced, by our own selves. However, in 
order for us to perceive reality, it must present itself to us as ‘in itself’—preceding 
and exceeding our subjective experience. This ambiguity is rendered still more 
ambiguous by the body’s simultaneous individual and cultural status. Bodies are 
always both thoroughly individual and thoroughly social or cultural. This is to say 
that lived relations can never be grasped perfectly by consciousness, since the body 
subject is never entirely ‘present to itself.’ Meaningful behaviour is lived through, 
rather than reflected upon, and this ensures that the actions of particular individuals 
may be meaningful without them being fully or reflectively aware of the meaning 
that their action creates or embodies. There is ambiguity precisely because we are 
not capable of disembodied reflection upon our activities, but are involved in an 
intentional arc that absorbs both our body and our mind (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 136). 
Instead, as the philosopher William Desmond (1990: 95).sees it, ‘the plurivocity of 
being is intimated in the sensuous showing of ambiguity itself.’  
Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject necessarily requires ambiguity. In his view, 
ambiguity prevails in our perception of things primarily because of our temporal 
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situation which he insists cannot but be ambiguous. We face a time gap between 
lived experience and reflection, between experience and consciousness of the 
experience, between experience and meaning. It is also important to remember that 
actively experiencing and reflecting on experience are clear and distinct activities. 
For Schütz (1976), a clear definition of a lived experience is fundamental for his 
concept of meaning. Only a defined experience has meaning; and, given the temporal 
nature of experience, a defined experience is therefore and necessarily always a past 
experience. Meaning is not an intrinsic feature of experiences, nor is it an additional 
experience. According to Schütz, experience while occurring—that is, while we are 
living in it—does not have any meaning; only the past experiences we can reflect 
upon are meaningful. Schütz (1976: 61–2) defines meaning as ‘nothing else but the 
attitude of the experiencing mind towards its past experiences.’ Not only is an 
experience still undefined while it occurs, but as we turn our attention to a lived 
instant, while we grasp it in its being present and not otherwise, it is already always 
past. What we grasp by the reflective act is never the present of our stream of 
thought, it is always its past. This is another kind of paradox: the ballad experience 
is always its own past.  
Finally, there is also ambiguity in the distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘world’: 
the mind may be viewed as symbiotically embedded not only within in its body but 
also in that body’s environment, and structured by its surroundings. What this view 
of embodiment calls for is an understanding of the subject not constitutive of, but as 






Radical Reflection  
It was stipulated that in the construction of a research design for the study of 
the ballad experience that what is needed is a methodology for exploration that is 
appropriate for a somatic focus on a seemingly non-rational topic and a consistency 
of analytical approach, but without becoming a rigid or closed system (Porter 2009). 
The role of reflection is crucial in the analysis of experience, and lies at the 
methodological heart of the interaction between the two levels of hermeneutic 
phenomenology and cognitive science. In order to engage in experience, out of 
necessity, research must be reflexive.  
Varela et al. (1991) advance a change in the nature of reflection from an 
abstract disembodied activity to an embodied, open-ended reflection. By ‘embodied’ 
they are referring to the necessity of a physical body whose sensory-motor 
experiences result in cognition. They begin their arguments by invoking ‘a 
fundamental circularity’ of being in a world that is ‘not separate from us’ (3). 
Although Merleau-Ponty recognised this circularity and embraced the study of 
experience in a radical way in phenomenology—using his phenomenological 
perspectives to reveal a middle way or an entre-deux between science and experience, 
inner and outer, or self and world binaries, calling it ‘radical reflection’—he 
nonetheless continued the tradition he came from, with only a theoretical means to 
explain experience.  
Varlea et al. move beyond many contemporary theoretical approaches. In an 
attempt to resolve the dissonance between science and personal experience, they 
look to a tradition which derives from the Buddhist method of examining experience 
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called ‘mindfulness.’27 Mindfulness means simply that the mind is present in 
embodied everyday experience; its purpose is to help us become mindful, to 
experience what one’s mind is doing as it does it, to ‘be present with one’s mind’ 
(23). The relevance this has for cognitive science is that, if cognitive science is to 
include human experience as it encounters the world, it must have some method for 
exploring and knowing what human experience is. Varela et al. suggest that Eastern 
philosophical ideas offer not only a wealth of important insights into the 
phenomenon of human consciousness but also otherwise unobtainable insights into 
the relations of embodiment that permit us to understand how the inner and the 
outer, the first-person point of view and the objective point of view of science, can 
coexist. 
 
Theory of Enaction 
Varela et al. introduce a theory of ‘enaction,’ based on hermeneutics, which 
implies ‘the enactment or bringing forth of meaning from a background of 
understanding’ (149). The concept of enaction integrates the Cartesian divide 
through interdependence of the perceiver and the environment. As we enact a world 
we are necessarily also embodied in it: knowledge involves creative cognition arising 
from the interconnections between our bodies, language, society, and the world.  
 What this methodology conveys is that reflection is not just on experience, 
but is a form of experience itself. When reflection is carried out in this way, it can 
                                                          
27 They contend that the rediscovery of Eastern philosophies, in particular from the Buddhist 
tradition, has the potential to be equally as important as the rediscovery of Greek thought in the 
European Renaissance. They add weight to their claim noting that in the Buddhist tradition, 




cut the chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions such that it can be an 
open-ended reflection of the kind Gadamer advocates in his philosophical 
hermeneutics, open to possibilities other than those contained in the current 
representation. As discussed, the hermeneutic encounter is one that prompts the 
interpreter to reflect on prejudices, understand them, attempt to justify them as 
rationally as possible, and then to go beyond them through what is encountered. By 
not including ourselves in the reflection, we pursue only a partial reflection, and in 
Varela et al.’s terms, our questions become ‘disembodied.’  
The chief idea in its application in the context of this research is that 
theoretical reflection need not be mindless and disembodied. From the standpoint of 
a mindful, open-ended reflection, the mind-body question need not be ‘What is the 
ontological relation between body and mind, regardless of anyone’s experience?’ but 
rather, ‘What are the relations of body and mind in actual experience and how do 
these relations develop, what forms can they take? Such a worldview has radical 
implications in answering the key question in this research: how is meaning created 
in the context of the ephemeral and intangible nature of musical performance?  
When we include in our reflection the asker of the question and the process of 
asking itself, then the question receives new life and meaning. Porter (2009: 177–178) 
himself notes the importance of this reflexivity as a researcher: 
The voices that emerge in a study such as this must also include the voice of the 
scholar, who needs to write himself (or herself) into the process…In doing so 
they may come nearer to the empathy of Herder and the understanding of 






Ethnomusicology: Truth and Method  
It was noted in Chapter Two that the field of ethnomusicology has seen shifting 
emphasis from representation toward experience—a shift that in itself reflects a 
confrontation with objectivism. With this change of direction, however, traditional 
ethnomusicological methods become quickly outmoded: they attempt to provide us 
with epistemological solutions to an ultimately ontological problem. The purpose of 
Gadamer’s philosophical project in Truth and Method ([1960] 2004) was to elaborate 
on the concept of philosophical hermeneutics and to uncover the nature of human 
understanding, arguing that ‘truth’ and ‘method’ were at odds with one another.28 
The word ‘method’ itself implies a pre-existing theory and concern with 
epistemological problem of finding, verifying and knowing the truth within the 
frames of reference defined by theory. Rice (2002), following Gadamer, believes that 
in ethnomusicology, the very idea of ‘method’ is at odds with the fundamental goal of 
the discipline—that is, to understand the experience of people making music.  
Turning back to the call for the ontological understandings of human musical 
experience, Rice (2002: 47) asks: 
If the self rather than method were the locus of explanation and 
understanding...might this realignment contribute to the reformulation of theory 
and method? Could theory and method, which take for granted a fixed and 
timeless ontological distinction between insider and outsider, be recorded within 
an ontology that understands both researching and researched selves as 
potentially interchangeable and as capable of change through time, during the 
dialogues that typify that fieldwork experience?  
 
                                                          
28 Gadamer was critical of two approaches to the human sciences: on the one hand, he was critical of 
modern approaches to humanities that modelled themselves on the natural sciences (and thus on 
rigorous scientific methods); on the other, he took issue with the traditional German approach to the 
humanities, represented for instance by Dilthey, who believed that correctly interpreting a text meant 
recovering the original intention of the author who wrote it. 
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In a theoretical framework where mind, self and world are intertwined, and where 
being is always being-with others, such a ‘radically reflective’ approach would seem 
to be the only option to understand the truth of experience as it emerges in context. 
The space of music and ethnographical work is shared by us all; it is the conceptual 
space in which cultural experience co-occurs for the researcher, singers and 
audience. Furthermore, it is where we know the passage of time, grasp meaning and 
make metaphoric connections to other areas of cultural experience.  
 
Experiential Fieldwork: Being There 
Although there is not agreement on any one paradigm for ethnomusicological 
research, and research can be quite idiosyncratic, there is one very important shared 
aspect, which is ethnographic and ethnological research. Essential to ethnographic 
research, of course, is fieldwork carried out among the people who belong to the 
tradition being studied. Porter (2009: 137) maintains,  
Ethnological fieldwork...remains the first and best way in which ballads can be 
studied and understood.  
However, in the absence of fieldwork method, then the ‘field,’ if not a place to work 
and test out theory, becomes an experiential place. Fieldwork is experience, and the 
experience of people making music is at the core of ethnomusicological enquiry. In 
the context of the new ethnomusicology, in fact, it may be possible to understand 
the relationship between music and culture in the absence of method, just by being 
there.   
Objectivism insists that ‘truth’ is what remains after the subject has been 
eradicated. In contrast, a dialectical view insists that subject and object are not 
105 
 
separable entities, but simply words we assign to different yet mutually determining 
moments and modalities of experience. This highlights a methodological 
indeterminacy: what is the nature of the relationship between the subjectivity of the 
ethnographer and the subjectivities of those with whom the ethnographer works?  
The truth cannot be reduced to either. In other words, we can neither assess the 
truth of our understanding representationally in terms of its fidelity to others; nor 
confessionally, as a disclosure of our own ulterior motives and unconscious desires. 
We may only assess it intersubjectively in terms of the social relationships that 
exist, first between the ethnographer and those with whom they work; and second 
between the ethnographer and his or her own lifeworld.  
Phenomenological understanding of musical experience sees fieldwork as an 
attempt to partially share experience by placing the researcher on the same plane as 
the research participant and engaging in a dialogic agenda. In this way ‘truth’ is 
negotiated through dialogue. Understanding occurs in the dialogue between the 
researcher and his or her people:  
This is the world, the intersubjective reality, that the fieldworker comes to 
know; and this is the only world one can truly reconstruct in one’s 
interpretative writings—if one comes to any understanding at all (Titon 1995: 
13).  
 
Porter’s development of a theory of ballad presence must look to see how 
meanings are negotiated among scholars, performers and active listeners (2009: 188). 
Participation is key. He writes, 
The...negotiation on ballad meaning might benefit if the student can sing as 
well as converse. This brings the issue of self-consciousness into focus. And if 
the hermeneutic arc is to function as it should, such mental and cultural 




Taking this on board, I was keen to experience the tradition myself, as a constant 
reminder of the actual experience under study in an attempt to not become at too 
much of a remove from lived reality. The majority of my experiential fieldwork was 
conducted in 2010 in various locations around Scotland at folk and singing festivals, 
ballad singing workshops, folk clubs and events, and more personal encounters. 29 
Informal interviews were conducted at live events where instances of ‘presencing’ 
might occur, based on the conviction that the performance of traditional ballads can 
only be effective in the context of exchange between audience and singer, in a two-
way communicative relationship. As Herndon (1971: 327–388) claims, the musical 
‘occasion’ can be seen as an ‘encapsulation of cultural cognition.’ She claims that 
cultural cognition influencing musical processes is to be found in the passing 
‘moments’ of musical practice as performance—the musical occasion, event, or 
experience.  
Often ethnomusicologists find themselves at some sort of cultural or historical 
distance from the traditions they study. Even insider ethnomusicologists—those 
born into the traditions they study—undergo a ‘productive distantiation necessary 
                                                          
29 Perhaps most notably were the excellent and highly popular ballad workshops held at Laurie’s Bar, 
Glasgow, with traditional singers Anne Neilson and Gordeanna McCulloch. These women are 
convinced of the power of ballads to communicate meaningfully to a contemporary audience, and 
keen to share that thrill with others. The intention and objective of these workshops is to give 
participants the confidence and the will to sing ballads by themselves. The backgrounds to songs are 
explored, as well as any folklore that may shed light on their meaning and origin. They work with the 
tunes, with the words, and with the phrasing, to produce an attractive and vibrant version. This is 
followed by a sing around in which some fantastic performances happen. I also attended ‘FifeSing’—a 
weekend of traditional singing for singers and enthusiasts, which takes place in Collessie in Fife, 
organised by Pete Shepherd. FifeSing was for me a unique opportunity to meet, hear and talk with a 
selection of the finest exponents of Scottish traditional singing to be found today—Sheila Stewart, 
Geordie Murison, Jimmy Hutchison, Terry Conway among others—and, of course, to participate in 
the singing sessions. One afternoon was dedicated entirely to the singing of ballads. I also attended 
Cullerlie Traditional Singing Weekend, a unique celebration bringing together outstanding 
traditional singers from Scotland, England, and Ireland Tom Spiers and Elizabeth Stewart and 
elsewhere, including Geoff Warner from New England. The event is especially for those who like to 
hear, enjoy, and join in unaccompanied traditional singing, including ceilidhs featuring the guest 




for the explanation and understanding of their own cultures’ (Berger 2008: 62–75). 
Herndon (1993: 77) writes, ‘I speak as myself; neither fully insider, nor outsider, 
neither fully etic nor fully emic.’ Rather than there being simply ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ categories of ways of knowing, all who place themselves ‘in front of’ a 
tradition use the hermeneutic arc to move from pre-understandings, to explanation, 
to new understandings. Such dialectic also helps to remove the distinction of ‘native’ 
and ‘ethnic’ concepts; it goes beyond a difference of categories or a mere exchange of 
views, and as such results in important descriptions as well as explanations. 
Experience in this sense is always in-between; understanding is always emergent. 
All individuals operating within the tradition continually re-appropriate 
their cultural practices, give them new meanings, and in the process create a 
continually evolving sense of self, of identity, of community and ‘being-in-
the-world’ (Rice 2008: 58).  
 
As Rice (2008) further emphasises, this type of inquiry into musical traditions sees 
the constitution of meaning as an open-ended process, something that people 
discover as they perform, listen to, and reflect on music over time. This openness is 
key to radical reflection. Experience, then, always suggests an openness to new 
experience.  
The truth of experience always contains an orientation toward new 
experience...the dialectic of experience has its own fulfilment not in definitive 
knowledge, but in that openness to experience that is encouraged by 
experience itself (Gadamer 2004: 319). 
 
Truth and Metaphor: Describing Experience 
Over the course of this research process I found myself engaged in discussion 
with individuals such us Stanley Robertson who cared deeply about the tradition 
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and who held particular beliefs about it. In the study of traditional song, we cannot 
afford to bypass these beliefs in the search for explanations that will satisfy both 
scholarly and native logic. We can find illuminating insights for scholarly 
understanding in  the complex of meanings that singers hold about their tradition. 
Rice (2003: 167) makes explicit the idea that metaphor is an indispensable tool in 
any attempt to study and understand human experience, and specifically musical 
experience: 
Ethnomusicologists [must] take seriously every metaphor, whether of their own 
making or of their research subjects for what they are: fundamental claims to 
truth, guides to practical action and discourse, ways of reconfiguring our 
understanding of the world, and sources for comprehending music’s profound 
importance to human life. 
 
Because of the limitations of our modes of representation, we have a hard time trying 
to express the full meaning of our experiences in language. When we are trying to 
describe aesthetic experience, we are forced to do so in metaphorical terms, because 
this the only mode of language in which inner experience can be expressed. For 
example, the ‘ballad experience’ is conceived of as the phenomenon of being ‘deeply 
moved’ in response to ballad singing.  This seemingly simple definition, ‘being,’ 
‘moved’, and ‘deeply’—is infinitely complex. ‘Being,’ in the simplest sense, refers to an 
engagement of the self as a sentient organism. But in saying this we are immediately 
thrown into the complexities and perplexities of the primary ontological issue at the 
core of metaphysics—the possibility and nature of ‘being’ as such. The term ‘moved’ 
raises the issue of experienced subjectivity—the human capacity to feel and to be 
aware of that which is being felt as being meaningful; that is, as being significant and 
fulfilling. ‘Moved’ is semantically related to ‘motion,’ and also to ‘emotion.’  The term 
‘deeply’ is also difficult, being based in the belief that human meanings exist not on a 
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single plane but on a spectrum, ranging from the trivial to the profound. Both the 
‘moved’ and the ‘deeply’ terms of the definition are necessarily metaphorical 
descriptions, grounded in bodily experience, an idea that will be developed in Part 
Two.  
We need metaphor to describe ambiguity, to describe those elusive and 
intangible facets of human experience that are beyond the reach of language. The 
‘truth’ of such language is a truth appropriate to its subject, which, by its nature, 
requires representation by oblique suggestion rather than by objective exactitude. 
Post-modern scholars are keen on deconstructing any kind of ‘truth claims,’ showing 
how each is nothing more than a self-interested, socially positioned construction. 
While this might be true in an academic context, it is still important to take people’s 
‘truth claims’ very seriously: they are telling us that music is deeply moving and 
deeply expressive and this is what gives meaning to our academic work.  
Metaphor has a fundamental power in constructing the world we perceive: it 
enables us to create and recreate meaning, and makes possible the creation of 
entirely new worlds of imagination. Part Two below explores contemporary theories 
of metaphor, informed by a turn in twentieth century analytic and continental 
philosophy away from a traditional rhetorical view toward the claim that metaphor 
is a fundamental element in human thought. Guck (1981) contends that 
metaphorical language can put us more directly in touch with those aspects of 
aesthetic experience upon which traditional analytical techniques were focussed, 












Ethnographic enquiry is located on a continuum that extends from 
description at one end to the use of such description for theoretical models and 
explanations at the other. This project was created to understand and make sense of 
a very specific idea, the idea of the ‘ballad experience’—an idea informed by a 
fieldwork encounter with the late Stanley Robertson, described early in Chapter 
One. According to Moisala (1995: 16), in cognitive ethnomusicology, the task of the 
researcher is to document the experience, and thereafter, to discover and interpret 
the implicit cognition and cognitive processes, building and developing models 
which examine musical cognition as a shared cultural process. This section will 
present contemporary theories of metaphor and embodied thought, introducing 
ideas of ‘cross domain mapping,’ ‘image schemata’ and ‘conceptual blending’—ideas 
which will be developed and applied to the ballad experience as ideas progress in 
later chapters. Theory is not theory for theory’s sake: in dealing with a study object 
as ineffable as musical experience, it serves ultimately to make ideas transparent and 
strengthen the quality of understanding. 
 
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor and the Embodied Mind 
Metaphor is a cognitive capacity unique to humans. Ordinary definition 
describes metaphor as a figure of speech or literary device in which a word or phrase 
is applied in order to denote a resemblance; however, there is abundant evidence to 
suggest that metaphor is not simply a manifestation of literary creativity, but that 
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metaphor is central to language and to how humans understand and make sense of 
the world. The linguist Lakoff and philosopher Johnson worked together to produce 
the seminal work, The Metaphors We Live By (1980), which in turn provided the 
impetus for the development of the field of cognitive study.  
Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and 
action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and 
act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature...Our concepts structure what we 
perceive... and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays 
a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting 
that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, 
what we experience...is very much a matter of metaphor (3). 
 
Prior to this view, language was explained mostly in terms of grammar; and 
regarding semantics, only in terms of surface structure.30 The reason why language 
exists in the first place, and why we use it specifically the way we do, is explored by 
Lakoff and Johnson.  
Metaphors are so deeply embedded in our consciousness that they often go 
unnoticed. Through the appearance of metaphorical constructions in everyday 
discourse, Lakoff and Johnson propose that metaphor is a basic structure of 
understanding. Metaphors create conceptual systems by drawing from two 
experiences we have in world and culture and by viewing one or the same aspect of 
something in relation to another, in a process of ‘cross domain mapping.’ That is to 
say, we conceptualise one ‘domain’ of experience (the target domain, which is 
typically unfamiliar or abstract) in terms of another (the source domain, which is 
most often familiar and concrete).  
                                                          
30 There has been a great variety of points of view regarding linguistic study. The key point here is 
that metaphor is at work below the level of language itself. 
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Human experience does not cluster automatically into universally 
meaningful categories; it gets organised, processed, understood and interpreted by 
the worldviews that our culture and language supply. Like language, metaphors are 
more than mere objective terms. When we categorise, we do so out of our 
interactional experience both with the physical world and our environment. 
Concepts are not arbitrary or reduced to the merely subjective, because they are 
necessarily created within the constraints of our physical world and the culture in 
which we live (14). This reflects the ontological assumptions driving this thesis: the 
fundamental circularity of being in a world that is not separate from us (Varela et al 
1993: 3).   
A fundamental idea in the contemporary theory of metaphor springing from 
Lakoff and Johnson’s work is a distinction between ‘conceptual metaphors’ and 
‘linguistic metaphors.’ Conceptual metaphors concern patterns of thought, and 
linguistic metaphors are the expressions of these patterns through various linguistic 
constructions. To conceptualise something is to bring order to a perceived 
phenomenon, to categorise it, relate it to existing experiential structures, to 
understand it. A conceptual metaphor is a cognitive map across two different 
domains; a linguistic metaphor is an expression of that mapping in language. The 
idea here is that linguistic expressions can be seen simply as linguistic 
manifestations of more general structures of understanding. The most important 
point in the approach to metaphor epitomised by Lakoff and Johnson is that it 
extends the discussion of metaphor beyond language. Metaphor, construed as one the 
basic resources of human thought, is evident in all domains of human experience, not 
just those which use language.  
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The Body in the Mind  
Understanding of the workings of metaphor have since been expanded since 
Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal book, by Lakoff and Johnson themselves and by others 
in light of new discoveries in cognitive science.31 One challenge metaphor theorists 
faced was the ultimate grounding of the process of cross domain mapping and 
conceptual metaphors. Even if it is accepted that we understand a target domain in 
terms of a source domain, how is it that we understand the source domain in the 
first place?  
Many important modern philosophers and theorists working within the 
paradigm of embodiment have emphasised that, ultimately, all of our knowledge is 
held bodily, because it is through our bodies that we are rooted in the world.  
Knowing in any humanly meaningful sense is emergent from and grounded in 
bodily experience and continuous with the cultural production of meaning 
(Bowman 2004: 48). 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) outline three major philosophical assumptions:  
The mind is inherently embodied.  
Thought is mostly unconscious.  
Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical  
 
In answering the question of the ‘ground’ of metaphor, Johnson (1987) proposed that 
meaning is grounded in repeated patterns of bodily experience. His work The Body in 
the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason claims that we draw on our 
embodied experience, allowing us to describe things within a continuum. We reason 
so predominantly in bodily terms—‘embodied cognition’—that we are largely 
unaware of this fundamental aspect of thought. He writes, 
                                                          
31 See Fauconnier (1997); Gribbs (1994); Johnson (1987); Kovecses (1990); Lakoff and Turner (1989); 
Sweetser (1990) and Turner (1991), (1996). 
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 Any adequate account of meaning and rationality must give a central place to 




Adopting and modifying terminology that he traced to the work of Kant, 
Johnson (1987) called such patterns of bodily experience ‘image schemata.’ An ‘image 
schema’ is a dynamic cognitive construct that functions like the abstract structure of 
an image and thereby connects a vast range of different experiences that manifest 
this same recurring structure (2). His use of ‘body’ stands as a ‘generic term for the 
embodied origins of imaginative structures of understanding, such as image schemas 
and their metaphorical elaborations’ (xv).  
An important thread running through Johnson’s work and crucial to the 
wider theoretical framework developing here is this confrontation with objectivism. 
In seeking to refute objectivism, it was important for Johnson to show how human 
knowledge could be grounded in embodied experience; that understanding could 
develop and flourish without having to touch base with an objective reality; and that 
such a reality was not a prerequisite for knowledge. The theory of image schemata is 
crucial in making his argument, for it supports each of these claims.  
The theory is that through early interaction with our environment (for 
example. bodily movement, sensory awareness) we understand and catalogue 
thousands of body-based concepts such as inside/outside, vertical/horizontal and 
self/other. This allows us to understand subsequent experiences through a process 
known as ‘metaphorical projection.’ This projection is based on the formation of 




Image schemas are central structures of understanding; they are not literal 
images but ‘structures that organize our mental representations at a [more general] 
level’ (23–4). Acquired automatically and unconsciously, conceptual metaphors 
constitute neural connections in the brain and involve projection, or ‘mapping’ of an 
experience in one domain to an experience in another domain. This is the process 
that gives rise to image schemata which in turn provide the basis for the concepts 
and relationships essential to productive metaphor.  
It is important to make clear here that image schemata are by no means 
exclusively visual—the idea of an image is simply a way of capturing the organisation 
inferred from patterns in behaviour and concept formation. When we invoke the 
term ‘imagery’ in the psychological sense, we might assume that this refers to ‘mental 
imagery’ and then further to assume that we are talking about visual imagery in the 
form of pictures or representations. But thinking in terms of the mental-visual 
representation biases the discussion from the outset toward something quite 
abstract. Johnson points out that if we realise that imagery (itself a metaphor) can 
occur in all other sensory modalities and not just the visual, and we realise that 
imaginary processes are sometimes profound and vivid engagements of the sensory 
modalities, it is possible to understand that all imagery can be interpreted as 
‘embodied imagery.’ 
The ‘verticality schema,’ for example, is fundamental to our understanding of 
two or three dimensional spaces—to give physical space an ‘up’ and ‘down’ 
analogous to the ‘up’ and ‘down’ of our bodies. This process is evidenced most 
notably in our expressions of emotions, consciousness and health, which uses our 
knowledge of physical space to structure our understandings. For example, 
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“I’m feeling high/down” 
“I woke up, I fell asleep” 
“I’m in top shape. I came down with the flu”  
 
In other words, the source domain is often more concrete, and the target domain 
more abstract. Because image schemata constrain but do not determine absolutely 
our understanding, imagination comes to play a crucial role in our experience of the 
world, for it is through the flexible play of imagination that we apply 
image-schematic knowledge to various situations.32 Johnson (1987: 170) summarises 
this perspective as follows: 
Creativity occurs at all levels of our experiential organization and not just in 
those rare moments when we discover novel ideas. We are imaginatively 
creative every time we recognize a schema in a new situation we have never 
experienced before and every time we make metaphorical connections among 
various preconceptual and conceptual structures.  
 
Imagination is thus not ancillary to our understanding, but is instead basic to it.  
Johnson bolstered his argument with numerous analyses of linguistic, 
conceptual, and visual phenomena, and showed how the theory of image schemata 
permitted a single, relatively simple explanation for the underlying structure of these 
phenomena. This theory offers a somewhat unique way to approach the problem of 
human understanding: it does not consist merely of after-the-fact reflections on 
prior experiences; it is, more fundamentally, the way in which we have those 
experiences in the first place. It is a result of the massive complex of our culture, 
language, history, and bodily mechanisms that blend to make our world what it is. In 
sum, the theory of image schemata enabled Johnson to develop a fundamentally 
                                                          
32 Similar arguments for the importance of image schemata or analogous structures have been made 
by researchers both in neuroscience and in human gesture as a communicative means. On 




different view of knowledge and understanding, leading to a fundamentally different 
way of doing philosophy and understanding cognitive science.  
To link this theory to the wider theoretical framework of phenomenological 
hermeneutics, Arbib and Hesse (1986) make a direct connection between the 
cognitive schema theory and hermeneutics. The concept of a ‘schema’ signifies that 
the knowledge we already have does not consist of disconnected pieces of 
information but is organised into patterns that we access and use in the acquisition 
of new knowledge. Such patterns or schemas allow us to ‘assimilate’ new 
information into already established frameworks. Importantly, new information can 
also cause a change in previously established schemas; schemas can change or 
‘accommodate’ themselves to the new object. We construct and create an 
interpretation. For example, texts are meaningless unless we have recourse to some 
interpretative framework that will to some degree facilitate understanding. In this 
sense, such a process is essentially hermeneutical.  
At present, the theory of ‘image schema’ still remains a theoretical construct. 
In his more recent work The Meaning of the Body (2008) Johnson turned back to 
cognitive neuroscience to further explore the bodily origins of meaning, thought, and 
language and examines the many dimensions of meaning, including images, qualities, 
emotions, and metaphors that are all rooted in the body’s physical encounters with 
the world. Work across a variety of fields has since made strong arguments for this 
point of view. Damasio, working from a neuro-physiological perspective, has made 
compelling arguments for the importance of the body to consciousness and thought 
in The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (1999). 
Although research on image schemata and similar structures is still preliminary, it 
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offers some of the best prospects for solving some of the problems of the relationship 




Even with the indispensable tool of metaphor, problems arise from the use of 
language as a medium to describe or analyse phenomena. How are the complex, 
multiple dimensions of the ballad experience to be described and represented? These 
problems are at the heart of what the ethnomusicologist Charles Seeger (1977: 107) 
called the ‘linguocentric predicament.’ In order to mitigate against this problem, he 
suggests that the use of graphic representation or visual demonstration has the 
power to be both descriptive and analytic at the same time and therefore conducive 
to understanding musical experience. However, the kinds of models which have 
been used in most investigators’ conceptions of musical phenomena and their social 
significance have been almost exclusively concerned with the atomistic description 
of static forms rather than with the process of experience perceived holistically.33 
The purpose of traditional musicological analysis is, certainly, to isolate or identify 
meaningful elements in the music, its performance, and its social significance; but to 
do this with any degree of success means understanding the musical process. Seeger 
himself placed a deliberate emphasis upon the functional or processual aspects of 
music by representing it as temporal, with changing rather than stable components, 
as dynamic rather than static. In my view, this can only be achieved by means of a 
more holistic view of the interdependent functions of the music process in the mind.  
                                                          
33 Porter (1976) has made an attempt to graphically represent in a conceptual model the changing over 




Creative Blending  
In order to try and overcome the ‘linguocentric problem,’ this thesis explores 
the theory of ‘creative blending’ developed by Fauconnier and Turner in The Way We 
Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (2002). This is an extension 
of Lakoff and Johnson’s original ideas of metaphorical mapping, also variously 
known as ‘conceptual integration,’ or ‘conceptual blending.’ Cognitive processes are 
incredibly complex. Theories of embodied cognition posit that ‘mental 
representations’ are the (embodied) ‘images’ with which our mind builds concepts 
and establishes interactive relationships with the environment. ‘Meaning’ includes 
patterns of embodied experience and conceptual structures of our sensibility. These 
embodied patterns do not remain private or peculiar to the person who experiences 
them, however. They become shared cultural modes of experience and help to 
determine the nature of our meaningful, coherent understanding of the world 
(Varela et al. 1991: 150). It is interesting to ask whether these patterns are inherited 
in our genome or whether they are universal because of our shared physical world. 
The basic idea is that we think in mental spaces, which form networks, where 
the spaces connect through mappings between structures. ‘Blending’ is specifically 
the ability to blend two different conceptual arrays so as to produce an emergent 
outcome (this is, essentially, how metaphor works) (45). Blending includes at least 
four basic ‘spaces’: two ‘source’ spaces, a ‘generic’ space that captures what both 
source spaces have in common; and the ‘blending’ space, where elements from both 
source spaces are blended to form a new reality. The mind performs many types of 
metaphorical mapping between these various mental spaces to come up with the 
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final product, known as the ‘blend.’ The figure below graphically represents this 
process at the most simple level. Mental spaces are represented by circles, and 




Blending processes are rarely as simple as depicted in the figure above. There 
may be several source spaces, and such ‘networks’ can be developed to model more 
complex processes. Diagrams such as Figure 1 above can only represent a sort of 
analytical snapshot of an on-going process, framed with the intention of capturing 
its essential features, making no claim to exhaust the possibilities for description. 
The embodied cognitive processes involved in creative blending will be described in 
more depth and in context in Chapter Six, as these relate to figurative language and 
personal narrative creation; in Chapter Seven as these relate to the blending of 
words and melody; and in Chapter Eight in terms of bodily ‘cross modal transfer.’  
In order for something to be understood as a mental space, it should have the 
ability to be represented in the mind with a stable structure and a well-defined 
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boundary. Mental spaces are dynamic structures, because mind is never fixed but 
constantly modified as our thoughts unfold in time. They contain partial 
representations of the entities and relationships in any given scenario as perceived, 
imagined, remembered, or otherwise understood. For example, beliefs, images, and 
dramatic situations all trigger the construction of mental spaces, whether the linked 
spaces are a belief and a reality space, a past and a present space, or a picture and a 
reality space. Source spaces, or input spaces, are mental frames summoned from the 
mind’s long term memory. They include vast amounts of information, much of which 
is culturally influenced. Guiding the process of mapping between two domains is the 
‘generic space,’ which is both the background and foundation for the meaning-
making process, capturing what the source spaces have in common. Our own prior 
experiences give life to the abstractions created in the generic space. The source 
spaces are therefore concrete representations of the abstract structure represented 
by the generic space, and the conceptual ‘blend’ is a further metaphorical projection 
from these, a new space where elements from both source spaces are blended to form 
a new reality. Every blend has an emergent structure, containing unique elements 
that are not copied from the source spaces.  
 Blending theory is simply one way to understand how the human mind 
works. It has been applied in cognitive neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, 
linguistics, music theory, poetics, mathematics, divinity, semiotics, theory of art, 
psychotherapy, artificial intelligence, political science, discourse analysis, 
philosophy, anthropology, and in the study of gesture and of material culture. It has 
proven itself to have wide-ranging applicability to the representation of both 
linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of cognition. Indeed, creative blending would 
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appear to be a fundamental human mental ability: its centrality is widely and 
robustly confirmed by empirical data. It is involved in everything from perceptual 
processing, through the sensation of pain, reception of music, to knowledge of cause 
and effect. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) go as far as to claim that conceptual 
blending is the great mental ability that gives human beings the ability to invent new 
concepts and, subsequently, create art, science, religion, culture and language. That 
is to say, it is our modern human imagination that has given us the ability to invent 
new concepts and to assemble new and dynamic mental patterns.  
 The theory of creative blending is not scientifically rigorous. It does not 
specify how meaning is represented in the mind but rather it offers a general model of 
meaning construction. It is important to make clear that this is not an explanation of 
how the brain works, but rather a descriptive model of how the mind works, using 
metaphor. Blending theory is as an open-ended system - more like a hermeneutic 
model. In truth, it is a grand metaphor in itself. As such, it can be used as a tool to 
map, model, interpret and attempt to understand the singularly plural ballad 
experience. In order to understand ‘presence,’ Porter stipulated that what was 
needed was a style open to exploration, and to be free from the need for specific 
answers; but at the same time demanding a consistency of analytical approach 
without becoming a rigid or closed system. Overly rigid systems do not consider the 
relationship of logic to human embodiment, or the flexibility of the human mind.  
  In ethnomusicology, this theory is useful because it provides a way to bring 
order to something extremely difficult to describe. Theorising about music requires 
that we bring order, even if of a tenuous sort, to an ephemeral and often intangible 
human experience. Zbikowski (2002) believes that cross domain mapping is a way 
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to both structure our understanding of music and extend it, as it allows us to ground 
descriptions of elusive musical phenomena in concepts derived from quotidian 
experience. Because an emergent, enactive, embodied view of cognition implicates a 
view of subjectivity as fluid, transient and polysemic, music’s processual character 
and distinctive bodily sense should not be regarded as secondary or epiphenomenal 
in terms of their cognitive significance. Such a view marries with and has the 
potential to extend both Ó Laoire’s (2005) and Rice’s (1995) prioritisation of modes 
of being over modes of knowing in the context of the musical experience. 
 
Summary 
It seems clear that there is great potential to explore the common ground 
between the more humanistic, cultural/ethnological approach and the cognitive 
approach, using theories of embodiment and embodied cognition to mediate 
between dialectical concerns. By juxtaposing cultures of inquiry in an attempt to 
elucidate the ballad singing experience, new understandings may emerge that would 
not be apparent were such juxtaposition not made explicit. It is my own view that 
although the academic language and metaphors used may be very different, cognitive 
studies may provide parallel descriptions to the analyses of ethnographic enquiry. It 
is not necessary to make descriptions from cognitive science stand in opposition to 
humanistic explanations, because all perspectives are partial perspectives.  
Working in the paradigm of embodiment stresses the physical and the 
processual, and enforces interaction between the bodymind and its environment. 
Such a holistic view prevents oversimplifications or unrealistic assumptions because 
it provides specific grounding in reality. Moreover, the embodied view of cognitive 
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science allows for direct cultural interaction, which is undeniably crucial for both 
language and music. Most notably perhaps, the embodiment paradigm stresses the 
temporal—the importance of which will be explored in later chapters. In this light, 
cognition and bodily activity intertwine: the mind is no longer seen as passively 
reflective of the outside world, but rather as an active constructor of its own reality. 
Contemporary phenomenology affirms the intersubjectivity and not the solipsism of 
Cartesian consciousness; the reciprocity, not the passivity, of perception; and 
embodiedness, not the disembodiedness, of consciousness. Phenomenologically, 
language too is a whole bodied activity.  
Philosophical hermeneutics investigates some questions that are also asked 
in the cognitive sciences. The nature of human understanding, the way that we gain 
and organise knowledge, the role played by language and memory in these 
considerations, the relations between conscious and unconscious knowledge—these 
are all good examples of issues that form the intersection of hermeneutics and the 
cognitive sciences.  That is to say that firstly, what hermeneutics discovers is not in 
opposition to what cognitive science discovers—in fact they are in agreement about a 
number of things; second, that hermeneutics has something to contribute to the 
cognitive sciences; and third, that the cognitive sciences have something to 
contribute to the field of hermeneutics. Philosophical hermeneutics raises questions 
about the conditions of possibility for human understanding—not how we should 
interpret or understand something, but what interpretation and understanding are 
and how they work. 
With embodiment and radical reflection we find grounded way of talking 
about the ballad experience as a ‘total somatic experience’ - one that affects both 
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body and mind; with Nancy’s post-phenomenological ontology we find a way of 
talking the ballad experience as an experience that is paradoxically both highly 
individual and simultaneously always a shared experience, as well as an explanation 
that cannot resort to explanations of the metaphysical: mind, self and world are 
intertwined. What this theoretical framework allows for is a focus on the creative 
processes present in encounters with cultural forms: not what is, but how it 




















CHAPTER FOUR 4 
“At the Mirk and Midnight Hour She Heard the Bridals Sing”:  
Developing a Theory of Ballad ‘Presence’34 
 
 In his most recent work, Porter (2009) is keen to foster an awareness of the 
ballads that moves towards an understanding of its ‘dramatic and affective presence.’ 
The very notion of ‘presence,’ even with Porter’s explanations, remains very complex, 
ambiguous and exceedingly difficult to define. It has been suggested that this theory 
is a ground for the study of the ‘ballad experience.’ If we are relying on Porter’s 
theories of presence as a foundation for this study, however, it is necessary to 
highlight ideas and areas that are particularly ambiguous in his thinking.  
The notion of ‘presence’ and its usage in academic discourse varies hugely 
between disciplines and perhaps fortuitously, Porter does not make clear where he 
appropriated the term ‘presence’ from. For me, the term has immediate philosophical 
and theological connotations. It is important to keep the distinction between sacred 
and secular very clear to avoid tenuous argument. 35  Looking to other discourses for 
insights, parallels and comparisons allows us to get closer to an understanding of 
presence; but to attempt a history of the critique of presence in this context is far too 
ambitious. Such a critique feeds into the theological and postmodern debate on the 
degree to which we are able to talk meaningfully about the world. Post-structuralist 
critics and literary theorists appropriate the term to support their view that there is 
a privileged fixed point at which the meanings of terms are anchored. As discussed 
                                                          
34 Again, this is a reference to the ballad ‘Tam Lin.’ The ‘mirk and midnight’ hour is the liminal time 
when the boundaries between this world and the next are blurred, and Janet awaits the arrival of the 
fairy folk. 
35 In a conversation with the ethnomusicologist Dr. Reily (ICTM Ireland Conference, Febuary 2011) I 
was advised not to be over cautious in divorcing such experiences from religious experience. Reilly 




in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s rethinking of ontology was an attempt to step 
away from the metaphysics of presence and ontotheological explanations—his term 
‘being-in-the-world’ seeks to emphasise the relationship between self and world as a 
unitary whole, and Nancy’s post-phenomenology seeks to bring out the idea of 
‘being-with’ as a priority in this ontology.  
Porter’s intended theories and definitions of ‘presence’ will be laid out more 
comprehensively for investigation. Examples will be given of presence in context, 
sourced in collected fieldwork descriptions of the ballad experience. Scottish 
Travellers have a word in the Cant language called the conniach, which is defined as 
the ‘feeling’ that can be conveyed in a successful performance. This notion will be 
explored and it will be shown how it can productively contribute to an 
understanding of presence. In looking to literature outside of ethnomusicology, 
Maslow’s accounts of ‘peak experience’ will be used to foreground discussions of 
aesthetic experience in terms of embodiment. Working from the premise that all 
humans engage with the world aesthetically, and that the ballad experience is, by 
extension, fundamentally an aesthetic experience, this section will argue for the idea 
of somaesthetics and appreciation of the body in Porter’s theory of presence.  
In terms of developing Porter’s theory, one of the most difficult obstacles to 
overcome was the ambiguous nature of Porter’s explanations of time and ballad 
presence. The second part of this chapter will consider relevant ideas in Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method ([1960] 2004), a work that seeks to articulate the very question of 
truth as it emerges in the experience of art from humanist conceptions and show 
how these aesthetic formulations of truth lead to the question of experience itself. 
Part of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy seeks to draw out what he calls the 
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‘temporality of art.’ His explanations of aesthetic time, his ideas about ‘art as play’ 
and his account of the hermeneutic encounter of the past in the present will be used 
to argue for enacted aesthetic time. In the hope of at least recognising to some extent 
the true nature of the ballad experience, this chapter will explore the social 
phenomenologist Schütz’s (1964) transformation of the philosopher Henri Bergson’s 
concept of dureé and the idea of ‘inner-time consciousness’ in relation to musical time 
and shared experience. Fundamental ideas will be introduced here and developed 
further in the following chapters: notably the idea of external and internal worlds, 
time and space. 
 
Porter’s definitions of ‘Presence’ 
Porter defines the term ‘presence’ in three ways: as a noun, as a quality of 
performance; as a verb, ‘to presence,’ by which he means to produce the quality of 
presence; and also in the active verb sense of ‘presencing,’ the idea that it is a shared 
experience in time (8–9). No commonly accepted method has ever been devised for 
the analysis of performative genres because of their varied character, and especially 
not for song.  Porter chooses to use ‘presencing’ rather than ‘performance’ to describe 
live enactment, because he feels that the terms ‘performing’ and ‘performance’ are 
vague, ambiguous and invested with a broad range of meanings that mean different 
things across different disciplines (such as linguistics and anthropology).36 Concepts 
of ‘performance’ in scholarship have been so varied that no unified theory has ever 
                                                          
36Performance studies incorporates theories of drama, dance, art, anthropology, folklore, philosophy, 
cultural studies, sociology and music performance: see Schechner (2002).  Among the topics 
discussed are the performing arts and popular entertainments, rituals, play and games as well as the 
performances of everyday life. Supporting examples and ideas are drawn from the social sciences, 
performing arts, post-structuralism, ritual theory, ethology, philosophy and aesthetics.  
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been developed.37 In Porter’s mind, ‘presencing’ signifies something other than the 
concept of performance, and he is careful to emphasise that we are not to confuse 
theories of presence with concepts of performance theory and its methods.  
As Porter sees it, presence ‘narrows and intensifies the sense of performance’ in 
two ways. First, it refers to an individual fashioning of a song, an artistic creation or 
re-creation on the one hand; and on the other, a transaction among human actors, a 
single, observable action or actions in a designated space (7–9). His intended 
definition conveys the notion that the performance of traditional ballads can only be 
effective in the context of exchange between audience and singer—in a two-way 
communicative relationship—and cannot be realised through recorded and digital 
productions or printed ballad texts. Put simply, it implies direct communication of a 
ballad to a live audience in a shared physical space. Crucial, then, to the definition of 
presence then is the idea of ‘sharing’ in a reciprocal act of communication. Porter also 
describes presencing as ‘a concentrated process, in large part an enactment that flows 
from the performer, the singer, who generates the dramatic atmosphere of the 
traditional ballad in a committed way’ (8, my italics). This language is evocative of 
the discourses in theories of embodied cognition, and as will be shown, his theory 
lends itself very well to discussion in this context.  
It is important to make clear that I do not claim that every time a ballad is 
sung that ‘presence’ will occur. Perhaps this is where my own use of presence 
departs from Porter’s; I prefer to save it to describe a special extraordinary 
performance when a ballad is sung exceptionally well to a receptive audience. By 
‘well’ I mean the skill and musicality of the singer and their ability to transport the 
                                                          
37 For a criticism of performance theory see Porter (2009: 182–186).  
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song. Even if all of Porter’s conditions are in place, presence still may not be 
achieved, and the ballad experience will still remain elusive. Ó Laoire (2006: 102) 
talks of the ‘perfect, ineffable, moment of performance’ which, in my own view, 
could perhaps be better described as the ‘moment of presence.’ Porter (2009: 182,  my 
italics) writes, 
Presence embodies the ritual moment within the tradition, and as such it 
renews, invests in, and promotes the tradition as a living potent force. Further, 
it creates the illusion the tradition itself is suspended, crystallised into a moment 
of time in which it is recast, modified and validated once more. 
 
The idea of the ‘crystallisation of time’ is a fascinating one. In Porter’s view, the 
performative moment is ‘a kind of collective look at the clock to compare time.’ More 
than this, he claims that presence creates its own time, when ‘normal measurable 
time is suspended and another world with its own time embraced’ (181). One of the 
most difficult problems in an attempt to unpack the idea of presence is this 
reckoning of time. In Porter’s explanations, presence forms the ‘central element in a 
tripartite process reminiscent of ritual enactment.’ He writes, ‘The process of 
articulating makes presence fall within what Durkheim called sacred…ritual time’ (181, 
my italics). This account is rather vague and ambiguous: he appears to use the terms 
‘ritual’ and ‘sacred’ interchangeably (the distinction is never made clear). If we are 
using Porter’s theory of ballad presence as founded on the experience of an 
alternative time—set apart from normal, quotidian time—it is absolutely necessary to 
be clear about what this means in unambiguous terms. In order to understand 
presence, it is necessary to find a more acceptable way to talk about our experience 
of time and aesthetic experience that does not rely on metaphysical explanations 
and that marries with the fundamental ontology set up in the previous chapter. In 
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order to achieve this, it is vital to consider the nature of the temporality of ballad 
‘presence,’ and seek to understand what happens when ‘normal, measurable time is 
suspended’ and another ‘world’ with its own time is experienced.  
According to Porter, the very experience of presence is understood to be ‘a 
departure from everyday norms into the unknown, unexpected or transcendental 
territory of the imagination.’ It is, he grandly claims, ‘the complete imaginative 
encounter’ (9). This idea of the ‘imaginative encounter’ will be explored and 
developed throughout this thesis. In order to understand the ‘ballad experience’ we 
need to access those ephemeral times and spaces created, in which we can discover 
the embodied and expressive ways of knowing, being and communicating in 
context. 
Porter’s Epilogue presents ‘Six Steps towards a (Theoretical) Stage’ 2009: 186–
190).  According to Porter, these ‘steps,’ rather than being sequential, represent 
distinct fields of analytical as well as artistic and creative activity. The first, 
‘Motivation and Collection’ refers not only to the performer and their choice of 
ballad repertoire on particular occasions but also the scholarly selection of what is to 
be studied, as well as the motives and selection processes of all those involved in 
‘presencing’—in event participation—which takes place within a bounded time and 
space. ‘Situation and Event’ refers to the nature and setting of the presencing 
scenario chosen by the participants. ‘Presencing and Interaction’ refers to the 
manner in which the event proceeds. If feedback and interaction is possible, it may 
lead to ‘Transformation.’ That is to say, the event will generate certain tensions and 
expectations. The performers themselves experience, through feedback, some sense 
of communicative power, or heightened sensation, and in Porter’s view, the nature 
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and extent of social and personal transformation is critical for the negotiation of 
meaning. Following this is ‘Re-integration.’ In Porter’s view, the return to normalcy 
is accompanied by a sense of release, and by a sense of common humanity. The final 
step is ‘Perception and Analysis.’ The entire sequence or ‘events within the event’ as 
it has taken place in time and space is subject to assessment by those participating 
and in particular by the professional observer (Porter 2009: 186–190).  
While these steps are informative and will be referred to in later chapters, the 
development of a theory presented here takes the notion of ‘presence’ in a new 
direction. 
 
Presence in Context: Ballad Singing and the Conniach 
In attempting to understand presence and its role in the ballad experience, it is 
vital to go back to native descriptions of the phenomenon of ballad singing. Sheila 
Stewart,38 Scottish Traveller, celebrated tradition bearer, talks about the idea of the 
‘conniach’—something she learned from her family’s tradition or style of singing, and 
essential to the ballads in particular. The conniach is a feeling in singing that is 
difficult to define, but is known to all her family members. It is clearly identifiable in 
someone’s singing, but is best described by the feeling it elicits in those who hear it. 
Dalargno (2007) has suggested that the conniach is roughly equivalent to the ‘duende’ 
in flamenco—a difficult-to-describe term that denotes authenticity and spiritual 
connection ‘Without it, they sound like songs; with it, they’re something else 
entirely.’  
                                                          
38 Sheila Stewart M.B.E (b.1937) was brought to prominence by Hamish Henderson at the School of 
Scottish Studies, and has been described as a singer ‘from the heart of the tradition.’ 
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The word conniach might has roots in the Scots and Irish Gaelic tradition of 
caoinead—keening and lamention—but we cannot be sure. Caoineadh is an extremely 
arresting form of delivery and has links with strong emotion. At some point in 
history, it could have been appropriated by the Travelling community and come to 
mean something different in a new context. Sheila is conscious of the conniach in 
longer and more serious songs she sings as well as the lighter and happier sort. If the 
links to caoineadh have been lost, what remains is the idea of an accurate and true 
performance, one which is heartfelt and sincere, as the following description will 
show. 
According to Sheila, in the Traveller context, storytelling is a ‘natural function.’ 
She talks about the many functions of ballad singing, but maintains that the most 
important thing is that ‘everything’s from your heart, nae your head.’ At a ballad 
singing workshop I attended in Glasgow in 2010, Sheila was keen to demonstrate in 
practice what she means by the conniach.   
Just like maybe somebody says to you, ‘You sang there and the hair on my head 
stood up,’ you know? Well this happens to me, deep within me when I sing a 
ballad I like. I just go way out there to outer space or into oblivion and I’m 
singing it to myself and this causes the most emotion to the song and it’s a build 
up, and that's what causes this. See, I dinnae think what I do is a style of singing. 
It’s just my own emotions. You put your own emotions and feeling into what 
you’re singing and that gets across to the folk...and makes them listen, involves 
them. If you produce the emotion, the feeling, the conniach to them it makes them 
stop to listen because that is coming from your heart and no fae your head.39 
 
In order to demonstrate the conniach, she sang us a verse from the song ‘Fause, Fause 
Hae Ye Been,’ firstly without much emotion and feeling, and secondly the way she 
would choose to perform it, putting in the conniach. Before she sang the ballad for the 
                                                          
39 Interview with Sheila Stewart by fieldworker Meredith Harley, School of Scottish Studies Archive. 
See SA1996.84  
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second time, she suggested that we listen closely so as to identify what she was 
doing with the words, and with the tune. She demonstrated how she projects into 
the song and moulds the words, stretching them out. According to Sheila, her 
singing conveys both feeling and emotion. Singing from the heart provides the 
emotion, and the feeling behind the song is the conniach. ‘I put my own self into it. My 
own emotion. My own spirit.’ Sheila sees this as a unity, or a trinity: 
“It’s the three in one, isn’t it? There’s the emotion, the feeling and the voice. You 
blend the three together and it gives you the conniach. My three in one is the soul, 
spirit and the voice. The spirit and the soul is the emotion and the feeling. And 
emotion is like your deep soul within you.” 
 
In order to bring this emotion to a performance, Sheila says she tells the story 
of the ballad to herself over and over. ‘I go inside the ballad. Instead of the ballad 
going inside me and me producing it with my voice, I go inside the ballad. I don’t act 
it. It’s just a natural function of the ballads to me.’ 
You see there’s a lot of different functions within the transportation of a ballad … 
It’s not just a function, say, ‘Oh I know that ballad right left and centre. I know 
the tune right, left and centre. But are you transporting it properly? You see there’s 
a lot functions within there. And once you’ve got all these functions coming 
together…the tune, the words, the pauses, the natural function…comfortable with 
yourself, sure of yourself, being able to cope with your own inhibitions, getting 
them all out. Then once you’ve got all that intae a tight ball and you throw it to an 
audience, it goes past them (1996). 
 
When learning the ballads from Traveller tradition, Sheila told us that if she could 
not put the conniach into a ballad, she would not be allowed to sing that ballad until 
she was ready for it, when her ‘metabolism and voice and character could deal with 
that particular ballad.’ According to Sheila, this is to do with respect. ‘If you don’t 
give it justice you’re not allowed to sing it, with respect, you’ve got to respect them.’  
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What is important in a ballad performance in Sheila’s view is that a person 
feels comfortable and relaxed when they are singing. Her own ability to convey the 
conniach depends entirely on the atmosphere and on the audience—that is, on her 
environment. Singing within her family is good, but singing in a noisy pub causes her 
to completely switch off: 
“I cannot sing the way I want to sing. I’m not relaxed, I’m uptight, because I’m 
no a pub person anyway. If I go to a folk festival the folk know what to do—that 
I’m an unaccompanied traditional ballad singer—I’m in my element. I know 
that people are there to listen to me and I just become myself, singing for me. 
And you can only transport the feeling that you have if you sing for yourself.” 
 
In Sheila’s view, people should sing for themselves first, for the love of singing and 
not for anybody else. If people sing with the wrong intention, are uncomfortable, are 
behaving unnaturally by putting on ‘airs and graces,’ are singing a song that does not 
suit them, or if they are looking to get approval from an audience, then the conniach 
will not be conveyed, and a ballad experience will not occur. 
“If it’s comin’ straight from their heart then it comes to you as a natural 
function... I listen for the type of song they sing to see if that song or ballad suits 
them. Because there is songs and ballads people sing that they shouldnae sing. 
A really good singer is a person that sings from the heart and not from the 
asshole, you know what I mean, it sounds as if they’re squeezing it out, trying 
to be perfective in their singing, instead of letting it come naturally.” 
 
For Sheila, the quality of the singing voice essentially does not matter as long as the 
singer has the right intention when singing. There would seem to be a very 
particular Traveller aesthetic, built on directness, right intention and the 
communication of the song itself, rather than on a self-aggrandising performance. 
This is not to say that humility or modesty is not involved; rather that it is respect 
for the songs and stories that must come first. ‘Perfect’ singing is not of primary 
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importance in the Traveller aesthetic. What is important for the conniach is the idea 
of ‘unity’—of emotion, feeling and the voice: 
I’ve heard good singers sing rubbish and I’ve heard a bad singer sing beautiful. I 
like a singer to maybe make a mistake…a person you know is singing from the 
heart and no the head. That’s what I look for. To me that’s most important, and 
the heart, putting your heart into it, put volume into it, open your mouth and 
let the words hear, and the feeling for the song. If a singer goes up there and the 
hair on my head stands, which doesn’t happen often, and shivers goes up my spine 
listening to them, everybody likes that singer. They have tae. 
 
As Sheila remarks, this does not happen often. However, it is not rare for people to 
feel that music in particular has some kind of powerful physical effect on them—that 
it causes, for instance, bodily sensations associated with emotional response, such as 
‘chills.’ Stanley talks about a ‘frisson’—a shiver coming down the spine. In recent 
years there have been several studies into this phenomenon. Not all scholars of the 
expressive arts refer to this phenomenon in the same way, simply because it is so 
difficult to quantify or indeed qualify.40 The neuroscientist Panksepp (1995: 173) 
notes that, despite its intriguing nature, ‘the prickly skin response usually called 
“shivers”, or “chills,” has not received the experimental attention it deserves,’ and 
that ‘people rarely discuss the experience [because] there is no unambiguous 
referent for it.’ But as Polkinghorne (1983: 280–281) reminds us, such experiences are 
closest to us, yet most resistant to our attempt to understand. Panksepp (1995: 172–
173) describes the experience variously as: ‘the tingly somatosensory feeling’; ‘the 
provocative and often delightful bodily experiences that deeply moving passages of 
music arouse in many people’; a bodily “rush” commonly described as a spreading 
gooseflesh, hair-on-end feeling that is common on the back of the neck and head and 
often moves down the spine, at times spreading across much of the rest of the body.’ 
                                                          
40  See Levinson (2006); Goldstein (1980); Panksepp (1995); Sloboda (1999). 
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The fact that Sheila says that listeners ‘have tae’ like a singer that can do this is 
worthy of mention. A good performance elicits this involuntary bodily response that 
hooks us in before we even have time to think rationally about why our bodies are 
responding. In order to better understand this in the context of the experience of the 
conniach and of the Maysie, the next section will look to Maslow’s account of ‘peak 
experiences’ in the case of musical experience and further to explanations of such 
experiences as ‘somaesthetic’ encounters.   
 
Peak Experiences   
The psychologist Maslow was interested in the fact that experiences 
traditionally associated with ecstatic religion or mysticism were in fact commonly 
reported in association with a wide variety of stimuli or situations having little or 
nothing to do with religious settings, such as ‘experiences of the aesthetic, of the 
creative, of love, of sex, of insight’ (1970: xi). He coined the term ‘peak experience’ for 
such occurrences. As has been often claimed, music can at times provide a substitute 
for the ‘sacred,’ for those who find themselves uncomfortable with the traditional 
demands of religion. Anthony Storr (1992: 155) notes that Nietzsche realised that for 
many people, ‘the concert hall and the art gallery have replaced the church as places 
where the “divine” can be encountered.’ On rare occasions, the effects of such 
experiences can be quite profound. When not at such a deep level, such experiences 
can nevertheless be positive in a variety of ways. Maslow’s data clearly shows that 
the effects of profound experiences, including those of music, are long-lasting on 
those who have them. They can change an individual’s sense of themselves and of 
their place in the world, positively and pervasively (1962: 774–82). 
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The effects of Maslow’s peak experiences of music in particular were 
examined by Panzarella (1980), who collected and analysed written and aural 
descriptions of music peak experiences. Panzarealla’s study does not make explicit 
the distinction between song and ‘textless’ music, however. It is surely an imperative 
to take into account the possible collateral effects of song lyrics and melody, 
because, as it will be argued in a later chapter, the experience of song and of music is 
cognitively very different. Nevertheless, interesting insights emerge from his source 
data that can relate to a study of the ballad experience.  
Perception in peak experience can be relatively ego-transcending, resulting 
in a kind self-forgetfulness. There is often disorientation in time and space, or even 
the lack of consciousness of time and space. This kind of timelessness and 
spacelessness contrasts very sharply with normal experience. Panzarealla found that 
the responses fell into four major categories: ‘renewal ecstasy,’ ‘motor-sensory 
ecstasy,’ ‘withdrawal ecstasy,’ and ‘fusion-emotional ecstasy.’ In renewal ecstasy, 
people reported a new vision of the world; a world seen as better, more beautiful 
than it seemed before, even though it continues to contain all the tragic, imperfect 
aspects it always had done. In the motor-sensory ecstasy, people report a variety of 
bodily responses such as faster or slower heartbeat or breathing, shivers, chills, 
tinglings, goosebumps, sweating, a feeling of being ‘high,’ and in some cases even 
tears. The withdrawal ecstasy involved a loss of contact with both the physical and 
social environment. A ‘perceptual narrowing’ was observed to occur; sense of time 
becomes distorted and attention is riveted to the aesthetic stimulus. In the ‘fusion-
emotional’ ecstasy, that attention takes on an intensely affective character, as the 
person feels emotionally connected or fused with the music. Such effects are 
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described by people who have encountered the ballad experience. Sheila, in 
describing the experience of the conniach, talks of ‘going into oblivion,’ of hair 
standing on end and of shivers in the spine.  
The next section will look to the experience of the aesthetic, and in 
particular the idea of an embodied aesthetics and its relation to presence. While 
‘aesthetics’ as a term is often understood to mean what is regarded as beautiful or 
appropriate in particular circumstances and situations, the aesthetic experience 
itself—as opposed to the anaesthetic experience—is conceived of as one in which our 
senses are operating at their peak, when we are present in the current moment, 
when we are resonating with the excitement of the thing we are experiencing and 
when we are fully alive.  
 
Somaesthetics: Embodied Aesthetic Presence   
Csíkszentmihályi, in his work Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (1990), 
believes that the aesthetic value of a work of art can be determined by its ability to 
produce ‘vivid experiences’ in its audience. Aesthetic appreciation has typically been 
described as an act of consciousness—that is, an act of mind. Such an account is not 
only inadequate, but distorted. Within an embodied world view, there is no 
consciousness without the body; appreciation can no longer be confined to a 
contemplative and objectifying act of consciousness. Similarly, the aesthetic object is 
not discrete and self-contained but both responds to and acts on the perceiving 
body. Several thinkers have made a case for aesthetic embodiment, which has 
powerful implications for aesthetic theory, leading to a somatically grounded 
understanding of aesthetic experience.  
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The body can be involved in aesthetic experience in fairly obvious ways, such 
as with art works that require the physical participation of the audience or 
interactive art in all its forms and degrees.  However, there are also more subtle ways 
in which the human body is actively present and makes an essential contribution to 
the art work and its appreciation: 
The aesthetic body, as a receiver and generator of sense experience, is not static or 
passive but possesses its own dynamic force, even when inactive. Aesthetic 
embodiment is being fully present through the distinctive presence of the body with 
the sensory focus and intensity we associate with the experience of art. It is being 
most completely human (Berleant 2004: 88, my italics). 
 
Embodiment conveys the active presence of the human body in appreciative 
experience. According to Merleau-Ponty, a body is a ‘charged field’. A charged field 
suggests energy that reaches out; the body is a concentration of forces that is part of 
a ‘field.’ The aesthetic adds intense focus, charged meaning, and perceptual power, 
for embodiment is highly perceptual.  
It would seem that if our emotional reactions reach a level of intensity 
sufficient to produce physiological response, the physiological and 
phenomenological effects are the natural culmination of the emotional perception 
itself, resulting in ‘presence’. The underlying rationale may be that, as embodied 
beings, the responses we most admire are not those in which only mind, or only 
body, are involved. In Desmond’s understanding (1995: 159), the quality of the 
aesthetic is the ‘sensuous presence of being whole.’ Theoretically, this idea is 
crucially important to the whole pursuit of understanding the ballad experience. 
What Desmond is saying, essentially, is that what is important is the aesthetic 
response of the whole person. Responses like this—those that are cognitive, emotional 
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and physiological all at once—are arguably of greater value than more limited or 
restricted aesthetic responses. To be most human, it appears, is to react to things, 
and perhaps especially works of art, with our whole selves. 
Mindfulness: Being Present 
In Desmond’s view, the ‘organic unity’ of mind and body together becomes the 
sign of ‘mindful being’ (1995: 159). The importance of the Buddhist notion of 
‘mindfulness’ was discussed in Chapter Three. The discovery of mindfulness in the 
West is not some encompassing insight into the nature of mind, but the realisation 
of just how disconnected humans normally are from their very experience. 
Experiences rapidly pass us by in a blur of constant commentary. We are not often 
‘mindful’ of the present moment; rather, we are more absent-minded. From the 
perspective of embodied cognition,  
Mindfulness means simply that the mind is present in embodied everyday 
experience; its purpose is to help us become mindful, to experience what one’s 
mind is doing as it does it, to ‘be present with one’s mind’ (Varela et al. 1991: 
23).  
When we experience something that shocks us out of the ordinary, it is a moment of 
acute awareness.  
Musical experience is no…act of symbolic representation. [It] is, however, 
invariably and embodied practice…people make or listen to music for the 
experience of ‘mindfulness’ it affords…the way it is experienced, bodily 
(Bowman 2004: 41). 
This idea of embodied aesthetics and mindfulness has been taken forward by 
Shusterman and developed into a new interdisciplinary field of study called 
‘somaesthetics.’ His ultimate interest is to develop a practice that cultivates somatic 
awareness and reflective corporeal engagement and field of study in which bodily 
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practices are studied and reflectively pursued in disciplined ways. In light of these 
ideas, ballad ‘presence’ is, first and foremost, an aesthetic experience—one which is 
fully embodied; or rather, in Shusterman’s terms, a ‘somaesthetic’ experience. A 
central appreciative value of ballad presence as a somaesthetic experience lies in the 
affirmation of wholeness it affords; of mind and body resonating together in 
response to a given performance.  
In my view, conceiving of the ballad experience as a somaesthetic experience 
adds a crucial dimension to Porter’s ideas about ballad presence and provides us 
with one direction to extend his theory; a direction that reflects the ideas and values 
of the paradigm of embodiment. Desmond (1990: 67, original emphasis) talks 
explicitly about the idea of ‘presence’ in embodied experience: 
We do not experience the artwork as set apart into sensation on the one side 
and something subjective on the other. We experience, stronger, we are 
stunned by something sensusous that is richly charged with expressive power. 
We witness the emergence of charged presence, at once stirring and elusive. 
 
This ‘presence,’ characterised as the ‘revelation of aesthetic’ according to Desmond, 
simply cannot be exhausted by any set of finite determinate concepts. Instead, ‘the 
plurivocity of being is intimated in the sensuous showing of ambiguity itself’ (1990: 
95, my italics).  
 
The Temporality of the Aesthetic  
The following sections explore relevant ideas in Gadamer’s Truth and Method 
([1960] 2004) which seek to articulate the very question of truth as it emerges in the 
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experience of art. Part of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy seeks to draw out what 
he calls the ‘temporality of art.’ 
Gadamer’s argument is directed to showing that understanding—and the kind 
of ‘truth’ that belongs to it—has the character of an ‘event’: that is, something that 
belongs to the specific temporal nature of our human life. He argues that while any 
given cultural art work is a product of a particular era, we nevertheless always 
encounter an artwork, even from long ago, as ‘immediately present’ (xiii). He does 
not conceive of artistic communication as the passing of information from one 
person to another; rather, some subject matter becomes mutually accessible to two 
or more people, in a process more akin to communion. To attend to a person 
speaking, or in this case singing a ballad, is to participate in a temporal, aesthetic 
event.  
Most importantly, the aesthetic event has its own time. Gadamer makes it 
clear that if we try to define the temporality of the work of art—the temporality of 
aesthetic presence—by speaking of two kinds of temporality—as Porter does—we are 
following what is, essentially, a false antithesis. The two kinds of temporality 
Gadamer refers to are the secular, or historical, and what is most often characterised 
as the ‘sacred.’ According to Harmon (2008: 50), ‘secular time proceeds linearly 
toward a goal from a goal, while sacred time is the cyclic return of the past in the 
present.’ Gadamer (2004: 120) argues that 
Only a Biblical theology of time, starting not from the standpoint of human 
understanding but of divine revelation would be able to speak of a “sacred time” and 
theologically legitimate the analogy between the timelessness of the work of art and 




To speak of sacred time without this kind of theological justification, Gadamer 
argues, actually obscures the real problem, which does not lie in the art work being 
‘removed from time’ but rather creating  its very own temporality. Rather than talk 
of sacred time, he prefers to talk of the ‘temporality of the aesthetic’ and makes an 
attempt to distinguish this temporality from transient, historical time. We need to 
ask, if not the ‘sacred,’ as Porter suggests, what kind of temporality is at work in 
aesthetic experience? 
 
Art as Play 
Gadamer, following Huizinga, starts from the premise that experiencing a 
work of art is a form of ‘play.’ 41 This to say that the work of art cannot be detached 
from its presentation, or enactment, in time. For Gadamer, play is most obvious in a 
religious ritual where the relation of community to the performance of the rite is 
essential to religious truth. This idea holds that the only purpose of play is the game 
itself, in which the players must ‘lose themselves’ if they are to achieve its end. This 
idea has been applied by Ó Laoire (2005: 34, my italics) in his studies of song and 
dance. He notes that 
In the to and fro hermeneutic of movement of play, Fes an intensified and truer 
vision of reality becomes apparent.  
 
Inescapably, the presentation or event has a repetitive quality. Here, however, 
repetition does not mean that something is literally repeated. Rather, every 
repetition is understood to be new and original. The example Gadamer gives to 
                                                          
41 Huizinga was a Dutch historian and one of the founders of modern cultural history. His seminal 




illustrate this point is that of festivals, which are essentially the same but always 
different in each enactment: simultaneously familiar, yet always new. A festival only 
exists in its being celebrated in time. The same is true of drama:  
It must be presented for the spectator, and yet its being is by no means just the 
point of intersection of the spectators’ experiences. Rather, the contrary is true: 
the being of the spectator is determined by his ‘being there present (121). 
It is important to clarify what Gadamer means by ‘being present.’ In his 
understanding, this does not simply mean to be there along with something else that 
is there at the same time. To ‘be present’ is to participate, to share. This is immediately 
relevant in light of Porter’s own prerequisite for presence in which it must be a 
shared, inter-responsive experience. Gadamer maintains that watching a drama in an 
involved way constitutes participating; in the same way, truly listening to a ballad 
being sung in a concentrated manner can be viewed as a genuine mode of 
participating in the event itself. 
Moreover, according to Gadamer, ‘being present’ also has the character of 
‘being outside of oneself.’ He understands this ecstatic condition as the positive 
possibility of being ‘wholly something else.’ This kind of ‘being present’ is a self-
forgetfulness, and is anything but a private condition, because it arises out of 
devoting full attention to the matter at hand. This state, according to Gadamer, is 
the spectator’s own positive accomplishment. The reason why some people will have 
what Maslow would call a ‘peak experience’ while others will not is that there is 
obviously a difference between a spectator who gives himself entirely to the ‘play of 
art’ and someone who merely watches out of vague curiosity.42 Unless the spectator 
is really involved, there will be nothing for him to deeply reflect upon. This is not to 
say that instances of curiosity cannot effect the kind of self-forgetfulness described 
                                                          
42 Of course, there are many biological, contextual, educational and experiential factors at work here. 
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here; rather, what is important is expectancy, intention and involvement (119–122). 
In my own view, these ideas are illuminating in the context of understanding the 
conniach and the Maysie. Gadamer’s ‘being present’ is clearly reminiscent of Maslow’s 
accounts of peak experience, which also results in a kind of self-forgetfulness.  
 
Contemporaneity  
In order to further explain the temporality of the aesthetic and the idea of 
‘presence,’ Gadamer discusses the idea of ‘contemporaneity’ (124). Contemporaneity 
belongs to the ‘being’ of a work of art, constituting the essence of ‘being present’. 
Gadamer believes that aesthetic experience can only be rightly understood within 
‘the hermeneutic continuity of existence’ (96), and understands contemporaneity as 
a ‘task to be achieved.’ This concept of contemporaneity comes from the theological 
philosophy of Kierkegaard (1844). For Kierkegaard, contemporaniety does not mean 
‘existing at the same time’. Rather, it names the task that confronts the religious 
believer:  
To bring together two moments that are not concurrent, namely one’s own 
present and the redeeming act of Christ, and yet so totally to mediate them that 
the latter is experienced and taken seriously as present (and not as something 
in a distant past) (in Gadamer 2004: 124).  
 
‘Contemporaneity’ in a Christian context then is the ‘proclamation of the 
Word’; ‘being present’ means genuine participation in the redemptive act itself. 
Gadamer maintains that the same thing is basically true when we experience art. In 
the event of a particularly deep experience of art, two moments of time are brought 
together: our own present and the present of the work of art, and past and present 
are united in experience. New meanings are continually being created with every 
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new act of performance, which creates a powerful dialectic between old and new. 
According to Gadamer, this is a continual process in any tradition; where old and 
new combine into exciting entities of living value. Ballad singing effectively ‘tests the 
limits of experience and consciousness by joining present with past and future, the 
living with the dead, and the here and now with the world beyond’ (Porter & Gower 
1995: 298).  
 Foley’s (1991:7) idea of ‘traditional referentiality’ helps us understand the idea 
of contemporaneity in this case: 
Traditional referentiality…entails the invoking of a context that is enormously 
larger and more echoic than the text or work itself,  that brings the lifeblood of 
generations of poems and performances to the individual performance or text.  
 
Traditional referentiality is inherent in all traditional ballad texts; each performance 
or version is resonant with the depth and breadth of ballad singing across space and 
time. What is involved in this process is recognition of the song’s ‘pastness,’ and 
with that, the illusion that the dialogue and characters of the ballad are voices of the 
past speaking in the present. What the ballad has to say is inevitably affected in a 
dialectical process by the contrast between life in the present and a sense of how 
things used to be. This fits in with the concept of tradition as a process of 
interpretation, attributing meaning in the present through making reference to the 
past.  
 Gadamer believes that the unity of past and present in aesthetic experience is 
self-contained, and crucially, that such an aesthetic experience has its own sense of 
time:  
What unfolds before us is so much lifted out of the ongoing course of the 
ordinary world and so much enclosed in its own autonomous circle of meaning 




In order to understand moments of ‘presence,’ this idea is illuminating. The moment 
of ballad performance creates ‘an enclosed circle of meaning’ that includes the 
present event, the past from which it came from and in some instances the pasts of 
all those who have sung the song before. Perhaps most importantly, it creates its own 
time. Porter’s explanation that presence creates sacred or ritual time, a time when 
normal, measurable time is suspended and another imaginative world with its own 
time, embraced (2009: 181). In light of Gadamer’s ideas of aesthetic time, this 
qualification makes far more sense. 
People who experience the heightened levels of engagement that can occur 
when a skilled singer, poet, or storyteller speaks, opening up a circuit between the 
performer and the audience, the past and the present, and the human and the divine, 
know that singing a song and hearing it well-performed is not simply enjoying a 
pleasurable experience: it is engaging in a communally creative act. 
 
Aesthetic Experience: Example of the Tragic 
Gadamer uses the example of the tragic aesthetic to illustrate his ideas about 
the temporality of art and play. The tragic is a fundamental aesthetic phenomenon; it 
is a structure of meaning that does not exist only in Greek tragedy, but in other 
artistic genres as well. This example is particularly useful here in the context of the 
traditional ballads, some of which are, by nature, very tragic. ‘The Dowie Dens of 
Yarrow’ is an example of the tragic at work in the ballad. The beauty and the horror 
of this narrative song—the way in which it brings together the themes of love and 
death—is poignant and effective, evidenced by the ballad’s ubiquity and popularity. 
150 
 
It is the story of deep suffering, the story of events that should never have happened, 
of intense and reasonless human sadness. It would violate both historical reality and 
poetic truth were the hero to win, though in another sense the ballad is also a poetic 
prophecy of the conditions of that victory. This is the quality of the Yarrow ballad, 
which elevates the narrative to tragedy in its full sense. It is the tragic content that 
guides the internal poetic truth of the ballad and makes it more than just the relating 
of a poignant incident, and here it become ‘a symbol of the duality that structures 
this ballad and the world view out of which it grows’ (Rogers 1980: 103).  
As art, songs provided an escape valve and, in some ways, I believe they continue to 
serve both performers and listeners in this way. They may be disturbing, as indeed 
all works of power are, but art’s purpose often acts to unsettle us, while at the same 
time giving us delight and pleasure. This contradictory impasse seems to me at the 
heart of what art is, and so continues to give the songs I sing a unique and potent 
charge (Ó Laoire 2006: 98–99) 
 
Blacking too is of the same opinion with regards to music at large. One of the features 
of musical experience, he claims, is that people become aware that ‘opposing’ 
phenomena are in fact different aspects of the same thing and that all ‘spring from a 
single source’ (Blacking 1969: 63)  
A profound truth about life is that almost all conditions encountered are of mixed 
character. We are aware of the bad, if only peripherally, even when firmly engaged 
with the good, and one glimpses the good even when caught up in the bad, 
intermingled as they are in virtually anything…The mutual focusing of positive and 
negative elements that results arguable ends up enhancing the appreciation of 
whatever good is being enjoyed. The essential poignancy of human life, one may 
suggest, resides in its mixed nature, in the indissociable union of its joys and its ills, 
the inescapable commingling of its pluses and minuses (Levinson 2006). 
 
Similar thoughts are to be found in Nietzsche, as Storr (1992: 158) observes:  
Nietzsche realized—no one more vividly—that the only life we know is constituted 
by opposites. Pleasure is inconceivable without pain; light without darkness; love 
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without hate; good without evil…This is why the greatest art always includes 
tragedy.  
 
A deep, profoundly moving experience of music can somehow yield an altered 
perception of the world, in which the paradox of simultaneous good and evil is not 
seen as something to be overcome but as something to be accepted.  
 Aristotle’s seminal theory of tragedy, according to Gadamer (2004), serves to 
exemplify the structure of aesthetic being as a ‘whole.’ This whole is a conceptual 
whole—the reconciliation of oppositions—rather than the sense of whole as 
discussed above in the context of embodiment. ‘Tragedy’ is the unity of a tragic 
discourse of events that is experienced as a unity. It is outwith the scope of this 
thesis to outline Aristotle’s theory of tragedy in detail. What is important to make 
clear in this case is the fact that in Aristotle’s definition of the essence and 
culmination of tragedy, ‘the spectator is an essential element in the kind of play we 
call aesthetic’ (Gadamer 2004: 125). The spectator effectively participates in the 
communion of ‘being present.’ What is experienced is something truly common:  
To see that ‘this is how it is’ is a kind of self knowledge for the spectator, who 
emerges with new insights from the illusions in which he, like everyone else, 
lives. The tragic affirmation is an insight that the spectator has by virtue of the 
continuity of meaning in which he places himself (128). 
 
The tragic has a specific effect on the spectator, to ‘overwhelm man and sweep him 
away.’ Aristotle talks of phobos, which is not just a state of mind, but a cold shudder 
that makes the blood run cold and makes us shudder. While phobos is associated 
with fear and the moment of terror, it is a useful concept the context of the ballad 
experience because it refers not just to an inner state but also its bodily 
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manifestation. In other words, it sounds very like the descriptions of the Maysie and 
the conniach. 
 In Gadamer’s view, such an event elicits ecstatic self-forgetfulness in the 
same way as a religious rite and that this experience of art has the ‘character of 
genuine communion’ (128). This thesis explores the idea that this moment creates a 
new space or time in which we are confronted with the truths of human existence: 
 
For it is the truth of our own world—the religious and moral world in which we 
live—that is presented before us and in which we recognise ourselves. The 
absolute moment in which a spectator stands is both one of self forgetfulness 
and mediation with himself. What rends him from himself at the same time 
gives him back the whole of his being (125, my italics).  
 
According to Blacking (1969: 64), the ultimate value in music lies in its 
‘power to restore and develop man’s sense of being.’ Blacking (1976: 34) claims that 
music can create a world of ‘virtual time’ in which things are no longer subject to 
time and space.43 Blacking’s claims make sense in the context of Gadamer’s 
philosophy, in that this ‘virtual time’ exists in the self-forgetfulness effected by 
music and in the enclosed circle of meaning that is created. It is within this closed 
circle of meaning that we experience what is often called ‘sacred time,’ reconfigured 
by Gadamer to be called ‘aesthetic temporality’.  
 Aesthetic temporality is characterised by the fact that it is enacted. In this 
sense, we can refer to both aesthetic time and ritual time as enacted time, whether or 
not this is based on theological assumptions.  Such a mode of time is in contrast to 
the concept of time understood as the separation of past, present and future. The 
concept of measured, linear time is one that facilitates our understanding of the 
                                                          
43 The philosopher Langer (1953: 109) first used the term ‘virtual time’ to refer to the quality of time 
passing more slowly or more quickly than clock time. 
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physical processes in our environment, such as the changing of the seasons, or 
watching people grow older. In this context, the past is terminal and the future is 
inaccessible; they are both non-existent in the present. By contrast, enacted time 
reckons time in a different way. In Christian ritual, in the moment of enactment,  
Time is a ritual now that contains within itself all of the past, the present of the 
originary, paradigmatic and eschatological event that is being enacted (Begbie 
2000: 43).  
 
Musical Time 
Music is often the natural partner of ritual enactment because it is the 
embodied experience of this alternative reckoning of time. Theology reveals this 
reckoning through theoretical reasoning, but, arguably, music reveals it through 
direct experience (Begbie 2002). In musical experience, we discover the simultaneity 
of the different modes of time through an immersion in the immediacy and fullness 
of the present. This is because musical metre is not measurement of discrete units, 
but the continuous flow of an indivisible whole, each present moment of which both 
rises out of its past and moves towards its future, while containing in itself all its 
past and all its future.  
A melody is first and foremost an ordering of acoustic events in time. Every 
note sounds not only itself but also its relationship with what has been sounded and 
with what is yet to be sounded. Because every musical note contains within itself all 
its dynamic meaning, all its movement away from and toward, we hear immediacy of 
its present sounding all its pasts and all its future. When we hear a melody, for 
example, we do not hear the first tone, then another, then another in isolated 
succession; we do not hear it in fragmented pieces, but holistically. In fact, when we 
dwell on past tones or imagine future ones we lose engagement with it. The inter-
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penetration of past, present and future, then, exists in the hearing of a note. ‘Melody’ 
can be seen is a kind of temporal gestalt. In musical metre, the past requires no 
remembering and future no foreseeing because both are already, immediately and 
fully present within each moment. We hear what is, what has been and what will be 
as a ‘simultaneity’—the key is in grasping the ‘now’ of the music. To be actively in the 
note now sounding is to be caught up in the dynamic tension between its present 
and its future (Zuckerkandl 1973: 94).  
The presence of past and future within the now of the music’s flow does not 
depend upon human psychological powers of remembering and foreseeing: it is not 
memory that stores the past, but time itself (Begbie 2002).  This is to say that in the 
hearing of music, we discover that the present is not a line dividing past from future. 
‘Musical’ hearing is neither remembrance of the past nor foreknowledge of the 
future, but presence to and participation in ‘another imaginative world with its own 
time’ (Porter 2009: 181). Melody’s role in the ballad experience is to help us enter this 
time between—this enclosed circle of meaning—through an embodied experience.   
Music reveals its existence as the flow of time…indeed, there is hardly a 
phenomenon that can tell us more about time and temporality than can music 
(Begbie 2002: 152). 
 
Past, Present, Future: Living in the Presence of Enacted Time  
In both music and ritual enactment, being and becoming meet in a single  
moment of now, a moment that is temporal but not timebound (in the clock sense), 
and immediate but far reaching in both past and future. By the term ‘moment’ I do 
not mean a discrete clock determined measurement; ‘moment’ must be understood 
here in terms of enacted time of ritual and music, a time that, although it has no 
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measurement, has limitless meaning. Through both ritual enactment and music, we 
encounter the meaning of now through the direct presence of its past and future 
references. Furthermore, we actively create this presence through engagement in the 
dialectic of memory (past) attention (present) and expectation (future).  This can be 
understood by reference to Ricouer’s hermeneutic model, which shows us how every 
new enactment is made present, and yields new understandings—an idea that will 
be further explored in later chapters.         
          Ó Laoire relates the potential to enter enacted time to the situated event, 
following Gadamer in arguing that art, and especially music, should not be separated 
from its context. It is the location, in Ó Laoire’s (2005: 38, my italics) view, that is 
important:  
The preparation of a special place creates a special time, the extended present, 
spurring the participants toward a new description of reality. 
 
  
The Extended Present 
Aesthetic experience was defined above as being an experience in which we 
are ‘present’ in the current moment. The pragmatist philosopher James (1950: 608)  
believes that the idea of the ‘present’ as a separate moment is ‘an altogether ideal 
abstraction, not only never realized in sense, but probably never even conceived of 
by those unaccustomed to philosophic meditation.’ James put forward the concept 
of the ‘specious present,’ the time duration in which a state of consciousness is 
experienced as being in the present.  This lived-through or extended present can be 
understood as a specious present tied to the past and to the future.  
The knowledge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, 




The whole present is therefore absolutely inaccessible. In the ballad singing 
experience ‘…performance synchronizes the tradition…[by] making the tradition 
“present” and experiential (Porter 2009: 181). The core unifying aspect, then, is the 
present. It is from the present - the ‘here and now’ - that we can think of the past and 
of the future; it is from the present that action is planned for performance in the 
external world through kinaesthetic movements; it is from the present that the chain 
of memories and anticipations that characterise the life of consciousness originates; 
it is to the present that the ‘essentially actual’ experiences are tied.   
 
Time as Shared Experience, Presence as Ontological Unity  
Crucially, the experience of time is always a shared experience. Bergson, 
philosopher of time, went as far as to claim that time is experience (1946). If culture 
is shared experience, as most anthropological interpretations accept (with or 
without some qualification), it is shared experience not of things or events, but of 
time itself. It makes absolutely no sense to talk of ‘time passing’ or of ‘experience’ 
except as a shared phenomenon: if time was not a shared experience, we could not 
know what time is. A familiar paradox arises: personal experience of time is highly 
private, but the experience of time, cannot in principle be bound to subjective states. 
By extension, it is necessary that co-existence is a temporal co-existence. Bergson’s 
idea of ‘culture’ is in fact the idea of ‘socialised time’ actualised in experienced 
duration, or to use his own French term, in the durée. According to Bergson, for 
human beings to have an existence outside their inner world, they must construct an 
external reality. We use the method of scientific measurement, which Bergson 
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characterises as ‘the spatialisation of time,’ to reconstruct the lived experience of 
durée.  
There are two commonly accepted frameworks for defining time. First, time 
is understood as the demarcation of past, present, and future; and second, as the 
counting of hours, minutes and seconds. The concept of time as the separation of 
past, present and future is one that facilitates our understanding of physical 
processes, such as the turning of the autumn leaves. In this context, the past is 
terminal and the future inaccessible; they are non-existent in the present. However, 
this first framework raises more uncertainty than clarity about time, for its three 
divisions are in constant flux: the future is continually becoming the present that is 
continually becoming the past. The second framework for defining time—as the 
counting of hours, minutes and seconds—is an artificially established construct. 
This, essentially, is a measure of movement, and deals not with time, but with space. 
It measures the amount of motion one body makes in relation to another—as for 
example, the earth turning round the sun. Within this framework, change creates 
time; that is, the turning of the earth on its axis produces the hours by which we 
calculate it. In other words, though real living goes on in the indivisible realm of 
durée, the world is broken into segments so we can explain, analyse and even 
understand the nature of our experiences in the common frameworks outlined 
above. Although the conscious reconstruction of our experience distorts them, this 
distortion is inevitable, because of the impossibility of ever halting the flow of durée. 
Bergson is acutely aware that since time is dynamic, as soon as we attempt to 
measure a moment, it is already gone. Time broken down into measurable units is 
constructed ‘spatialised time,’ and not true duration. 
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For Bergson, the key to reality is that all change (time and movement) should 
be treated as indivisible. He defines durée as this indivisible mobility: in the durée, 
experiences flow incessantly, realising a succession of indistinct elements, a 
continuous change of conscious states produced by the interpenetration of 
qualitative moments. These elements structure themselves and interpenetrate like 
the notes of a melody where every note extends into the next in an organic, 
unbroken whole. Culture is always in motion; it is grounded in experienced time and 
driven by creativity in constant motion. The view of the world as impermanent is 
accepted in eastern philosophies—that all of conditioned existence, without 
exception, is in a constant state of flux. True time and true reality do not consist of 
‘states,’ since states imply immobility. However, because durée is ineffable, the way 
toward understanding it cannot be expressed adequately through language or 
symbol. In Bergson’s view, it is inexpressible and can only ever be grasped through a 
simple intuition of the imagination. At every moment of our imagining, whether 
productive or merely receptive, a certain phase of the imagined world appears as 
present and refers both backward to earlier phases and forward to later ones.  
 
The ‘Vivid Present’  
             The social phenomenologist Schütz (1964) utilises Bergson’s idea of durée, 
emphasising the nature of its importance in the communicative process of music and 
musical experience. He believes that ‘communicating with one another 
presupposes…the simultaneous partaking of the partners in various dimensions of 
outer and inner time…’ (178). Subjective time in the everyday life-world is 
characterised by the encounter between inner durée and spatialised cosmic time. 
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Schütz conceives of a new temporal perspective born of the fusion of durée with 
cosmic time; a new flux which he calls the ‘vivid present.’  
In light of Schütz’s transformation of Bergson’s ideas, we can reconfigure 
these ideas and think of ‘presence’ to be synomymous with the ‘vivid present.’  In 
this sense, presence itself creates a new and imaginary dimension of time. The ballad 
experience has the potential to reveal to us the timelessness of the inner durée and 
removes the boundaries of the outer world time. Schütz contends that we can grasp 
the Other’s lived experience in the ‘vivid present’ simultaneously with our own 
stream of consciousness. This is to say, in the case of ballad ‘presence,’ while the 
other is singing and structuring his experience in his inner time, we listen to the 
words step by step, following our own stream of consciousness. ‘Simultaneity,’ then, 
is not a concept that refers merely to external time but is especially connected to 
inner time. For communication, a relationship is established by reciprocal sharing of 
the other’s flux of experience in inner time by living through a vivid present together. 
 The ‘vivid present’ exists in the intersection between durée and cosmic time, 
between inner and outer worlds. In finding a way to talk about time, we can set up a 
series of dichotomies or binary oppositions: between inner and outer, qualitative and 
quantitative, internal and external, past and future, spatialised and non-spatial, flux 
and ordered, measurable and immeasurable, public and private. Porter’s concept of 
presence can be understood to exist in the intersection between these dichotomies. In 
my own view, we can think of presence of creating and occupying that liminal space 
between; between inner and outer worlds, between past and present. It collapses the 
walls of time and space, transcends or hovers between polarities of existence. If we 
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re-call the words of Stanley Robertson, this is what he tells us: ‘...and the space that’s 
in between is where the Maysie lives.’ 
In an attempt to proceed from lived experience to an explanation of lived 
experience in language, it becomes necessary in terms of philosophy to find, invent 
or create a metaphorical realm to account for the meaningful. However, if we forget 
that we are working in the metaphorical realm, the distinction between what is 
literal and what is metaphorical can break down, and we are at risk of falling into 
the trap of false logic. It is important to be wary of the danger of the analytic 
conflation of the metaphorical and the literal, when our language does not embody 
such a distinction or bear such a conflation. The problem lies in the false sense of 
understanding brought about. It must be made clear that the new ideas presented 
here are a fiction. Some would argue that subscribing to such fictions or holding them 
up as ‘true’ is dangerous, because 
It increasingly appears as if we are dealing with profound and serious questions 
of human existence, wrestling with mysterious and ethereal qualities, which we 
know to exist and yet are always, tantalisingly beyond our reach … there 
remains a fairytale quality to the play of these fantasies (Costelloe 1994).  
Ricoeur does not see such a fiction as a lie; he would rather conceive of a product 
that can lead us to new ideas and new understandings (1981: 246). As long as we are 
aware of the limitations of language, all is not lost. What is presented here are new 









Chapter Four: Summary and Conclusions 
  
This chapter has attempted to identify gaps and possible openings in Porter’s 
theory, unpacking the term ‘presence’ using insights from a variety of philosophical 
and fieldwork sources. The fascinating notion of the conniach was introduced to shed 
some light on the phenomenon from the point of view of the singer in a Scottish 
Traveller context. The importance of the aesthetic experience, of the total somatic 
experience, or our whole selves was emphasised in order to provide justification for 
exploring Gadamer’s investigation of aesthetic time. Gadamer showed us that art is a 
form of ‘play,’ or rather a temporal ‘event’ in which we participate. This event creates 
a closed circle of meaning by bringing two disparate events together and creates a 
state of self-forgetfulness in the participant. The idea of participation, or sharing, is 
crucial to the dynamic and process of presence. The notion of ‘enacted time’—which 
can be explained in both theological or aesthetic contexts—helps explain the special 
time of presence within a humanist framework. The echoes of religious experience 
and parallels with theological ideas point not to a divergence of experience but 
rather, as Maslow believed, experience that lies at the heart of what is means to be 
human.   
The importance of the idea of ‘unity’ made itself apparent in several ways. It 
is central in descriptions and explanations of the conniach with its trinity or unity of 
emotion, feeling and voice, and with the particular power of aesthetic experiences 
that engage our whole selves—body and mind. In a hermenetutic context, it 
manifested in the unity of the enclosed circle of meaning created by aesthetic 
experience in Gadamer’s explanation of the temporality of the aesthetic, in the unity 
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of opposites in our experience of art given in the example of the tragic and in 
‘emplotment’—our desire to make sense of experience by creating a unified 
meaningful whole. 
 In order to answer the question of how we become so immersed in the ballad 
experience to be able to ‘presence imagined worlds,’ we need to explore the 
relationship between presence and sound. The following chapter examines the 





CHAPTER FIVE 5 
“Oh What a Voice, What a Voice, what a Voice I hear”: 
‘Deep Listening’ and the Ballad Experience 44 
 
 
This chapter turn to the relationship between presence and our experience of 
sound, examining the dynamics of the embodied experience of the performed singing 
‘event.’ Studying sound is necessarily related to the act of listening. Based on the 
assumption that our experience of being-in-the-world is always being-with and that 
mind and body, self and world and self and other are intertwined in a unitary whole, 
listening must be understood as an act of the body and, by extension, must 
necessarily take into account other bodies. This chapter concentrates on aural 
experience, but ultimately, the kind of holism aimed for goes beyond our sense of 
aurality, pointing toward the need to address the entire sensory spectrum. 
The focus on listening is a relatively new direction in the study of culture at 
large, reflecting in a shift in focus from the object to the role of the subject in the 
creation of meaning (discussed in Chapter Two). If the Maysie is said to exist in the 
ethereal, transient performance space between singer and listener, we must surely 
ask the extent to which the listener recreates the song in the listening, as much as the 
singer does in the performing. Before the main argument is developed, the notion of 
‘deep listening’ (Becker 2004) will be introduced. For context, limitations of 
‘ocularcentric’45 scholarship and the Western cultural bias will be laid forth. In 
attempt to move beyond such scholarship, post-phenomenological theories about 
                                                          
44 The quotation here is in reference to the title of a traditional song sung my Lizzie Higgins, Scottish 
Traveller.  
45 The term ‘ocularcentrism’ was popularised by Martin Jay (1994) in which he identifies vision as a 
philosophical buttress to Western thought. 
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the experience of sound from the post-phenomenologists Don Idhe ([1976] 2007) 
and Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) will be introduced and discussed. Such works seek to 
understand how sound impacts upon the body, attempting to reunite ‘sensation’ 
with ‘understanding.’ The semantic difference between hearing and listening will be 
clarified, and the idea of a habitus of listening—a culturally situated mode of listening 
—will be developed. The idea of song as sounding presence will be explored and used 
to develop ideas about ‘enacted time’ from the previous chapter. The idea of the 
‘presence of silence’ is also questioned: in an embodied sense, is silence ever possible? 
Following ideas developed in Chapter Four, listening is understood here as an 
act of participation. Porter (2009:148, my italics) advocates that what is important in 
the study of ballad presence is not just the textual content,  
the gesture, the existential act that envelops singer and audience and makes 
“present” the imagined world the singer is creating.’  
 
The conniach was described by Sheila Stewart as the feeling it elicits in those who 
hear it. ‘You put your own emotions and feelings into what you’re singing and that 
gets across to the folk…and makes them listen, involves them.’ The idea of listening as 
an ‘existential act’—enveloping both singer and listener—is key to the development 
of ideas here. While there is a stark divergence in the demands and experience of 
performing and listening, this chapter argues that there is a deep indissoluble 
connection between the performance of music and its reception through listening. In 
this vein, the act of listening is considered in the context of Nancy’s rethinking of 
existential phenomenology and fundamental ontology of the singular-plural.  
The final section asks how listening opens to a notion of internal and 
external worlds and investigates the capacity of the ear to reveal, ‘make present’ or 
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‘Deep Listening’ is a notion which Becker (2004) appropriates from the 
composer Pauline Oliveros. The term conjoins musical expression and the emotional 
impact of musical expression:  
Deep listening involves going below the surface of what is heard and also 
expanding on the whole field of sound, whatever one’s usual focus might be. Such 
forms of listening are essential to unlocking layers and layers of imagination, meaning and 
memory (Becker 2004: 2, my italics) 
 
A ‘deep listener,’ then, is a term for a person who is deeply moved by listening to 
music or an oral performance—a piece of classical music, a certain pop song, a folk 
performance for example. Some of us, it would seem, are more disposed than others 
to the act of deep listening. Many of us will be able to bring to mind an experience of 
singing that has deeply moved us, whether we were singing ourselves or were part 
of an audience. We may say that a certain song ‘resonated’ with us, or ‘struck a 
chord’—both examples of metaphors grounded in bodily experience. Becker 
understands deep listening as a kind of secular ‘trancing,’  
divorced from religious practice but often carrying religious sentiments such as 
feelings of transcendence or a sense of communion with something beyond 
oneself (2).  
 
The idea of communion in aesthetic experience was explored in the previous 




Being ‘All Ears’  
In ‘deep listening,’ it is not just sound that is important. In an interesting 
discussion with Professor Foley,46 it was agreed that what is most important in 
expressive culture is the live, dynamic, participatory and embodied nature of such 
events rather than the purely oral or sonic. In other aesthetic experiences—such as 
dance—sound may not be to the fore. It is important to stress that the wider ideas 
and discourses engaged with are not reliant on phonocentric assumptions.47  
 Shusterman’s philosophy of somaesthetics, discussed in the previous chapter, 
attempts to develop an understanding that allows us to relate to the world with 
both body and mind in a more complex way than through cerebral interpretation 
alone. Shusterman takes ‘interpretation’ to refer to deliberate reflection or 
decipherment that construct an understanding of their object (2000). Bowman 
(2004: 41), an advocate for a somaesthetics of music, claims that ‘we feel melodies in 
our muscles as much as we process them in our brains.’  That is to say, sounds that 
enter the ear affect both body and mind. Sound does things to bodies at a visceral 
level; our ears are not alone in responding. Since the ear has no eyelid, sound cannot 
be blocked out or ignored - our whole being is involved in listening, just as it is 
involved, as will be argued, in interpreting what it hears. The idea of ‘being all ears’ is 
to articulate the idea of the ‘total somaesthetic experience,’ where both body and 
mind are immersed entirely in deep listening. 
 
 
                                                          
46 Personal Communication, (2010). 
47 This does bear significance for an understanding of listening in general for the experience of those 
with hearing difficulties. Deaf people do in some sense ‘listen’ – they can feel the resonance of bass 
frequencies in their bodies (see Idhe 2007: 44–45). For a broader discussion of bodily listening see 




 It has been argued that a Western cultural bias has constructed the voice and 
the body as the ‘radical alterity of the logos and the mind,’ ascribing only meaning to 
the mind and implicitly imposing value judgements. This assumption is deeply 
ingrained in twentieth century thinking (Dolar 1996: 7).48 Essentially, we are 
working within a disciplinary trajectory that has always emphasised ‘rendering the 
poetic visible’:  
We have concentrated on verbal art as it emanates from the mouth and travels 
through the communicative channel, capturing it before it disappears into the 
mysterious tunnels and crevices of the ear (Bendix 2000: 36).  
 
The concept of ‘ocularcentrism’ describes a tendency in Western modernity to 
ascribe particular primacy to vision above the other human senses. In the English 
language, there is an alignment of ‘the eye’ (vision) with the Cartesian cogito to 
signify rational knowledge: the observer is a seat of awareness, bounded by the skin 
and set against an exterior world. Such a view has only recently been challenged by 
an ‘anti-ocular’ turn in twentieth century continental philosophy. Vision, according 
to anti-ocularcentrism, is the one modality of perception that leads us to objectify 
our environment, regarding it as a repository of things that exist outside of and alien 
to our own bodies, and over which we exercise domination. To be ocularcentric is to 
adhere to an objective world independent of and external to human consciousness, 
to which the observer gains admission by the authority of the eye. In the twentieth 
century, European (and particularly French) scholarship mounted a thoroughgoing 
                                                          
48 A good example is that of Barthes (1977), who made the assumption that the phonic bodily 
dimension of the human voice—its ‘grain’ as he called it—has only pleasurable and ‘pre-semiotic’ 
connotations. In my opinion there is a fundamental misunderstanding underpinning Barthes’ idea of 
the meaninglessness of the voice as a sonic medium produced by the body, in that he mistakes 
language for communication. 
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critique of ocularcentrism, though arguably this recent ‘denigration’ of vision has 
paradoxically served to reaffirm its centrality.49 That is to say, the only tools we have 
at hand to critique ocularcentrism are ocularcentric in nature, much in the same way 
that there are fundamental problems in understanding quantum physics: we are part 
of the quantum field and as such we can never step outside of it in order to observe 
it.  
Such inherited preferences for writing and print are difficult to shake off. This 
bias has been particularly evident in the undervaluing of oral traditions as compared 
to their literary counterparts, and a preference for the written is particularly 
pertinent in ballad studies, as discussed in Chapter Two. Even folklorists studying 
oral culture have striven to render the performative in print in the interest of adding 
oral literatures to the canons of written. In my own view, text-centred literary 
analysis fails to address how a reader is moved by a great work of literature and at 
best ‘skirts the issue of the culturally divergent pleasures of listening and embodied 
experience’ (Bendix 2000: 36). Such works attend to the message; the physicality 
and embodied experience of sound is bypassed on the way to signification. In my 
view, the ocularcentric scholarly fixation with text and textualising, combined with 
the paucity of interdisciplinary vocabulary to address the aural, have impoverished 
much of the ethnographic record of the ballad singing experience. The 
ethnomusicologist Stoller (1984: 561,567) proposes that 
Sound is a dimension of experience in and of itself…A deeper appreciation of 
sound could...make us consider in a new light the dynamic nature of sound, an 
open door to the comprehension of cultural sentiment.  
 
                                                          
49 Derrida (1978), for instance, holds that the binary of darkness and light is the founding metaphor of 
Western philosophy: ‘the entire history of our philosophy is a photology, the name given to a history 
of, or treatise on, light.’ 
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Orality: Presence of the Word 
In the study of orality, some attempts have been made to overcome this bias. 
Ong (1967) first drew attention to the significant ‘presence of the word’—that is, the 
meaningful sensuous dimension of speech—claiming that the human being 
communicates with his whole body. Ong’s provocative exploration of the nature and 
history of the ‘word’ in some of its social, psychological, literary, phenomenological, 
and religious dimensions argues that the word is initially aural and in the last 
analysis always remains sound; it cannot be reduced to any other category. Ong 
(1967: 129–130) therefore posits sound as the most important factor in his own 
theory of presence, claiming that ‘being is what we experience in a world of sound.’  
His major interest was in exploring how the transition 
from orality to literacy influenced culture and changed human consciousness. 
However, it is very difficult to make clear-cut distinctions between what constitutes 
the ‘oral’ and what constitutes the ‘written.’ Not to understand this as a continuum 
(or perhaps better, a to-and-fro movement between two never fully discrete 
modalities) is to participate in a Romantic and Whiggish historiography with its 
embedded value judgements on the relative positions of the written and the oral: 
that is, the prestige of writing versus the ‘authenticity’ of oral.50 Ong claims that the 
transition from oral to written communication in stages of cultural development 
entails what he calls the ‘loss’ of presence. For Ong, people in a primarily oral culture 
hear words not as things, as though they were looking at them, but as sound, sound 
that consumed them. He conceives sound as an ‘event manifesting power and 
personal presence.’ By ‘presence,’ Ong understands ‘the kind of relationship that 
                                                          
50 This is a huge field of study in its own right. See Havelock (1988).  
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exists between persons when we say that two persons are present to one another.’ 
With presence, he believes, we ‘gain an immediacy and a certain kind of relevance’ 
(646). In his view, sound, unlike vision, envelops us in a multidimensional presence: 
Vision comes to a human being from one direction at a time: to look at a room 
or landscape, I must move my eyes around…When I hear, however, I gather 
sound simultaneously from every direction at once. I am the centre of my 
auditory word, which envelops me, establishing me at a kind of core of 
sensation and existence (72). 
 
Presence, in the full sense of Ong’s understanding, entails more than ‘sensation’; it is 
grounded in all of the bodily senses simultaneously. We speak of a ‘sense’ of 
presence, rather than a sight, sound, smell, taste, or touch of presence (646).  
 Ong was above all concerned to contrast the properties of speech and 
writing. A possible shift in perspective here is rather to conceive of these contrasting 
properties as the difference between hearing and vision. Ong’s arguments are 
provocative in that he asserts that typography ‘subverted’ the ‘proper’ power of the 
word. Arguably, this standpoint is short-sighted in that it does not allow for how 
typography could potentially enhance that power in the intricate interplay of media 
we have today.51 Similar ideas are explored in Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous (1996), 
where he argues that literacy served to narrow the circle of communication to the 
human voice. We still ‘hear’ things talking to us while reading, we hear voices, see 
visions, travel across space and back in time.52 Literacy makes possible abstract 
thought itself; but, Abram argues, we pay a big price for such spellbinding 
logomancy: we forsake our bodies and come to live in our heads. Literate 
                                                          
51 Finnegan (1977) maintains that if we are to use words accurately, we should speak of a continuum 
between ‘orality’ and ‘orality plus a full deployment of the resources of literary and mass 
communication.’ 
52 There are different kinds of reading. For example, very fast reading is visual and oversteps the 
phonetic centres in our brain. See Dehaene (2009) for a cognitive neuroscientist’s guide of how the 
brain acquires reading. 
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consciousness—abetted by Plato and Descartes—creates the subject/object, 
mind/body and nature/culture dichotomies of Western thought. It also creates the 
form/matter dichotomy. That is because words in themselves are neither a sound nor 
a sight, once they can be both heard and seen. The meaning (form) of a word is 
abstracted from both its audible and visible embodiments (matter). The vowel 
sounds, made by breath passing through the larynx, animate a text—literally. Breath 
is air. As Abram notes, in the ancient way of thinking at the boundary of orality and 
literacy that survived in the earliest Greek philosophy (the Anaximenes), ‘air’ is 
‘soul.’ This is still echoed in the etymology of the English word ‘spirit’ which is 
cognate with ‘respire.’ Abram’s claim is that modalities of human consciousness 
correlate with modalities of human communication, and that fundamental changes 
in modalities of human communication—as from orality to literacy—are 
accompanied by profound changes in human consciousness.  
Our modern society and modern technologies have moved far beyond the 
original cultures Ong and Abram talk of in which the ‘word’ acquired its powerful 
meaning. It could also be argued that in the literary context, the move to print 
results in the hibernation rather than the complete loss of presence, because that 
text can always be brought back to presence in the act of speech, or indeed song. 
Gadamer (2004: 394–395) believes that all writing is a kind of ‘alienated speech,’ and 
its signs need to be transformed back into speech and meaning through the process 
of interpretation and dialogue with the text.  
 In writing, the meaning of what is spoken exists purely for itself, completely 
detached from all emotional elements of expression and communication (392). 
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 It could perhaps be argued that collected ballad texts are alienated in a similar way, 
and need to be transformed not only in the act of reading but performed and shared 
in live experience.  
   
Contemporary Philosophical Theories 
 Moving past the dominance of visual categories and into a phenomenology of 
sound, listening and embodied presence, phenomenological enquiries have sought to 
go against the grain of tradition. Prominent here are Don Idhe’s ([1976] 2007) 
exploration of listening and voice and Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical enquiry 
Listening (2007) which investigates the philosophical ramifications of sound and its 
relationship to the human body. Nancy is interested in the ways in which the 
subject listening is constituted in its relations to, or with the sound itself. For Idhe, 
listening is always ‘listening to’ (23). On Nancy’s model of co-existence and being as 
being-with, the act of listening is always listening-with rather than listening to.  
Nancy’s ideas have been taken up by Simpson (2009), who explores a 
classical music performance. In my own view, Nancy’s ideas offer a particularly 
insightful route into and a conceptual means with which we can begin to 
characterise these listening events, and by extension build upon our understandings 
of the ballad presence. In the ballad experience, there exists a plurality of relations: 
relations between the listeners’ body and the sound encountered, and between those 
bodies simultaneously experiencing the sound together. Listening evokes a complex 
of physiological, emotional and reasoned responses. Nancy describes the body like 
an ‘echo chamber,’ responding to music through inner vibrations as well as outer 




‘Hearing’ and ‘Listening’ 
It is important to distinguish between ‘hearing’ and ‘listening,’ for in some 
contexts they are semantically very different. Barthes (1986), in his short writings 
around music and listening, devalues the significance of ‘hearing’—the physiological 
—suggesting it is something shared with animals, something ‘primitive,’ while 
‘listening,’ conceived of as the interpretation of a sign, is what makes us human 
(249). ‘Interpretation’ here is taken to refer to those acts of conscious thought and 
deliberate reflection that construct an understanding of an object. There is a tension 
set up here between the language of meaning and its pre-verbal status of sound. That 
is to say, Barthes underplays the significance of the physiological form of hearing as a 
bodily experience. This is generally the case in studies of music and sound.  
In Nancy’s view, ‘hearing’ is physiological. There are not different modes of 
hearing as it were, but there are of listening—listening is an existential ‘act.’ He 
argues convincingly that we can listen without intentionally interpreting what we 
hear and that sounds can affect us powerfully before signification.53 His decentring of 
interpreted meaning in this case suggests being attentive to the sound itself. This not 
to say that people will not interpret or find meaning in sound, but rather that there 
is something of significance in un-interpreted experiences. Ó Laoire (2005: 214) 
would argue that this stance prioritises ‘modes of being’ over ‘modes of knowing.’ 
                                                          
53 This idea is not new. Many Romantic poets believed that imaginative literature communicates by 
means of words that are felt before they are understood. This conception of poetic thinking as 
fundamentally pre-rational (if not altogether anti-rational) is taken up by Keats, who, in a single verse 
couplet of ‘Sleep and Poetry,’ conveys  his sense of wonder at  
‘[t]he hearty grasp that sends a  pleasant sonnet 




Shusterman (2000) believes that it is possible to have a ‘sense’ of an experience 
without necessarily having to think about it, and without having to intentionally 
interpret that experience. With this deeper appreciation of sound experience, we 
can ‘open doors to the comprehension of cultural sentiment’ (Stoller 1984:567). 
While it might be difficult to do this in an alien culture, with deep reflection, such 
an appreciation certainly opens a door to the understanding of our own.  
   
Habitus of Listening    
Becker (2004: 71) proposes that we need a term which is the ‘aural equivalent 
of the visual term for modes of seeing, that is, the gaze.’ The term ‘gaze’ is used in a 
variety of contexts to exemplify the situatedness of looking, the historical and 
psychological specificity of any one visual approach, and the complex of modes of 
seeing with rhetorical and structures and beliefs. Modes of seeing imply habits of 
seeing that change not only across space, but also at different historical periods 
within a single culture. Similarly, modes of listening vary according to the kind of 
sound heard—whether that be music or otherwise—the expectations of the musical 
situation, and the kind of subjectivity that a particular culture has fostered in 
relation to musical events (Johnson 1995). In Becker’s view, even more than modes of 
looking, modes of listening implicate not only structures of knowledge and beliefs 
but also intimate notions of personhood and identity. Listening addresses interiors; 
listening provides access to what is hidden from sight. This idea is central to the 
arguments in this thesis and will be explored later in this chapter. 
 In an endeavour to express temporal situatedness of the listener, Becker 
suggests the utility of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Habitus was originally coined as 
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an alternative to terms such as ‘culture,’ which seemed too static, and obscured 
idiosyncratic modes of thought. Still left with the need to refer to the ways in which 
beliefs and behaviours seem relatively stereotypical within a given society, Bourdieu 
proposed the term habitus to function theoretically in place of the world ‘culture’: 
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment…produce 
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions…it also designates a way of 
being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, 
tendency, propensity, or inclination (1977: 72, 214)  
 
Habitus, then, is an embodied pattern of action and reaction, in which we are 
not fully conscious of why we do what we do, not totally determined, but with a 
tendency to behave in a certain way. Our perceptions operate within a set of habits 
gradually established throughout our lives and developed through our continual 
interaction with the world beyond our bodies—the evolving situation of being-in-
the-world. The ‘pro-active ballad audience’ (Toelken 1999) must have layers of 
experience and knowledge to enable them to understand a performance on the terms 
in which it is presented. Being an informed ballad listener is a learned art, learned by 
some in the context of their family, community or peer group, and by others through 
actively seeking out today’s performance environments, which can range from 
intimate family settings to commercial broadcasts (McKean 2003: 10). Our habitus of 
listening is tacit, unexamined and seemingly completely natural. We listen in a 
particular way without thinking about it. Becker argues that most of our styles of 
listening have been learned through the unconscious imitation of people around us 
and with whom we continually interact. It is possible that our listening behaviours 
are innate, but the fact that they vary across cultures would suggest that it is more 
likely that they are culturally constructed. 
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 Becker’s notion of a habitus of listening can be extended in the light of Nancy’s 
ideas in this context. Bourdieu’s concept is characterised as a ‘system of 
dispositions.’  Nancy maintains that as we are always already with—or rather, a with 
that is at once singular, but one among many singular relations—we will always be 
‘disposed’ in a certain sense. Every hearer occupies a position in a cultural field not of 
his or her own making; every hearing is situated and enacted. We accumulate our 
listening habits and expectations largely unawares; only when we are confronted 
with an alternate kind of listening are we likely to reflect on our own conventional 
mode. Listeners can shift modes in different contexts, such as the ways in which we 
listen to music at a chamber music recital, or at a rock concert, or a folk club. For 
example, we sit quietly at a chamber music recital; we shout loudly and dance 
around at a rock concert; we may tap our feet along to the beat at a folk club. Cross 
culturally, modes of listening may add features not shared by us, or may not involve 
features that we take for granted.   
  The idea of a habitus of listening underlines the interrelatedness of the 
perception of musical emotion and learned interactions with our surroundings. It 
entails a disposition to listening with a particular kind of focus; to expect and to 
experience particular kinds of emotion; to interpret the meaning of the sounds and 
our emotional response to them in somewhat (but never totally) predictable ways. It 
will encompass expectation, attention, absorption, and imagination. The stance of 
the listener is not a given, but necessarily influenced by place, time, the shared 
context of culture, and intricate and irreproducible details of our personal 
background and experience. Such a position foregrounds our being in the world and 
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contends that our conception of reality is always conditioned by our embodied 
existence (Ó Laoire 2005: xiii).  
 
Nancy’s Concept of ‘Sense’  
We can ask questions about the textual content of a ballad, but Nancy 
would argue there is also a ‘sense’ in the very sound of the lyrics, in their tone, 
timbre, and so on, which can be ‘made sense of’ before and even without them being 
interpreted. Such an understanding of sense is important in the context of the 
paradigm of embodiment in that it suggests that there is a ‘sense’ before it is 
articulated or voiced.   
Bodies make sense before we sense in words in the folding and unfolding of 
their presence with other bodies’ (Simpson 2009: 2563).  
 
Sense, then, is fully embodied: it is ‘constituted in the materiality of corporeal 
existence (James 2006: 106).  
 The understanding of sense here is that it is always this sense, ever present, 
each time it occurs. It is not a universal sense, but a singular multiplicity of sense 
(Simpson 2009: 2563). There is also performativity to sense. According to Nancy, 
sense ‘has to repeat itself’ (2003: 93). It is possible to link back to the idea of play and 
performance discussed by Ó Laoire (2005), recalling Gadamer and his theory of 
enactment. Inescapably, the performative event has a repetitive quality. Here, 
however, repetition does not mean that something is literally repeated. Rather, every 
repetition is understood to be new and original.   
Nancy talks of sense in terms of ‘being-toward.’ This is to be understood in 
the temporal sense—we are always moving toward sense. It is the movement of being 
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toward or rather ‘coming to’ presence. The coming of sense is infinite. We cannot say 
that sense exists, but rather it is emergent, it is process; it cannot be predicted but 
changes course as particular interactions coalesce. In my view, this is a useful 
metaphor for understanding the Maysie, which comes to be as particular interactions 
coalesce. This idea will be developed over the following chapters. 
In terms of listening, sense must ‘resound.’ Nancy’s (2007: 6) notion revolves 
around a fundamental resonance, ‘as a first or last profundity of ‘sense’ itself (or of 
truth).’ Sense is not sound and vice versa, but rather, sound is a modality through 
which sense arises (in resonance). Meaning is therefore resonant; its sense is found 
in resonance. This wisdom is captured in the fact that we often say that a powerful 
song ‘resonated’ with us. In Nancy’s view (2007: 54), listening to sound is always on 
the edge of meaning. That is to say that meaning is always ‘in praxis’ it is never a 
given but has to be enacted.  
 
Voice and Song 
Harmon (2008) believes that song reaches the objective of instilling a quality 
of presence more quickly and more fully than speech. As the modernist poet T. S 
Eliot one said of the words of a song,  
The text is there…partly to keep those parts of the mind and body engaged 
while the song goes about its deeper work (in Burrows 1989: 400, original 
reference unknown). 
 
This idea might be fanciful, but there are many who would testify to its truth. The 
bodily act of singing opens up a resonant presence that, according to some thinkers, 
allows words to penetrate our being at a deeper level. From this view, daily speech is 
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so regulated and stylised that we enter an almost dissociated state of awareness into 
which the words drop and diffuse themselves, whereas song heightens our embodied 
awareness. Physiologically, David Burrows (1989: 391–394) claims that musical 
prolongation of a single word sung to one pitch has the effect of focussing attention 
on the sheer sonic quality of the voice, its timbre and resonance:  
In singing, anatomy expands into temporality, because lungs and larynx take 
more time to realize their sonic potential as pitch and resonance than is 
required by the surface apparatus to articulate the phonemes of speech. 
 
Moreover, in singing, the whole body is engaged. The following quote articulates the 
complexity of the physical act of singing, often taken for granted: 
Singing is a physical experience… It is a combination and coordination of 
breath, resonance and articulation. The breath rises from the body supported 
by the muscles of the lung cavity and the lower back. The air passing through 
the larynx activates the vocal folds…The pharynx enlarges and enhances the 
resonating space through which sound passes. The sinus cavities are also 
involved as resonators. The articulators of the buccal cavity shape the words 
and the breath carries the song outward to its listeners (Brodovitch 1998: 46–
47) 
  
As a bridge, breath is aligned to both body and mind and it alone is the tool which 
can bring them both together, illuminating both (Hanh 2008: 23).  
Zumthor (1990: 5–6) emphasises the physical power of the voice: 
Voice lodges in the silence of the body as the body does in the womb. But 
unlike body, voice returns to its matrix, immediately and constantly erasing 
itself as speech and sound…There is no doubt that voice constitutes an 
archetypal form in the human consciousness: a primordial and creative image, 
both an energy and configuration of features that predetermine, and activate 
and structure our first experiences, feelings and thought.  
 
‘The image of voice reaches deep into a region of lived experience where it escapes 
conceptual formulas and where prescience alone operates’ (Zumthor 1990: 6, my 
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italics). Prescience could suggest a ‘foreknowing,’ but rather in this case it could 
relate to the idea that song can affect us prior to signification and that there is 
significance in un-interpreted experiences.  Ó Laoire (2005: 222) notes that the term 
‘prescience’ here comes under the heading of a mode of being, and that such a view 
contends that the singing voice is not first experienced at the level of knowledge but 
at the prior level of being. Zumthor’s analysis points to the existence of voiced song 
on the phenomenological plane, functioning independently of any conceptual 
framework. He also draws attention to the etymology of the terms for voice in 
various languages for this phenomenon and its equation with spirit, discussed above 
in reference to Abram’s (1996) discussion of breath and respiration. It can be argued 
that sounds of words and melody and their intonation focus the awareness of 
‘presence’ in the present through an embodied experience, where ‘one body acts 
upon another in song’ (Zumthor 1990: 5–6 in Ó Laoire 2005: 222) 
 
Sonorous Present and Emergent Spaces  
This section explores what happens in the emergent and enacted ‘present’ of 
embodied song experience, understood as the ‘sonorous present.’ The previous 
chapter introduced the idea of ‘enacted time’ as a way to describe the kind of 
temporality experienced in aesthetic encounters, arguing that music in particular 
reveals this sense of enacted time through direct experience. Ó Laoire (2005: 38) 
believes that it is the location that is allows us enter enacted time— ‘the preparation 
of a special place creates a special time, the extended present.’ Rather than think of a 
‘special place,’ we can imagine a ‘created space’—a result of the interplay of sound, 
space and time.  
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Like vision and touch, our dominant understanding of space is Cartesian. For 
instance, we think of the body (which is an object) as being in a space (a void) 
rather than constituting space itself. In the sonorous present, sounds create their 
very own emergent temporary space. Nancy (2007: 13) writes,  
The sonorous present is the result of space-time: it spreads through space, or 
rather it opens a space that is its own…immediately omnidimensional.  
 
Nancy’s understanding of listening here as both spatial and temporal is significant. 
As Idhe (2007) notes, in the past there has been a tendency to emphasise the 
perceptual significance of sound in terms of temporality rather than spatial 
perception.  
 Stanley Robertson refers to ‘waves in the air’ in his descriptions of the Maysie 
and the ballad experience. This description is fitting: from the point of view of 
physics, ‘sound involves changes in the pressure of the air, and travels as waves in 
the air’ (Taylor 2000: 34–65).  Sounds are temporal, emergent and transitory. Sounds 
come to us in a series of physical waves that set off reciprocating vibrations within 
the interior of every object they touch: ‘the expansion of sound through obstacles, its 
property of penetration and ubiquity has always been noted’ (Nancy 2007: 13). 
Sounds have a single source but they do not remain fixed. In this sense, sounds are 
liminal; they are always in-between. What we have is a single source with multiple 
interpretations, an idea that makes sense using Nancy’s model of the singular-plural.  
Ihde (2007) argues that to hear a sound is to share or actually ‘participate’ in 
the source of that sound. This participation ‘from the inside out’ serves to dissipate 
our sense of separateness from the source of the sound, creating a temporary space. 
In Nancy’s view, in entering this space created by sound, we are immersed in the 
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sonorous present of that space, in addition to being processually integrated in a 
multiplicity of other relations with other bodies. Irigaray, (2004: 139), a 
commentator on Nancy’s work, writes that ‘sounds…open and re-open a space 
outside bodies, in bodies and between them.’  
 
Experience of Song 
It is helpful to leaven these theoretical ideas with descriptions from lived 
experience. While the following example is limited by my own culturally situated 
imagination, the ideas can be crafted and shaped to make clear exactly the point 
under discussion. In my own experience, when I have sung, and it has ‘worked,’ my 
face and my ears feel strange, and my voice feels very loud inside my head. For this to 
happen, I have to be fully committed to the performance and give it my full 
concentration. Such an experience of singing is an experience that is beyond 
language; or rather, our language system does not allow us to describe the 
contradictions inherent in such experiences. I have a feeling of nerves, but this 
feeling is not as simple as nervousness. While singing, I feel absolutely in the present 
moment but not at the same time; or rather, I feel so immersed in the present that I 
cease to be aware of it and I feel like I am somewhere completely removed. The space 
created would not be there if not for the real space encompassing myself as the 
singer and the audience; but the song space is created by the participants and 
myself—their bodies, breath, expectations, intention, memories, histories and 
emotions. It is a strange feeling to have one’s voice filling a space that is not defined 
by the material walls.  
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Such an experience has not been comprehensively explained or theorised, but has 
attracted some critical attention nonetheless: 
Singers themselves have the sensation of expanding, in attenuated form, into 
surrounding space and filling it (Burrows 1989: 20).   
 
Singing generates a ‘sensation of swelling or of expansion of self that, along with the 
sensation of connectedness with breath, builds within us a palpable sense of presence’ 
(Harmon 2008:44). When we sing, we know that we are here, that we are alive, that 
we are connected.  
While I am singing, it feels as if I am so immersed in the present I ‘forget’ 
about myself. All perception of time passing in quotidian experience is altered. We 
truly experience what could be called the ‘nowness of now’.54 A ‘perceptual 
narrowing’ occurs, according to Malinowksi’s descriptions of peak experience. I am 
so ‘zoned in’ on concentrating on singing that I am surprised when it is over and 
people show their appreciation. I suppose I would be tempted to describe the 
experience in terms of Csíkszentmihály’s (1990) explanations of ‘flow’—where a 
person in an activity is fully immersed in a feeling of energised focus, full 
involvement, and success in the process of the activity. On some occasions, I am so 
focussed on the act of singing that I become my voice, I become my body. I am my voice 
for that period of time, for that vivid, extended present.  
This feeling can be perhaps be explained to some degree by the fact singing 
naturally integrates the body in a kinaesthetic sensation generated by the cycle of 
inhaling and exhalation. Although this is also true when we speak, the sense of 
continuous flow is more pronounced when we are singing. Deleuze (2005: 39, 
                                                          
54 Personal Conversation with Dr. Martin, UoE, 6th June 2011. 
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original emphasis) suggests that music ‘strips bodies of their inertia, of the 
materiality of their presence: it disembodies bodies. This disembodiment is, at the 
same time, a realisation of coming into ourselves as embodied beings, because ‘music 
traverses our bodies in profound ways’ (39). In singing we merge with the present 
and feel like our individual subjective body is no longer separate from the 
surroundings, but this feeling is a direct consequence of the fact that we are very 
much in our bodies. Such an idea is echoed by Nancy (2007), who talks about ek-
stasis: in sounding, and consequently listening, we stand outside of ourselves at the 
same time as we become more aware of ourselves as being a body. 
   
Co-existential Act of Presence 
 Niles (1999: 53) argues that effective performance arousing the Maysie will 
have a corporeality about it ‘...dependent on a visible, audible, and sometimes tactile 
connection’ between the audience and the performer. This mirrors Porter’s (2009) 
theory of ballad ‘presence’ which he claims is particularly meaningful when the 
singer and audience are inter-responsive in a specific space that they share. It is 
possible to claim, then, that the listening audience plays a pivotal role in the success 
of oral performance: 
The listeners lift the singer, allowing the transformation of breath melody and 
articulate sound in a true “culmination of voice” (Ó Laoire 2006: 93).  
 
 The ‘power of the Maysie,’ Niles (1999: 53) believes, ‘depends on the presence 
of receivers, not just a sender.’ That is, it will be ‘collaborative’ and dependent on ‘a 
visible, audible, olfactory, and sometimes tactile connection’ between the audience 
and the performer (53). Self-expression, on the other hand, endows the performer 
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with the full, perhaps overblown figure of creativity, reducing the audience’s role to 
a passive presence in the creative act. Niles believes that many contemporary 
performances of self-expression have skewed the performer-audience relationship: 
performers hog the spotlight while the audience sits physically and spiritually 
isolated in a darkened hall as if its members are passive consumers of a product 
rather than essential participants whose reactions can, as Niles puts it, guide and 
inspire the performer (53). In a collaborative performance, the Maysie affects not only 
the performer, but also the audience, who will take the singer’s words and make 
something of them, perhaps long after the performance has ended. 
I can remember one instance of singing in a bothy in the early hours of the 
morning at Cullerlie Traditional Singing weekend, Summer 2010. I was singing a 
version of the ballad ‘Young Emslie,’ a tragic song that has a repeated line in every 
verse with the potential for beautiful harmonies. The bothy was tiny—it must have 
been only two metres square, and it was not the greatest venue for acoustics. We 
were crammed in like sardines, unavoidably encroaching on each others’ personal 
space, uncomfortable but intent on sharing songs. Bottles of whisky were passed 
around. I managed to find a space in the back corner, half sitting on a window ledge. 
It was my turn for a song and so I started singing from the corner. With the others 
listening intently and soon joining in the repeated line with supporting harmonies, 
the song started to take a life of its own. I really felt like my voice was being carried 
by the others; I really did feel ‘lifted’ by the others.   
We may say that in order to experience the Maysie, there must be 
differentiation and divided roles; there must always be a singer and a listener—or 
listeners - in order for presence to take effect. The medium in this case is the ballad, 
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but the singer and listener together effect presence. Where Niles and I differ is in 
conceiving of this relationship between singer and audience. Niles calls it the 
‘sender-receiver’ relationship. In my view, it is more akin to a process of sharing, more 
like a communion than a process of transmission. Perhaps in deep listening, the 
dialectical differentiation between speaker and listener becomes the pathway to a 
kind of interpersonal social communion. This idea was introduced in the previous 
chapter, when the experience of the play of art has the character of genuine 
communion. This idea complements Nancy’s idea of being-with and listening-with, 
with co-presence as singularly plural. To recall Gadamer, truly listening to a ballad 
being sung is a genuine mode of participation in the event itself. 
 In ‘presence,’ there exists a dialectic between voicing and listening, between 
sounding and hearing, which embodies the dialectic between the individuals 
engaging in the communication. I propose that the ‘ballad experience’ can be 
understood, in Nancy’s terms, as the co-existential act of ‘coming to presence.’ 
Together, the performer and audience - singer and listener - create an environment 
in which the Maysie may flourish.  
    
The Presence of Silence 
 The necessity of voice and song for ballad presence has been discussed, but it 
is also important to consider the ‘presence’ of silence. Contrary to what might have 
been argued thus far in this chapter, ballad presence is not all down to the 
manifestation of sound. If sound, voice and participation in song are what reveal 
presence, what place does silence have? The audible is a field where sound and 
silence exist in alternation. Silence is not absence, however. Rather, it is expectation, 
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and in my view contributes to presence as much as does sound. In embodied 
experience, is this really possible?  Our hearts are always beating, our lungs are 
always breathing. Nancy’s conception of sense is that sense is first of all the rebound 
of sound. 
Sense opens up in silence—as when we listen to our heart beating, which is 
more than just ‘hearing’ a sound: our whole being is resonating there (30).  
 
Dauenhauer (1980: 18–19) writes that ‘music itself is filled with silence’; that there is 
a silence that characterises all rests and pauses. Harmon (2008: 55) believes that 
silence is ‘the timeless space between the soundings of its successive tones.’ But 
music is not filled with silence as absence as such, but rather, it is filled with ‘not-
music.’ This not-music—or embodied silence—is not timeless but the opposite; it is 
highly temporal and active. Arguably, ‘not-music’ is an equal but different 
component of the whole. A truly musical performer is aware of this embodied silence 
while he or she performs: 
The accomplished performer ‘takes his time’ for he [sic] understands that music 
lives not only by sounds, but also by silences which cause the very soul of the 
performer or the listener to be steeped in music. The mediocre performer, however, 
hustles the notes instead of linking them together flexible and freely: for he fears the 
breathing spaces and silences which break the continuity of the form when one does 
not know how to give them spiritual content (Brelet 1968: 116).  
 
With this in mind, we remember the conniach and the idea of ‘respect’ and 
understanding for the songs and the idea in the Traveller tradition that you are not 
permitted to sing the song unless you can ‘give it justice.’ Since embodied silence is 
as much component of music as is sound, its relationship to the ballad experience is 
integral. In fact, without embodied silence, the presence that sound reveals can never 




Presencing Imagined Worlds 
 This final section looks to the idea of how listening opens to a notion of 
internal and external worlds, exploring how we can become so immersed in the 
ballad experience to be able to ‘presence imagined worlds’—a central theme in this 
thesis. The capacity of hearing to reveal or ‘create’ the hidden dimension of reality is 
an idea rooted in the phenomenology of auditory experience. Ihde (2007: 51) claims 
that,  
Any inquiry into the auditory is also an inquiry into the invisible. Listening 
makes the invisible present. 
 
Ihde believes that sound reveals the internal world in a way that other senses cannot. 
Listening addresses interiors; it is characterised by withdrawal, turning inward. 
Sound not only makes the invisible present, but makes it visible in a certain sense, as 
internal, imagined movement. In this way, ‘oral performance takes on a visual as well 
as an auditory dimension’ (Niles 1999: 55). Arnold Berleant (2004: 157). writes that 
The verbal presence is a species of incantation, for it evokes an imagical realm 
in which there is a reconciliation between man and his direct experience. 
  
There is, then, an interesting relationship between sound and vision in deep 
listening. In embodied experience of music and song, I argue, following Berleant 
(2004: 157), that ‘sound evokes sight and together they form a world of imagination 
that surpasses the ordinary world around us.’ The phenomenological worldview is 
that reality is not something ‘out there’, but rather something that is constructed. 
This is also the understanding from the view of embodied cognition, where ‘mind, 
culture, body and action partake of each other, co-constructing the only ‘realities’ 
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available to human experience’ (Bowman 2004: 47). The idea of the lebenswelt or ‘life-
world’—the world of immediate experience—central to phenomenological 
interpretation, suggests that we can inhabit multiple lifeworlds or realities. In 
phenomenological terms, the ‘ordinary world around us’ described by Berleant is the 
everyday lifeworld, the world of daily experience. That is to say, deep listening takes 
us out of our daily lifeworld and spurs us to temporarily inhabit a new created 
reality. 
 Nancy argues that our sharing of a ‘world’ comes in the sharing of resonance. 
This is not just the resonance of sound, but a resonance of sense itself.  It is a ‘being 
familiar with’—a habitus—that is the access to and sharing of a world. Nancy gives 
examples of the ‘hospital world’ or ‘Debussy’s world’ but here we could equally 
think of various sub-cultural worlds that access to which comes with a sharing of 
sense and resonance. It is through our habitus of listening we are able to share imagined 
worlds. The loosely defined ‘ballad world’ (Atkinson 2002), or the ‘balladic 
otherworld’ (Porter & Gower 1995), constitutes a particular lebenswelt, which we 
actively construct.  This idea will be developed in the following chapters. 
 
Imagination Becomes Experience 
 In deep listening, as Becker (2004: 27) proposes, ‘imagination becomes 
experience.’ Niles (1999: 81) believes that  
The strong tendency of oral poetry … is to collapse the walls of time and space so as 
to create the illusion of continuity between the heterocosmos of the poem and the 




The hermeneutic idea of a ‘fusion of horizons’ is relevant here. In such a model, 
meaning is always experienced as immediately present. Our own horizon of 
experience, our internal context—prior experience, associations—fuses in the 
present with the meanings in the text, and the horizon of the world in which the 
cultural work was produced.  
 Ethnomusicologists studying living traditions have uncovered interesting 
insights in the body of native beliefs connected to the meaning of song and musical 
experience. Suojanen’s (1984) study of hymn singing and the oral tradition in 
Finland is particularly interesting in this case. An informant claimed that folk hymn 
singing ‘creates a link with the limits of reality, something unusual and something 
beyond man’s own existence’ (92). 
One can live, as it were, through song…Through it you can enter a completely 
different world, both musically and emotionally, with all its associations, and 
then contact with other singers like a link in a long chain’ (in Suojanen 1984: 
87). 
 
The idea of entering a completely different world makes sense in a phenomenological 
context and the idea of inhabiting multiple realities. The idea of a ‘long chain’ in this 
description is reminiscent of Henderson’s well-known idea of tradition 
characterised as a ‘carrying stream’ - a river of songs, customs, skills and beliefs that 
flows through time, borne by succeeding generation, reflecting the value and 
importance placed on the oral tradition of passing on the stories, songs and tunes of 
the people for successive generations (in McKean 2007: 154).55  
The idea of ‘traditional referentiality,’ briefly mentioned in the previous 
chapter, also comes into play here -  the ‘invoking of a context that is enormously 
                                                          
55 See Henderson (1992). 
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larger and more echoic than the text or work itself, that brings the lifeblood of 
generations of poems and performances to the individual performance or text’ (Foley 
1991:7). The singer, in this case, valorises and empowers his or her performance by 
tapping into a shared community inheritance. Traditional referentiality necessarily 
deprives the ballad singer of a measure of freedom in performance, but for ballad 
singers and audiences, these restrictions are the conditions of the very realisation of 
poetic power: 
For it to be a story, the song must make you want to listen; thus it calls upon 
metaphors from across the land, across hundreds of years and hundreds of 
generations, to catch your ear. Folk songs are unfathomable and undeniable. 
The old ballads carry a kind of truth, a collective something that is its own 
truth (Wilentz & Marcus 2005). 
 
It is interesting to conceive of the idea of traditional referentiality in a more directly 
sonic capacity, specifically the relationship between sound and memory. More often 
than not, it is not the textual content of the song that has affective meaning. For 
every song that has lines, verses or a whole story that is deeply meaningful to the 
listener, there is another one for which the meaning is evocative—reminding the 
singer or listener of a person, or an event, that has no literal connection with the text 
(it could be argued that this is problem with limited text-based approach to the 
analysis of ballads). It is not just the teller whose physical presence makes these 
stories so memorable; it is the whole set of people, both living and dead, who share 
the site of performance: 
 It is this ‘ritual space,’ as (Turner might call it) where social dramas are 
‘enacted’ in a ‘time out of time’ that is akin to what is found in ritual and 




In this ‘space,’ connections are made that defy rational understanding. Lizzie 
Higgins, Scottish Traveller and ballad singer, claimed that when she was singing she 
was looking into her father’s eyes. ‘Often, fan I’m singin, ye’ll see my eyes lookin ava. 
I’m lookin’ at him. That’s the magic, I see him all the time. When I’m singin, he 
comes’ (in Niles 1999: 51). Niles, the fieldworker in this instance, could not explain 
Lizzie’s transformation in performance: ‘She was voicing the language of another 
world; I have no other way of putting this’ (51). 
 Some people may hold the belief that this kind of ‘other world’ is real: the 
world of our ancestors. It is not my place to judge such claims. I suggest only that 
the ideas presented here offer a possible explanation: that it is a cognitive process of 
imaginative projection, focused in the present through the embodied experience of 
the sound. In the imaginary space created by space and time in the ballad experience, 
we encounter the meaning of now through the direct ‘presence’ of its past and 
imagined future references. Furthermore, we actively create this presence through 
engagement in the dialectic of memory (past), attention (present) and expectation 
(future). This process of meaning-making will be further explored in Chapters Six 
and Seven.  
 Such ideas help us understand and give new meaning to Porter’s (2009: 9) 
claim that ballad presence is ‘a departure from everyday norms into the unknown, 
unexpected or transcendental territory of the imagination…the complete imaginative 
encounter.’ What we are dealing with is the creative construction of narratives and 
imagined worlds. Unlike Porter’s approach, this methodology provides a way to talk 
about this process or experience without using words like ‘transcendental,’ and 
allows for a consideration of the fully embodied nature of experience. The text of the 
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song, which is so often the focus of ballad studies, is not the sole reason for the 
creation of meaning. What is importance is the total somaesthetic experience, the 
‘existential act that makes “present” the imagined world the singer is creating’ 
(Porter 2009: 148). It is not the singer alone who creates imagined worlds; it is the 
listener and singer together.  
 
Totality of Experience 
 According to Nancy (1993: 200), to be ‘listening’ is always to be outside and 
inside, ‘opened from without and from within’ a body. ‘Deep listening’ can be defined 
as a direct perception of non-material events through the medium of material events. 
The activity of our senses engages us with the materiality of the world. Musical 
melodies can be fundamentally defined as dynamic events. They are conveyed 
through physical events—vibrations in the air, the stimulation of our organs of 
hearing, the responses of the nervous system—but they are not contained in these 
physical events. It is arguable that hearing the dynamic qualities in music is a direct 
perception of non-material events through the medium of material events. Sonorous 
presence reveals two dimensions of existence: internal and external, material and 
non-material, tangible and intangible. More than this, sonorous presence reveals that 
these two dimensions are not closed off from one another, but are actually 
interconnected aspects of one world and one experience. The ear is a membrane that 
unites what is outside with what is inside. Baumann (1990: 123) invokes the image of 
an eggshell mediating between sound and brain/body, arguing for a consciousness 
which taps the shell of reality from both sides—through which the inside becomes 
the outside and the outside becomes the inside...This consciousness incessantly 
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listens with a ‘third ear’ which finds between the two auricles the creativity that 
constructs reality in its own and special manner. 
 
What we perceive through deep listening is a ‘totality experience’—a totality of the 
tangible and the intangible. 
 
Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions 
  ‘Deep listening’ as a concept was shown to be a useful term that 
encompasses the idea of listening as an existential act where both body and mind are 
engaged, as well as to emphasise its participatory nature. The idea of a habitus of 
listening was suggested as a way to express the temporal situatedness of the listener. 
It was argued that the sharing of sound catalyses the embodied ‘presence’ necessary 
for our full, conscious and active participation in the ballad experience. The ballad 
experience itself was approached by means of a spatial metaphor. Although these 
‘spaces’ only exist for the duration of performance, and are therefore temporary and 
transient, they make sense, even if they do not provide us with a  rational explanation 
for the phenomenon of ballad singing. They constitute a sense of understanding and 
belonging for many people who participate in their making. The fact that we cannot 
hold such spaces in our hands—nor is it possible to capture or represent them—does 
not make the methodological venture to understand them a futile one.  By making an 
attempt to study the ‘liveness’ and richness of real time, it is possible to access the 
spaces created: the embodied and expressive ways of knowing, being and 
communicating in context.  
In concluding this chapter, I tentatively suggest that the semantic power of 
‘words’ expand the awareness of possibilities ranging over past, present and future, 
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through the creation of narratives; while sounds of music and melody and their 
intonation focus the awareness of ‘presence’ in the present through a visceral, 
embodied experience. There is an interesting relationship between sound and 
internal vision, where in the ballad experience the singer and listener together ‘make 
present’ imagined worlds. ‘Deep listening’ in the ballad experience induces a sense of 
collective identity through the experiencing of self and other as co-participants in an 
enacted, situated, live event, and actively listening can be viewed as a ‘co-existenital 
act of coming to presence.’ The way sound touches the body is the ‘very vibratory 
essence that puts the world of sound in motion and reminds us…that we are alive, 
sentient, and experiencing’ (Shepherd 1987: 158). The following chapter analyses 
what this sound is made of in the context of the ballad experience. The ideas 
developed in this chapter will be further extended in Chapter Eight, which looks to 














CHAPTER SIX 6 
“That is the Road to Fair Elfland”: 
Ambiguity and the Productive Power of Metaphor 56 
 
   
 The ballad scholar Toelken asks the question, ‘to what extent can all 
language and meaning be interpreted as metaphorical in essence?’ (1995). In 
developing his argument for the ‘essential metaphoricity of folksong,’ he nods to the 
theories of Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal Metaphors We Live By (1980), but looks only 
to their very early work. It is quite possible to take Toelken’s idea of ‘metaphoricity’ 
much further: ballads are not just figuratively and linguistically metaphorical; the 
actual experience of the ballad is a metaphorical embodied process, at work on a 
‘complex matrix of several levels’ (Ó Laoire 2005: 255).  
The characteristics of the ballad form—formula, patterned arrangements and 
narrative components, refrains, motifs, recurring melodies and melodic elements—
have been explored by countless scholars. I do not wish to rehearse this scholarship 
but rather think of new ways to explain how ballads have ‘productive power.’  To 
this end, the first section of this chapter will concentrate on the figurative language 
of the ballads understood from an embodied cognitive perspective, based on the 
contemporary theory of metaphor. Blending is explicitly at work in figurative 
language, and as such an examination of the ballad will serve to illustrate the 
productive value of conceptual blending theory in this context. The idea of novel 
metaphors, entrenched meaning and the idea of cultural framing will be introduced.  
Such cognitive theories have their origins in reception theory.57 Ideas from 
reception theory, most pertinently the notion of ‘indeterminacy’ will be developed to 
                                                          
56 This title is in reference to the Border ballad ‘Thomas the Rhymer’ (Child#37). Here the Queen of 
Elfland is trying to entice Thomas to come with her, where he will trapped from seven (fairy) years. 
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bridge the first section with the second section of this chapter, which explores the 
productive power of metaphor beyond its traditionally perceived substitutive role. 
Inspired by the writing of Ricouer and his narrative theories, Ó Laoire (2005: 207) 
understands song as ‘a metaphorical discourse which mediates the conflicts and 
perplexities of social existence.’ The final section builds on Ó Laoire’s ideas, 
exploring Ricouer’s hermeneutics in relation to ideas from embodied cognition. 
Ricouer (1976) presents metaphor as the ‘touchstone of the cognitive value of 
literary works.’ The point of departure for Ricouer’s theory of metaphor is 
essentially the same as for Lakoff and Johnson; however, where Lakoff and Johnson 
focus on the broad patterns of thought evident in systems of metaphor (such as 
those that link emotional states with orientation in space) Ricouer chooses to 
concentrate on the singularity, what he called the ‘raw poesis’ of metaphorical 
utterance (Zbikowski 2009: 88).  
The basic idea expounded in this chapter is that when two or more entities 
come together a metaphorical process is at work, and it is in the liminal space between 
where new meanings are created, in a ‘perpetual process of coming to be.’ Meaning is 
not grounded in external culture but is emergent, created in the tension between self 
and world and between self and other. Central to the developing argument is the 
notion of ambiguity. As discussed in the Chapter Three, Merleau-Ponty’s (2002: 
220) idea of the ‘genius of ambiguity’ challenges us to construe ambiguity not as a 
cognitive flaw but rather as a cognitive advantage. There is a plurality of relations 
present in the ballad experience which points to a fundamental multiplicity in 
meaning. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
57 The convergences and divergences of these theories have been noted by other scholars. See 
Hamilton & Schneider (2002). 
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The chapter will conclude by relating these ideas back to the thesis title, 
‘Presencing Imagined Worlds.’ 
 
Strongly Marked Discourse  
The ballad scholar Gunmere, writing in 1907, believed that ‘the main 
structural feature of the ballad is simple repetition with incremental changes, utterly 
devoid of metaphor, which advance the statement of fact and help the narrative, 
however slowly, on its way’ (42, my italics). In my view, he could not have been 
more wrong. It was once the generally held view that the subject of poetic diction 
and metaphor were more appropriate to the discussion of authored ‘elite’ literature, 
and folkloric oral clichés were seen to be a flaw of ‘bad’ literature. After the Parry-
Lord theory of oral formula for epics was developed, such ‘clichés’ were re-
characterised as a powerful device of recreation, and certainly not a ‘flaw.’ This 
theory sought to elucidate the mechanism whereby some oral poets are able to 
improvise poetry, and why orally improvised poetry has the certain characteristics it 
does. In Parry’s view, formulas were not individual and idiosyncratic devices of 
particular artists, but the shared inheritance of a tradition of singers. They were 
easily remembered, making it possible for the singer to execute an improvisational 
composition-in-performance. For a time, oral formulaic composition was assumed to 
be the ideal model for understanding all oral poetry. In an attempt to redress the 
balance or bias of scholarship, such a model rethought the distinct and inherent 
differences between the oral and the literary.  
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These ideas were explored in balladry by Andersen in Commonplace and 
Creativity:  the Role of Formulaic Fiction in Anglo-Scottish Traditional Balladry (1985) and in 
Buchan’s The Ballad and the Folk (1972). 
Where the literate poet strives for originality of expression, the oral poet is 
content to use his received traditional diction, and not only for reasons of necessity. 
Through generations of use traditional language accrues a contextual force; it 
acquires connotative reverberations unrecognised by the ear unturned to 
tradition and it becomes the ‘right’ and ‘fitting’ language of verbal art (Buchan 
1972: 171, my italics).  
 
In Buchan’s view, where literary poems express personal vision, ballads tell stories 
that express a community’s outlook on life. ‘Where the literate poet writes as an 
individual…the oral poet tells stories that embody and give expression to the kinds of 
belief and feeling shared by his community…’ (171).  
 Atkinson (2002) is rather more cautious in extending the oral formulaic theory 
readily to ballads. It is not as easy to claim that ballads sit at the oral end of an oral 
versus literary spectrum. Oral versions of ballads have coexisted over long periods of 
time with written versions as well as printed texts. The complex interplay at work 
was discussed in the previous chapter. Atkinson makes the point that ballads, unlike 
epic poems, permit the possibility of a substantially larger degree of memorisation of 
the entire text not only by the singer but even of the audience. Formulas may 
function more as mnemonics for memorisation than as materials for re-creation on 
the Parry-Lord model. Ballad melodies usually comprise of distinctive tunes which 
also can be expected to function as effective mnemonics for the ballad whole. 
Moreover, more recently in the life of ballads, recordings of versions have been made 
available which drastically alter modes of transmission, and ideas of formulaic 
recreation would seem to apply less and less. 
201 
 
The ballad form certainly uses words in such a way that they differ 
somewhat from ordinary everyday speech, using word association to convey emotion 
and mood. This allows songs to convey meanings in a more vivid manner, which is 
heightened further in the act of embodied performance. 
Poetry is a strongly marked discourse...Whether it is voiced in a unique register or 
is accompanied by a musical instrument, poetry is always distinguishable from 
normal speech or prose. Its ability to express emotion, articulate wisdom, and 
activate memory is naturally linked  to its listeners or reader’s perception of 
rhetorical marking, which in oral performance takes on a visual as well as an 
auditory dimension (Niles 1999: 55, my italics). 
 
The idea that oral performance takes on a ‘visual and auditory dimension’ was 
explored in the previous chapter and has been described elsewhere as the ‘eminently 
visual nature of the ballad diction’ (Rogers 1980:103). It will be discussed again in 
Chapter Eight. 
 
‘Essential Metaphoricity of Folksong’  
Since the introduction of oral formulaic theory, ballad scholars have since 
striven to understand figurative language in terms of the role of metaphor in 
traditional art forms. An ordinary definition describes metaphor as a figure of 
speech or literary device, in which a word or phrase is applied or substituted in 
order to denote a resemblance. Ballad imagery is therefore not metaphorical in the 
literary sense. Ballads lack the similes and imagery of written literature, but what 
they do have, in Buchan’s words, is a kind of ‘traditional received diction’ (1972: 171). 
Such strongly marked discourse works by association and can be characterised as 
‘ritual occurrences carrying a freight of cultural meaning’ (Toelken 1986: 140). The 
description of ‘ritual occurrences’ is pertinent in the light of discussions about 
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‘presence’ in Chapter Four. Porter believed that ‘presence embodies the ritual moment 
within the tradition, and as such it renews, invests in, and promotes the tradition as 
a living potent force’ (2009: 182, my italilcs). Ballad language itself, it would seem, 
has a part to play in presence. 
Toelken (1995) attempts to clarify the ‘precise nature and function of 
metaphor’ within song: oral formulations, motifs, imagery and symbols and 
commonplaces. Metaphorical language is found throughout folksong, but, he 
argues, is most prominent in dramatic ballads: 
In dramatic ballads, there is more latitude for metaphor, more room for 
variation, for it is the shared experience of trauma rather than the detail of a 
coherent story line that seem to be central concerns...dramatic ballads seem to 
use narrative structure more as a framework for associated evocative images and 
metaphors (15). 
 
The idea here about ‘shared experience’ is important to the argument. Toelken does 
not suggest that there is an arbitrary set of metaphors which singers have memorised 
and applied in narrowly defined poetic or metrical situations, but rather that there 
exists a considerable well of potentially connotative references, based on shared 
cultural values, which have been shaped and used by gifted singers to give them 
value and meaning. He argues that not to recognise the power of metaphor is to 
overlook some of the most compelling reasons for the intensity of the ballad 
experience; but, at the same time, to read too much into them or to interpret them 
according to arbitrary or literary systems is ‘to denigrate the facility with expressive 







To summarise Atkinson’s account (2002: 12) of the often-described 
characteristics of the ballad style, traditional elements include repetitive textual, 
metrical and melodic structures; patterned arrangements of narrative and 
conceptual components; parallelism of phrases including so-called incremental 
repetition; conventional vocabulary and epithets; recurrent, formulaic phrases, lines 
and stanzas; formalised refrains. They also encompass a characteristic musical idiom: 
a distinctive corpus of folksong tunes, unstably matched to the texts so that there 
may be many tunes for the same ballad type or many different songs sung to what is 
essentially the same tune; a recurrent vocabulary or melodic, rhythmic and dynamic 
techniques, as well as ornamentation, designed to meet with the emotion and 
metrical demands of the song texts.  
In the ballad, the story is not articulated fully, it is implicit. The language and 
imagery are highly suggestive, which is key to the productive power of metaphor. 
Conventional ranges of personal and place names, times of day, seasons of the year 
and colours all contribute to the loosely defined but nonetheless unmistakeable 
‘ballad world’ (Atkinson 2002: 13). Buchan (1972) argued convincingly that through 
generations of singers, such language and imagery acquires and develops, comprising 
this received traditional diction. In such a highly suggestive narrative setting, the 
associations of traditional metaphors help establish a deeper recognition of cultural 
meaning.58  
                                                          
58 In Buchan’s view (1972: 171), the symbolic imagery has roots which lie in a now fragmented 
mythology. The ballad genre itself has evolved from medieval (and even earlier) oral traditions, 
incorporating the ritualistic, magical elements of ancient myths and folklore. Traditionally, the teller, 
singer or poet would have been a kind of magician, a mediator between the other world and this 
world, and this emerges in the ballad theme of the supernatural.  
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The following examples are in no way exhaustive but are useful for illustrative 
purposes. An example of suggestive meaning in balladry is the use of colours. Green 
and red are common—virtually every time someone gets dressed in green, that person 
will inevitably encounter danger and in most cases, ends up dead by the end of the 
story. Green is also associated with the supernatural. Janet, in ‘Tam Lin,’ ‘kilted her 
green mantle a little aboon her knee’ and soon after encountered the supernatural in 
the form of Tam Lin, and ends up pregnant. Location is also important: dangerous 
encounters take place in liminal spaces, away from the family home, by rivers or in 
woods. Markers like ‘in the greenwood’ are loaded with this association. In the 
ballad ‘Lord Randal,’ the greenwood was a place of danger—in one version he met a 
fairy there disguised as his true love and was punished and poisoned. It is ‘down by 
the greenwood sidie-o’ that ‘The Cruel Mother’ kills her twin babies, but their 
ghosts come to reproach her and tell her how she will suffer for her crime. As well as 
spatial markers, the ballads are ripe with temporal markers. Times of year and even 
times of day are crucially important. Supernatural happenings take place around 
transitional periods of the day, such as the ‘mirk midnight hour’; and of the year, like 
Halloween. Romantic encounters often happen in early May. The connections here 
are too consistent to be a matter of coincidence. It is not cliché; rather, such 
metaphors are loaded with cultural meaning. 
Recurrent too are story elements or motifs, many of which are found 
throughout folklore genres at large. Motifs are abstract representations of an idea, 
frequently recurring ideas or repetitions of a meaningful element in a work. 
Identifying a motif is invariably an act of interpretation. Narrative units such as 
journeys, water-crossings, executions, murders, scenes of meeting, talking birds, 
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magical corpses and so-called ‘floating verses’ can all constitute motifs of sorts. 
Würzbach and Salz (1995) have attempted to compile an index for the Child ballad 
corpus:  
The tension between conceptual potentiality and textual realisation inherent in 
the motif constitutes fascination…The content of a motif derives from the 
components of character, action, locality, objection and disposition.  
 
The possible content components of the motif can be categorised according to 
‘person’ (characters, action and dispositions), ‘space’ (localities and objects) and 
‘time’ (into courses of action). By way of illustration, common motifs include, for 
example, the act of combing hair. This image often occurs just before a suitor 
appears, and would seem to indicate readiness for marriage or willingness to be 
approached. Where a woman loses her lover, she vows that a comb will never go 
through her hair again, or that she’ll cut her hair off, suggesting the intention of 
remaining faithful. In folklore at large, hair is often associated with various aspects 
of sexual power. Another example is the appearances of certain animals. In many 
ballads, birds carry messages of importance, often to tell of death. Motifs can also 
pertain to structural elements. Of all the possibilities, the most ubiquitous structural 
element is the use of ‘three actions,’ very familiar to folklorists. In the ‘Bonnie Banks 
of Fordie,’ three sisters encounter a man; the first two are murdered by him, but the 
third uses her wit to survive, realising that the man is her brother. Such a series of 
actions is more ‘ritualistic’ than ‘real.’ The so-called ‘law of three’ also allows for 
intensification of the key issue through incremental repetition. There are hundreds 
of such examples of suggestive language, spatial and temporal markers and motifs in 
the ballad tradition, but it is not the purpose of this work to describe them; rather 
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here I seek to understand the relationship between such markers and the human 
embodied mind. 
In Toelken’s view, metaphor functions in a number of ways to do with 
structure and narrative style, but mostly to do with a shared range of textual 
understanding among the members of the audience in which the song is understood 
and used. In terms of structure and style, metaphor can be used as a powerful way to 
resolve complications of the linear plot. The ubiquitous image of the rose and the 
briar is a good example: after death, a rose often grows out of the female grave and 
the briar out of the male’s, bringing lovers together in a physical union denied them 
in life. This serves, on one level, to resolve the emotional dilemma. The image of the 
rose and female sexuality is powerful in its foregrounding the sexual reunion of the 
couple; even in cases when sexual connection is not central, we can still see a 
distinctly metaphorical function being fulfilled by the image. Toelken’s main 
argument is the extent to which a central, rich metaphor such as the rose and the 
briar can bring forth or suggest a cluster of important shared values, what he calls a 
‘constellation of shared meanings’ and help us apply them meaningfully to a scene or 
event. Ballad images and structures create  
A simply designed but emotionally effective context of cultural meaning in which 
dialog and dramatic interaction foreground an event of vicarious experience in 
terms of its most intense and disturbing moment, phrased not in the language of 
explanation, description or information, but in a dramatic language of nuances 
and connotations (Toelken 1986: 139) 
 
Inside the space of the ‘ballad experience’ can be seen as a kind of vicarious theatre 
where the stage is in the minds of those who share the cultural associations, and 
who understand the language which animates them and through which—in the 




Many of these ballad metaphors are so rich in divergent possibilities and are 
employed in scenes of such recognisably heightened or intensified human concern 
that when their traditional associations (e.g the rose with both sex and death) are 
expressed, they have the capacity to excite a broad range of implied meanings not 
expressed overtly in the text.  These metaphors are ‘multivalent’ (Toelken 1995: 96) 
and point towards ambiguity. They contain little explanation, little detail and 
almost no data but have a great deal of visual imagery that is presented, as if listeners 
already ‘know’ the story. This calls to attention to the multiple possibilities of 
meaning as well as the metaphor’s capacity for ambiguity in its poetic sense.  
Csikszenmihalyi (1978) has observed in The Arts, Cognition, and Basic Skills that 
the making and experiencing of art constitutes a process in which cognition and 
emotion are intertwined, and the conflicts which art attempts to master cannot be 
encoded by the unambiguous symbols on which reason relies. Like other forms of 
knowledge, art is an adaptive tool by which we master forces in the environment in 
order to survive it. Artistic cognition models experiences that are ambiguous, and 
must therefore use codes that are multivalent, changeable and holistic, but at the 
same time highly specific. It is true to say that there has been a tendency among 
ballad singers throughout history to dramatise the traumatic, ironic, threatening, 
anxiety-provoking and ambiguous dimensions of human experience rather than the 
stable, predictable and mundane. Perhaps mundane occurrences have not been 
worth singing about; but even this tells us something about cultural attitudes. It is 
because these areas of human concern are seldom unambiguous, and every person 
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responds to them differently, that the poetic devices used are appropriately open to 
multiple interpretations. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that many people map the unfamiliar onto 
the familiar in order to create new understanding and clarity. In contrast, Strauss 
and Quinn, in A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning (1991) argue that metaphors are 
based on culturally agreed understandings, and more often than not they add 
complexity rather than clarity, pointing towards ambiguity. A series of metaphors 
that suggest both death and sex—the rose and the briar—for example, can hardly be 
explained away as ways of making a single abstraction more available to the senses, 
for their result is not clarification but ambiguity.  
Metaphor works both ways. Apart from the ballad’s complexity and 
emotional power, metaphors within in folk song are powerful because of their 
positive ambiguity: the capacity to express an idea more fully and with greater 
complexity of human feeling than can an objective statement. Hymes (1972: 29) 
insists that metaphor is ‘basic to rendering experience intelligible probably because 
the topics broached in these forms are complex and ambiguous for most people.’ 
Moreover, metaphor and image allow for the presentation of emotions and concepts 
that can reflect on one another profitably.  
As an example, the phrase, ‘the dowie dens of Yarrow’ is polysemic. The word 
‘dowie,’ an old Scots word meaning sad, is linked to ‘dens,’ another Scots word 
which describes the banks of the river. In such ballads as ‘Babylon’, ‘Lady Isabel’ and 
others, the riverside is the scene of a poignant reminder of destruction. It is often the 
site of a sexual encounter; or, as it is in this case, the place where a murdered victim 
is dumped. On one level, these scenes are depicted along riverbanks because they are 
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liminal areas. The word Yarrow too appears to have multiple meanings. Nicolaisen 
(1984) points out that the percentage of an audience listening to this ballad being 
sung who would have prior knowledge of the geographical location of the river 
would be very small indeed. Therefore, its geographical associations become 
redundant and the function of the place name operates on the level of metaphor. 
Performances of this ballad have to be understood not as the recounting of one 
particular drowning, but as the presentation in a narrative song of the death of the 
lover trying to reach his beloved from whom he is separated. Just as the fast flowing 
river becomes the symbol for the separating obstacle, so ‘Yarrow Water,’ as the name 
of that river, takes of the role of metaphor in this context, 
 [serving] the same iconic function and [playing] the same semantic roles of the 
river as a dividing boundary and fateful separation, inviting parted lovers to 
fatal attempts at reunion...it is a symbol for everything that divides, separates 
and disrupts, a poignant reminder that all is not well in this world and that so 
much is broken and fractured and still has to be healed. [The] name helps to 
narrate that condition and to rehearse its tragic consequences (Nicolaisen 1973: 
226). 
 
Metaphor, then, functions in a number of ways and has to do with the shared range 
of textual understanding. Good poetic imagery of any sort, whether written or 
performed, is important because of its positive ambiguity—its capacity to express and 




The ballad is not only a literary entity; the music and performance are 
equally important for many of its receivers, and sometimes more important than the 
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text itself. Toelken’s concern is with the singing of the ballad in its live, cultural 
context and not the text as it may appear in print as a ‘fossil.’ Ó Laoire (2005: 207) 
also contends that too literal a reading of a song can be limiting: ‘if we conduct only 
a literal reading, removed from performance context with its special spatial and 
temporal precincts we are at risk of misinterpretation.’ Finnegan (1977: 33) 
expresses a similar view in her discussion of the ways in which oral poetry is 
performed. She contrasts this with the written word, emphasising the emotional 
rapport built up between performer and listener, citing style, constraints and 
opportunities of delivery as important factors which shape oral poetry and which 
cannot be discerned from the text alone. Oral poetry, when separated from the 
‘chance conditions in which it appears’ (Gadamer 1989: 116 in Ó Laoire  2005: 38) 
loses its many salient features necessary for a full understanding of it. Gadamer’s 
idea that art is a kind of ‘play’ was introduced in Chapter Four, where it was argued 
that that the work of art cannot be detached from its presentation, or enactment, in 
time. In listening, we are called to actively construct possible nuances and 
implications which might otherwise be overlooked. ‘Performance is the enabling 
event, tradition is the context for that event’ (Foley 2002: 131). 
In understanding the function of ballad imagery we must, as Toelken advises, 
take cognisance of not only the texts, but of all other contexts as well. He suggests 
four contexts: the ballad text itself, the cultural context, the generic context and the 
performance context. While it is helpful to isolate these different contexts in the 
case of ballad meaning, it is my own view that these should be seen more holistically 
and understood to function together. 
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The performance context is the live situation in which a ballad is actually 
performed by a singer to an audience, who could be said to inhabit the same habitus 
of listening (this might not always be the case). Since there are various conditions 
which might affect the way in which the text actually comes forth, the performance 
itself may be said to take place within contextual realities that can create a 
constellation of meanings. Toelken argues that it is evident that the figurative 
meaning cannot be said to reside entirely within the text as part of its manifest 
content, but somewhere between the text (as it is performed) and that shared 
constellation of assumptions and associations that gets triggered when this singer 
sings this song before this audience at this particular time. Wilgus suggests that the 
historical context must also be considered. Being aware of the diverse and 
complicated literary and cultural history of certain texts, commonplaces and 
clusters of meaningfully related actions is another way of perceiving the depth of 
ballad meaning. Toelken argues that this knowledge is more addressed to the scholar 
or very knowledgeable singers or listeners who have access to such information than 
to the singer or audience to may not know about the details of a symbolic or 
metaphorical development. There are therefore differing degrees of depth to which 
we can plug into such constellations of meaning. Lastly, Toelken suggests the 
musical context—the constellation of tunes and tones through which the ballad 
reaches articulation. The afterthought of mentioning the musical context is telling of 






Contemporary Metaphor Theory and ‘Creative Blending’ 
Examining the above-described processes at work from the point of view of 
embodied cognition affords an even richer understanding of the productive power of 
metaphor. In the ballad experience, Rieuwerts (2007: 254, my italics) claims, 
 
What is involved is not the passive repetition of externally determined 
words...but people actively moulding the world around them which, ultimately, 
constitutes the world we experience and live in…It is through poetry, not 
exclusively, certainly, but surely pre-eminently, that people create and re-create 
that world.  
 
The idea of actively creating and recreating phenomenological worlds is key to the 
development of ideas in this thesis. We create the world we inhabit through creative 
and cognitive processes which often operate below the level of consciousness. As 
human beings, we are always thinking, but not all of our mental processes take place 
on a conscious level. In fact,  
Nearly all important thinking takes place outside of consciousness…the 
imagination is always at work in ways that consciousness does not apprehend; 
consciousness can glimpse only a few vestiges of what the mind is doing 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 33–34, my italics). 
  
Creative blending plays a crucial role in how we think and make sense of the 
world we encounter. In my own view, it is illuminating in understanding cognitive 
processes at work in the ballad experience. Through creative blending we can 
understand how we create and recreate reality and unreality—how we ‘actively mould 
the word around us,’ to use Rieuwert’s term. The simplified explanation of the 
theory of creative blending presented below is intended to lay out the basics of the 
theory as it can be applied on two levels: firstly, to the figurative language of the 
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ballad—that is, oral motifs, imagery and symbols; and secondly, on the macro level, 
the mythic, or the level of fictional worlds. 
Blending theory frequently appeals to literary examples for explanation; 
however, it is important to make clear here that the development of the theory in 
this context is intended to elucidate the cognitive processes that underlie meaning 
construction and not merely a theory for literary analysis. In this sense, its 
application to a form such as the ballad does not reduce the ballad to a literary 
entity, but rather allows us to study the experience of the ballad as a literary entity 
and as process, allowing for the integration of musical experience and other 
dimensions at later stages in the argument. 
 
The Blending Process 
According to cognitive theory, the networking facilities of the brain have 
enabled us to keep complex ideas in our minds as stable representations, to 
manipulate these representations in various ways, and to combine them with other 
representations. Creative blends bring together two or more conceptual realms in 
such a way that the conceptual space which they share has features and powers that 
are not necessarily found in the things compared. This contrasts with our usual 
sense of metaphor where meaning is rigidly constrained to compare concrete 
features. Complex concepts are formed through a process of integration, or 
‘blending’ of concepts from disparate domains to create new meaning.  
Although the blend unfolds in a flash and not necessarily in linear fashion, it is 
still possible to distinguish certain stages of the process. According to Fauconnier 
and Turner, the emergent structure is generated through a three-part process of 
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composition, completion and elaboration. Composition puts together elements from input 
spaces to create new entities in the blended space. Completion extends the image 
suggested by the initial mapping from the input spaces, drawing on our background 
knowledge of the circumstances and associations—this is the process of filling in 
background information from the source inputs (information that is not explicitly 
mentioned in the blend). Especially in the process of completion, the person 
processing a blend needs to access a vast store of long-term knowledge, including 
culturally-dependent frames. Elaboration is a more extensive operation than 
completion—it develops the structure of the blended space by building on the 
principles and logic at work in the blend. Elaboration is the process of what is called 
actually ‘running the blend’; it involves the creation or discovery of new meanings. In 
effect, the input spaces decrease in importance and the focus is directed towards the 
rich imaginary possibilities of the blended space (Zbikowski 2002: 80). It is at this 
stage in the process where we can start to invent our own narratives, and project 
emotions using our prior knowledge. An important feature of the emergent blend is 
then that it is not static, but can be further elaborated in a perpetual process of 
coming to be.  
 
Tension and Invariance  
Conceptual blending assumes that there is a degree of structural ‘invariance’ 
between the input spaces of a given blend. Correspondences need not always be 
factual—need not make logical sense—in order that meaning might be distilled from 
them. When the information in each of the input spaces is very different from one 
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another, the integration can produce extremely novel results. The idea of invariance, 
or ‘tension,’ is crucial to the theory developing here.  
 According to Turner (1998: 65), ‘the tension of the blended space is reinforced 
by a corollary blending of impossibilities.’ It has already been noted that 
preponderance of the metaphorical references in ballads and folksong operate in 
fields of love, sex and death—arguably the most definitive of human experiences. 
Experiences such as death and sex are not ambiguous in and of themselves, but the 
devices we create to talk about them are. This is because our attitudes toward them 
are conflicting. For example, we can conceive rationally of death, and yet we are 
incapable of really knowing about it. Love and sex equate to creation; death equates to 
destruction. It is important not to conflate love with sex in this context: abductions 
and rape in ballads are very different from sexual love affairs. Love and sex are not 
the same, but are often discussed coterminously in ballad literature. Conspicuously, 
metaphors of love and death almost appear magnetically in the ballads, one 
juxtaposed with the other. Love, death and sex would seem to form a complex of 
meanings in ballads, or what Ó Laoire (2005: 201) calls a ‘widespread thematic 
network.’ Such a thematic network, he notes, is extremely prevalent in folksong 
traditions of Northern Europe. It was discussed above that metaphors are based on 
culturally agreed understandings, and more often than not they add complexity 
rather than clarity, again pointing towards ambiguity. Toelken (1995:158 in Ó Laoire 
2005: 202) suggests that the interplay of love and death themes ‘works like a 
powerful oxymoron, each term mitigating and qualifying the other in extremely 
effective ways’ and further that direct juxtaposition and interaction of erotic and 
deadly elements has proven to be a tension of essences with considerable power. 
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The heavy focus on love and death in the ballads, it would seem, is neither 
arbitrary nor coincidental. Creative blends are generally activated when situations of 
ambiguity and confusion exist, and new ideas must be conceived in order to respond 
to those conditions. In Turner’s view (1998: 823), the tension created by such a 
juxtaposition of impossibilities allows for a deeper understanding of each:  
Blending is a dynamic activity. It connects input spaces; it projects partial structure 
from input spaces to the blend, creating an imaginative blended space that, however 
odd or even impossible, is nonetheless connected to its inputs and can illuminate 
those inputs.  
 
Ballads create blended spaces of love and death in order to explain and teach 
something new by drawing on and extending the familiar. Ricouer’s theories of the 
productive power of the inner workings of metaphor as discussed by Ó Laoire 
(2005) add a further dimension to understanding in this case. Ricouer points out 
that metaphor brings together two distinct semantic fields which serve to break 
down ways in which these separate fields were already categorised. The power of a 
metaphor is founded on the ‘tension between the strangeness of the pairing and its 
suitability’: 
Remoteness persists in closeness. This is why to see similarity is to see the 
likeness in spite of its difference. To speak of one thing in terms of another 
which resembles it is to pronounce them alike and unalike. Imagination—in its 
semantic sense—is nothing but this ‘competence’ which consists of producing 
the genre through the difference, again not beyond the difference, as in the 
concept, but in spite of the difference (Ricouer 1991:125 in O’Laoire 2005: 228). 
 
Meaning is created in this new ambiguous blended space. According to Ricouer, 
although a new order comes into being, the old categories also continue in the sense 
of incongruity revealed by the metaphorical juxtaposition. The ballad form exploits 
the ambiguity of language as well as its utility for forming novel ideas. In the 
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example given above, Turner’s concept of blended spaces reconciles the tension of 
essences of the love and death dichotomy into one novel idea: creation and mortality 
are brought together in a metaphorical process. 
Turner argues that these very ambiguous contradictions are what enable us 
to understand an altogether newly created realm, which logical consistency is 
incapable of invoking. Blended spaces allow unusual cognitive freedom and 
creativity. This helps explain why the ballads utilise such ambiguous metaphors to 
convey their meaning. 
 
Creating ‘Unreality’ 
The process of creative blending is not unusual or exceptional; it is in fact 
exceedingly common. ‘Blending is in principle a simple operation, but in practice 
gives rise to myriad possibilities’ (Fauconnier 1997: 149). The result is not simply a 
sum of the shared characteristics of the inputs, but rather the flexible human mind 
actively creating or recreating something which did not previously exist; and in some 
cases, an ‘altogether newly created realm.’ Human beings have the ability to ‘operate 
mentally on the unreal, and this ability depends on our capacity for advanced 
conceptual integration’ (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 217). In other words, it is part 
of our cognitive make-up to be able to operate on the level of the unreal.  
The three most important elements that allow the cognitive construction of 
imagined worlds are language, meaning, and the conceptual abilities of humans to 
extract and create meaning from language. We do this by metaphorically mapping 
elements from one idea onto another and then merging these elements with other 
elements to project new meanings in the process of elaboration, described above. The 
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example given by Zbikowski (2004) by way of illustration is that of fairy tales in 
traditional folklore, where new imagined beings are created. Fairy tales are 
imaginative and fantastical. Accordingly, features of imaginary beings and beings are 
blended together with real beings and/or beings. Concepts associated with an 
animal (in particular, its characteristic behaviour and physiognomy) might be 
integrated with concepts associated with humans (capacity for speech and rational 
thought) to create a new kind of creature that that lends itself to any number of 
possibilities for narrative structure and ‘play’ of the imagination. In this example, 
both domains—or mental spaces—are linguistic. For example, a person in a ballad 
may be able to transform from one shape (human) to another. A good example of this 
is the mythological creature of the ‘selkie,’ or ‘silkie.’ Selkies are able to become 
human by taking off their seal skins, and can return to seal form by putting it back 
on. An examples of such a story is the famous ballad, ‘The Great Silkie of Sule 
Skerry.’ 






Reality is not simply the opposite of unreality; possible worlds are constructed 
cognitively by our ability to blend concepts.  
 
Background Framing and Entrenched Blends 
 The central developing idea in Toelken’s argument about the ‘essential 
metaphoricity’ of ballads is that meanings within and attributed to song must 
invariably be formed through a combination of personal experience and contextual 
understanding, rather than being fixed in essence: ‘we perceive the differences and 
register the connotative meanings chiefly by context and cultural experience and not 
by simple reference to denotation’ (1995: 48). Interpreting the ballads requires the 
marshalling of a large stock of background information, including background 
knowledge, knowledge of conceptual metaphors, and local contextual information. 
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Context is also crucial for interpretation, figuring into the meaning construction 
processes to yield the derived meaning of a given utterance. 
As Fauconnier (1997) notes, figurative language expressions do not have 
meaning in and of themselves, but rather they have meaning potential. The meaning 
that an expression can produce in a particular communicative situation depends 
greatly on the background knowledge of the participants, as well as the extant 
mental space configuration set up in the local context. Different communicative 
contexts activate structured background knowledge that constitutes and constrains 
the interpretive process and defines meaning. These background assumptions are 
indefinite, ranging from explicit assumptions to tacit knowledge and personal 
configurations. Much like Toelken’s ‘constellations of meanings’ and Buchan’s 
‘traditional received diction,’ creative blends can become entrenched concepts with 
repeated use and social institutionalisation. Ballad metaphors have developing 
meaning; new metaphors become entrenched in time. What inevitably happens in 
this process is that entrenched metaphors like this can form input spaces in 
themselves, and can be further blended with other complex constellations of 
meaning. The difference that comes with entrenchment is that the mappings 
between spaces in the network are retrieved from memory rather than being 
calculated or created in the act of performance.   
 Fauconnier and Turner (2002) classify such examples as involving 
‘compression.’ This term suggests that the relationship that allows us to draw 
mappings between elements in different mental spaces. Such mappings can be 
compressed so that a single element in a blended space simultaneously represents all 
of its counterparts in the various input spaces in the network. In the ballad, such 
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entrenched blends function as effective mnemonics for the ballad whole. Fauconnier 
and Turner argue that compressions are cognitively useful because they enable 
speakers to employ ‘human scale’ concepts to mediate our comprehension of 
abstract ideas. This idea will become crucial in the next chapter when the 
entrenched metaphors and textual elements of the ballad constitute one domain of 
experience, to be blended with the musical element as a separate domain of 
experience and creating further possibilities for the imagination. 
Ultimately, comprehension relies on the receiver’s ability to unpack the blend 
and apprehend the mappings to elements in the input reference spaces. Our ability 
to unpack a creative blend demonstrates the complexity of this process. As in the 
case of metaphor interpretation, however, the correct interpretation of these 
constructions requires the use of background and contextual knowledge to 
apprehend the mappings from elements in the blended space to elements in the 
input reference spaces. This is an important point in that it shows the open-
endedness of creative blends. Some blends have to be interpreted in very specific 
ways, but some may have wildly varying interpretations of certain elements because 
of a listener’s subjective view. In theoretical terms, this is referred to as ‘optimality 
constraints.’ A theory of human cognitive powers must not only account for the 
richness and variety of human innovation, but also show how that innovation is 
guided (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 310). 
 
Traditional Referentiality 
It is important to emphasise that, while the blending process itself is 
universal, its practical application in the thought processes of an individual ought to 
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be analysed in the light of that individual’s cultural background, always singularly 
plural. It is important to further emphasise the importance of ‘culture’ in conceptual 
blending. There is a vast amount of cultural background information that must be 
accessible in order for a blend to be properly understood, for our ability to ‘run’ a 
blend. Especially in the process of completion, the person processing a blend needs 
to access a vast store of long-term knowledge, including culturally-dependent 
background frames and be able to easily recognise entrenched blends. 
The idea that the meaning an expression can produce depends greatly on the 
background knowledge of the participants can be explained using Foley’s idea of 
‘traditional referentiality.’ This was mentioned in the previous two chapters: in 
Chapter Four it was introduced to help explain ‘contemporaneity’—the idea of the 
past speaking in the present; and was discussed in Chapter Five in relation to the 
idea that a singer enlivens performance by tapping into a shared community 
inheritance rather than through individualistic imposition.  
By virtue of their particular traditional way of telling, Foley argues that such 
oral or oral-derived texts embody reference to all pre-existent moments within the 
same body of tradition. Chapter Four discussed Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy 
in relation to the idea of the temporality of art. His argument is directed to showing 
that understanding—and the kind of ‘truth’ that belongs to it—has the character of 
an ‘event’: that is, something that belongs to the specific temporal nature of our 
human life. He argues that while any given cultural art work is a product of a 
particular era, we nevertheless always encounter an artwork, even from long ago, as 
‘immediately present’ (xiii). In Foley’s view (1991: 6), the most characteristic features 
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of oral texts are exactly those which most often recur in other texts within the same 
body of tradition: 
Traditional elements reach out of the immediate instance in which they appear 
to the fecund totality of the entire tradition, defined synchronically and 
diachronically, and the bear meanings as wide and deep as the tradition they 
encode.  
 
The presence of such ‘elements’ relates the individual oral traditional text to the 
entire body of tradition and so deepens and enriches its resonance and its meaning: 
Each element in the phraseology or narrative thematics stands not simply for 
that singular instance but for the plurality and multiformity that are beyond 
the reach of textualization (Foley 1991: 7). 
 
To describe this process of generating meaning, Foley (14–17) uses the term 
‘metonymy’—a mode of signification where the part stands for the whole. The 
particular traditional, metonymic elements referred to by Foley are most readily 
represented by the formulaic phrase and theme, but in fact can embrace ‘a whole 
spectrum of structural units of phraseology and narrative pattern with varying 
degrees of traditional resonance’.  
 The term ‘traditional referentiality’ was first developed primarily for the study 
of the oral epic traditions, as well as the oral derived-texts of Homeric and Old 
English epics. The notion is, then, predicated on its oral nature and so upon 
cognitive categories that that are operative in the world of oral traditional art, 
performance and reception. It was noted above that theories of oral formulaic 
composition do not transfer readily to the study of the ballad. In developing and 
adapting the theory of traditional referentiality for the study of the ballads, Atkinson 
(2002) explores Foley’s idea as ‘intertextuality’—suggesting that each textual version 
only comes into existence by being modelled upon and varying from a pre-existent 
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version; that ‘each acquires a multiplicity of subtexts representing different and 
potentially contradictory accounts’ (16).  Texts are ‘not structures of presence but 
traces and tracings of Otherness’ which means that they are created by the 
duplication and reinterpretation of other ‘texts’ (Von Worton & Still 1991: 45). 
Many ballads have links to folktales and are therefore implicitly intertextual.59 That 
there are many variants of ballads points to their inherent intertextual qualities. 
 It is possible to expand further on this idea by rethinking what 
intertextuality means in a cognitive perspective. Intertextuality is usually regarded 
almost exclusively as a literary term, but it is not merely a literary phenomenon. It is 
possible to explain it in terms of the underlying cognitive processes by referring to 
creative blending. Conceptual blending underpins intertextuality: understanding 
intertextual texts from a cognitive perspective reveals new creativity involved in the 
meaning-making process, based on conceptual structures rather than on purely 
linguistic structures and processes. We think intertextually. In other words, our 
physical and socio-cultural knowledge and experiences form a type of ‘intertext’ that 
may be conscious or unconscious knowledge at specific times, but nonetheless 
influences the meanings we construct. Since it is possible to regard the ‘self’ as a 
textual construct, and intertextuality as a condition of thought or consciousness, 
then it is inevitable that individuals should bring their own ‘texts’ to a ballad 
performance. The ballad achieves meaning when it is brought into an intertextual 
relationship with all the other ‘texts’ that go to make up the individual mind at that 
specific time and place. By rethinking this from a cognitive point of view, we begin 
                                                          
59 For a list of folktale parallels of the Child ballads see Taylor (1964). 
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to see the multiple ‘layers of story…that make for an understanding of presence’ 
(Porter 2009: 137).  
 Such a level of cultural understanding, or traditional referentiality, is vital to 
understanding creative blends. This is especially true in unpacking the figurative 
language of the ballads and making sense of constellations of meanings. Traditional 
referentiality activates structured background knowledge that constitutes and 
constrains the interpretive process and defines meaning; metaphors become 
‘compressed’ into tradition. The meaning of the ballad is often found in the 
‘emergent structure’ of the blend—the elements that are unique to the blend and that 
do not exist in either of the source spaces. However, if the listener of the ballad is not 
familiar with the cultural background of the source spaces, they may not recognise 
what material is unique to the blend, and meaning will be lost. Cultural background 
is not the only factor that contributes to the understanding of a blend; personal 
experience with the input spaces, for instance, is also a contributing factor. Fully 
accessing the input spaces requires cooperation between several processes of which 
cultural background is a vital element. 
 
Novel Metaphors 
There is a stark difference between ‘entrenched metaphors’ described above 
and ‘novel metaphors.’ This section concentrates on the idea of the ‘novel metaphor’ 
and in particular Turner’s theory for understanding how these metaphors work 
through the idea of creative blends. In The Literary Mind (1998) he describes the mind 
itself as ‘literary,’ meaning that it forms stories. He views the process of cognition as 
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narrative in structure and does not separate cognition from the act of narration. 
Turner, in The Literary Mind (1996: 4-5), writes, 
Narrative imagining—story— is the fundamental instrument of thought. Rational 
capacities depend upon it. It is our chief means of looking into the future, of 
predicting, of planning, and of explaining. It is a literary capacity indispensable to 
human cognition generally. This is the first way in which the mind is essentially 
literary. 
 
This is a fundamental point. Telling stories, singing songs, and conjuring imaginary 
worlds are skills that have been coded into us by the processes of evolution itself. 
The folklorist Niles (1999: 3, my italics) articulates this human propensity in 
different terms: 
Only human beings possess this almost incredible cosmoplastic power, or 
world-making ability…Storytelling is an ability that defines the human species as 
such...Through storytelling, an otherwise unexceptional biological species has 
become a much more interesting thing, Homo narrans: that hominid who not 
only has succeeded in negotiating the world of nature…but has also learned to 
inhabit mental words that pertain to times that are not present and places that are the 
stuff of dreams. It is through such symbolic mental activities that people have 
gained the ability to create themselves as human beings and thereby transform 
the world of nature into shapes not known before. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson also agree that metaphors have the power to create a new reality. 
Ultimately, human beings shape their world through the stories they tell, through 
‘cosmoplastic power’ or creative blending, whichever explanatory route we choose 
to take. The world of the narrative is not the world of immediate perception but a 
world of imaginative possibilities. It is, essentially, a process of imaginative 
understanding. 
A good metaphor creates a semantic innovation that gives us a new 
understanding which we have not previously possessed. In this way, it 
resembles the process of mimesis, the creative manner in which the stuff of life is 




Ricouer’s narrative theory explains this process of narrativisation through what he 
terms ‘emplotment’ or ‘mimesis.’ Emplotment is a ‘power of schematisation’; mimesis 
‘presents’ or acts out a story dramatically. Ricouer considers that the creation of 
metaphor is similar to the creation of a work of art. He defines mimesis not merely as 
representation, but as a creative imitation. Emplotment is the process whereby a 
person gathers scattered events, actions, goals, causes, and desires into one 
meaningful story, as a way of imitating our actions with the hope of grasping them 
as a meaningful whole. Understanding these seemingly disconnected events is by 
means of the plot. According to Ricouer, the plot must have a beginning, middle and 
an end, while the narrative text must be construed according to the rules of genre 
and composition of the culture, to impose a form upon material. The narrative, then, 
as a work, refigures the world of action as a world of imaginative possibilities. In the 
same way that creative blending provides us with new meaning on a miniature scale, 
disparate, already existing elements are put together in a new way as part of the 
mimetic process to form new works. The following sections explore this mimetic 
process as they relate to meaning-making in the ballad experience.  
 
Reception Theory 
The second section of this chapter explores the productive power of 
metaphor beyond its traditionally perceived substitutive role. Ideas from reception 
theory are useful to bridge ideas from the first section with ideas of personal 
narrative creation.  Convergences and divergences in reception theory and Turner’s 
cognitive criticism have been noted elsewhere in literature (Hamilton & Schneider 
2002). The two theoretical lines focus on the cognitive processes involved with 
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reading specifically literary texts. Iser (1974) argues that there are ‘two poles’ in any 
text: ‘the artistic refers to the text created by the author, and the aesthetic is the 
realisation accomplished by the reader.’ Somewhere between the poles is the 
cultural work, which readers create by ‘realising’ a text, but Iser admits that the 
realisation can never be precisely pinpointed (274–72). It is the omnipresent third 
wheel, the vague space between, that Iser wishes to theorise. This idea of the ‘third 
wheel’ is reminiscent of the idea of the ‘third ear’ of our consciousness discussed in 
the previous chapter, which ‘finds between the two auricles the creativity that 
constructs reality in its own and special manner’ (Baumann 1990:123). Toelken 
argues that it is evident that the figurative meaning cannot be said to reside entirely 
within the text as part of its manifest content, but somewhere between the text (as it is 
performed) and that shared constellation of assumptions and associations that gets 
triggered when this singer sings this song before this audience at a particular time. 
 A developing theme in my argument is the role of the subject in the creation of 
meaning. The previous chapter focused on the role of the listener. A model of 
audience response has been markedly lacking from folklore studies at large, but a 
phenomenological approach to the realisation of the text finally acknowledges the 
central place of the audience in the achievement of presence in vernacular performed 
art. Neal and Robidoux (1995) argue for the applicability of reception theory to the 
creation of meaning out the dynamic interaction of text and audience in folklore 
genres; Atkinson (2002) has begun to explore the possibilities in the context of 
ballad studies, focussing on audience reception. Foley, in studying oral-derived epic, 
drew on the reception theory of Iser and Jauss in studying the creation of meaning in 
the performance of oral narratives. Atkin’s work is very much text-centred in the 
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traditional sense, although there are insights that can be expanded and developed 
here nevertheless. Tom McKean (2003: 6), in The Flowering Thorn: International Ballad 
Studies summarises Neal and Robidoux’s reception theory (1995): 
The interplay engendered through the reciprocal relationship between the text 
and the audience can no longer be perceived as a static entity: when engaging 
any text the audience becomes embroiled in an interactive game that can be 
played over and over again. This process takes place with differing results for 
each individual and for each contact with that specific text. Just as the success 
of any game depends upon the involvement of the participants, the success of 
any ‘reading’ of the text depends not only upon that text but upon the audience.  
 
Several ideas here feed into ideas already discussed. We saw in Chapter Four that art 
itself can be understood as a form of ‘play’ where the plays must ‘lose themselves’ in a 
kind of game, and that a work of art cannot be detached from its presentation, or 
enactment, in time. Such ideas were illuminating in developing a theory of ‘presence.’ 
The idea of the ‘singularity’ of experience is key; and the idea that meaning is 
emergent and changing is central to understanding. 
  Reception theory for literature was first inspired by Barthes’ famous 
proclamation of the ‘Death of the Author’ (1967). According to Barthes, writing and 
creator are unrelated; to attribute an author is to place a limit on the text. Barthes 
argued that every work is ‘eternally written here and now’ with each re-reading, 
because the ‘origin’ of meaning lies exclusively in its impressions on the reader. The 
author, existing before the text, is the past of his own text. With the death of the 
author, the transformed text effectively takes on a multidimensional space; it 
becomes an irreducible plurality of meaning that depends on the plurality of 
signifiers that weave the text together. Barthes’ idea is clearly relevant in the field of 
ballad studies. Ballads rarely have a known author, and when they do, this quickly 
becomes unimportant in the process of transmission, variation re-creation and 
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constant renewal. Perhaps it is because this observation is so obvious that it has not 
yet been articulated. In fact, if the ballads were authored, this would completely 
change their aesthetic power. It is almost inconceivable that traditional ballads have 
a known origin. It has been noted that what characterises ballads is their a-temporal 
quality: they describe a world that is Other and that is past. There is no narrator to 
speak of. ‘Ballads’ of the kind ubiquitous in Ireland are often composed to 
commemorate a particular person or a particular event, which necessarily imposes a 
limit on the text and radically alters the creative processes of perception. 
In Barthes’ essay, ‘From Work to Text’ (1971), the text is no longer ‘an object 
of consumption,’ but rather a process of ‘play, activity, production, practice.’ 
Meaning emerges in the experience of those who make it and listen to it, in praxis. Ó 
Laoire (2006: 1) suggests that the ballad itself constitutes a ‘multidimensional 
praxis.’ Praxis is defined here as the notion of actively creating a subjective world, and 
is key to the ideas expounded in this thesis. Porter and Gower (1995: xxvi) use the 
term ‘cultural practice’ in their study of Jeannie Robertson’s ballad singing, because 
it attends to the ‘intersubjective meanings by which individuals create the world 
they live in, which is riddled with conflict and ambivalences.’ According this view, 
‘music-making, singing and narrating supply a performative means of making these 
conflicts and ambivalences intelligible, and what is more, meaningful.’  
 
Gaps of Indeterminacy 
One of the key ideas in reception theory relevant here is that texts are 
inherently indeterminate. As well as the literary text, they comprise what is called 
the ‘unwritten’ part of the text. The act of reading involves filling in the ‘gaps of 
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indeterminacy.’ Reading is understood as a subjective, affective activity, in the 
course of which the reader re-creates the text and becomes co-creator along with its 
author. Textual indeterminacy becomes an essential condition for art to exist, and a 
text alone without an act of re-creation cannot be perceived as a work of art. 
According to this model, the literary or cultural work is itself a phenomenological 
concept, realised from the dynamic interaction of the written text and the subjective 
reader.   
A written text requires a reader, brought into being by the inherent 
requirement of the cultural text that it be subjected to an active, co-creative 
process of reception in order to achieve its complete realisation (Atkinson 
2002: 9)  
  
Although reception theory has concerned itself with written, literary texts, 
Atkinson argues that it is not difficult to extend these insights to ballad texts. 
Lacunae are integral to the narrative style: ballads tend to focus on a central 
situation and stress the situation rather than continuity of narrative or 
characterisation. The idea of the ‘gap’ is integral to some of the classic descriptions 
of the narrative style of the ballad form at large:  
The focus on situation, emotion and action rather than continuity of narrative 
or characterisation; brief sharply illuminated scenes, impersonality, economy of 
expression and avoidance of circumstantial detail (Gerould 1932: 4–11).  
 
We also find gaps in melody (musical intervals), in plot (often absurd), in narrative 
(often fragmented), in sound (verse end, long pauses etc), in structure, in logic and 
reason, in between words and their meaning. Gunmere (1907: 91) famously 
described the ballad style as ‘leaping and lingering.’ Hodgart (1950 in Toelken 1995: 
96) suggests that ballads are less like linear plot sequences but more like plays or 
film montages, because  
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They contain little explanation, little detail, and almost no data, but have a 
great deal of pointed and heightened dialogue and visual image that is 
presented as if listeners already know (or can quickly perceive) the story’s basic 
situation and dilemma. 
 
Indeed, it would be possible to claim that ballads are often conspicuous by what is 
absent rather than what is present. Similar ideas are inherent in Ricouer’s 
hermeneutics: no matter how detailed and complete a text may be, there is always a 
gap:  
Every text, even a systematically fragmentary one, is revealed to be exhaustible 
in terms of reading, as though, through its unavoidably selective character, 
reading revealed an unwritten aspect in the text. It is the prerogative of reading 
to strive to prove a figure for this unwritten side of the text. The text thus 
appears, by turns, both lacking and excessive (Ricouer 1991: 401). 
 
Paradoxically, then, ballad texts seem to lack determinacy but also enable an excess 
of meaning, so that they are inexhaustible in terms of interpretation. As Atkinson 
notes, the corollary of the ballads is that part of their artistry lies in these omissions 
which require the readers to contribute to the realisation of the ballad meaning. 
‘Gaps in texts not only necessitate but provoke audience interaction’ (Neal and 
Robidoux 1995: 224).  
 Iser’s concept of the ‘implied reader’ (1978), brought into being by the 
inherent requirement of the text - that be subjected to an active, co-creative process 
of reception in order to achieve its complete realisation - can be re-imagined in the 
context of the ballad experience as an ‘implied audience’ brought into being by 
exactly the same requirement for co-creative reception in the traditional text. In 
performance, this is the role of the ‘deep listener.’ It is this inherent indeterminacy 
that invites both ballad singer and audience to participate in the realisation of the 
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ballad text as a coherent whole and become co-creators themselves, in what Nancy 
might call the ‘co-existential analytic of coming to presence’ (2007).  
What emerges from this picture is the necessity of indeterminacy and 
ambiguity in folklore such as the ballad and also the necessity of co-creation on the 
part of the audience. It is pertinent to ask how far meaning is destabilised by the 
phenomenology of reception. Neal and Robidoux assert that there is a complete 
instability of meaning; Foley on the other hand believes that tradition places 
constraints on a possible range of meanings, embodied in the concept of ‘traditional 
referentiality.’ It is simply not exceptional for two people to take away different 
meanings from an experience of the same aesthetic phenomenon. This is not to say 
that meanings are infinite, but to say somewhat paradoxically that there is an 
infinite possibility of meaning within given set of parameters: 
Meanings intended by performers and those received by listeners need not be 
congruent; audiences always have latitude in interpreting  songs, as performers 
do in presenting them (Greenhill 1995: 171 in Atkinson 2002: 10).  
 
Songs are replete with potential for interpretation, which may differ greatly among 
individuals according to their personal and situational contingencies (Ó Laoire 2005: 
204).  
Old songs preserved as texts in the present are ripe for interpretation by 
whoever hears them or sees them, while at the moment of performance new 
meanings may be generated by ostensive reference to the performer, the 
audience, or the situation. Songs, like any text or meaningful action, have an 
excess of meaning and the potential for widely varying interpretations (Rice 
1994: 115) 
 
That there can easily be more than one meaning attributed to a song furthers an 
argument for the importance of ambiguity and the singularly plural. What is 
interesting in developing these ideas from reception theory study is an examination 
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of the embodied cognitive processes at work in the creation of meaning in ballad 
presence and the ballad experience.   
 
Personal Narratives Configured as Metaphor 
Ó Laoire’s work (2005), rooted in the phenomenological hermeneutics of 
Ricouer, extends the productive power of metaphor far beyond its traditionally 
perceived substitutive role: 
It seems to me that personal meanings attributed to works of art can be 
regarded as the configuration of a metaphor and that some of Ricouer’s ideas 
provide insight into the way in which it functions. 
 
Such a configuration, as he sees it, fits well with Ricouer’s views on the formation of 
successful metaphors, and in my view, with Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of 
creative blending.  
This function of metaphor explained and explored by Ó Laoire can be seen as a 
part of a larger cognitive process at work in cultural experience. Identifying with a 
character’s plight or emotion and relating it to personal experience, to family 
bereavement, trauma or tragedy, for example, provides people with a mediating 
context—or ‘space’—to comprehend personal experience more deeply. Ricouer points 
out that metaphor brings together two distinct meanings which serve to break down 
the ways in which these were already categorised. As discussed above in relation to 
mimesis and narrative creation, successful metaphors are founded on the ‘tension 
between the strangeness of the pairing and its suitability.’ The striking difference 
between our idiosyncratic personal narratives and the narratives of the song, in Ó 
Laoire’s view, must constitute what he calls the ‘tensive core’ of the metaphor, 
suggesting that it is this ‘tension’ between the similarities and the differences of the 
235 
 
two cases which lend the metaphor its expressive power. Such a process of 
configuration enables us to gain a new and sympathetic understanding of human 
relationships in the same way it provides people with a mediating context to 
comprehend more deeply and perhaps relate it to personal experience (2005: 200). 
Contradictory emotions emerge from the performance situation. Songs, in creating 
ambiguity, provide a context for the expression of what may or may not be otherwise 
expressible.   
The idea of ‘gaps of indeterminacy’ is crucial to this argument. Arguably, such 
lacunae require a more personal relationship with the ballad, because the subject is 
obliged to fill in the gaps with their own personal experience. It is this kind of 
‘plural, multilayered context that obtains’ (Ó Laoire 2005: 209). The experiences of 
our past, our history, the natural world around us, deeply personal experiences and 
the experiences of family and friends all play a part in the processes of meaning 
creation in the ballad experience. Sheila Stewart talks about her own personal 
experience in the following quote, which illustrates the above ideas very well: 
When I sing I'm not just singing for the song’s sake. I’m singing for the trees, for 
the grass, for the birds, for the horses we used to go on long ago, for the free way 
of life that Travellers did, of the music, of the stories we told, and all that comes 
into one and that's tunnelled into the body and it all comes out like that and that’s 
what I think I sing like... And there’s so many functions within that. This is what I 
want to share with everybody, to identify it to them so as they can get this feeling 
that I have down here as well, taking all these things into perspective and it’s a 
good thing to share. ’Cause not many folk are free.60 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the role of memory and ‘deep listening.’ 
Songs often remind the singer or listener of a person or an event that has no literal 
connection with the text. Certain songs bring into sharp memory loved ones who 
                                                          
60
 School of Scottish Studies Archive tape SA1996.84. 
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are lost, great teachers who we learn from—certain personalities perhaps—and it is 
often these associations that move us rather than the content of the song or subject 
or song itself. Meanings, then, can also build up cumulatively over an extended 
period and can be more intensively interpreted than is possible from a single 
performance.  
Such meanings can unfold a world which exists independently of any one 
enactment, increasing their emotional power with every successive 
performance. In such cases, accumulated meanings exceed the ostensive 
reference in their revelation of another world (Ó Laoire  2005: 204). 
 
In this way, a ballad’s emotional power is increased with every successive 
performance in such a way that the dramatic metaphor of the song has the power to 
suggest a constellation of shared experiences and values, at once singular and shared. 
Artworks, regardless of their age, can endlessly renew themselves by taking on 
contemporary meanings: 
The fact that a work stretches out of a past into the present as enduring moments 
still does not mean that their being is an object of aesthetic or historical 
consciousness. As long as they fulfil their function they are contemporaneous with 
every age (Gadamer 2004: 120). 
 
Through a process of creative blending, past and contemporary reality can be 
experienced together. Gadamer believes that it is in narrative that these become 
unified. As we have seen, Turner views the very process of cognition as narrative in 
structure and it is impossible to separate cognition from the act of narration. 
 Thomas Dubois (1995: 238–9) has recognised three ways in which meaning 
may be attributed to songs:  
Narrativization involves the application of a temporal, local and character specific 
framework as means of conceiving and appreciating the situation described… 
Singers and audience members alike may relate elaborated narrativised 
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explanations for many traditional lyrics…Personalization (or first-person 
association) refers to a variety of ways in which a lyrics could be explained 
through reference to oneself. Audience members may relate a song to their own 
present or past situation or recall the circumstances in which they first heard the 
song. Attribution (or third-person association) refers to the act of glossing a lyric 
through mention of another person, often the song’s author. Audience members 
may relate the song to other people in a given situation.  
 
Ó Laoire (2005:209), informed by Dubois’ three processes of narrativisation, 
personalisation and attribution, shows how we can discover the key to the creation 
of meaning for songs. This, he argues, explicitly requires the uncertainty of 
performance and the circumstances informing it, invoking Foley’s notion of 
traditional referentiality to add weight to this argument.  
This three stage process could be mapped onto the three major operations at 
work in the creative blending process: composition, completion and elaboration. In this 
way, the human mind actively creates something which did not previously exist. 
Such a view clearly demonstrates the productive potential of metaphorical thought 
far beyond its traditionally perceived substitutive role. The metaphorical process 
that occurs in the juxtaposition of personal meanings and works of art, in this case 
the ballad, forms part of a more complex metaphorical process that can be explored 
even further in the context of ballad singing, that incorporates many levels of cross 
domain mapping and conceptual blending.  
This ‘law of three’ also applies to Ricouer’s mimesis model. There are three 
moments of understanding narrative: pre-figuration, configuration and re-figuration. 
This three-fold mimesis, the pre-reflective understanding of the world of action and 
the appropriative reconfiguration of that world as a world of possibilities for being 
are mediated by the objective ‘moment’ or event of the text, the ‘presencing’ of it.  
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Having alienated itself if the text, the subject returns to its life world, now 
developed and transformed, in a moment of appropriation (1990: 71).  
 
Imagining the Epochē   
 
In the to and fro hermeneutic of movement of play, a change occurs which 
suspends everyday reality, through which an intensified and truer vision of reality 
becomes apparent’ (Ó Laoire 2005: 34: my italics).  
 
Ricouer proposes that a metaphor is part of a process through which new properties 
were attributed to a familiar subject, which he calls ‘predication.’ For Ricouer, the 
key to the process of predicative assimilation was the imagination. As he saw it, 
discourse—and in particular, poetic discourse—generated a rich and potentially 
contradictory assembly of images, and it was through the processes of the imagination 
that these processes could be reconciled: 
By displaying a flow of images, discourse initiates changes of logical distance, 
generates rapprochement. Imaging or imagining, thus, is the concrete milieu in 
which and through which we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a 
mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode (1978: 
150) 
 
This word ‘rapprochement’ could easily be replaced by ‘creative blending’ in this 
context. What Ricouer’s process of ‘imagining’ required, however, was a suspension 
of what he calls ‘ordinary reference’. The idea of the epochē  is central to his theory of 
metaphor. In the epochē there is a temporary suspension of ordinary reality, of time 
and of space. I suggest that the idea of the ‘created space,’  explored in the previous 
chapter, can be seen to constitute the embodied epochē, which could equally be 
explained in terms of Gadamer’s ‘closed circle of meaning’ discussed in Chapter One. 
As Ricouer observes,  
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Poetic language is not less about reality than any other use of language but refers 
to it by the means of a complex strategy which implies, as an essential 
component, a suspension and seemingly an abolition of the ordinary reference 
attached to descriptive language (1978: 153). 
 
 The epochē allows us to accept all data on an equal footing, whether that data be 
contributed by the physical world or by our imagination, whether the data is 
objective and subjective. The kind of split reference mentioned in this 
formulation—involving both objective and subjective data—is made possible by 
the imagination. 
Imagination does not merely schematize the predictive assimilation between 
terms by its synthetic insight into similarities nor does it merely picture the 
sense thanks to the display of images aroused and controlled by the cognitive 
process. Rather, it contributes concretely to the epochē of ordinary reference and 
to the projection of new possibilities of redescribing the world (Ricouer 1978: 
154). 
 
The split reference of poetic discourse has its correlate in the relationship between 
emotions (as embodied processes) and feelings (as a reflection on those processes). 
The similarity between two things is regarded as a product of an endlessly creative 
faculty of imagination. Through the workings of productive imagination, metaphor 
brings into being ‘new meaning, semantic innovation, which operates verbally to 
extend the polysemy or multiple meanings of words found in natural language’ 
(Ricouer 1981: 39 in Ó Laoire  2005: 34). 
 
Meaning, Temporality and Transformativity 
Why do we imbue certain experiences with more significance and meaning 
than others? An explanation is needed for the selective activity of consciousness. It 
can be said that our consciousness interprets experiences according to the cognitive 
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interest existing at that moment. We then turn the attention towards one point or 
another of the lived experience and interpret it according to the cognitive interest 
existing at the moment of performance. Meaning must be relational: it is the 
relationship between one lived experience and the whole life-experience of the 
individual. It is therefore necessarily unique to each individual; and furthermore, it 
changes with every successive lived moment. Not only is the meaning of each 
experience fundamentally unique, but the ‘same’ experience does not have a meaning 
established once and for all. Such information is not a solipsistic configuration: it is 
socially constituted and pertains to the culture handed down through socialisation 
or enculturation. This, on the one hand, explains the similarity of the visions of the 
world characteristic of any individual social group; on the other, it does not 
eliminate the subjective dimension.  
According to Ricouer, a ‘text’ can be read and re-read with the possibility of 
new appropriation in each case; there is no final appropriation, no final meaning. 
Ballads are continually sung and re-sung, experienced and re-experienced. This 
process involves a creative manipulation and integration of three senses of time: 
past, present and future. Ricouer (1988: 21) calls this a ‘mimetic trinity.’ Human time 
is figured as a ‘three-fold present.’ Whenever we bring an experience to mind, it 
takes on a different meaning, a meaning that will depend on the temporal moment in 
which attention is again focused on the experience. By consequence, meaning is 
therefore fundamentally a function of time itself. Central to Bergson’s philosophy of 
time, discussed in Chapter Four, is the idea of memory. He argues that durée is only 
possible because of memory, in that through memory the past is accumulated in its 
entirety. In memory, not one element is lost and every moment that it retains carries 
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within itself the entire flow of the past and so is, as such, irreversible and 
unrepeatable. To follow a narrative, we must use our accumulated memory of its 
events and our own accumulated memory in order to comprehend or, as Ricoeur 
(1984: 21) puts it, ‘grasp together in a single mental act things which are not 
experienced together.’  
In the ‘narrative event,’ event is simply understood to mean the passing from 
one state to another and therefore some sort of change must take place. Most 
analyses of narrative largely ignore this aspect of a narrative because they emphasise 
structural relationships rather than their transformation in time, and focus on the 
static rather than the dynamic relationship between parts of a narrative. All 
narrative structures are, essentially, systems of transformations. To link these ideas 
back to ideas of ballad presence, Porter (2009: 181) claims that presence forms ‘the 
central element in a tripartite process.’ Performance ‘synchronises tradition’ by 
making the tradition present and experiential:  
The singing of ballads, as the phenomenal recreation of experience through 
feeling, is the essence of transformativity, not only because singing intensifies 
emotional depth, but because, at a single stroke, it incorporates history and 
social structure into the ritual process (Porter and Gower 1995: 298). 
 
Transformativity, essentially, is the existential act that ‘makes the imagined world 
present’ as if it were real. Fluxes of past, present and future run back and forth in 
some mysterious netherland to meet and meld in the arena of aesthetic performance. 
This is the realm of the imagination. In the many worlds of the imagination, time is 
not subject to the same constraints as in the everyday life experience of the outer 
world. In our imagination, we can travel backwards and forwards in time; we can be 
in different places and times simultaneously; the structure of time appears chaotic 
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Ó Laoire (2005: 207) writes,  
If we accept that song can act as a metaphorical discourse which mediates the 
conflicts and perplexities of social existence…it becomes apparent that it 
constitutes a world in its own terms, in which everyday norms may be 
suspended. 
  
This idea can be developed from ideas introduced in the Chapter Five. In music and 
song, we experience a ‘world of imagination that surpasses the ordinary world 
around us’ (Berleant 2004: 157). ‘Deep listening,’ it was argued, takes us out of our 
daily lifeworld and spurs us to temporarily inhabit a new created reality—a reality 
that we actively construct. We enter the epochē through the suspension of our 
ordinary reference. Ideas about creative blending and mimesis help make sense of 
this process. The polysemy of the song and of its performance context separates it 
from quotidian terms of reference; disparate new meanings can be invested in songs 
at the very moment of their performance, depending on the singer and on the 
listeners. The indeterminacy of the lyrics and the liminal nature of the created 
‘space’ in which they are performed creates a gap for singer and listener alike which 
could free them from the constraints of every day conventions. ‘A whole song may 
picture a ‘reality’ which is as much of the mind as it is accomplished fact (Shields 





Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusions 
Ideas presented here suggest that the traditional elements alone do not make 
ballads what they are. Such features can be used to focus attention, but are not 
always the key to dramatic meaning. Ballads exist through time not solely because 
their singers recall all the stanzas and sequential details but because singers and 
their audiences have continued to respond deeply to well-articulated, culturally 
shared metaphors and dramatisations of human experience. Ballads must be seen as  
Hallmarks of intensification, distillation and vernacular recognition of the 
smallest critical mass that can still evoke an audience’s response through 
employment of appropriate cultural nuance and metaphor (Toelken 1995: 103).  
 
Ballads achieve their characteristic effect through masterful dramatic recreation 
through culturally meaningful situations or events. Because human concerns about 
love, betrayal, family violence, sex, vulnerability, courtship and death are powerful, 
we respond deeply when they are made palpable in a dramatic scene with cultural 
meaning. Because these areas of human concern are seldom unambiguous, and 
everyone responds to them differently, the poetic devices used are open to multiple 
interpretations. Metaphors have the capacity to animate and direct our responses to 
the situations described or suggested in the ballad. Indeed, ballads may have 
persisted not because they have successfully transmitted strings of narrative detail, 
but because they have continued to dramatise powerful constellations of personal 
and cultural meaning.  Their function is to foreground or dramatise ambiguous 
aspects of human concern. Because a culture’s nuances of language and values inform 
the processes of articulation, the result is likely to be far more meaningful than the 
invention of a single author: 
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By and large we are not studying the accumulated texts of a few educated 
poets but the dynamic record of a general dynamic capacity to use the poetic 
power available in the song traditions and the contexts of everyday life in 
order to foreground and articulate central features of shared human concern 
(Toelken 1960: 50). 
  
Ideas from the contemporary theory of metaphor and embodied cognition 
can be used to extend work already undertaken dealing with the creation of ballad 
meaning. The characteristic ballad language and ‘commonplaces’ (Andersen 1985) 
set up a schema (a mental representation of the structure). Hearing these markers 
immediately brings to mind the schema of a ballad story in the mind of the reader. 
Applying the framework of creative blending enables us to examine how we are 
cognitively able to set up worlds in relation to the real world using the example of 
the ‘ballad world.’ The listener expects certain elements that are intrinsic to ballads to 
be presented in the narrative. The listener is also required to ‘fill in the gaps’ of 
indeterminacy in the co-creation of meaning. This process takes place with differing 
results for each individual and for each contact with that specific text. The ideas 
presented here demonstrate how a creative blending network may be used as a tool 
to illustrate how we could understand the ballad world in terms of a deeper 
meaning. As Toelken (1995: 21) reminds us, 
Folksongs, dependent as they are on the styles, colourations, nuances and 
ambiguities of spoken language and the ongoing creative variations of 
musical expression, thrive on the suggestiveness and multiplicity of 
possibles inherent in culturally shared arenas of vernacular performance, 
negotiation, and discourse. Because so many levels of perception are 
simultaneously engaged, a folksong is worth a thousand pictures, for it 
expands our engagement with meaning...And yet, for this to be perceived and 
experienced with force, the song must be encountered in its unique reality—
while it is being sung. 
 
The conclusion here then is that, 
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No matter how frugally the details of a ballad are presented, no matter how 
wonderfully ambiguous the metaphors may be, the music organises the verbal 
materials into readily understood, intensely felt and easily recalled units of 
cultural meaning’(Toelken 1995: 21).  
 
The following chapters will explore the idea of creative blending in relation to ‘song’ 
as a temporary metaphorical construct, and further, in relation to ‘gesture,’ which 














CHAPTER SEVEN 7 
“Harp and Carp and Come Alang Wi’ Me”: 
Words, Music Ballad 61 
 
 
This chapter builds on the question asked in the previous chapter: how is 
meaning created in the context of the ephemeral and intangible nature of musical 
performance? The full realisation of a ballad cannot exist independently of its sung 
performance with melody, and so this chapter seeks to elucidate the elusive 
partnership between melody and words in the ballad experience. In her lecture on 
Scottish balladry, McClane (2011) spoke of words and tune as the ‘twa sisters’ of 
balladry, each vying for attention, much like the sisters themselves in the ballad of 
the same name. Chapter Five made the claim that few would dispute: it is not words 
or melody as separate entities, but both together that work in song. But how do they 
work together in song? How do they interact in performance and how do we make 
sense of this? The relationship between words and music is central to the study of 
song in general, and so recent work on understanding song will be briefly 
summarised.  
Talking of coming ‘together’ presupposes that two isolated entities are to be 
juxtaposed. The ease and difficulty with which we can talk of words and melody as 
isolated or separate entities will be discussed here; and whether words and music 
constitute separate symbol systems is also questioned. In Chapter Five we explored 
the difference between sound and words, and argued that sounds can affect our bodily 
way of being before signification. Before the main thrust of the argument is 
                                                          
61 Again, this chapter title is in reference to the ballad ‘Thomas the Ryhmer.’ 
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developed, a brief account of the problematic nature of the traditional semiotic 
approach in the elucidation of the embodied ballad experience is necessary.   
The idea developed in Chapter Six - that when two or more entities come 
together a metaphorical process is at work - will then be developed in relation to 
words and melody. This idea was inspired by conversations I had with Stanley 
Robertson (2008), introduced earlier in this thesis:  
…in these waves, up here, floats yer melody and down here floats yer words, so 
ye’ve got the melody and the words, and the space that’s in between, that is 
where the Maysie lives… 
 
Using insights from embodied cognition developed for understanding ‘song’ as a 
temporary construct (Zbikowski 2002), this chapter proposes a new model for 
understanding how words and melody come together in the ballad experience. We 
have previously discussed ‘creative blending’ in relation to novel metaphors, 
entrenched meaning and the idea of cultural framing. Creative blending theory is 
based on evidence of metaphorical mapping between different ‘spaces,’ or ‘domains’ 
of experience. I suggest here that words and music can be understood to constitute 
two separate domains of experience, which blend together to create ‘ballad blends.’ 
This theory will be explored using a case study.  
 
Words, Music, Song    
Possibilities arise when words and music come together in song, and in 
certain circumstances, the result is far greater than simply the sum of its parts. The 
topic of the power of song in general has fascinated writers on music for centuries, 
but surprisingly, a satisfactory definition of song itself remains elusive. In its most 
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basic taxonomical description, ‘song’ is a conjunction of ‘words’ and ‘music,’ 
especially where the vocal production of the words makes use of determinate 
pitches. This definition is clearly inadequate, but it does provide a common ground 
for considering how we categorise such entities.  
Lawrence Zbikowski (2002: 44) notes that, in the history of song analysis, 
there have been relatively few attempts to come to terms with how words and music 
combine to create the phenomenon of song. There have been painstaking analyses of 
song texts which only mention cursorily the music that sets the texts; in musicology 
there are carefully crafted analyses of musical structure supported by instances of 
how the words mirror this structure, but there are few comprehensive analyses that 
attempt to capture how the meaning constructed by the words and the meaning 
constructed by the music come together to create the meaning associated with a 
particular song in performance.  
In the case of aesthetic forms that involve language and music, a consequence 
of the emphasis on language has been that mappings from language to music have 
received most attention, and mappings from music to language tend to be neglected. 
It is telling that contemporary metaphor theory and the theory of conceptual 
blending were originally developed with respect to linguistic phenomena. This bias 
is also evident in the history of song scholarship at large and in the narrower field of 
ballad scholarship. While some scholars have explored the ballad as ‘song,’ it is not 
the central focus of many seminal works.62 Historically, the study of the musical 
dimension of the ballads has been neglected relative to the study of the ballads as 
                                                          
62 One notable exception is Bronson. The Traditional Tunes of the Child Ballads (1959–72) is considered 
indispensable in the history of ballad studies. The Ballad as Song (1969) is concerned with both the 
methodology in the comparative study of folksong and the interrelationship of tunes and texts. 
Tolken (1995: 20–23) affirms that the study of music is key in establishing meaning in song texts. 
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poetry, a trend which was noted in Chapter Two. Bronson and other scholars of 
ballad music maintain that the neglect of the musical dimension—of the ballad as 
song - leads to a dangerously incomplete knowledge of oral transmission. A study of 
the interrelationship of tunes and texts is paramount in establishing meaning in 
song texts. In my view, an understanding of this relationship is crucial for our 
understanding of the embodied ballad experience.  
 
Recent Work on Song 
Victor Kofi Agawu (1992) offers a survey of some recent work on song and 
identifies four basic models for analysis. The first model derives from the work of 
Susanne Langer (1953) and operates on the premise that when words and music 
come together in song, the music wholly absorbs the words. As Langer puts it,  
Song is not a compromise between poetry and music, though the text taken by 
itself be a great poem; song is music (152).  
 
The second model proposes that there is an irreducible relationship between words 
and music. As Lawrence Kramer expresses in Music and Poetry (1984), 
A poem is never really assimilated into a composition; it is incorporated and it 
retains its own life, its own body, within the body of the music (127).  
 
The third model conceives of song as a compound structure in which the words 
carry the primary semantic content and the music colours or enhances what the 
words signify. This is somewhat limited in that it takes no account of the 
meaningfulness of music. It also assumes that people always attend to the word, 
which is certainly not the case. Agawu proposes a fourth model in which song is 
constructed as a confluence of three independent but overlapping systems: ‘music,’ 
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‘words’ and ‘song.’ He notes that this model provides no concrete identity for song, 
but instead, allows song an identity only by default. This led him to conclude that,  
Perhaps, then, what the model points to is song as process, not as product. What 
is interesting in other words, is not what song is, but what it becomes in its 
perpetual striving for a concrete mode of existence (1992: 7–8).  
 
In this light, song can be defined as a dynamic phenomenon in which discourse 
structures from language and music combine. One of the main objectives in this 
research is a desire to move away from conceptions of Scottish songs as cultural 
objects, and welcome a shift in focus to ‘process’ rather than ‘product.’ Key to this 
insight is the understanding of ‘song’ as a dynamic process, rather than song as 
abstract static concept. Agawu’s perspective adds a new dimension to this 
conception, leading to the definition of ‘song’ as a temporary cognitive construction, 
recruited from the text and music presented to us in performance: a metaphorical 
product of the interaction between words and melody in performance.   
Zbikowski argues that both the literary and musical content of a song and 
the ways in which it is structured as a vocal and melodic composition must 
constitute the basic pattern and frame of any interpretation and understanding. To 
this end, he adapts Agawu’s fourth model and explains this idea in light of recent 
research in cognitive science on image schemata. Working on the assumption that 
the mental spaces basic to creative blends can be set up by music as well as language, 
Zibowksi (2002: 286, my italics) comes up with a theory to explain ‘song’ in this 
context. 
Music breathes life into poetry and poetry breathes life into music, and 




In an attempt to understand the workings of the ballad experience, 
Zbikowski’s model of song can be appropriated as the confluence of ‘music,’ ‘words’ 
(in no particular hierarchical order) and ‘ballad,’ and can be elaborated to include 
specific ballad features. This is the space of ‘song’ or in this instance, ‘ballad.’ Such a 
new space creates cognitive possibilities for the play of the imagination, 
metaphorical mapping and creation of new ideas, narratives and even new worlds. 
Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) idea of ‘compression’ is crucial in this process, 
allowing linguistic mappings to be compressed so that a single element in a blended 
space simultaneously represents all of its counterparts, enabling us to mediate our 
comprehension of abstract ideas. Entrenched textual metaphors constitute one 
compressed domain of experience, to be blended with the musical element as a 
separate domain of experience in a novel way. This process will be explained in more 
detail below. 
 
Ballad as Song 
The close relationship between words and music is exhibited in a particularly 
intimate way in the ballad; the specific relation between the words and the tune are 
often intriguing, and are certainly inextricably and symbiotically linked. Although a 
neat fit between a musical phrase and a metaphorical nuance may not always be 
discoverable, and even though different tunes are known to migrate from one song to 
another, Bronson considers the tune to be potentially far more central to the 
establishment of meaning.  
Whether a tune strikes us as beautiful, plaintive, cheerful, plain or complex, the 
rhythm, tone, structure, and performance of a song is integral to its meaning 




Considering these important musical features of ballad melody leads us to 
appreciate the potential richness of the study of the ballad beyond the verbal 
metaphoric discussed in the previous chapter.  
The question of ‘stability’ often lies at the heart of any discussion of ballad 
texts and tunes. The degree to which the ‘inner core of identity’ (Bronson 1969) 
persists in balladry is demonstrable on both the verbal and musical sides; but 
arguably perhaps more so on the musical. Bronson argues that a narrative theme may 
be stated in any number of ways; the plot being independent of the choice of words.  
When we consider that there is no accessible original to impose its authority; 
that at every moment in its history such a tune is open to all the gusts of casual 
influence, subject to forgetful recollection, to individual, or local, or epochal, 
preferences in mode and rhythm, to wilful invention or derangement, to the 
accidents of marriage with continually altered verbal patterns that impose their 
own necessities upon melodic statement, and all these operative without any 
counterbalancing overt external control: we can only marvel at the inner 
urgency with which folk tunes maintain their essential selfhood in the face of 
such overwhelming odds (Bronson 1955: 51).  
 
The concept of stability, by implication, also raises the question of 
instability. Ballads have survived through varying fashions and cultural changes, 
moving back and forth between oral and written traditions. In surviving through 
change, then, they do achieve a kind of cultural stability. Paradoxically, however, ‘if 
there is one characteristic shared by traditional song, it is variation’ (McKean 2003: 
2). It has always been a matter of contention whether variation or stability should be 
emphasised in the study of traditional ballads. On one hand, as Rieuwerts (2007: 
243) makes clear, the variants of a narrative can help us to ‘read’ culture and attempt 
to understand cultural concerns. However, in literary analysis, the very concept of 
variation raises difficulties: ‘a genuinely popular ballad can have no fixed and final 
form, no sole authentic version, there are texts but there is no text’ (Kittredge xvii in 
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Rieuwerts 2007: 243). Musical variation is hardly less frequent than textual 
variation; indeed, it is almost impossible for a singer to perform a ballad exactly the 
same way twice. While a singer may endeavour to do so—to sing it the way it should 
be sung—the conditions under which a song is performed are always unpredictable. 
 It not unusual, then, to find the same version of a ballad being sung to a 
variety of tunes of suitable rhythm and metre, or to find the same tune utilised for 
several different ballads. Just as there are clusters of versions for most ballads, so a 
given ballad may have associated with it a family of tunes whose members appear to 
be versions of a single form. This does make ‘text-to-music’ analysis difficult and 
problematic. This problem is a difficult obstacle when the focus is on the fixity of 
printed texts and tunes. However, the fact that different tunes exist for the same 
ballads becomes an irrelevancy and can be overcome in the context of embodied 
performance: what matters is the temporary interaction of a text and a tune in a 
specific and dynamic moment of performance. This is not to say that some tunes may 
have a more powerful effect than others. We must ask, then, what is the relationship 
between melody and text in the presencing of ballads?   
 
Creative Blending of Text and Music 
Perhaps one of the reasons why we humans are so fascinated with ‘song’ and 
why the ballad has proved to be such an enduring cultural form is the fact that it 
combines two separate domains of experience. Textual meaning and musical 
meaning exist both independently and interdependently, but when these two 




From the perspective of creative blending theory, in some cases words and 
music will prompt the construction of two independent but correlated mental 
spaces, which interact with each other in a dynamic way leading to a new space in 
which concepts drawn from each of these two input spaces are blended. This new 
space typically serves as a site for the imagination. However, the extension of such 
an imaginary world cannot simply be predicted from ‘linking’ the domain of the text 
with the domain of music. It results instead, according to Zbikowski, from ‘blending’ 
elements and events from these two domains to create a new one with its own 
structures and relations and extends beyond the immediate bounds of text and music, 
greater than the sum of its parts. This idea might help us understand Stanley’s claim 
that ‘the space between is where the Maysie lives’: it is the newly created ‘space 
between’ where new meanings are created. 
 Such a theory of creative blending and song is based on the assumption that 
words and music can be set up as two separate domains of experience. This 
assumption has to be defended. On one hand, the differences between words and 
music would suggest that they do indeed belong to two different conceptual 
domains; on the other hand, the similarities between the two suggest that language 
and music may use some of the same cognitive resources.  
The similarities and differences between music and words actually works 
productively both ways in this context. According to the theory of invariance 
introduced in the previous chapter, the two cognitive domains need to be 
sufficiently different to produce novel results, but at the same time there needs to be a 
degree of similarity between them so that the structure from one domain may be 
readily mapped on to the other to create meaning. The power of a metaphor itself, 
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according to Ricouer, is founded on the ‘tension between the strangeness of the 
pairing and its suitability,’ where ‘remoteness persists in closeness.’ According to 
Ricouer, imagination - in its semantic sense - is nothing but this ‘competence’ 
which consists of producing the genre through the difference, again not beyond the 
difference, as in the concept, but in spite of the difference’ (Ricoeur 1991: 125 in Ó 
Laoire 2005: 228).  
In the case of song, as Zbikowski observes, the  invariances or ‘tension of 
essences’ is between the mental space set up by the text and the mental space set up 
by the music. Before developing this theory further, it is necessary to unpack the 




There are numerous similarities between words and music. Both are unique 
to the human species, both unfold over time and both make use of sound. There are 
innumerable cultural practices across the world which blur the boundaries between 
the two modes of communication. Consequently, any attempts to draw or determine 
a finite boundary between what counts as language and what counts as music is very 
difficult. 
‘Music,’ as a term used to describe the melodic and rythmic dimension song, 
is unsatisfactory in this context because what it implies in a wider discourse is 
simply too large in scope. It is pragmatic, therefore, to divorce the overarching 
concept of ‘music’ from vocal music, or singing. Interestingly, there are surprisingly 
few examples of vocal music without words. There exists ‘diddling’ or mouth music, 
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which makes use of non-meaningful phonemes that imitate instruments to create 
melodies. The information available on forms of wordless vocal music account for 
examples distributed over different musical cultures and practices, ranging from 
simple devices for musical learning to elaborated forms of performing art. 63 Two 
examples in a Scottish context are canntaireachd in the Gaelic tradition, a method of 
teaching pipe tunes orally; and also puirt a beul, some of which make percussive use of 
vocables.64 The fact there is surprisingly little wordless vocal music would suggest 
that perhaps listeners find the sounds coming from a human throat unconvincing 
without the sort of explanation a song text provides, but instruments succeed in 
being convincing even without using words. Perhaps we are simply more culturally 
pre-disposed to expect words, but what is clear is that in most cultures, song 
requires the two together: the poetic power of words and the affective power of 
melody. Often when a great piece of music is played—a fiddle air for example—we 
often describe it as ‘singing,’ cantabile, that is, able to imitate the human voice.  
 It is perhaps easier to conceive of words and music as constituting a 
spectrum, or a sliding scale, with vocalisation as language at one end, through 
heightened speech, through various forms of vocalised non-language and with verbal 
music at the other. The question of when sound becomes music is certainly 
troubling, and there is no satisfactory answer to be found. In my own view, in 
certain contexts, from the point of view of their sonic properties and in the specific 
context of orality for example, verbal music can belong to such a continuum; but in 
                                                          
63 It is possible that such forms originated from the combination of a vocal apparatus in human 
species and the necessity of rhythmical expression in all human cultures. See Scher (1970). 
64 Mouth music is rarely non-meaningful in its original form, In a Gaelic context it is often satirical. 
The point is that the cultural referents have been forgotten - especially for the satirical pieces, which 
tend to be local in focus. 
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other contexts, when defined by function, verbal music and language can 
pragmatically be separated into different entities.  
 
Symbolic Systems: The Problem of Semiotics 
The question as to why we have developed both language and music is a 
fascinating one and has troubled many scholars.65 There are many ways to approach 
this question. From the point of view of literary theory, we live in a world that we 
understand through symbols, and we make meanings through our creation and 
interpretation of ‘signs.’ Indeed, the notion that music is a language is the basis for 
some of the most prevalent metaphors used to describe music. Whether music is 
such a symbol system is still a point of contention.  
Analysis of the ballad singing experience is incredibly multifaceted. Porter 
(2009: 112) suggests that such analysis will often lead to what he calls ‘a reflexive 
semiotics.’ I am not entirely sure what he means by this. The relatively recent field of 
musical semiotics is very complex, and it is outwith the scope of this thesis to 
engage in its origins or various trajectories.66 In my view, traditional semiotics is not 
entirely productive to understanding the ballad experience because it does not lend 
itself particularly well to the dynamic and processual nature of performance, or 
                                                          
65 Pinker (1997: 534) suggests that we did not evolve a taste for music, and that music is merely 
‘auditory cheesecake, an exquisite confection crafted to tickle the sensitive spots of at least six of our 
mental faculties.’ Mithen (2009) holds the opposite view, offering an evolutionarily-informed 
hypotheses that music evolved as a device for enhancing cooperation among individuals. Mithen 
brings to bear cognitive and evolutionary perspectives which support Blacking’s (1973) belief that 
rhythm and dance are the most primal expressions of a culture; that music it is one of the things that 
makes us human, that began to distinguish us from our hominid ancestors. Blacking’s idea is that the 
origin of music, what he terms proto-music, was not functional but ecstatic in nature. Essentially what 
Mithen and Blacking propose is that there were rudimentary rhythms which caused ecstatic 
experiences in humans whereby people would spontaneously emit sounds, which, he believes, was 
the beginning of singing and vocalisation. 
66 See Tarasti (2002). 
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indeed the idiosyncrasies therein. Traditional semiotic theory assumes an external, 
objective reality and a separation of subject from object. We proposed a 
fundamentally different ontology of self and world intertwined in Chapter Three. 
Where structural semiotics seeks to uncover the universal and a temporal condition 
under which these experiences come to be ‘lived’ as such but only as a ‘coded’ 
production that perpetuate a ‘singular universal structure of the mind’ (Levi-Strauss 
1966), phenomenological hermeneutics grounds the multifarious expressions of 
human existence in a hermeneutic understanding of being-in-the-world. 
The basic problems with traditional semiotic theory and the ontological 
status of the ‘sign’ are firstly the question of how cultural systems can be at once 
transpersonal, seemingly existing independently of the actions of any individual 
subject, but at the same time entirely reliant upon their instantiation in the actions 
of individuals; and secondly the question of the relationship between process and 
structure. The objectification of music required by semiological analysis is 
diametrically opposed to the humanistic research established by anthropological and 
folkloristic models. In the study of Western Classical notated music, there exists a 
bias which parallels the bias of literacy over orality discussed in Chapter Five, borne 
out of the eighteenth and nineteenth century objectification of music. Musical 
semiotics and ideas such as ‘topic theory’67 operate in elite and individually 
composed music that has a larger element of fixity of musical ‘text’ than traditional 
forms. In the case of most classical music, there is a musical score; and while each 
iteration of that performance will be different for many reasons (for example, 
technological advancements, conditions of performance, style), there is a fixed form 
                                                          
67 See Monelle (2000). 
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with which to work. The oral tradition to which the ballad belongs is characterised 
by variation and adaption, and the same degree of fixity does not exist.  
The reason traditional semiotic approaches have not been favoured by many 
ethnomusicologists lies with the suspicion that semiotics dwells on musical signs 
and structures to the detriment of social context and significance. Advances in 
embodiment theory highlight what is perhaps the main problem encountered by 
musical semiotics, which is the complete lack of a general semiotic theory of time. 
Many such problems of representation and meaning have been taken up by cognitive 
science, which is why this is the direction taken here rather than attempting to 
develop a semiotic model for understanding the ballad experience. The framework of 
embodied music cognition seems to adapt more naturally to the problems of 
investigation developed in less formalised music cultures. The temporal dimension 
will be further explored in Chapter Eight in relation to the idea of ‘gesture’ and the 
embodied nature of musical experience, as well as the idea of time being a singularly 
plural experience. 
 
Words and Music as Different Domains of Experience? 
 One of the main differences between words and music is that music, on the 
whole, is much less precise than linguistic meaning. Comparing a musical phrase to 
a sentence, it is abundantly evident that the musical phrase has a low level of 
semantic specification, while the linguistic sign has a high level of specification. It is 
often argued that this is because we, as humans, have created words for the purposes 
of  signification- we have imbued them with their meaning -  and that musical notes 
as sounds are naturally occurring in nature (Harmon 2008: 117). According this view, 
261 
 
words and musical notes differ fundamentally. Words, as opposed to musical notes, 
set up a separation between subject and object: what the word names becomes that 
object, separate from the name. The namer becomes the subject, separate from what 
has been named. To vocalise the word ‘rose’ for example, is to make present to the 
imagination what may be physically absent to the senses. There will be as many 
different images of ‘rose’ present in the room as there are participants in the 
conversation. Here the idea of the singular plural comes into play: it may be 
ontologically true that a rose is a rose, but this is never the case in our subjective 
experience. Words, according to this theory, necessarily establish divisions between 
speaker and listener and speech has to struggle towards understanding unity by 
continually spinning new webs aimed at overcoming what the spinning itself 
separates and divides.   
With words and with language there is always a system of symbols that 
must be negotiated before meaning is found. David Burrows (1989) argues that, 
because musical notes do not refer to anything outside of themselves but contain 
within themselves the full and actual presence of their meaning; signifier and 
signified and subject and object can stand together. From this perspective, words 
indicate things beyond themselves, whereas musical notes do not. Musical notes in 
and of themselves rarely carry meaning, but series of notes composed together can be 
symbolic and have referential power. This is not the same as words in a sentence, 
because each word by itself is a semantic signifier on some level. The meaning of 
musical notes, in Victor Zuckerkandl’s (1973: 68) view, lies not in what they point 
to, but ‘in the pointing itself.’ Zuckerkandl argues that what gives notes in a melody 
their musical meaning is their dynamic quality: not in the musicological sense of loud 
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and quiet, but in the sense of their movement in time. This dynamic is also relational: 
a note heard in isolation has no dynamism, but a note as part of a melody is a heard 
as complex of relational notes (which includes ‘not-music,’ discussed in Chapter 
Five). This dynamism is nonmaterial, intangible, yet ‘alive.’  
In Chapter Five it was noted that in recent years, ethnomusicology has 
focused on the role of the listener and on comprehension of the function, importance 
or meaning of music. To this end, ethnomusicologists have turned to a rethinking of 
semiotic methods as a basis for a better synthesis between detailed musical and 
textual analysis and possible interpretive approaches. For example, Thomas Turino 
(1999, 2008) looks to Piercian semiotic theory of emotion,68 using concepts of the 
icon, the index, the symbol, snowballing and chaining in order to explain the effects 
of music. Semiotic approaches like this delineate the power of music to bring to 
memory associations of other realities not intrinsic to the musical sound (Rouget 
1985; Seeger 1987). ‘Indexical meanings’ may include remembering an emotional 
event in our lives; music may be ‘iconic’; that is, within the convention of a particular 
musical culture: it may portray, express or resemble a particular emotion and thus 
elicit that reaction in the listener. But how does Turino’s theory work in the context 
of song where there are two meaning systems at work? Moreover, such theories still 
fail to seriously consider the idea of the emergent present. There are many insights to 
be found in Turino’s work, but the fact that musical sounds can affect us before 
signification (as discussed at length in Chapter Five) is, in my view, is of as much - if 
not more - interest. One of the central aims of this thesis is to develop an 
                                                          
68 The pragmatist philosopher and logician Charles Sanders Peirce formulated his own model of the 




understanding that allows us to relate to the world with both body and mind in a 
more complex way than cerebral interpretation alone.  
 
Form and Function 
Zbikowski states that language and music have different functions within 
human culture. He follows the work of the developmental psychologist Tomasello 
(1999), who situates the emergence of language in our species within the broader 
development of human culture. It is possible to argue that the primary function of 
language is to direct the attention of another person to objects or concepts within a 
shared referential frame. Music’s primary function is to represent through patterned 
sound various dynamic processes that are common in human experience. Chief 
among these dynamic processes are those associated with the emotions.69 The 
difference in function between these two modes of communication is matched by a 
difference in the forms through which the functions are realised, or performed. Given 
this perspective, it can be argued that mappings between the domains of language 
and music - in terms of function - involve structures that are fundamentally 
different in kind.  
Zbikowski notes that language tends to focus on objects (whether real or 
imagined) and on relationships between objects. Language can direct our attention 
to a process (e.g. the noun ‘descent’ picks out a dynamic process that involves a 
traversing of space), but it is less common for language to embody such a process 
(364). When it does—the sound of a horse’s step, to use Zbikowski’s own example—
we imitate this with the words ‘clip-clop, clip-clop,’ and language starts to become 
                                                          
69 Recent work by Damasio (2003) can be construed as sequences of physiological and psychological 
events that delimit feelings and the movements of bodies through space.  
264 
 
more ‘like’ music. Music, then, does not tend to be involved to the same extent with 
the rich symbolic systems typical of language. The following distinction can 
eventually be made: ‘the basic materials of music . . . contain no direct reference to a 
surrounding world’ (Burrows 1989: 73).  Mappings from language to music will tend 
to focus on static aspects of the musical domain; mappings from music to language 
will draw out the dynamic aspects of the domain of language. Music has evolved its 
own kinds of complexity - complexities in the management of pitch, timbre, 
rhythm, form - in keeping up with the complexities of the world that speech orders 
and represents.  
 Chapter Five argued that the semantic power of words expands the 
awareness of narrative possibilities ranging over past, present and future, while 
sound focuses the awareness of ‘presence’ in the present through an embodied 
experience of ‘deep listening.’ In this sense, the ‘sonorous presence’ of music is 
attributed to the ability to remove the separation words can create between signifier 
and signified, and between speaker and things spoken about, in a process akin to 
communion. To recall Eliot, ‘the text is there…while music goes about its deeper 
work.’ This the only way I can understand Langer’s claim that ‘music can convey 
truth in a way that language cannot’ (1994). In language, there are always symbols to 
negotiate; whereas the effect of music is visceral, physical and more immediate in 
comparison to the detour we must negotiate with language. 
Despite the exceptions and problems inherent in the claim that words and 
music are separate domains of experience, in general, and for our purposes, it is 
possible to claim that, at least in their characteristic usage in the contemporary 
world, words and music have different functions. While the range of language 
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functions is broad (to communicate between a mother and small child, or between 
two work colleagues for example), it is primarily characterised by the use of symbolic 
tokens to direct the attention of another person to objects and relations. Music, by 
contrast, provides a sonic medium for a wide range of dynamic processes that are 
marked in human embodied experience, and has the effect of focussing attention in 
the present, through embodied experience. As Zbikowski notes, what music does 
make reference to—or perhaps embodies—is the interior world of emotions or 
physiological states, and that it is this ‘world’ that typically escapes the grasp of non-
metaphorical language.  
 
The ‘Ballad Blend’ 
Zbikowksi’s theory is not concerned with very general correlations between 
music and text, but with the creative blend produced by an entire song rather than 
at the level of sounds or very specific phrases—although this could be the focus of 
future research in this area. What is interesting is how words and music work 
together to tell stories that enhance and expand on structural features inherent in 
the ‘source spaces’ for each individual blend, where the emergent structure produces 
narratives considerably more extensive than suggested by the ballad text alone. In 
the case of traditional ballad and in song more generally, this process does not 
include simply ‘music’ and ‘text’. A given ‘ballad blend’ involves many other elements 
—performance context, cultural context, internal context etc. According, to Porter, 
it is in the event of the ballad singing experience that these layers of story ‘fuse’ and 
attain ‘presence.’ The idea of fusion can perhaps be better understood as ‘blending.’ 
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The ‘blends’ produced will never be the same; each is a unique, highly personal and 





Zbikowski applies his methodology to nineteenth century art songs, and 
experiments further by applying his theories to some twentieth century pop songs 
to show the multiple applications of his theory. In my view, Zbikowski’s approach 
presents unique opportunities for the analysis of the ballad experience. What this 
theory can illuminate is where text and melody interact, to create the effect that we 
recognise as ‘the ballad.’ The problem with this methodology is that it can only be 
achieved after the event, and relies upon a knowledge of the text. Zbikowski’s model 
is therefore limited, but for the purposes of demonstrating the dynamic processes of 





The Ballad Form 
Central to the conventions of the ballad genre is the ballad stanza, consisting 
of quatrains of alternating four-stress (tetrameter) lines, and three-stress (trimeter) 
lines. The simple rhyme scheme has proved remarkably stable over time, retaining 
two common variations, ‘abcb’ and ‘abab.’ Internal rhyme is extensively used within 
lines and stanzas, and alliteration and assonance add to the mood, and ease of 
recitation of the poem, and probably act as mnemonic scaffolding. The language is 
simple and colloquial, interspersed with archaic words, but showing little use of 
elaborate or literary figures of speech, but rather, as discussed previously, 
‘entrenched blends.’ Characterisation is minimal, with no explanation given of a 
character’s motives or actions.  
The ballads are also characterised by repetition. One major feature of balladry 
is the extensive use of incremental repetition, coupled with grammatical parallelism, 
a literary device which can build up successive layers of insight and meaning around 
the central theme and manifest a unity as well as opportunity for development in the 
poem itself (examples will be given shortly). The unfolding of a story often involves 
repetition of a theme with slight variations, thereby ‘creating a feeling of tension and 
gradually leading to the denouement’ (Karpeles 1973 in Finnegan 1977: 105). 
Ultimately, it gives structural prominence to a sense of inevitability and foreboding. 
Wittig (1958: 149) explains,  
The fact that ballads were songs, and the use of incremental repetition, made 
it possible to jettison much strictly unnecessary connective material, and 
most ballads lead abruptly from one scene to the next.  
 
Ballads also encompass a characteristic musical idiom: a distinctive corpus of 
folksong tunes, unstably matched to the texts so that there may be many tunes for 
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the same ballad type or many different songs sung to what is essentially the same 
tunes; a recurrent vocabulary or melodic, rhythmic and dynamic techniques, as well 
as ornamentation, designed to meet with the emotion and metrical demands of the 
song texts. Ballad tunes are based on modes rather than the diatonic and chromatic 
scales. As Bruno Nettl notes in his work Folk and Traditional Music of the Western 
Continents (1973), most ballad tunes have, as one characteristic, a melodic contour 
which roughly forms an arc, starting low, rising in the second phrase, remaining on 
the higher level of tessitura70 in the third phrase (the prevailing vocal range within 
which most of the tones lie) and moving down to the level of the first phrase in the 
last. The most stable part of the tune occurs at the mid-cadence (the end of the 
second text line) and the final cadence (the end of the fourth line). The third phrase 
of the tune, corresponding to the third line of the stanza, is the most variable in 
terms of pitch. Significantly, these notes happen to coincide with the rhyming 
words. The last note of the tune, the point of resolution and final repose, usually falls 
on the keynote of the scale; the mid-cadence falling normally a perfect fifth above the 
tonic or a perfect fourth below it. Where the lines of music and the text coincide, 
and the points at which the music comes to a temporary rest, are also those at which 
the sentence, phrase or thought in the text is completed. There is, moreover, a close 
relationship between the smaller segments of musical and linguistic structure, for 
example, between stress and accent, between the smaller segments, length and tone 
of the syllable.  
                                                          
70 In music, the term tessitura generally describes the most musically acceptable and comfortable 
range for a singer. 
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The usual situation in balladry is that the narrative or lyric statement unfolds 
lineally in the words while the music presents a circular, redundant counterpoint 
that mitigates and even slows the way a story progresses, or intensifies the way a 
lyric develops. This means that in ballads especially, where descriptive detail is 
sparse, the redundant tune creates an insistence on the relationships between each 
verse and the whole. The repeated strophic structure of song melody is in tension 
with the temporal progression of the narrative. The repeated tune slows the lineal 
rush of events and therefore allows for a more intensified perception of the 
metaphorical language. Compared to language, music’s reasoning is essentially 
circular. There is one kind of verbal discourse that does double-back on itself, and 
the word for it is ‘verse’; and it is verse, interestingly, that characterises the ballad. 
The word ‘verse’ itself is derived indirectly from the Latin vertere, ‘to turn.’  
There are other devices in poetry that tend to a merging of particulars into 
the whole. Metaphor, for example, encourages the listener to achieve a stereotypical 
and individual fusion of images with a common focus, always singularly plural: 
Each rhyme is the copula in a metaphor which states, in generalised form: there 
is a realm in which the diverse things we are talking about come together and 
fuse, and a common resonance can stand for that place. The parallel structures 
of a series of stanzas carries this effect over into larger dimensions, and a 
strophic musical setting of those stanzas reinforces the effect. Music is free to 
take all of this further, because it is free of the need to make discursive sense 
(Burrows 1989: 397, my italics).  
 
This demonstrates my hypothesis that the semantic power of ‘words’ expands the 
awareness of narrative possibilities ranging over past, present and future, through 
the creation of narratives; while sounds of music and melody and their intonation 
focus the awareness of ‘presence’ in the present through a visceral, embodied 
experience. The partnership between repeated words, parallel action and redundant 
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tune functions so powerfully that often captivating ballads have hypnotic qualities. 
This idea will be discussed in more depth towards the end of this chapter. The tune 
and the text should reinforce each other; both should stress the same place in the 
narrative. 
Upon reflection, we must perceive that the very idea of narrative, of progress 
from point to point in a story, is inimical to its statement in identical units of 
simple melody, repeated as many time as needs requires. The melodic form, an 
integrated succession of a given number of short phrases, has powerfully 
imposed itself on the verse form, to mutual advantages; but the inherent 
demands of narrative song are for a freer and more dramatic vehicle (Bronson 
1969: 129).  
 
It is clear from this quote that in Bronson’s view, melody affects all aspects of the 
text. 
 
Case Study: One Narrative, Two Contrasting Examples 
In order to demonstrate the utility of conceptual blending theory and its 
application to the study of the relationship between words and melody in the ballad, 
this next section will work through two example analyses of the ballad ‘The Dowie 
Dens of Yarrow’ in terms of two conceptual blends, and argue for an interpretation 
of the narrative strategies of both text and music in terms of these blends. It seems 
fitting to select this example because it is the very song that Stanley sung to me in 
our early fieldwork encounter to illustrate the Maysie and the ballad experience; and 
it was the experience of hearing this song that was the genesis of this entire study. 
Furthermore, this representative ballad example clearly supports my argument.  
Philip Bohlman (1988: 17) comments,  
Analysis of a single song stands not just to proffer a hermeneutic explanation of 
its form or of the meaning of which it is part, the text exists only within a 
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context of performance and tradition, and it is one task of the student of 
folklore to understand how text, performance and tradition interrelate. 
 
A methodology for the analysis of the blending of text and music in song, 
according to Zbikowski (2995: 243-286), entails several stages. Firstly, to highlight 
the basic characteristics of the text and the basic characteristics of the melody and 
to establish the correlations between the two; and secondly, to propose how these 
correlations might lead to a blend: that is, how do music and text combine to create 
a blended space? What are some of the features of this blended space?  
The transcriptions below are descriptive, not prescriptive, and are based on a 
singer’s performance on one occasion or from recorded versions. The problem with 
this methodology in an attempt to get at lived experience is abundantly clear. 
Nevertheless, the pictorial representations are useful to illustrate the different 
versions.  
The first version here was collected from Stanley Robertson, learned from his 
aunt, Jeannie Robertson. The tune has been adapted and forced into a Western scale 
for the purposes of transcription and reference, and is written an octave above the 
original performance. 71 The slanting line represents a slide. 
 
                                                          
71 Transcriptions were created using Sibelius notation software. There are broadly three kinds of 
transcriptions of tunes. First is the skeletal type, exemplified by Bronson and by most collections of 
folk songs. The second, at the other extreme, are exact transcriptions which show nuances of grace 
notes and detailed time values. These are very difficult to read even for an experienced musician and 
are useful only for purposes of comparison (Munro 1996: 53). The third is the compromise utilised 
here. Porter (1968: 172–75) classifies this level of vocal transcription as a ‘detailed transcription by 
ear.’ Most of the ornaments are given, as are the main changes in time signatures. The key signatures 







There was a lady in the north 
You scarce could fin’ her marrow 
She was courted by nine gentlemen 
And a plooboy lad frae Yarrow 
 
These nine sat drinking at the wine 
A’ drinking on Yarrow 
When they a’ swore they would mak’ a vow 
Tae fight for her on Yarrow 
 
It’s will ye tak’ the lang sharp lance 
Or will ye tak’ the arrow 
Or will ye tak’ your trusty sword 
For tae fight wi’ us on Yarrow 
 
I winna tak’ the lang sharp lance 
I winna tak’ the arrow 
But I will tak’ my trusty sword  
For tae fight for her on Yarrow 
 
She’s washed his face and she’s kaimed his hair 
She’s stroked his hips sae narrow 
And she dressed him up like her ain braw knight 
For tae fight for her on Yarrow 
 
Fare weel, fair weel my lady gay 
Fare weel my lady Sarah 
For I must go and fight for thee 
On the dowie dens o’ Yarrow 
 
For three he slew and three withdrew 
And three he wounded sairly 
‘Til her false brother john came up behind 
And stabbed him maist fouly. 
 
 
Oh faither dear I dream a dream 
I dream o’ doul and sorrow 
For I dreamt that I shewed windin’ sheets  
On the dowie dens o’ Yarrow 
 
Oh dochter dear I read your dream 
I doot it will prove sorrow 
For your ain true love lies dead and gone 




And she’s gaed ower yon high high hill 
Doon by the houms o Yarrow 
And there she saw her ain true love 
A bloody corpse on Yarrow 
 
Her hair it being three quarters long 
The colour it was yellow  
And she wrapped it roond his middle sae sma’ 
And she carried him back tae Yarrow 
 
Oh faither ye have seven sons 
You could wed them a’ the morrow 
But the bonniest floo’er amongst them a’ 
Was my plooboy lad frae Yarrow 
 
Oh faither, faither mak’ my bed 
And mak’ it lang and narrow 
For my true love died for me today 
I shall die for him tomorrow. 
 
The second version here was sung by Emily Smith and was learned from the written 





There lived a lady in the north 
You could scarcely find her marrow 
She was courted by nine noble men  
And her ploughman boy o’ Yarrow 
 
As he gaed ower yon high, high hills, 
An’ doon yon path sae narrow, 
There he spied nine noblemen 
For to fight with him on Yarrow 
 
There was three he slew, and three withdrew, 
Ane three lay dyin wounded; 
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‘Til her brother John stepped in behind 
An’ pierced his body through oh. 
 
"Go home, go home, you false young man, 
An’ tell your sister sorrow, 
That her true love John lies dead and gone 
And a bloody corpse on Yarrow" 
 
As he gaed ower yon high, high hills, 
And doon yon path sae narrow; 
There he spied his sister dear 
She was comin’ fast for Yarrow. 
"Oh brother dear I've dreamt a dream 
I hope it won't prove sorrow, 
I dreamt that you were spilling bluid 
In the dowie dens o’ Yarrow." 
 
"Oh sister dear I'll read your dream 
And I'm sure it will prove sorrow; 
Your true love John lies dead and gone 
And a bloody corpse on Yarrow." 
 
Now this fair maid's hair was three quarters long 
And the colour of it was yellow 
She tied it roon his middle smaa 
An she cairried him hame tae Yarrow. 
 
"Oh daughter dear dry up your tears 
An dwell no more in sorrow, 
For I'll wed you tae a far higher degree 
Than your ploughman boy on Yarrow 
 
 
"Oh faither dear you have seven sons 
You can wed them all tomorrow, 
But a fairer flooer there never bloomed 
Than my ploughman boy on Yarrow." 
 
Stanley’s version has thirteen verses; Emily’s has only ten. Consequently, Stanley’s 
version is more involved; the story is more complete and there is a more detailed 
explanation of events. Despite the differences in length, the narratives are very 
similar and there is no question that both tell the same story. Between them, they 
have six almost identical verses. It is not productive to engage in a very close textual 




Despite the fact that these two versions are different in length, there is a 
similar structure:  a tale of the death of two lovers told in three parts.72 If we divide 
the ballad into its elemental components, interesting conclusions can be drawn. At 
the narrative level, the ballad may be split into three parts: preparation, battle 
(climax) and mourning. Interestingly, the ballad also has a binary structure. The first 
half of the ballad concentrates on the hero, the second half on the heroine. The first 
half concentrates on the action: the stanzas tell what parties are there and what they 
do, where all is for the sake of the story. The second half concentrates on feelings: the 
stanzas tell what the parties feel, focussing on the revelations of the characters. The 
moment of the boy’s death, then, is particularly significant. It indicates the precise 
point at which the ballad begins to concentrate on how people feel and react rather 
than what they do.  
The tragic nature of this ballad was discussed in Chapter Four to illustrate 
Gadamer’s ideas about aesthetic temporality and the idea of the reconciliation of 
opposites. Here we have a split between the hero/heroine, action/emotion, 
plot/character, and the physical/metaphysical.  
This difference between the two parts corresponds to a fundamental duality in 
worldview...the worldview of the Scottish balladry that duality includes the 
difference between male and female, as the character structure emphasises 
(McCarthy 1990:110).  
Images culturally associated with love and with death appear in pairs, balanced one 
against the other in descriptions of characters, events and scenes. The juxtaposition 
of irreconcilable inseparables such as death and love arouses strong emotions and 
                                                          
72 This structure is meaningful in itself. Glassie (2000) has demonstrated the importance of what is 
called ‘bilateral tripartite symmetry.’ It is logical that we should find the same kinds of symmetry 
satisfying in ballads as we do in other creative forms. 
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gives depth and power to a number of traditional songs including this one, and a 
large number of the stories and motifs serve to express this basic, unstated 
opposition, such as the motif of the rose and the briar discussed in the previous 
chapter.   
The central stanzas of the second part of the ballad expresses the heroine’s 
grief in manic and grotesque terms, and is possibly the most powerful and most 
memorable image in the ballad. The girl sets out alone to bring home the body of her 
murdered lover. In this emergency, she ties her hair round his waist and drags him 
home. Both versions include this iconic motif. The action, at first glance ridiculous, 
serves well to highlight the desperately lonely plight of the girl: it is powerfully 
poetic and a compelling act of grief. Here, the ballad certainly takes on a visual 
dimension; a good example of Roger’s (1980:103) ‘eminently visual nature of the 
ballad diction.’ 
The verse incorporating the dream adds an element of the supernatural to the 
story, but also serves to show that the lovers were close emotionally as well as 
physically. In Smith’s version, the girl is in dialogue with her brother about the 
significance of the dream; in Robertson’s she is in dialogue with her father. Other 
notable motifs include the image of ‘pulling heather bells,’ common in folk literature 
as a portent of danger. The ‘marriage bed’ motif is found in the first version given 
here, but not the second. It is an example of what is commonly known in folk 
literature as a floating or ‘wandering’ verse—an entire verse that is supplanted from 
one ballad to another with ease. The simple reference to the marriage bed is 
powerfully emotive, suggesting the lovers never had the chance to realise their love 
for each other. This verse is powerful and shows refusal of consolation, and points to 
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the possibility of her death in a final suicide. This last verse dramatises a 
fundamental ultimate ambiguity: does she really die?  
As discussed is the previous chapter, such motifs are ‘traditionally 
referential,’ working as examples of Buchan’s received traditional diction. In this 
context they can work as entrenched blends retrieved from memory, recruited and 
blended with the melody in performance creating the ballad as song as a temporary 
construct and novel blend. That is, they have been compressed and stored in memory 
to be recruited in new ways in the processes of elaboration, which is the third stage 
in the creative blending process, following composition and completion (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002).  
Incremental repetition is one particularly notable structural characteristic of 
the ballad in both examples, on both the musical and the verbal side. On the verbal 
side, incremental repetition is most notable in the ballad’s rhyming scheme; on the 
musical side it is made up of repeated musical phrases. This repetition also lends 
tension to the unravelling story. Arguably, it is the rhyme scheme that is the 
definitive characteristic of this ballad. It may seem somewhat prescriptive and 
restrictive—it only admits words that rhyme with Yarrow, with very few exceptions: 
There lived a lady in the north 
You could scarcely find her marrow 
She was courted by nine noble men  
And her ploughman boy o Yarrow 
 
“Oh brother dear I've dreamt a dream 
I hope it won't prove sorrow, 
I dreamt that you were spilling bluid 
In the dowie dens of Yarrow” 
 
“Oh faither dear you have seven sons 
You can wed them all tomorrow, 
But a fairer flooer there never bloomed 
Than my ploughman boy on Yarrow.” 
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In my view, the success of the ballad is in fact made possible in part because of this 
restriction. It produces a powerful emotive result. The rhymes ‘marrow’ ‘narrow’ and 
‘yarrow’ all work to evoke the word ‘sorrow.’ ‘Dowie’ itself means ‘sad’ or ‘sorrowful,’ 
so with the incremental repetition there develops a semantic complex of words. The 
ballad has a prevalence of vowel sounds in it - in ‘Yarrow’ there is the Y a sound, the 
long [j ɑ:] sound (two phonemes). It does not come across as mundanely repetitive; 
it actually works as a hypnotic device, reaching the objective of instilling a quality of 
presence more quickly and more fully than speech. Physiologically, this is an 
example of the musical prolongation of the vowel sound having the ‘effect of 
focussing attention on the sheer sonic quality of the voice, its timbre and resonance’ 
(Burrows 1989: 391). In this way, the melody expands temporality: these prolonged 
sounds inadvertently contribute to the overall sorrowful feel of the ballad, 
unmistakeable in its effect. Overall, the tonal effect of the recurrent rhymes for 
Yarrow are characteristic, and even when difficult, they help to convey the aura of 
dire tragedy. 
Where there is a stark difference between these examples is between the two 
melodies and singing styles. Stanley’s tune is modal and haunting, with wavering 
minor intervals that do not conform easily to Western scales. The melody itself—the 
minor intervals and modality—embodies the sense of ‘dire tragedy’ discussed above.  
The idea of a regular time signature is irrelevant here; Stanley pushes and pulls the 
melody for effect, stretching the words, playing with the dynamics and changing 
rhythms. This irregularity probably helps to explain phrasing differences. In my 
experience, irregularity tends to correlate with a greater dominance given to words 
in the rhythmic structure. As he tells us, ‘ye get some ballads that have natural 
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resting places. And ye get ither verses key to reminding the story’ (2008).  The 
Hungarian composer and ethnomusicologist Bartók identified two primary singing 
styles in European folk music, which he named parlando-rubato and tempo 
giusto. Parlando-rubato, stressing the words, departs frequently from strict rhythm. 
Parlando is essentially a mode of performance, extremely difficult to notate, where 
the melodies are not performed in strict rhythm but with many, hardly perceptible 
abbreviations and elongations (Suchoff 1997: 264). Such a term is useful to describe 
Stanley’s approach to performance.  
               The second tune easily fits into the Western scale of Bb major, which gives 
the song a very different feel. It is sung in straight metre, with no wavering of pitch 
and only subtle discrepancies in rhythm and variation in ornamentation to 
emphasise certain high points in the narrative. The story is carried along in a certain 
way, but the melody does not ‘pack the same punch’ when it comes to emotion. The 
structure of this major tune is very gentle, rolling up and down like hills of the 
landscape where the song originated. As a shorter version of the narrative, the 
second example here can be very effective as well as affective. Emily herself 
remarked,  
It’s more major you know? It doesn’t sound quite as miserable as some of the 
others can… It gets to the point and doesn’t miss out any major events.73  
The most interesting elements in any creative blend are the conflicting 
elements. According to the theory of invariance, it is ‘tension’ that lends the 
metaphorical process its productive power. In the ballad as a form in general, it is 
                                                          




often the case that melody and verse are in tension, developing from the forward 
progression of the narrative contrasting with the insistent cyclical nature of the 
tune. Essentially, what we have is a redundant tune carrying a progressing narrative 
culminating in cataclysmic events. It is not simply that the text mentions something 
sad at a particular point, and that the melody features minor intervals. Numerous 
correspondences combine to form the outline of a general principle of correlation 
between the two domains. In the case of the second tune given here, it could be 
argued that the major intervals and gentle melody contrast sharply with the deeply 
sad imagery, serving to shock a listener into contemplating just how dreadful the 
ballad situation is. Such a traumatic experience contrasted against such a gentle 
tune is the ‘tensive core’ of this particular ballad blend, serving to highlight the 
tenderness and sadness of the heroine’s actions and emotions. Ó Laoire (2006: 98–
99) believes that the presentation of dualisms lies at the heart of what art is, and it is 
this that give songs a ‘unique and potent charge.’ Such an elusive ‘charged presence’ 
(Desmond 1990: 67) somehow yields an altered perception of the world, in which the 
paradox of simultaneous good and evil is not seen as something to be overcome but 
as something to be accepted.  
The first tune works in a different way. The sounds and the dissonances have 
a very visceral effect on the body, setting up an atmosphere of unease which allows 
for the hypnotic perception of the unfolding narratives, playing on the tension and 
release that we actually ‘feel’ in our gut. Arguably, one of the main features of the 
ballad as a cultural form is the insistent rhythm of the words and the melody which 
can, on occasion, have hypnotic qualities. This rhythm is married to the powerful 
figurative language and metaphor and, in the case of the ballad, is transported by 
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melody in the act of performance. Moreover, ballads have compulsive rhythm: words 
and music combine rhythmically to produce manipulation and control of time, 
which can in some cases serve to alter our consciousness.  










Presence, Rhythm and the Imaginative Grasp 
The question remains, how do we become so immersed in the ballad to 
participate in a created imagined world? In his work Textual Narratives and a New 
Metaphysics(2002), Raymond Shorthouse attempts to show that the ‘question of 
presence’ is actually a question of the unity with the world that we imaginatively 
appropriate and inhabit in an encounter with a textual form; and that sonority and 
rhythm play a key role in this notion of unity. Focussing on the relationship between 
presence and sound, he appeals to both Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity and to 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the phonetic ‘gesture.’ Drawing extensively upon recent 
developments in post-phenomenological philosophy, his work argues that each 
narrative has a rhythmic structure, or prose rhythm, in relation to its semantic and 
figurative characteristics. The ‘imaginative grasp’ is grounded in the mediated 
relationship between ourselves and the text in a ‘rhythmic, sonorous condition of 
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being.’ That is to say, each narrative has a rhythmic structure, or prose rhythm, in 
relation to its semantic and figurative characteristics. Shorthouse draws on 
theological ideas to further explain his ideas: in this case he likens the process of 
relating to a text to participating in liturgical activity, where symbols play an 
ontological mediatory role. In this context we ‘imaginatively participate’ in the 
active world of the text by means of the symbolic rhythmic structures of metaphor 
and narrative; and unity, or presence, is achieved in the rhythmic drive to inhabit the 
world of the text.  
In an encounter with a given cultural text, our attention is focused in the 
process of grasping the meaning, or the ‘unity’ of the narrative, made possible by the 
background of the unfolding world which we imaginatively inhabit. Shorthouse 
gives literary examples to illustrate the structural rhythmic texture of the 
poetic/narrative mode and the role rhythm in poetry and narrative play in this 
dynamic process.  Rhythm and metaphor are seen to be the key factors in this 
unfolding process, with the significance of metaphor being its powers of re-
description, in terms of new meaning. He claims that our grasp of the narrative is 
rooted in an ‘ontological sonority’ which is mediated through the rhythmic 
resonance of the physical body. It is arguable that the inherent rhythms of narrative 
he talks of are highly dramatised in embodied performance, as opposed to the mere 
act of reading. The effect on the lived body is not so philosophically abstract; it is far 
more obvious and physically immediate. This furthers the argument advanced in 
Chapter Five that the semantic power of ‘words’ expands the awareness of 
possibilities ranging over past, present and future, through the creation of narratives; 
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while sounds of music and melody and their intonation focus the awareness of 
‘presence’ in the present through a visceral, embodied experience. 
According to Shorthouse, this process is an alteration of the very state of our 
being and is ‘rhythmic’ in a profoundly ontological sense. As part of his examination, 
he argues that textual rhythm mediates emotional states, activity and—significantly 
with respect to rhythmic anticipation—the mediation of temporality.  While 
Shorthouse’s musings remain abstract, there is scientific evidence from cognitive and 
neuro-scientific experiments that the capacity of the brain for the registration of 
events is limited to a time window of three, four or five seconds.74 This is so 
fundamental that it tends to influence our strategies for interacting with the world, 
especially when dealing with others in a cultural setting. Our language and culture 
has evolved to have rhythm that matches our bodily experience. Natural language 
unfolds within a time window; our sentences roughly reflect the amount of 
information our consciousness can process.  We can easily convince ourselves of the 
validity of this through our own experience.  
When we speak, we usually stress one particular syllable in a clause. The 
same is true for each line of the ballad. From a cognitive perspective, even the 
simplest musical or song phrase is extremely complex. In this context, each ballad 
phrase has a specific internal structure with a focal point which can be examined 
closer. Consider the following, an excerpt from the singing of Stanley Robertson: 
                                                          
74 Carol Krumhansl (2000: 160) remarks that ‘the perceptual organization of temporal patterns is 
possible only in a restricted range of times. That this range corresponds with the duration of 
rhythmic patterns typically found in music suggests a psychological restraint on temporal patterning 
in music. The most reliable results are those of Ernst Pöppel (1994, 2000)  who has performed a large 
number of experiments. He sees our inherent tendency to group events into larger units as being 






This is known as one of the ‘paralinguistic’ features of language that do not easily 
transmit in written form. Although the stress is not referential in itself, it does have a 
semantic value, as it serves to transmit meaning in a certain way.  
 As humans, we are very rhythmic beings. The physical body has rhythms 
that can be measured: the beat of our hearts, our breathing, the speed at which we 
naturally walk across the planet. Somewhere deep inside we hear the music, feel the 
rhythm, and instinctually react. Cultural forms such as music serve to dramatise the 
temporal and rhythmic nature of our existence. On some occasions they serve to 
create the effect of the ‘crystallisation of time,’ seemingly stopping the forward 
movement of time altogether. 
 
Altered States 
The use of music as a means of promoting changes in states of consciousness 
has been practised for centuries across different cultures.75 Becker uses the following 
quote by William James to open her contemporary study, which suggests that there 
may be some use for extraordinary states of consciousness:   
                                                          
75 See Aldridge and Fachner (2006). 
286 
 
Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but 
one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the 
filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. 
We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the 
requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, 
definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of 
application and adaption (James 1982 [1902]). 
 
Becker (2004) believes that given the right cultural expectations, ‘deep listening’ to 
any kind of music, vocal or instrumental, can be associated with ‘trance’—or, rather, 
‘extended alternate consciousness.’ She believes that such ‘trance-like’ states may 
relate to the basic fabric of emotions and consciousness, which are our ancestral, 
animalian heritage.76 Musicians often use the expression ‘I become the music’ to 
describe their sense of self when playing music. Barthes (1986) writes of the ‘the 
body in a state of music’ and T. S. Eliot (1943) claims that ‘you are the music while 
the music lasts’ (in Becker 2004: 144). Becker (2004: 54,25) views such an 
experience as a ‘profound mystery’: 
Feelings of nearness to the sacred or loss of boundaries between self and other 
can occur in relation to emotionally aroused musical listening…You lose your 
strong sense of self, of ego, as you feel one with the music, you lose the sense of 
time passing and may feel transported out of quotidian space. Trancers 
experience a kind of syncope, and absence, a lapse, a “cerebral eclipse”.  
The ethnomusicologist John Blacking frequently alludes to this dimension of musical 
experience, which he sees certain as a means to ‘transcendence’.77 For the Venda 
people of the Northern Transvaal (South Africa) studied by Blacking, such 
experiences of transcendence resulted in communications with the ‘spirits.’  In 
Becker’s (2004: 147, my italics) view,  
                                                          
76 The potential for the extreme mode of trance ‘may be genotypical of all humans, but if so, only a 
very small percentage ever actualize it - even in societies where trancing is much more common than 
in Western Europe and the United States’ (Becker 2004: 150). 
77 See Blacking (1995) 
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Music enhances the sense of a different imaginary world…increases emotional 
excitement, and may facilitate the experience of a different self. The 
transformed consciousness…allows for alternate mental images, the 
accompanying emotions and behaviour that may be remote from quotidian 
ways of interacting with the world. I suspect the power of music to stimulate 
emotion, to create an imaginary world…while entraining the minds and the bodies. 
Beyond identification of time, place, action or character, much of the music in 
trance is also important in bringing into existence other times, other places, 
other beings. This idea of ‘creating and imaginary world’ is central to ideas in 
this thesis. 
Blacking (1995 [1969]: 34) refers to the experience of transcendence as meeting 
the ‘internal other’ or the ‘other self,’ which is tied to our sense of who we are at 
different times and is the memory or prospect of self in the future:  
The ‘other world’ or ‘other mind’ refers to states in which people become keenly 
aware of the true nature of their being, of the ‘other self’ within themselves and 
other human beings, and of their relationship with the world around them  
 
In this way, music provides a link between alternate selves, places and times that 
become real places and real times in heightened musical experiences. By enveloping 
the listener in a soundscape that suggests, invokes, or represents other times and 
distant spaces, the transition out of quotidian time and space comes easier. 
Imagination becomes experience. This idea was first introduced in Chapter Five.  
One is moved from the mundane to the supra-normal: another realm, another 
time, with other kinds of knowing (Becker 2004: 27).  
 
This ‘other consciousness,’ from a phenomenological perspective, can be seen to 
constitute another ‘lifeworld,’ When someone is performing music, singing a song, or 
indeed participating in performance through active listening, different rules are 




‘Space Between’: The Maysie’s Imagined Worlds 
 
Stanley believes that the space between words and melody is where the Maysie 
lives. According to Zbikowski’s model of creative blending for song, the words 
dynamically interact with the melody in performance, creating meaning together in 
the emergent ‘space between’ in a perpetual process of ‘coming to be.’ In the structure 
of the blended space of the ballad, elements of the textual domain and the musical 
domain combine, suggesting a world of rich imagery that draws upon both domains 
and extends beyond them. Through the process of creative blending, we can enter 
into an imaginary domain, creating a new ‘space’ with possibilities for the creative 
play of the imagination. This is the domain of song, of ballad.   
 
The imaginary world summoned by the ballad has been characterised as the 
‘ballad world’ (Atkinson 2002: 13) and the ‘balladic Otherworld’ (Porter and Gower 
as 1995: 306). This ballad otherworld is analogous with Zbikowksi’s imaginary 
world, the extension of which is rendered possible with the blending of elements 
from different domains of experience. Stanley’s own description of the ballad ‘the 
Dowie Dens of Yarrow,’ exhibits a fantastic example of the extension of an imaginary 
world, and an example of the flexible human mind actively creating or recreating 
something which did not previously exist; and in this case, an altogether newly 
created ballad realm. Stanley was able to tell me about the motives of the characters, 
their personalities, their physical build, what they looked like, what kind of clothes 
they were wearing. It was remarkable: 
Ye ken it’s aboot knights—they’re sayin’ nine gentlemen but they are knights. 
She dressed him up like her ain braw knight so he’s nae made a fool of. Now he 
was just a poor wee laddie, ken, just a poor wee lad, a slim lad. And you could 
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see his hygiene wasnae the best ye ken ‘cause she’s had tae wash his face and 
kaim his hair…But she’s given him colours and that tae wear which dressed him 
up. So, at least he had the honour to go out. See, he couldna use a lance, he 
couldna use an arra—see, he wasn’t trained in the rules of armoury. But his 
trusty sword—he was a ploughboy. And a ploughboy could knock the hilts aff 
o’ trees that stuck in the field. So he was a good—he could smack weel; 
although he was little and slim he could smack weel. And it says—and this is 
very important to the actual battle scene: ‘and three he slew,’ so he killed three 
o’ them, and ‘three withdrew.’ Now, the three that withdrew didnae withdraw 
out o’ cowardice; they withdrew because he made them feel ashamed—the 
other knights fightin’ a bit o’ a laddie. So oot o’ the laws o’ chivalry they left. 
And three he wounded sairly. But the false brother John—see he was ashamed 
o’ his sister, dear lookin’. She had all these knights courtin’ her but she was aye 
pickin’ up wi’ a ploughboy laddie, and he was shamed. And that’s where, he 
was comin’ up tae congratulate the laddie and sleekitly stabbed him in the 
back. Sayin’ ‘well done now’ and stabbed him maist foully. So he was a false 
brother John. And then, it was an affa shamin’ as well for the father, that this 
ploughboy laddie had been killed by his own son fa was a knight, a noble man 
ye ken (2008)  
 
The level of imaginative involvement Stanley has with this ballad is truly amazing.  
 
If a singer, storyteller, or musician has the power to bring about such a state, 
then one of the muses is at had. One is not just amused, however; one is also 
amazed and inspired (Niles 1995:53).  
 
Stanley had a similar involvement with all the ballads in his repertoire. He has 
effectively created an entirely new reality inside his head. Such a degree of 
imaginary world-making as in Stanley’s case is not altogether common in the 
modern day (it may have been in human’s distant past); nevertheless this example 
serves to highlight in fairly spectacular fashion the narrative possibilities for the 
imagination created by a creative blend set up by the words and the music. In itself, 
this is a fantastic example of the human capacity for advanced conceptual 
integration (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 217). Some people may hold the belief that 
this kind of ‘other world’ is real: the world of our ancestors. In Chapter Five, we 
discussed Lizzie Higgin’s imaginary world, and suggested that her experience was 
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an example of the cognitive process of imaginative projection, focused in the created 
space of present through the embodied experience of the sonorous.  
   
 
The Ballad World  
 
           It has been argued that the ‘ballad world’ can be seen to constitute a particular 
phenomenological lebenswelt, which we actively construct. According to Porter 
(2009: 9), the experience of ‘presence’ is described as ‘a departure from everyday 
norms into unknown, unexpected or transcendental territory of the imagination. 
The process of creative blending provides us with an explanation of how we 
cognitively construct such imagined worlds.   
Developing ideas from this chapter with the previous chapter, the ‘ballad 
world’ can be understood to constitute a kind of collaborative, singularly plural 
‘macro blend.’ Culture is, in large part, a product of social cognition. The narrative 
form of mythology especially is an ideal subject for creative blending analysis, since 
blending theory has been successfully applied to the understanding of narrative 
structure by a number of authors.78 Most work on creative blending considers 
blends as the product of single individuals, and considers multiple ‘agents’ only to 
the extent that a blend is created by one agent for the comprehension of others. In 
contrast, cultural blends are the result of a community process in which many voices 
interact over time, and this interaction imposes a variety of unique forces on the 
development of a blend. It is tempting to accept this diversity at face value as a 
complex creation of a single culture, but it is in fact the result of many successive 
                                                          
78 Todd Oakley (1997) argues that scholars of myth, e.g. Robert Graves (1955) have long used their 
own equivalent of blending theory’s optimality principles of ‘web’, ‘unpacking’ and ‘good reason’ to 
deconstruct the social purposes and history behind myths. 
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blendings of the individual belief systems of different peoples, each of which 
contributes a new character, story or motif to the overall blend. These grand themes 
allow mythology to serve as a magnifying glass through which the microscopic 
workings of conceptual blending can be seen in macroscopic terms. A mythic blend 
may sometimes originate with a single source, but its survival depends on 
acceptance by a community, where each individual may have different cultural 
purposes for the blend.79 These purposes sometimes conspire, sometimes oppose, to 
shape the blend. Opposition can produce the tension and invariance needed to 
reinforce the blend and in fact give it more power.  
In the discourse of conceptual integration, such new worlds are described 
simply as ‘fictional’ or rather, as ‘possible’ worlds (Ronen 1994: 88–91):80  
Once the label “fiction” has been attributed, conventions dictating the status and 
proper interpretation of fictional propositions are activated. When a text is 
considered to be fictional, its set of propositions are read according to fictional 
world-constructing conventions and it is made to signify by observing the set of 
fictional reconstructing conventions.  
 
Possible worlds represent things that exist and things that do not exist in the real 
world; they are the space for the ‘blending of impossibilities.’ Properties from the 
real world are projected through cross domain mapping onto properties in the 
possible world. Some elements from the fictional world correspond with elements 
from the real world, and some elements are entirely fictional, but we understand the 
elements that are entirely fictional in terms of our knowledge and experience of the 
real world—for example, time passes differently or people do not age for example. 
Created worlds conform to real-world logic, but at the same they transcend it. 
                                                          
79 Relevant here is Carl von Sydow’s suggestive notion of the ‘ecotype’ as a localised folk narrative 
that have features unique to a peculiar place and people: see von Sydow (1934). 
80 The term ‘possible worlds’ was first coined by Liebnitz (Ronen 1994: 5). 
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Reality is not simply the opposite of unreality; it is the same but different; in Ricouer’s 
terms, ‘remoteness persists in closeness.’ As a result, counterfactual or possible 
worlds may have very authentic and substantial effects on our conceptualisation of 
the real world, and our processes of meaning-making often embody contradictory 
conditions. ‘Counterfactual’ reasoning—reasoning not based on cause-effect 
relationships—is central to this process. Not all created worlds must display 
elements of the supernatural, but such examples illustrate the process of creative 
blending in constructing ‘unreality’ rather well. 
 
The created ‘space between’ of the ballad experience is omnidimensional, in 
which the space between words and music plays a central part. In terms of the 
relationship between words and music, the idea of the ‘ballad’ itself can be 
understood as a temporary construct that we recruit in the act of performance. Such 
a created space also bridges internal and external worlds: in entering this ‘space’ 
created by sound, we are immersed in the sonorous present of that space. Another 
dimension of the space between is created by the participants—their expectations, 
intention, memories, histories and emotions in processes of mimesis, emplotment 
and personal configuration described in Chapter Six. Such experiences transform 
one’s sense of time and space while at the same time conjuring memory and 
associations with previous events. As well as the interaction between words and 
music in the ballad blend, the background cultural framing and personal experience 
play a huge role in the meaning making process. The listener must 
Fill in lacunae in the sung narrative, extend metaphor and symbolism, feel the 
implications of the melody line, and engage in many other forms of internalised 
interpretation...The song—melody, performance, and text—combine to involve 
the listener’s intellectual and emotional armoury in the act of conscious or 




The idea of the epochē is important here—the idea that ordinary reference is 
suspended, which could equally be explained in terms of Gadamer’s ‘closed circle of 
meaning’ discussed in Chapter Four. The act of ‘deep listening’ to words and music 
blended together cognitively takes us out of our daily lifeworld and spurs us to 
temporarily inhabit a new created reality—a reality that we actively construct. 
Disparate novel meanings can be invested in songs at the very moment of their 
performance, depending on the singer and on the listeners, through the process of 
creative blending, elaboration and the retrieval from memory of traditionally 
referential entrenched blends. In this way, a whole song may picture a ‘reality’ which 
‘is as much of the mind as it is accomplished fact’ (Shields 1993: 74).  
 
Chapter Seven: Summary and Conclusions 
 The theory of creative blending offers one way to capture the unique 
contribution of each mode of communication—the two sisters of words and tune—
to the process of meaning construction in the ballad experience. Under certain 
circumstances, elements and relations from the mental space set up by the music of 
a song blend with elements and relations from the mental space set up by the text 
to create an entirely new world for the imagination. Most importantly, spaces need 
to be sufficiently different for invariance to have its effect, and at the same time 
must also have a uniform topography—that is, the mental spaces that contribute to 
the blend at the centre of the phenomena of ‘song’ must be structurally similar for 
blending to occur: at some level, the discourse strategies for language and music 
must be similar, or no blend will result.  
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The importance of and value of the theory of creative blending to the study of 
ballads then is firstly that it provides us with a way to ground our descriptions of 
elusive musical phenomena in concepts derived from quotidian experience, since it 
has been shown that the structural relations basic to cross domain mapping have 
their source in repeated patterns of bodily experience; and secondly, it provides a 
way to connect musical concepts with concepts from other domains, i.e. the text 
with the music. It is important to make clear that what is presented is not a 
comprehensive theory; rather it can be viewed as a new contemporary perspective 
that may help us understand one level in the complex existential process of 
meaning-making in the ballad experience. While creative blending theory raises as 
many questions as it answers, it has the potential to bring the importance of ballad 
melody into view, so that we may better understand the contribution of both words 
and melody to a larger multimodal metaphor. The process of creative blending does 
not include simply ‘words’ and ‘melody’: personal experience and levels of context, or 
‘layers of story’ are vital, as we saw in the previous chapter. Together with a highly 
personal background framing consisting of multiple narratives, these layers 
conceptually blend in the act of performance to create striking possibilities for the 
imagination.   
The insistent rhythm of the words and the melody can have hypnotic 
qualities. In this context we ‘imaginatively participate’ in the active world of the text 
by means of the symbolic rhythmic structures of metaphor and narrative; and unity, 
or ‘presence,’ is achieved in the rhythmic drive to inhabit the world of the text.  
These ideas are illuminating for understandint how we imaginatively become 
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immersed in the ballad narrative to participate in a created imagined world, and how 
we might try to understand the role of presence in the ballad experience.   
What is still needed in this picture is an explanation in cognitive terms how 
the body is involved in this process. Porter insists that the ‘presence’ of ballads is 
only meaningful when the singer or performer and audience are inter-responsive in 
a specific space that they share. The following chapter will explore the ballad blend 
in terms of the musical gesture, and explore the multimodal processes of mapping 







CHAPTER EIGHT 8 
“In Earthly Flesh and Blood”: 
Embodiment, Somatic Presence and the ‘Ballad Gesture’ as Being 
Between81 
 
This chapter turns again to the central research question, how is meaning 
created in the context of the ephemeral and intangible nature of musical 
performance? It considers the lived experience of the body, what has been called the 
‘sensory perception of presence.’ Chapter Five investigated the role that ‘deep 
listening’ as an existential act plays in ‘the gesture…that envelops singer and 
audience and makes “present” the imagined world the singer is creating’ (Porter 
2009: 148). This chapter turns to the idea of the ‘gesture’ itself.  Porter’s theory 
states that: 
ballads attain “presence” when they are realised in face to face performance…in 
the unifying gesture of the singer and the active feedback of the audience’ (137, my 
italics).  
 
One of the central aims of this chapter is to show how Porter’s notion of the 
‘unifying gesture’ can be extended in the light of new ideas concerning musical 
gesture, based on theories of cross modal perception. The previous chapter looked at 
cross domain mapping between text and music as separate domains of experience 
and the possibilities this creates for the imagination inside the ballad experience. 
Here we develop theories of cross domain mapping to account for how sound affects 
                                                          
81 The title of this chapter refers to the ballad 'The Wife of Usher's Well' (Child #79). This ballad tells 
the story of a mother whose three sons are shipwrecked. The strength of her grief brings them back to 
earth as revenants, but they may only stay for one night. She defies the natural order by wishing for 
the return of her dead sons: ‘I wish the wind may never cease, / Nor fashes in the flood, / Till my sons 
come hame to me, / In earthly flesh and blood’. 
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the body, as well as how bodies interact with other bodies in a shared space and 
time. Embodiment and the ballad experience will be explored here in two senses: the 
singular and the plural; of being and being-with. The idea of being-with will be 
discussed in relation to the notion of intersubjectivity, re-thought as 
‘intercoroporeality.’ Ideas here will further support the claim that ballads are 
embodied acts of musical and verbal communication between people who have a 
visceral experience affecting both mind and body, and further the hypothesis that 
musical experience is about much more than symbolic representations of feeling: 
body and action partake each of the other, co-constructing the only ‘realities’ 
available to human experience, through the creation of new narratives and imagined 
worlds. 
Gesture works on two levels: it has external movement in space and time as 
well as in the internal world as a cognitive phenomenon. It will be argued that it is 
the body that mediates between these two dimensions of experience. In the musical 
gesture, we share not just sound, but also time.  It is vital, then, to reconsider the 
nature of the temporality of ballad ‘presence’ in the context of the ballad gesture.  
Ideas first introduced in Chapter Four will be revisited: that with presence, ‘normal, 
measurable time is suspended’ and ‘another world with its own time is embraced’ 
(Porter 2009: 181). Bergson’s philosophical ideas about time, first discussed in 
Chapter Four, suggest an already embodied conception of culture; and for that reason 
his theories of time resonate with contemporary concerns of understanding the 
body. Bergson argues that the only way to understand the relationship between 
mind and body is in fact through time rather than through space.  
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Ideas developed in this final chapter allow us to talk about the ballad 
experience as a ‘total somatic experience’—one that affects both body and mind, and 
offers explanations of the intangible nature of the ballad experience that do not 
resort to metaphysical explanations. What we are dealing with is not the 
contemplation of an alternative reality, but the perception of a heightened reality—a 
reality which is embodied; and moreover, a reality that is at once both subjective and 
shared. 
 
The Maysie and the Sensory Perception of Presence 
It has been argued that what is most important in expressive culture is the 
live, dynamic, participatory and embodied nature of experience. Chapter Four made 
the argument for a somatically grounded understanding of aesthetic experience. 
‘Bodily effects,’ it was argued, are essential to the full value of the experience, 
because they represent a corporeal confirmation of what is registered at the same 
time by the mind and imparts a kind of added value to ‘somaesthetic experience.’ 
Niles (1999: 53) argues that effective performance arousing the Maysie will have a 
‘corporeality about it...dependent on a visible, audible, and sometimes tactile 
connection’ between the audience and the performer.’ One of the central claims of 
Niles’ work is the importance of ‘somatic communication’: that when people listen 
to songs and stories performed, they are aroused by the physical presence of the 
speaker as well as the sound of the voice striking the ear. Stories and songs do not 
have affective qualities simply because of their abstract wisdom or style, but also 
because of the bodily presence of the people who tell them: 
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[Singing] is a bodily phenomenon. Like ritual, it depends on the physical presence 
of the members of a group and involves their participative energies…The physical, 
somatic presence of performers and listeners in a site set aside for performance—
the sensory perception of presence—is a powerful yet underrated factor (Niles 
1995: 122) 
 
This mirrors Porter’s theory of ballad ‘presence.’ Porter believes that presence is 
particularly meaningful when the singer and audience are inter-responsive in a 
specific space that they share. The immediacy of human contact and the sensory 
presence of the enactment are essential for the ‘psycho-physiological’ impact of 
performance; it is the responsive nature of the ballad genre that makes it real and 
come alive. Crucial to the definition of presence is the idea of ‘sharing,’ in a reciprocal 
act of communication. This idea has been explored with regards to the role of 
listening in the singer-audience relationship, where it was argued that audience 
members are not merely listeners, but active participants in the ballad experience.  
In Porter’s argument, the ‘feedback process’ is central to the production and 
reception of songs. Even if members of the audience are only passive tradition 
bearers, they have an essential role to play in the dialogics of performance. 
Ultimately, feedback has the power to modulate the performer’s own response to his 
or her performance, who themselves experience through feedback some sense of 
communicative power, or heightened sensation—perhaps the Maysie.  
Active feedback involves much more than aural reception, however. 
Participation also involves processing the movements made by the performers, the 
visual spectacle of them singing and the qualities and expressive meanings of the 
movements and gestures of their hands, arms, head, and other body parts. In 
cognitive terms, even at the sensory stage, the body’s role is far more extensive and 
intensive than the mere act of listening. The idea of bodily listening— ‘being all ears’ 
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—was first mentioned in Chapter Six. Ontologically speaking, it has been argued 
that musical hearing is hearing-with, and the foundation of this ‘with’ dimension is 
the body: grounded, polysemic and active. Ambiguity and unpredictability are 
therefore always part of sonic experience. The roots of musical listening, performing 
and creativity draw upon our bodily constituted appreciation and attraction, and 
the mechanism by which we negotiate such ambiguous terrain is not rational and 
calculating, but somatic and culturally informed by our habitus.  
A musically moving experience entails a kind of sympathetic resonance 
activated by sound, an embodied state of mind that is cognitive and, at the same 
time, affective and corporeal (Bresler 2006). In Nancy’s (2007) view, we come to be in 
bodily resonance with our environment in this affective relation. This understanding 
highlights the significance of our coexistence in material relations, and especially 
with sound in this case, and adds another dimension of understanding to Blacking’s 
claim that music is ‘an experience of becoming’ (1973: 28). 
 
Being Between: Intercorporeality 
As was discussed in Chapter Five, ocularcentric tendencies in scholarship 
privilege vision as the dominant sense, equating it with light, consciousness and 
rationality, while the remaining senses are considered inferior. This view has 
implications for perceiving the world: 
Trapped in the dualism of individualism and idealism, we become convinced that 
whatever we see in our “mind’s eye” is a private vision, split off from what others 
know and feel, split off from the synaesthesia that integrates all our perceptions, 
split off from the body, the other, the world (Grumet 1988: 129). 
 
 302 
An opposing view is explored by Gail Weiss (1999), in Body Images: Embodiment as 
Intercorporeality. Weiss’s ideas are informed by a phenomenological world view and 
specifically theories of embodiment in this context. Inter-embodiment poses that the 
construction of the body and the production of body knowledge is not created 
within a single, autonomous subject, but rather that body knowledge is created in 
the intermingling and encounters between bodies. How we come to know ourselves 
and the world around us is performed, constructed, and mediated in relation to 
other beings, and it is this relationality that is crucial. Rather than knowledge 
formed through the rational autonomous I, knowledge is the body’s immersion, its 
intertwining and interaction in the world and between others. To describe 
embodiment as ‘intercorporeality’ is to emphasise that the experience of being 
embodied is never a private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual 
interactions with other human and nonhuman bodies (Weiss 1999: 5). Elizabeth 
Ellsworth (2005: 4) agrees, arguing that experience ‘acknowledges that to be alive 
and to inhabit a body is to be continuously and radically in relation with the world, 
with others, and with what we make of them.’ To be a body is to be ‘with’ other 
bodies, to touch, to encounter, and to be exposed, and such bodied encounters 
produce intercorporeal understandings.  
 
Intersubjectivity as Intercorporeality 
 Intersubjectivity as a term used in philosophy, psychology, sociology and 
anthropology is used to describe a condition somewhere between subjectivity and 
objectivity; one in which a phenomenon is personally experienced (subjectively) but 
by more than one subject. According to this principle, there is reciprocity through an 
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engagement with one another. Phenomenology embraces the notion of 
‘intersubjectivity’ as a way of explaining human perceptual experience of the world. 
However, collective subjectivity can still be the sum of the subjectivities of isolated 
individuals. From the perspective of embodied philosophy, the body is the subjective 
source or intersubjective ground of experience (Csordas 1999: 143).  
In his later work, Csordas (2008: 117, my italics) argues that intersubjectivity 
actually takes the form of intercorporeality, with the intention to ‘bring an explicit 
theoretical recognition of intercorporeality as a mode of collective presence.’ Csordas’ 
work is an exercise in cultural phenomenology insofar as ethnographic instances 
provide the concrete data for phenomenological reflection: describing his encounter 
with a Navajo singer, he explores elements of embodiment including language, 
gesture and touch, concluding that intersubjectivity is a concrete rather than an 
abstract relationship.  
To describe intersubjectivity as intercorporeality has certain valuable 
theoretical implications. Firstly, it helps us to avoid the temptation to think of 
intersubjectivity as an abstract relation between two isolated mental entities. 
Secondly, because bodies are already situated in relation to one another, 
intersubjectivity becomes primary, so that we do not have to begin from the 
Cartesian position of the isolated cogito and later arrive at the possibility and 






Presence and Intercorporeality 
The relevance of these ideas to the study of the ballad experience relates directly 
to Porter’s theories of presence in the ballad experience, first explored in depth in 
Chapter Four. Porter argues that  
The meaning of the ballad is at its most complex in the performance situation, 
when narrative immediacy is reinforced by communicative devices (singing, 
gesture, visual and aural contact) and modulated by contextual factors (domestic 
space, public arena), all of this to a point where the individual sense of a ballad’s 
meaning is modified by audience expectation and a shared sense of performative 
understanding (2009: 173). 
 
Furthermore, he claims that 
Meaning is not contained solely in the ballad texts but in the entire communicative 
gesture and in the interpretative moves of the audience as individuals... These 
meanings are all part of a potential “presencing” of ballads as singers, audiences 
and students bring to coherence their experience of an essentially performative 
genre (177).  
 
By suggesting that meaning is not contained solely in the ballad texts not only shifts 
the focus from the text to the role of the interpreting audience, but makes it an 
imperative to place emphasis on what Porter calls the ‘communicative devices’—that 
is, the nonverbal dimensions of the performative understanding. Following Ruthrof 
(2000), Csordas talks of ‘wordless intercorporeality’ and argues that language must 
be associated with its ‘Other’ —the nonverbal—if it is to have meaning:  
The Other of language is not the world as a set of unmediated data, but rather a 
fabric of nonverbal signs out of which cultures weave the world the way they see 
it (30–31).   
 
In his view, to talk of non-verbal ‘communication’ or body language is misleading 
because it presumes that the non-verbal is parallel to the verbal, and can be studied 
in parallel, with parallel methods. Csordas (2008: 117) writes,  
 305 
The problem with using the term “communication” in conjunction with the 
nonverbal is that it focuses our attention the code…the analogy is particularly 
unfortunate in the term “body language,” for that which is nonverbal is precisely 
not language, and to treat it as if it were is to deny its positive aspect.  
 
In emphasising the body’s centrality, Henri Bergson (2007) is suspicious of 
language and symbolic representation because of the effect of alienating us from our 
own constantly unfolding embodied experience. He convinced many thinkers that 
immediate experience and intuition are more significant than rationalism and 
science for understanding reality. Chapter Seven highlighted the problem of 
traditional semiotic theories which assume an external, objective reality and a 
separation of subject from object, in counter distinction to phenomenological 
hermeneutics which grounds the multifarious expressions of human existence in a 
hermeneutic understanding of embodied being-in-the-world.  
It has been argued that in understanding communicative, artistic orality in a 
culture, we should attend to sounds rather than words. This is because words are 
abstract but sounds bind humans to one another. For example, Niles (1999) argues 
that piping is a more intense form of communication than words because of its 
power to speak directly to the ‘spirit.’ Lizzie Higgins repeatedly remarked that 
piping is a form of ‘spiritual expression,’ ‘a kind of language, for it speaks to you as if 
in words’ (50). 
“When my father picked up his set of pipes, Jack, he used tae lay his head 
against his drones an’ close his eyes. The pipes became my father’s soul; my 
father’s soul became the pipes” (Higgins in Niles 1995: 51). 
 
According to Ong (1967: 126), when there is sound operating in shared physical 
space, what becomes bound together are the ‘most interior of interiors’—that is, the 
conscious interiors of human beings. John Blacking (1977: 9) shares a similar view: 
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The interiorizing force of…song, relates in a special way to the sacral, the ultimate 
concerns of existence. On psychological and physiological levels, interiorizing 
corresponds to shared somatic states and the rhythms of interaction that transform 
commonly experienced sensations into externally and visible transmissible forms.  
 
The question, ‘do we have ineffable knowledge of certain kinds of nuances in 
expressive forms that we cannot express in words?’ was asked in Chapter One. It 
was argued that in order to understand the transitions between the individual, 
cultural and transcultural dimensions of aesthetic experience, research methods are 
needed that are capable of grasping ‘the most profound type of knowledge [which] is 
not spoken of at all’ (Bloch 1998: 46).  The following sections make use of theories of 
cross modal transfer, musical gesture and theories of mirroring that attend to the 
‘shared somatic states’ and ‘rhythms of interaction’ of human aesthetic experience, in 
an attempt to understand the Maysie and the ballad experience. 
 
Cross Modal Transfer 
The ‘simultaneously ambiguous yet vivid and compelling character [of 
musical experience] stems from a human capacity for cross modal transfer’ (Bowman 
2004). Cross modal transfer occurs where perception involves interactions between 
two or more sensory modalities. The word ‘cross’ in this context, however, is limited, 
implying a one way transfer rather than an interactive process. It needs to be 
clarified or perhaps reiterated here that both cross domain mapping and cross modal 
transfer are not about the imposition of one structure on to another, but rather a 
dynamic correspondence that is set up between two domains or modalities (Fatone 
(2010) prefers to use ‘intermodal’ for this reason). Cognitive, neuro-scientific and 
post-phenomenological research emphatically show that sensory processing is 
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modulated by information in and attention towards other senses, which suggests 
that we need to consider the wider perceptual system in its totality instead of 
isolating registers of experience and separating the senses hierarchically. That is to 
say, perception crosscuts the boundaries between brain, body and world.  
In musical experience, cross modal transfer results from the human capacity 
for mapping structures, patterns, and gestures from our embodied existence and 
sections onto sound: 
We deploy bodily-acquired schemata to transform intriguing patterns of sound 
into measured and metered musical movements and events musically…a 
function of our having experienced and enacted things like them elsewhere, in 
non-musical realms (Bowman 2004).  
 
Discourse concerning auditory phenomena, and music specifically, relies heavily on 
terms derived from non-auditory realms of experience, applying metaphorical 
mappings from visual-spatial, kinaesthetic, and tactile domains. In our attempts at 
describing musical experience, we objectify music and characterise it as 
disembodied, and through the medium of language we use metaphors to relate it 
back to musical experience.  
Johnson and Larson’s essay ‘“Something in the Way She Moves” —Metaphors 
of Musical Motion’ (2003) provides an example of how an approach based on 
embodied cognition can be integrated with a theory of musical meaning. In their 
view, ‘our very experience of musical meaning is fundamentally shaped by 
conceptual metaphors that are grounded in bodily experience’ (8). Through a 
process of cross-domain mapping, we apply our bodily understanding to domains 
such as music, giving rise to a rich variety of linguistic expressions through which 
we can describe musical relationships. Our mappings of conceptual metaphors onto 
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music are constrained by the image-schematic structure of the correlated domains: 
we must be able to draw correspondences between the musical domain and that of 
our embodied experience. We can use our understanding of the former to structure 
our understanding of the latter.  They propose that musical experience is based 
largely on identifiable conceptual metaphors of physical motion. We know about 
motion through seeing objects move; through moving our own bodies; through 
feeling our bodies moved by outside forces. These three bodily based patterns of 
perception are cognitively inscribed and re-inscribed by virtue of having a body and 
being in the world (4). For example, it has long also been established that our 
concepts of time are metaphoric, and we conceive of the passing of time as 
movement in space (3). Since music occurs over time, they reason, it is logical that 
we conceptualise music as spatial movement. Our perception seems to extract 
certain shapes and patterns from sound, which are subsequently represented in the 
mind. 
The example of the idea of ‘tension and release’ illustrates this perfectly. The 
reason for characterising music in terms of tension and release is not to exercise 
abstract technical musicological jargon but to capture, in a single, highly salient 
image, important aspects of our experience of music. This image is more kinaesthetic 
than visual, and comprises a host of bodily sensations that we associate with tension 
and release, of tightening and relaxing our muscles. Applying the image associated 
with these sensations to music allows us to describe the relatively abstract and 
ephemeral domain of sound in terms of concrete physical experiences (Zbikowski 
2000: 3). We know tension cannot be maintained indefinitely, and so infer that 




Imaginative Act: Sound and Vision 
It has been argued that there is an interesting relationship between the 
modalities of sound and vision in deep listening. There are two kinds of ‘vision’ here: 
external vision and internal, created ‘vision’ in the mind’s eye, in the imagination. 
Recent discoveries in neuroscience research have shown that the visual and motor 
cortices are closely linked. For example, Vines et al. (2006) have studied interactions 
and perceptions of musical performance in the aural and visual domains, and found 
that visual information—in the form of performer’s movements—actually modifies 
listeners’ experiences of music with respect to tension, phrase length, anticipation of 
phrase and emotional content, concluding that ‘seeing’ a performer’s movements in 
combination with ‘hearing’ the performance creates a different musical experience 
for the subject than perceiving music in the aural domain alone. Vines et al. refer to 
this experience as having an ‘emergent experience.’ Godoy (2003: 318) proposes a 
triangular model to show the inextricable cross modal relationships between action, 
vision and sound:  
The image of sound production will have visual and motor components in 
addition to that of the “pure” sound, and I believe images of sound producing 
actions can play the role of mediating between the visual and the sonorous, i.e. 
that actions can translate from the sonic to the visual and, conversely, from the 
visual to the sonic.  
 
Godoy’s model places cross modal imagery as fundamental to musical experience. 
His understanding allows for an interactive process between modalities, and the 
emphasis is on bodily experience.  
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One of the main aims in investigating the ballad experience is to understand 
this connection between the auditory and the visual - the idea that ‘sound evokes 
sight and together they form a world of imagination that surpasses the ordinary 
world around us’ (Berleant 2004: 157). Consider this description of a singing 
occasion by Ó Laoire (2005: 225): 
The correlation between music and lyrics is reflected in the bodily behaviour 
when songs are being sung…When Tory people are listening to songs, they sit 
very still, their arms folded, perhaps softly repeating some of the song lyrics for 
themselves. They appear intent on the song, their heads bent almost as if in 
prayer, reminiscent even of a foetal position. They give themselves up to the 
song and to the singing of it, an imaginative act, I argue, which allows for the 
redescription of reality (Ricouer 1991: 128) and the coalescing of meaning at 
different levels.  
 
Ó Laoire highlights the importance of the bodily response—the total somaesthetic 
experience—and that in this experience they give themselves up in an ‘imaginative 
act.’ The theory of cross modal transfer helps us make sense of this seemingly 
abstract experience. The embodied templates that constitute and permeate musical 
experience become the embodied resources for further constructive action, other 
acts of ‘world making.’ Musical experiences such as the ballad experience are very 
complex and nuanced situations. Our corporeal existence makes it possible for us to 
phenomenologically experience features of sound. According to this view, we 
actively create our subjective world. Richard Middleton (1990) suggests that music 
is both an embodied construction and a semiotic device for constructing and 
enacting further possibilities and ranges of embodied experience. Not only is music 
constructed both by those who engage in acts of performing and listening to it, it is 
significantly implicated in constructing the broader realities in which those acts of 
performing and listening occur. Music at large is therefore not just a source of 
 311 
‘aesthetic’ meaning but a vital constructive agent in the lives of all who engage in it. 
The act of making music - of singing songs - whether as a performer or listener, is a 
constructive act: the creation of coherent constellations of cross-modal connections, 
rich in their capacity to align and realign experiential worlds’ (Bowman 2004: 41)  
 
Being-with: The Unifying Gesture 
Current theory in cognitive science in its widest sense holds that the 
development of human consciousness hinges on our neural capacity for having 
unified, multimodal representations of ‘gesture.’ Cross modal references, then, result 
in ‘gestures.’ The term ‘gesture,’ however, is a problematic term that can be classified 
in various ways according to different theorists. As work on the gesture that 
accompanies speech has shown,82 non-linguistic forms of communication are an 
important way in which humans shape their thought. As embodied meaning, 
gestures are an important part of our national and cultural identities. The Linguist 
David McNeill (2005: 15) maintains that ‘gestures are a universal and inseparable 
part of language.’ McNeill also proposes that language is inseparable from imagery. It 
would seem that non-linguistic thought (in the case of music at least) is also 
inseparable from mental imagery, which is always already embodied imagery.  
There is evidence that in infancy, our earliest stages of consciousness are not 
modality specific. When an infant is engaged in the exchange of gestures, there is no 
distinction for the infant between the different modes of communication, i.e. 
somatic, auditory, and visual. According to this theory, gestures are represented in 
the mind as a kind of unified gestalt. Only later in our development does our 
                                                          
82 See Goldin-Meadow (2003); Kendon (2004): McNeill (1992). 
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perception become stratified. The psychologist Daniel Stern (1998: 53) describes 
the properties of such a gestalt in the following terms:  
The experiments on cross-modal capacities suggest that some properties of 
people and things, such as shape, intensity level, motion, number, and rhythm, 
are experienced directly as global, amodal perceptual qualities. 
 
Colwyn Trevarthen (2002) has also suggested that in later life, this ability to 
recognise the way we share information about ourselves through bodily states and 
movement patterns informs our linguistic and cultural skills at a fundamental level. 
Evidence based on studies into preverbal communication between infants and their 
parents shows that human infants are apparently unique in the richly rhythmic 
interactions in which they engage, responding to movement and sonic 
representations of movement. He suggests that human cognition develops from 
image schemas formed in our earliest childhood; schemas that condense the 
experiences of our earliest interaction with the world on an abstract, preverbal level. 
These schemas are not only related to the physical experiences of moving and acting, 
but also to our emotional experiences. Gesture and emotion are therefore closely 
interrelated. 
The foundations of all psychological co-operation or intersubjectivity are to be 
found in a sense of movement and in detection of the generation of qualities of 
movement in other bodies (Trevarthen 2002: 26–27).  
 
The idea is that our earliest experiences of communication combine gestures with 
vocalisations and touch, and unfold in several modalities simultaneously: visually, 
somatically, and aurally. Considering the development of human cognition in this 
light, it would appear that cognitive functions are active at all levels of 
consciousness. Stern (1998) believes that this deeper—or earlier—level of perception 
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does not leave us as we mature, but stays with us at more abstract levels of thought. 
In other words, even though we might not be aware of it, this early state of 
intersubjective meanings of a unified gestalt remains with us and is fundamental for 
our social and communicative skills.  
 
The Musical Gesture 
Cross modal reference in musical experience results in musical gestures. The 
idea of the ‘musical gesture,’ conceived of in subtly different ways, has been the 
subject of recent scholarship.83 Bowman (2004) goes as far as to assert that the 
entire range of musical gesture is invariably a fundamental part of what music fully 
perceived is. Music theorists use the term gesture to refer to both the physical 
external gesture in the form of movement, as well as the internal gesture as a 
cognitive phenomenon, as ‘imagined movement.’ The internal gesture emerges in the 
mind in response to musical stimulus, the result of the extraction of shapes and 
patterns from sound in the process of cross modal transfer as discussed above.  
Robert Hatten (2004: 1) offers a broad definition of musical gesture to be understood 
as ‘energetic shapings through time’ which emphasises the processual and temporal 
nature of experience and helps to illustrate the idea of intermodal images in 
combination. He argues that ‘the basic shape of an expressive gesture is…intermodal 




                                                          
83 See Kühl (2007); Hatten (2004); Gritten and King (2006); Sklar (1994). 
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Cross Modality in Singing Perception 
In the ballad experience, what we have is an exchange between audience and 
singer - in a two-way communicative and active relationship. The natural context to 
experience a ballad performance is through audio-visual perception in real time 
where the audience can listen to the musical sounds and see the gestures which 
originate them. Porter, in his developing theory of presence (2009: 155) quotes 
Merleau­Ponty in his discussion of ‘gesture’: 
What is communicated by the singing act can only be grasped by 
understanding the singer’s gesture or expressive intention—which is a 
synchronic modulation of his own existence, a transformation of his being” 
(1945: 214)  
 
It is interesting to think of this relation in terms of cross modal transfer and 
the musical gesture. Claudia Mauléon (2009) explores the communicative intentions 
of the singing performer in terms of embodied experience, seeking to observe the 
incidence of audio-visual, visual and aural modalities of perception on the audience 
with regards to five singing events. Her hypothesis is one of ‘multimodal complexity’ 
- that gesture and voice together form unique and complex indivisible whole, 
allowing the listener to encounter a deeper experience of the musical event. 
Interestingly, Mauléon’s participants had no formal music training, were not familiar 
with the song performed prior to the performance and could not grasp the ‘meaning’ 
of the song text as it was sung in a foreign language. Their aesthetic judgments were 
therefore based exclusively on their sensory perception.  
In every performance, singing is guided by sensory-motor perceptions. Tactile, 
kinetic and sonic perceptions coming from the ear (both internal and external) all 
provide feedback to the singer. In turn, the listeners have access to the sound and the 
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external movements of the performance. The singer effectively shapes, in vocal 
sounds, the musical representations in his or her mind. According to this view, in 
every performance, the act of singing implies a series of internal movements that lead 
to a complex of actions that allow the materialisation of the imagined sound, and 
this complex imagery is the result of cross modal transfer.  
According to Mauléon, the voice in artistic use is the result of a dynamic 
interplay between the ‘corporeal reality’ and ‘communicative intentions’ of the 
interpreter or listener. ‘Corporeal reality’ is a concept encompassing both anatomical 
and functional aspects beneath the quality of the vocal sound, and the corporeal 
situation of the interpreter and their relationship with the environment, both 
immediate and mediate. ‘Communicative intentions’ are conscious and unconscious 
musical ideas conducting the performance, including affective and emotional 
features, which give rise to complex imagery and where corporeal reality plays a role.  
Mauléon asks if the communicative intentions are also present in the dynamics of 
the gestures themselves, and if the listener could infer the communicative intentions 
of the singer solely by means of gestures. In her view, recordings cannot reveal 
communicative intentions in the same way as actually participating in the 
performance. However, it seems that suppressing the vision at the origin of sound 
does not completely prevent the audience from perceiving the communicative 
intentions of the singer through sound alone. This explains the feelings of those who 
testify that they can experience the Maysie from recordings.   
When we listen to music, what we actually hear is an auditory stream, which 
is subsequently being processed by auditory perception. Gestures, accordingly, are 
rich gestalts, that combine auditory information (hearing the movement) with 
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implied visual information (imagining the movement), somato-sensory information 
(feeling the movement) and emotional information (interpreting the movement). 
Fatone (2010: 416) suggests that ‘intermodalising’ in performing or listening to 
music is a spontaneous and automatic process, and represents a ‘unitary cognitive 
experience—a kind of ur-gesture, or meta-gesture—while each individual image plays 
a co-articulating role.’  
 
Kühl’s Musical Semantics and the Musical Gesture 
The cognitive musicologist Kühl in Musical Semantics (2007) presents a novel 
way to think about musical meaning by linking musical sounds to gesture, and 
gesture to both processes of communication and to embodied experience. His 
models take into account the here and now of the embodied experience. While Kühl’s 
theories have been developed with Western classical music and jazz in mind, with 
few slight modifications and extensions they are illuminating in their application to 
study of the ballad experience, and add a new dimension of understanding to 
Porter’s (2009) idea of the ‘unifying ballad gesture.’  
 Kühl’s approach to musical meaning is grounded in Johnson’s theory of 
image schema (1987) and Ricouer’s theories of metaphor (1975) and narrative 
creation (1984-8). He believes that musical experience involves several cognitive 
functions including categorisation, narrativity, schema-based perception, cognitive 
mapping and conceptual blending—ideas that have been developed and utilised in 
the previous chapters and applied to different levels of the ballad experience. Kühl 
believes that the metaphoric mapping from the music domain to the body domain is 
a meaning-making process, in that it pertains to the way human beings make sense 
 317 
of the world. In other words, Kühl suggests that the ‘musical gesture’ is the human 
way of making sense of music.  
Kühl (2007: 1) goes as far as to claim that ‘musical gesture epitomizes human 
expressivity.’ Gesture represents an implied and embodied level of communication, and 
is therefore key to understanding musical meaning. This is the level of ‘wordless 
intercorporeality’ emphasised by Csordas (2008); the ‘other’ of language and the 
ineffable knowledge that we cannot express in words alone. Crucially, Kühl’s 
argument is based on the premise that musical meaning emerges first as a preverbal 
concept, ‘sensed rather than thought’ (49). The idea that music can affect us before 
signification was introduced in Chapter Two: in Nancy’s argument that we must 
attend to the ‘actual fleshy materiality of the body’; that sounds that enter the ear 
affect both body and mind, and in Shusterman’s philosophy of somaesthetics that 
calls for bodily understanding more complex than cerebral interpretation alone. 
Such a stance can be interpreted as the precedence of ‘modes of being’ over ‘modes of 
knowing’ advocated by Rice and Ó Laoire—a position that ‘foregrounds our being in 
the world and contends that our conception of reality is always conditioned by our 
embodied existence’ (Ó Laoire 2005: xiii).   
 
The Process of Meaning-making 
Kühl argues that the process of semiosis in musical experience lies at the very 
root of aesthetic expression and experience. He builds on this insight by drawing on 
Lev Vygotsky’s (1962) analysis of pre-conceptual knowledge, who argued that a key 
phase in the development of conceptual thought was what he called ‘thinking in 
complexes,’ with a complex construed as a ‘pre-conceptual agglomeration of 
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impressions and observations’ (61). Kühl proposes that this same kind of loose 
affiliation is typical of cognitive process of making-sense-of-music:  
Musical meaning joins uneven elements, like phrase, timbre and form, in order to 
name a few possibilities, that involve cognitive processing at different levels. The 
formation of a unified gestalt, as with in a Vygotskyan complex, seems to rest on an 
innate property of the human mind/brain (67). 
 
Kühl’s formulation of the idea of ‘gesture’ incorporates both external physical 
experiences of music and internal perceived patterns of movement. We experience 
musical events as internalised movements or gestures, that is, as mental imagery or 
imagination. In Kühl’s understanding, the expressive gesture works on two levels: it 
has external movement in space and time on the expressive level; and on the content 
level the movement symbolises an emotion in the internal world.  The external 
sound pattern is intimately linked to an internal gesture. The internal gesture, or 
image, exists between the presence where the object is experienced, and the thought 
where it becomes idea. According to Kühl’s model it is the imagination that somehow 
creates the bridge between mind and body, between external and internal.  
The process of experiencing music is described by Kühl (2007: 150-151) as 
follows: 
The auditory stream presents humanly structured sound to the human ear, 
which is not yet music. Auditory scene analysis and schema based perception 
leads to an extraction of musical elements from the sound stream, like for 
instance, rhythm and melodic phrase...some of these elements are selected 
subjectively as being of special interest, evoking cognitive responses that are 
mapped to the elements...Through cognitive processing, involving functions like 
categorisation and integration among others, responses are bundled in an 
emerging musical experience  
 
This ‘emerging musical experience’ is, essentially, a kind of ‘creative blend.’ 
According to Kühl, the construct which typifies this integrative process is the 
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musical gesture, which is active and polysemic. There is an interdependence in this 
process between emotion, gesture and music, which makes it clear why we 
experience this mapping from musical experience to movements of the body and 
emotional response, and vice versa. As Kühl conceives it, the musical gesture is a rich 
gestalt that combines auditory, somato-sensory and emotional information and lends 
itself to imaginary visualisations of musical material. The process relies in the main 
on metaphorical understanding of successions of musical gestures as representing or 
instantiating various image schemas—an idea based Johnson’s theory of image 
schemata (1987) outlined in Chapter Three. Kühl points out that language has 
preserved this piece of wisdom for us in the metaphorical expression ‘we are moved 
by music,’ which is, in itself, a cross modal expression grounded in bodily 
experience. ‘Motion’ and ‘emotion’ are more deeply semantically linked than we 
might first realise. Kühl’s work suggests that music has any number of interesting 
things to tell us about the relationship between body and mind. 
 
The Rhythmic Body 
Probably the most conspicuous evidence of the linkage between music and 
body comes from music’s temporal or processual character. Bowman (2004) 
suggests that perhaps the intimate relation between music and the body involves a 
kind of experienced similarity between the beat’s imagined movement and those of 
the body. Bodily constituted properties highlighted by Kühl include tension and 
release, volume and balance, accent, metre and syncopation, tonal centre, line and 
phrase, height, depth and movement. There also exists the range of expressive 
attributes including seriousness, tenderness, and playfulness, for example. It is the 
 320 
body’s presence in each of these, and their consequently intimate links to personal and 
collective identity, that account for music’s remarkable capacity to deeply move and 
affect us.  
Salient features of the ballad will resonate in the human body in different 
ways. Rhythm resonates as body gesture; textual elements evoke specific semantic 
content; metrical form is experienced as spatial maps (routes through imaginary 
space); musical phrases are expressive gestures; the quality of the human voice has 
strong affective resonance; certain specific elements in the music will call upon 
acquired personal or cultural memory (cultural framing). Outer representation of 
sounding causes (the musical object) are mapped onto an inner representation of 
effects, which emerges in the ballad experience. The encompassing gesture maps 
onto emotion, and integrated as inner subjective movement (creative imagination). 
Different elements arise as musical experience and map onto each other in different 
ways for each individual, forming a meaningful cognitive network and emerging as 
embodied musical meaning.  
The cognitive linking of an external auditory event to an internal emotional 
content in a metaphorical process through the expressive gesture indicates a kind of 
narrative, but one based on embodied experience rather than on literary models. This 
is an absolutely key point in the context of the development of ideas in this thesis at 
large. The musical experience creates an unfolding story. Ricouer’s hermeneutic and 
narrative theories (1984-8), and Ó Laoire’s extension of these theories (2005) as 
applied to the experience of song, are crucial here. Chapter Six developed the idea 
that we grasp the meaning of lived experience configuring and reconfiguring past 
experiences in on-going stories which have certain plots or directions and which 
 321 
guide the interpretation of those experiences. In the case of the ballad experience, 
this process is exceedingly complex: there are multiple new narratives and imagined 
worlds emerging in the process— ‘layers’ of story—and integrating with each other to 
create powerful new meanings. This idea helps us make sense of Porter’s (2009: 137, 
my italics) prolegomena for a study of ballad presence:   
The student needs to peel away these layers of “story” in relation to a specific 
song sung in a defined context: the plot, the story of the text and of the tune, 
the story of the singer and how he or she views the song, the story of the 
culture that produced and sustains it. These layers attain “presence” when 
they are realised in face to face performance. They commingle and collide as 
the singer unfolds the song, contributing in their diversity to that sense of 
presence. The story of the performance, then, when analysed along with these 
other layers, makes for an understanding of presence. In the act of face-to-face 
performance, these layers fuse in the unifying gesture of the singer and the 
active feedback of the audience. 
 
According to Porter, it is in the event of the ballad singing experience that these 
‘layers’ of story ‘fuse’ and attain ‘presence’ in the performative gesture. The idea of 
fusion here reminds us of Gadamer’s hermeneutic ‘fusion of horizons,’ where 
meaning is always experienced as immediately present, and past and present are 
united in experience. Our own horizon of experience, our internal context—prior 
experience, associations—fuses with the meanings in the text, and the horizon of the 
world in which the cultural work was produced. The idea of ‘fusion’ can also as 
easily be characterised as a process of creative ‘blending.’ In this sense, the ‘story’ of 
the song exists on multiple levels: the internal narrative; the story of the song’s 
creation and transmission; the story of the singer, specific performance, situation 
and audience, the story of the community. Considered alone, the verbal text, for 
example, is only one part of this interdependent, intersubjective reality, in which the 
singer seeks to transform experience through traditional patterns and sounds into 
an existential act of communication (Porter & Gower 1995: 277).  
 322 
 It is interesting to here to bring to mind Sheila Stewart’s explanations of the 
conniach. She talks of the ‘many functions’ of ballad singing. In the performance of a 
ballad, she says one must ask, ‘are you transporting it properly?’ 
You see there’s a lot of functions within there. And once you’ve got all these 
functions coming together… once you’ve got all that intae a tight ball and you 
throw it to an audience, it goes past them (1996) 
The experiences of our past, our history, the natural world around us, deeply 
personal experiences and the experiences of family and friends all play a part in the 
processes of meaning creation in the ballad experience. Ó Laoire (2005: 209) writes 
that it is ‘this kind of plural, multilayered context that obtains.’ 
 
The Total Ballad Gesture 
Analysis of the ballad singing experience has proved to be complex. The idea of the 
all-encompassing ‘gesture’ that expresses both external and internal worlds is 
illuminating in its application to the ballad experience. The gestalt musical gesture 
can in this context be re-characterised as the ‘unifying ballad gesture,’ combining all 
the elements needed—external and internal —for the success of ballad presencing. If 
we read the following quote from Porter in light of Kühl’s formulation, we can see 
how the two theories can marry together: 
I have already argued that the meaning of the ballad is at its most complex in 
the performance situation, when narrative immediacy is reinforced by 
communicative devices (singing, gesture, visual and aural contact) and 
modulated by contextual factors (domestic space, public arena) —all of this to a 
point where the individual sense of a ballad’s meaning is modified by audience 
expectation and a shared sense of performative understanding’ (2009: 173) 
These meanings are all part of a potential “presencing” of  ballads as singers, 
audiences and students bring to coherence their experience of an essentially 
performative genre (177)  
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Subjective and Shared: Being-with 
The same ballad can mean difference things to different people, and the same 
person can experience the same ballad differently in different contexts—always 
singularly plural. This does not mean, however, that the relationship between the 
ballad’s structure and its experienced content is absolutely arbitrary. 
We can share aesthetic experiences. Most importantly, we seem ­ in all cultures 
and at all times ­ to use art in the form of music as an indispensable part of our most 
meaningful moments, as a device for sharing. This means that although meaning 
cannot be pinpointed in any specified manner, there is still an amount of stable 
substance in musical communication which can be defined. 
The most important part of musical meaning, in Kühl’s view, is this shared 
nature of the experience. The musical gesture, he believes, represents the link 
between music as sound, on the one hand, and what he describes as the 
intersubjective social and emotional content on the other. The specific view of 
intersubjectivity advocated by Kühl is informed by the view of Trevarthen (2002), 
discussed above—the idea that our unique ability to have a language and a culture 
begins with the experience of the intersubjective sharing of emotion and sensation.  
Crucial to this picture is the distinction between ‘experience’ and ‘sensation.’ 
In Blacking’s (1975) view, ‘Sensations are unique to [a] person, time and place, not 
really susceptible to analysis.’ Experience, on the other hand, is ‘cumulative and 
shared’ and therefore social: it creates links between others and the self. Experience, 
in Blacking’s view, is ‘described in language, acted out in company…[they] need not 
be couched in words, but must be shared (in Sager 2006: 146). This public definition 
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of experience nevertheless presupposes that our ‘shared’ experiences affect our inner 
sensations. In Kühl’s view, the musical gesture directly conveys information about a 
subject’s emotional state and intention. In music, the sharing of gestures is further 
intensified through the pulse, which beings about a synchronisation of implied 
movements.  
The mind accurately ‘represents’ the moving body in time and space, and…these 
mental or cerebral ‘motor images’ of the body in action serve efficiently to 
represent other persons’ bodies and their intentions in behaviours (Trevarthen 
2000: 164) 
 
This, according to Kühl, is what gives music its power. 
Kühl suggests that we subjectively experience music on three levels: 
embodied, mental and emotional, and that these three levels of response interact 
with each other in certain ways through cross modal transfer. This experience, 
however, is always framed by the situated, socio-cultural and personal—ways that 






Intercorporeal Sharing of Gestures 
The idea of gesture-based communication is further strengthened through the 
discovery of ‘mirror-neurons.’84 This phenomenon is a general neural mechanism 
that enables individuals to understand the meaning of actions done by others, their 
intentions, and their emotions, through activation of internal representations coding 
in motor terms the observed actions and emotions by mentally simulating their 
actions, as though the observer were itself acting. Shusterman (2009) explores the 
use of mirror-neuron theory to explain certain problems of the convergence of 
audience and performer perspectives in the context of musical experience. 
According to the theories of embodied cognition, mechanisms such as mirroring and 
cross-modal sensory mapping allow a witness to a performance to project clues 
contained in sound and movement into their own body. In this way, the listener 
simulates in their own body sensory-motor experiences that trigger images about 
the communicative intentions of the singer. 
When we hear a song, we entrain ourselves to it, while we synchronise 
ourselves cognitively to a temporal pattern of expectations and predictions, set up 
through musical form and gestures. All this evidence would suggest that seeing and 
hearing a performer using their body to sing a song is thus very likely to engage 
motor neural pathways involved in performing those movements, so that the 
observer, if they have a keen somaesthetic sensibility and are very attentive, can get a 
feel in their body of the motor qualities of the performers’ movements they observe. 
Since imagined visualisation can provide analogous neural and physiological activity 
                                                          
84 Mirror-neurons play an extensive role in human neural processes; their primary aim is deemed to 
be to enable us to simulate the minds of others, whether the other is observed or imagined: see. 
Gallese and Goldmann( 1998); Lacoboni (2008); Shusterman (2008, 2009). 
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to that of vision itself, a ‘deep listener’ who imagines what performers are doing in 
producing the music they hear could likewise experience motor sensations relating 
to such somatic movements of performance. Emotion, gesture and sensual 
perception are interwoven in a dialogic communication with ‘the other.’ Essentially, 
what we are concerned with here is the experience of intercorporeal sharing 
through gestures.  
This perspective adds a new dimension to ideas explored in Chapter Four 
about ‘being present.’ In Gadamer’s understanding (2004), to ‘be present’ is to 
participate, to share. This is immediately relevant in light of Porter’s own 
prerequisite for presence in which it must be a shared, inter-responsive experience. 
Gadamer maintains that watching a drama in an involved way constitutes 
participating; and in the same way, truly listening to a ballad being sung in a 
concentrated manner can be viewed as a genuine mode of participating in the event 
itself. The idea of ‘being present’ is conceived of as a kind of game. Gadamer starts 
from the premise that experiencing a work of art is a form of ‘play’ - it cannot be 
detached from its presentation, or enactment, in time. Ultimately, a relationship is 
built upon sharing simultaneously different dimensions of time. The listener 
participates in the process of making meaning through sharing, where meanings are 
built up and shared simultaneously in a sort of flux set up between singer and 
listener.  
            In Kühl’s understanding (2007: 226, my italics), musical meaning has its roots 
‘at the level of gesture, in its expressive, microstructural dimensions, and in the 
expanding of the gestural flow inside the extended present.’ Ó Laoire (2005: 38) also 
talks of the ‘extended present’ in terms of the preparation of a special place, which, 
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he believes spurs the participants ‘toward a new description of reality.’ This lived-
through or extended present can be understood as a kind of ‘specious present’ tied to 
the past and to the future. The idea of the ‘vivid present’ was introduced in Chapter 
Four to help make sense of this idea of the extended present. It exists in the 
intersection between the inner durée and outer cosmic time, between inner and outer 
worlds. It will be shown below that understanding Kühl’s notion of the ‘extended 
present’ in terms of the ‘vivid present’ allows us to extend Kühl’s ideas in relation to 
theories of ballad ‘presence.’ 
 
Sharing External and Internal Worlds 
This final section develops the argument for the intercorporeal sharing of 
gestures exploring the importance of time. A study of time helps us to understand 
the relationship between both internal and external worlds, and between mind and 
body. Schütz, whose work (1973) bridged phenomenology and sociology—the 
subjective and the shared - argues that experiences can be partially shared across 
individuals, offering us a scheme for analysing the dynamics of partial sharing which 
helps us see experience as ‘cultural’ without homogenising groups of others or 
indeed exaggerating differences.  
The relationship between time and meaning, however, is extremely complex. 
Arising from it is the apparent paradox of a present that cannot be grasped in its 
immediacy and therefore remains obscure. Radically, Schütz asserts that time is 
meaning, and that ‘the problem of meaning is a time problem’ (1967: 12). In his view, 
our lifeworld is structurally and radically connected to time; and time is a 
constitutive part of meaning. Communicating presupposes the simultaneous 
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partaking of ‘various dimensions of outer and inner time…’ (1964: 178). We can 
directly assure ourselves only of the existence of the other’s body but not of their 
consciousness. We can, however, apprehend the other’s lived experience at the same 
time as we are going through our own experience. In this sense, time is a structure 
that performs a decisive role in the basic process of understanding the other.  
Only within this experience does the Other’s conduct become meaningful to the 
partner tuned in on him—that is, the Other’s body and its movements can be and 
are interpreted as a field of expression of events within his inner life (Schütz 1964: 
178).  
 
We can grasp the other’s lived experience in the ‘vivid present’ simultaneously with 
our own stream of consciousness. A relationship is established by reciprocal sharing 
of the other’s flux of experience in inner time by living through a vivid present 
together. In the case of music, meaning is tied in a special way to inner time. 
According to Schütz ‘there is no doubt that the dimension of time in which the 
musical work exists is the inner time of our stream of consciousness—in Bergson’s 
terminology, the durée’ (31).  
           
Mind and Body and the Experience of Time 
Bergson’s philosophy claims that the body plays a crucial role in mediating 
between - or rather, synthesising - these two dimensions of existence: the external 
(shared), and internal (subjective). That these dimensions are considered separate is 
a result of our interaction with the world on a human scale. Chapter Five made the 
case that sounding presence reveals that these two dimensions are not closed off 
from one another, but are actually interconnected aspects of one world and one 
experience. 
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Bergson (2007) emphasises the importance of our bodily movements for the 
constitution of the outer world and its particular time perspective. He argues that 
the world is given its character by action, process and movement, and that it is our 
lived experience alone that validates these as real truths. Crucial to the process of 
communication, then, is that all forms of social action are necessarily based upon 
bodily movements - kinaesthetic movements in space. We act in the outside world 
through the movements of our bodies. We experience bodily movements from 
within, we act them without: this is to say, we experience our kinaesthetic 
movements simultaneously as both events in the outside world and as aspects of our 
own stream of consciousness. As events in the outside world, our bodily movements 
partake of the structure of objective, spatialised, measurable time; as aspects of our 
stream of consciousness, they also belong to the qualitative time of durée. In 
Bergson’s view, it is therefore our bodily movements that synthesise in simultaneity 
the two perspectives into a new temporal perspective borne of the fusion of durée 
with cosmic time, the vivid present: 
 In and by our bodily movements we perform the transition from our durée to the 
spatial or cosmic time, and our working actions partake of both. In 
simultaneity we experience the working action as a series of events in outer and 
in inner time, unifying both dimensions into a single flux which shall be called 
the vivid present (Schütz 1962: 216, my italics) 
 
In musical experience, we discover the simultaneity of the different modes of time 
through an immersion in the immediacy and fullness of the present. This is because 
musical metre is not the measurement of discrete units, but the continuous flow of 
an indivisible whole, each present moment of which both rises out of its past and 
moves towards its future while containing in itself all its past and all its future. 
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Becker (2004: 133), in her exploration of deep listening and trance, considers this 
dimension of time, here quoting Gilbert Rouget (1985: 121, my italics): 
In the dimension of time, music modifies our consciousness of being to an even 
greater extent. It is an architecture in time. It gives time a density different from 
its everyday density. It lends a materiality it does not ordinarily have and that is 
of another order. It indicates that something is happening in the here and now; 
that time is being occupied by an action being performed, or that a certain state 
rules over the beings present. 
 
Shared Vivid Present 
In order to communicate with others, we have to perform acts which are to 
be interpreted by others. Gestures, speech, storytelling, song and other forms of 
expressive culture are all forms of social action. The ballad in this case is understood 
as a form of meaningful communication. Schütz (1962) believes that it is these 
experiences of meaningful communication that generate the very idea of community. 
He coins what he calls a ‘mutual tuning-in relationship’: a sharing, in the ‘vivid 
present,’ by each individual in the inner time of the other; or, more precisely, in the 
constitution and sharing of a common time, the common vivid present. We 
recognise the other’s humanity in the way in which the other shapes our experience. 
The foundation of intersubjectivity, of intercorporeality, is to be found in a sense of 
movement in others’ bodies interwoven in a dialogic communication with ‘the other.’ 
The power of song, its ‘interiorizing force’ corresponds to ‘shared somatic 
states’ and ‘rhythmic interactions’ (Blacking 1977: 9 in Porter and Gower 1995: xiv). 
This idea makes sense in embodied cognitive and phenomenological terms. Schütz 
characterises this sharing as the ‘We-relation’ and places it as base of a shared world. 
The streams of consciousness coordinate and co-determine each other in a series of 
what he calls ‘reciprocal mirrorings.’ Each individual’s expectations are influenced 
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by the other’s expectations. All this determines the fact that the experience we share 
simultaneously in the vivid present is not felt as your personal experience, nor as 
mine, but as our common experience; the time of the experience is not my or your 
vivid present, but our vivid present. Schütz believes that ‘this present, common to both 
of us, is the pure sphere of the We’ (1962: 175). He later (1976: 177) describes the 
‘We-relationship’ as: 
The transcendence of I and Thou into a We that goes beyond the uniqueness 
and the finitude of both. This We is not the sum of I and Thou; it is a reality in 
some way, whose nature is symbolic (it does not belong to the everyday world), 
and which integrates and transcends both. 
 
Schütz expands the meaning of the word sharing, so that sharing radically implies a 
fusion of the streams of consciousness: ‘the intertwining, the sharing, the fusion, of 
two streams of consciousness, of two internal times into a common time, a shared 
vivid present’ (in Muzzetto 2006: 22). The ‘now’ of the stream of consciousness, the 
present of human experience, is not an instant experienced as separate from the 
preceding and the following instants, it is a ‘vivid present’ which, like James’s 
‘specious present,’ is tied to the past and to the future. This idea is illuminating in its 
application to the ballad singing experience. We discussed above the idea that 
Porter’s (2009: 137) ‘layers of story’ ‘fuse’ in the unifying gesture of the singer and the 
active feedback of the audience. The meaning of this assertion can be extended 
further. As well as understanding the idea of a fusion of layers of story in terms of a 
hermeneutic fusion of horizons or an act of creative blending, we can choose to 
interpret it in terms of Schütz’s fusion of streams of consciousness unfolding in time.  
 This idea of the fusion of consciousness also helps us understand what Niles 
refers to when he suggests that personal and social memory can take on aspects of a 
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‘single consciousness.’ In the following quote he links the physical body to memory 
and consciousness, implicitly expressing the relationship between body and mind:  
The workings of both personal memory and social memory…from certain 
distances away can take on the appearance of aspects of a single consciousness 
(1995: 122, 202) 
 
  The final chapter will come to the conclusion that what these kinds of 
experiences have evolved to foster is empathy. In Blacking’s view (1973: 51), ‘we 
often experience greater intensity of living when our normal time values are upset’ 
and that music may help to generate such experiences. In his view, music creates a 
special world of time, no longer subjected to real time and space; and in the ‘virtual 
time of music,’ people become ‘keenly aware of the true nature of their being, of the 
other self within themselves and of the relationship with the world around them’ 
(52). The result of such an experience is what Blacking (1989) later calls ‘fellow 
feeling,’ defined as an awareness and sensitivity to other people and to the ‘other 
self within.’ Keil and Feld (1994: 91) articulate this idea in embodied terms: 
The significant feature of musical communication is...that its generality and 
multiplicity of possible messages and interpretations brings out a certain kind 
of ‘feelingful’ activity and engagement on the part of the listener, a form of 
pleasure that unites the material and mental dimensions of musical experience 
as fully embodied.  
It is phenomenological fact that such experiences are often saturated with the 
awareness of others. For Heidegger, care and concern for others is the ultimate 
reason for ‘being-in-the-world’: care and concern is what signifies man’s existence 
and makes it meaningful. He argues that the sense of care is time: if humans had no 
concept of time they would have no reason to be engaged or implicated in the world 
in a human way—it is the awareness of temporality that establishes that the 
relationship that human beings have with the world is through concern. The world 
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is not a private possession but a shared world. The following quote from Burrows 
(1989: 399, my italics) illustrates this idea well: 
To whatever extent music does not point to a world beyond the cognitive and 
motor activity of constituting it out of the raw material of sound, it gives the 
participant a sense of himself as someone with a central responsibility for the 
creation of his own provisional world…In any of these roles [performer and 
audience] the participant is released for the duration of the performance from 
dependence on some outer, oppositional world. At its most fulfilled, the world 
he synthesizes is a self-validating, non-dualistic world of presence in and through 
movement. 
 
Chapter Eight: Summary and Conclusions 
The ‘presence’ of ballads requires direct communication of a ballad to a live 
audience in a shared physical space and is only meaningful when the singer or 
performer and audience are inter-responsive in a specific space that they share. 
Rethinking intersubjectivity as intercorporeality allows us to develop this argument 
to include the non-verbal dimensions of experience. ‘[The] articulation of a ballad in 
a sung gesture realises, actualises and presences the tradition’ (Porter 2009: 181, my 
italics). This claim can be extended in light of new ideas about musical gesture based 
on theories of cross modal perception.  The contiguity between gestural and musical 
structures in the cognitive system can serve as the basis for cross-modal mappings, 
which results in embodied meaning from music. The idea of the all-encompassing 
‘gesture’ that expresses both external and internal worlds is illuminating in its 
application to the ballad experience. The cognitive linking of an external auditory 
event to an internal emotional content in a metaphorical process through the 
expressive gesture indicates a kind of narrative, but one based on embodied 
experience. Time is important in this argument for two reasons: firstly, it enables the 
ballad experiences to be a shared experience; and secondly, it helps create altered 
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states of consciousness which allow us to access and create imagined worlds beyond 
lived reality. A particular way of being-in-the-world while inside the ballad 
experience differs from the more emotionally neutral, everyday inner experience of 
daily living. But this is also an experience of being-with-others; in the ballad 
experience, singer and listener become one in a sonic and rhythmically coordinated 
whole.  In this sense, the ballad experience has the potential to reveal to us the 
timelessness of the inner durée and removes the boundaries of the outer world time. 
It is the body that mediates between internal and external worlds.  
Ballad singing is not merely a cultural performance, but a way of ‘distilling 
the life world and its fullness in a ritualising gesture that fuses cognition, feeling and 
volition’ (Ricoeur 1966 in Porter & Gower 1995: 298). Meaning is not contained 
solely in the ballad texts, but in the entire communicative gesture. 
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CHAPTER NINE 9 




This penultimate chapter will bring the central themes of this work to 
their culmination. The genesis of this study emerged from Stanley Robertson’s 
originary quote, ‘the space that’s in between is where the Maysie lives.’ Before 
concluding, in a final search for the Maysie, this chapter will reflect in more depth 
on the idea of ‘imaginative empathic projection’ in affective encounters, the non-
rational dimension of such encounters, theories of interstitiality and liminality in 
relation to the hermeneutic process, and the transformative power of stories in 
song. It will conclude with reflection on the question of ballads and truth. 
 
Imaginative Empathic Projection 
In Chapter One I quoted the philosopher Arnold Berleant, who writes that 
‘the creative act illuminates the possibilities of human transcendence that we all 
share when we engage with art.’ In the context of music specifically, Becker (2004) 
believes that ‘deep listening’ to certain musical forms often carries sentiments such 
as feelings of transcendence or a sense of communion with something beyond 
oneself. Before bringing ideas presented here to their conclusion, we must ask how 
this feeling of ‘transcendence’ is to be reconciled with the ontological convictions 
underpinning this research.  
From the standpoint of embodied cognition, the idea of transcendence—from 
a relation to or dependency on another world beyond this world—is simply not a 
valid proposition. Rather, such abstract thinking relates to conceptual metaphor and 
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the workings of the brain. Our transcendent experiences must find expression 
through words that articulate the nature of the abstraction. In order to make sense of 
and describe such transcendent ‘experiences,’ we—as humans—limited by language, 
are forced into the realm of metaphor. In my view, cultural and folkloric metaphors 
such as the Maysie can be understood as a tool for explaining one of the most 
fundamental and profound of human experiences: that is, engagement with something 
beyond ourselves, whether simply a sense of community and communion, or 
something more deeply existential. My own argument, following Gadamer in his 
search for ‘truth in human experience,’ is that this kind of heightened experience is 
firstly and fundamentally a very human thing. Many cultures and individuals across 
human history look for such transpersonal experiences perhaps because they—we—
need something beyond ourselves to make sense of the human experience.  
The inherent problems with words ‘spiritual’ and ‘transcendent’ were raised 
in Chapter One, and the need for an alternative conception of embodied spirituality 
was stressed. Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor (1999) is of vital importance 
in understanding this extraordinary realm of the transcendent. They re-imagine 
‘transcendence’ as ‘imaginative empathetic projection,’ defined as the cognitive 
ability to imitate others, to ‘know our environment, understand how we are part of 
it, and how it is part of us’ (566).  The mind within the brain has an imaginative 
ability to project itself onto outer circumstances. A major feature of the embodied 
mind empathic, and our capacity for imaginative projection is a vital cognitive 
faculty. From birth we have the capability to imitate others, to vividly imagine 
experiencing what another might experience. We can experience something akin to 
getting ‘out of’ our bodies; yet this process is very much a bodily capacity. We 
 337 
empathetically imagine ourselves in the body of another, cognitively simulating their 
movements. That cognitive simulation, when vivid, results in the ‘feel’ of movement 
without moving (we experience this when dreaming, for example). This feeling is 
never disembodied or impersonal, but the expression of the depth of the human 
subject. The experiences of such a ‘feeling,’ in Lakoff and Johnson’s view, form a 
major part of what has often been called ‘spiritual’ experience (although this claim 
depends on the particular use and definition of the word ‘spiritual’). Particular forms 
of music—those created for being as opposed to having (Blacking 1973: 50)—can engage 
the emotions while coordinating interaction between self and others. Arguably, there 
is nothing inherently ‘mystical’ about this, yet phenomenologically, experientially, it is 
a form of transcendence: breaking down the boundaries between self and other.  
 
The Maysie as the Spirit of the Gaps? 
How do we understand the Maysie? It was suggested in Chapter One that a 
good way to understand the hermeneutic process is through the myth metaphor of 
the Greek figure of Hermes. Hermes is the mediator belonging to a liminal realm: 
between the magical realm and the realm of ordinary, everyday reality; between 
waking and sleeping; day and night; world and underworld, conscious and 
unconscious. Walter Otto (1979: 118–119) describes the phenomenological experience 
of the liminal in the context of darkness: 
A man who is awake in the open field at night, or who wanders over silent 
paths, experiences the world differently than by day. Nighness vanishes, and 
with it distance; everything is equally far and near, close by us and yet 
mysteriously remote. Space loses its measures. There are whispers and sounds 
and we do not know where or what they are…There is no longer a distinction 
between what is lifeless and living; everything is animate and soulless, vigilant 
and asleep at once. 
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Otto’s passage above, and the seeming paradoxes inherent within it, resonates with 
John Niles’ (1995: 52) description of the Maysie’s visitation, which might take on new 
meaning in this context: ‘There are shivers at the spine, and the small hairs on your body 
start to rise and move…While it lasts it is like a living death.’ We may ask, what is this 
realm of night in which the nearness and far-awayness of objects vanishes, where 
there is no objective difference between the lifeless and the living and we experience 
a living death? In the objective world of day, things have their finite measure; but in 
the mind, in imagination and dream, distances vanish, relationships of time alter, and 
we can sense our self in a different world. It is possible to make a comparison 
between the Greek mythical figure of Hermes, first discussed in Chapter One, and 
the Maysie herself. Like Hermes, She is a ‘spirit of the gaps.’ She inhabits an in-
between realm, at the crack between worlds.  
 
Affective Encounters 
The encounter with the Maysie herself is an event that presents itself as 
in-between. Through this encounter—the creative tension between self and world —
we are able to open ourselves to our own experience, our own perception. Our 
senses saturate us with the undeniable richness of experience and open us to the 
non-rational—or perhaps more-than-rational—dimensions of existence. The shivers 
and chills experienced when the Maysie is present are essential to the full value of the 
ballad experience because they represent a bodily confirmation of what is registered 
at the same time in the mind. In this sense, bodily felt chills act as corporeal 
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endorsements of what is grasped in more cognitive or cerebral terms. It has been 
argued here that the central appreciative value of such chills lies in precisely the 
affirmation of wholeness that they afford, of mind and body resonating together. 
Levinson (2006: 172) suggests that it is first and foremost in bodily feeling that we 
experience a sense of our unity and wholeness, and that the act of singing itself ‘puts 
us in touch with the wholeness of our being’ As argued in Chapter Five, conceiving 
of the ballad experience as a somaesthetic—engaging body and mind—adds a crucial 
dimension to Porter’s ideas about ballad presence. Somaesthetic appreciation 
celebrates the value of our ambiguous, plurivocal presence, and in this sense can be 
seen as an ontological opening.  
Ó Laoire (2005: 34) suggests that in the to and fro hermeneutic of movement of 
play, ‘a change occurs which suspends everyday reality, through which an intensified 
and truer vision of reality becomes apparent.’ It was argued in Chapter One that 
such insights come from an ability to approach life with ‘liminal freedom.’  
From the source of the event of appearing, something comes toward man that 
holds the two-fold of presence and present beings… One does not so much act 
as respond, does not so much speak as listen, does not so much interpret as 
understand the thing that is unveiled. The primary movement here is 
understanding as an emergence of being (Palmer 1980: 3) 
What is interesting and important about this kind of interpretation is that it goes 
beyond technique and method-oriented conceptions to a moment more primordial—
a moment before our present thought forms—in order to grasp something essential.  
In Heidegger’s view, this is a kind of bridge to ‘non-being.’ The transcending of the 
already-given world, in Heidegger’s own writing ([1955­7] 2002), is called the ‘step 
back.’ This step back is a movement back from an embeddedness in a set of fixed 
definitions of reality in order to regain access to a certain realm of ‘latency’ which we 
might also call our ‘deeper sense’ of the meaning of being. Heidegger roots his 
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thinking in a latency lying below the level of manifest consciousness.  In the preface 
to Richardson’s work, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (2003: viii-xxiv), 
Heidegger writes that this realm of ontological nonbeing is not the ‘transcendental,’ 
but rather a kind of ‘creative foundation and source for our being-in-the-world.’ 
Desmond (1995: 270, my italics) talks of this creative foundation in terms of 
‘mindfulness transcending instrumental reason, to a renewing of our being in the 
middle.’ 
The aesthetic phenomenologist Dufrenne (1973: 542) believes that the proper 
function of art is that it makes us undergo the ‘absolute experience of the affective.’ 
We are ‘moved’ affectively by the confrontation with aesthetic forms. The new 
position to which we are ‘moved,’ metaphorically, is ‘deep.’ The metaphorical use of 
depth is of something that is hidden from view, something which cannot be seen 
when we are positioned at the surface. When that which is hidden is suddenly seen 
—suddenly experienced with ‘liminal freedom’—our foundations are shaken. We are 
seized, physically, emotionally, mentally, by meanings resonant with a sense of that 
which is most real to us: our consciousness of ourselves as being in and of the world.  
We are clouded in our daily lives, but sometimes we gain access to the realm 
of clear-sightedness and truth. Desmond (1995: 75) believes that through art we 
might access something essential, something we are always losing, something for 
which we sometimes long, and something we sometimes regain. In the following 
quote he gives the example of the ballad experience itself:  
I speak of the elemental…It is simple yet elusive, clear as daylight yet 
mysteriously stirring, ageless yet recurrent….Listening to some old ballads we 
sometimes hear the elemental—so simple, so elegant, so powerful—yet without 
insistence—as if singers were in touch with more directly with something 
irreducible... For the elemental is such that its expression is just its simple 
being. There is no disjunction between expression and being—as if a pure voice 
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of innocent song just rose from the heart of being, as if that song were the most 
natural thing in the world, were the very nature of things (Desmond 1990: 272, 
my italics).  
 
Unfolding Worlds of the Imagination 
This thesis has argued that the ballad experience provides access to the 
imaginary ‘ballad world,’ remote from the quotidian lifeworld, by enveloping singer 
and listener together in an experience that suggests other times and distant places. 
Songs can ‘unfold a world’ of the imagination. This idea is echoed by Michael 
Jackson (2002: 254): ‘stories…transport us into another space-time…It is in this sense 
that once upon a time is always the here and now.’ That is to say, we cannot divorce 
the ‘once upon a time’ in a sort metaphysical sense from the actual ‘here and now’ of 
the vivid present.  
The idea of creating new imagined worlds, according to Dufrenne (1973), is a 
defining feature of aesthetic perception itself. Our imagination is a most valuable 
tool, for it assists us in seeing beyond the immediately visible. It is our ability to 
imagine other ‘possible lives’—our own and those of others—that creates our bond 
with diverse social and historical worlds. Storytelling in all its forms mediates our 
relationship with worlds that extend beyond us. It is absurd to speak of stories as 
either personal or social, for their meanings inevitably depend on a fusion of both 
horizons, as well as a fusion of horizons of biographical and historical, self and other, 
private and public. 
In this case, whatever the distinctive qualities of the ballad experience, the 
significance of it seems in large part dependent on what a listener takes such 
experiences to signify. The emphasis here is on the ways in which individuals draw 
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on extant narratives to create meanings particular to themselves. As Katharine Lee 
(1993:77) explains, aesthetic encounters are significant  
when there is a perceived wholeness in which the scattered details of the object 
or event fall immediately into order and coherence and resonate with the 
individual’s understandings and feelings. It is a moment of great magnitude 
because of the transformative insights it affords the individual. 
 
This process was explored in Chapter Six through Ó Laoire’s theory of the 
productive power of metaphor, Ricouer’s theory of mimesis and the process of 
creative blending. Gadamer (2004: 306–310) reminds us that understanding is not a 
merely cognitive process, but rather it is achieved (on an existential level) by means 
of the practice of previous understandings applied to new situations. We actively 
use our imagination and ‘bodily thought’ (Grosz 2001: 70) to empathically 
understand the other’s position and bring about our own existential understanding. 
Jackson (2002: 33) writes of this essentially hermeneutic process, 
The intelligibility of any story or journey will depend on this unconscious 
bodily rhythm of going out from some place of certainty or familiarity into a 
space of contingency and strangeness, then returning to take stock. 
In becoming immersed in the ballad story through cognitive processes of 
metaphorical mapping, our self-identity is altered in an imaginative appropriation of 
the narrative identity. This process is the very essence of ‘transformativity’ that 
Porter (2009: 153) talks of in his theory of presence: 
I want to suggest by “transformativity” the active, transitive, capacity of singing 
to bring about a qualitative change, both internal and external…Ballad singing 
transforms not just the song material itself but also the human effort and 
experience that gave rise to it. In this transformativity indeed, that is the key to 





Singular and Shared: The Carrying Stream 
The twentieth century philosopher Hannah Arendt (1968) argues that 
storytelling transforms our lives by enabling us to reshape and diffuse diverse and 
difficult personal experiences in ways that can be shared. Blacking (1969) believes 
that the purpose of art is to capture force with form: the force of individual human 
experience and the form of collective cultural experience. Without the perennial 
conversion of cultural narratives into stories that speak to private idiosyncratic 
concerns, cultural narratives such as the ballad lose their viability. Jackson (2002: 
226) believes that storytelling is a modality of working with others to transform 
what is given into forms of experience and meaning that are collectively viable. 
Stories bring philosophy down to earth, working within the everyday lifeworld of 
human struggle, encompassing a plurality of perspectives, in order to gain an 
enlarged view of human experience. 
Stories, then, cannot exist as purely personal revelations, but must be 
realised dialogically and collaboratively in the course of sharing with others. This is 
why we may ‘no more recover the original story than step into the same river twice’ 
(Jackson 2002: 23). It is possible to use this river metaphor to extend Henderson’s 
(1992: 24) idea of the ‘carrying stream of tradition,’ first discussed in Chapter Six. Ó 
Laoire (2006) believes that such narratives represent the fundamental framework of 
an ancient structure, a continuing development which is negotiated anew with each 
coming generation. Since their original conception and creation, the ballads have 
changed, enriched or transformed their meanings, but in a way, still preserve many 
of their original patterns. To revisit a quote from Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 25), ‘it 
is a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed 
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in the middle.’ This is the effect of the transformations all experience undergoes as it 
is replayed, recited, and reworked in the place of intersubjective life. As Arendt 
(1958: 184) puts it, the ‘story comes into being within an already existing web of 
human relationships.’ ‘Life stories only assume the full measure of the meaning in the 
space of the world…of plural existence, of intersubjectivity’ (Jackson 2002: 226).The 
power of ballads, then, resides in the in-between spaces of intersubjectivity, of 
intercorporeality. In sharing them we testify to the very diversity, ambiguity and 
interconnectedness of experiences that abstract thought seeks to reduce, tease apart, 
and contain.  
 
The Ballad Song 
Crucial to the idea of ‘presencing imagined worlds,’ and arguably what makes 
the ballad experience it so distinct, is the fact that it is story in song. Melody is an 
integral element of the ballad narratives: their musical component heightens 
narrative energy and adds a new dimension the expression of emotion that language 
cannot communicate. A central argument in the preceeding chapters has been the 
idea that the semantic power of ‘words’ expand the awareness of possibilities 
ranging over past, present and future, through the creation of narratives; while 
‘sounds’ of music and melody and their intonation focus the awareness of ‘presence’ 
in the present through a visceral, embodied experience. The insistent rhythm of the 
words and the melody together can have hypnotic qualities, and in this context we 
‘imaginatively participate’ in the active world of the text by means of the symbolic 
rhythmic structures of metaphor and narrative. Ideas in Chapters Four and Eight 
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further explored the importance of temporality, arguing that that the temporal 
structure of experience is crucial to the meaning of expressive culture.  
In Chapter Five it was argued that together, performer and audience—singer 
and listener—create an environment in which the Maysie may flourish. Niles (1995: 
49) proposes that such moments of communication—or rather, in my view, 
communion—unite the separate souls of the audience, ‘sparking recognition of their 
common character or fate.’ Experiencing self and others as co-participants in 
presence requires that we traverse the frontiers that seem separate to us. Harmon 
(2008: 30) argues that the essential nature of communal song is this very crossing: 
the breaking down the boundaries of self and other and experiencing a unitary state. 
In her view, song has the potential to reveal the fundamental togetherness in the 
being of things: self and other are brought together in shared experience. Although 
Harmon (2008) talks of communal song in a specifically Christian context, the fact 
that she believes that ‘with no other art does this crossing occur with such 
immediacy and directness’ supports this argument for the power of song. In 
Desmond’s view (1990: 259), ‘in singing we meet an outpouring of articulation of 
enigmatic affirmative power’:  
It is the human voice overreaching itself in a song that speaks to the human 
heart but knows also that the human heart does not know itself (Desmond 
1990: 270) 
 
This is, perhaps, the very ambiguity that ‘serves to define man’ (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 
220). 
 Some kinds of music—and I argue that the ballad is one such kind—are 
capable of affecting humans at the very depths of what can be experienced. Blacking 
(1973:108) believes that music can ‘transcend time and culture’:  
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The realisation of music’s unifying nature can help people to transcend narrow 
cultural boundaries and political interests and to act in ways that are in the 
interests of their fellow human beings and their self-actualization into 
wholeness by giving them the means to experience human connectedness, 
perhaps the most vital of all experiences. 
The ‘being’ of significant experiences of music blurs the distinction of subject and 
object, of self and other. We become aware, if only fleetingly, of the 
interconnectedness of all things. This idea is articulated by Burrows (1989: 399) in 
the following quote: 
Music is a dualistic trick for suspending duality: music and participant do form 
a duality of self and other, but to attend deeply to this other is to merge with it.  
 
Subjective meaning, feeling, and knowing take on an extended reality by merging 
with significant, imaginative instances of musical creation.  This results in an altered 
experience of our body in time and space. This kind of experience reveals that there 
exists, under the differences that language and words create, a layer in which all 
things have a common rootedness, which ‘spring from a single source’ (Blacking 
1969: 63).  
 
Being aesthetic is a living refutation of dualism in showing us bodied mind as 
activating is own self-mediation with otherness (Desmond 1990: 66). 
 
At such depths an alternative reality and an alternative way of being are achieved, in 
which wholeness of meaning is attained in a world full of division and alienation. As 
Desmond rather wonderfully articulates, ‘Whole worlds sometimes rise up in a song…the 




Ballads and Truth 
It has been claimed that the ballad as a form is remarkable for its simplicity, 
intensity and profound capability to express something true of human experience. 
Wilentz and Marcus (2006: 354) go so far as to claim that the ‘old ballads carry a 
kind of truth ... that [cannot] be found anywhere else.’ What does this mean? We 
might say that ‘truth’ is created in performance. Since singers speak of ‘getting into’ 
the song, of ‘being the person,’ in short, like an actor on stage, they project 
themselves imaginatively into a situation in which they have never in reality 
participated and the audience accepts this projection as truth. In this closed circle of 
meaning, the epochē, the ‘created space between,’ there is a temporary suspension of 
ordinary reality, of time and of space. The space between allows us to accept all 
information on an equal footing, whether it is contributed by the physical world or 
by our imagination. Jerrold Levinson (2006), writing on the nature and function of 
musical chills, reflects that 
Experiences of the sort in question announce themselves as the mark of a 
confrontation with some fundamental truth of life, bodied forth by the music 
that so moves us. Such chills are received not as mere physiological 
disturbances, but as ones fraught with significance. 
 
 To return again to Timothy Rice’s central conviction (1994: 305, my italics), and my 
own opening quote: 
The truth that music embodies and symbolically represents is not a 
propositional logical truth, verifiable by the niceties of epistemological 
reflection and explanation, but an existential, ontological truth that sensation, 











CHAPTER TEN 10 
Conclusion 
 
This concluding chapter will comprise an integrated, retrospective summary of 
this research, highlighting its importance to the respective fields of ballad studies, 
folklore, expressive arts and ethnomusicology. The overall aim of this work, as stated 
in the abstact, was a paradigm shift in terms of the way in which the ballad is 
understood. Here I will reflect on the ways in which the preceding chapters 
delivered on this aim, in challenging entrenched worldviews, breaking down 
notional barriers and synthesising disparate areas of scholarship. A brief summary of 
chapters is presented, reflecting on how each, rather than forming stand-alone units, 
work together to form a progressive narrative and coherent whole. Following this, 
my contribution to scholarship in this emerging field will be recapitulated, and 
directions for future work will be suggested. By way of closing, I will offer some 
concluding remarks.  
 
Transformation in Thinking 
This research sought to go beyond prevailing and traditional approaches and 
move towards a ‘transformation of thinking’ that operates outside the conceptual 
structures endorsed by the established order (Heidegger 1971: 138). In this case, the 
‘established order’ could be seen to be related to the traditional ‘text-centred’ 
approaches in ballad studies, and the ‘conceptual structures’ to our perhaps un-
reflected Western philosophical assumptions about the nature of our engagement 
with the world, such as mind/body dualism and isolated subjectivity.  
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The idea of the liminal ‘space between’ has been central to this process of 
transformative thinking. In hermeneutic theory, the space between is a source of 
both creativity and critique of the prevailing forms of thought and being. Not only is 
the space between where the Maysie lives, it is also a space of juxtaposition that 
unhinges expectation and opens thought to the emergence of something new 
altogether. I have striven here for in order to find a more holistic lens through which 
to view the world. By juxtaposing cultures of inquiry and striving for productive 
dialogue between theoretical perspectives, new understandings have emerged that 
might not have become apparent had such juxtaposition not been made explicit.  
 
On Reflection: Brief Summary of Chapters 
The introduction to this work invoked the metaphor of the ballad form itself, 
where the cyclical nature of the tune creates an insistence on the relationship 
between each new verse and the whole. Methodologically, I took the approach of 
writing a cumulative narrative, feeding in new theoretical ideas to create layers of 
complexity as the narrative advanced. In adopting such a holistic approach, ideas 
have connected and overlapped in interesting ways, and it is difficult to separate the 
strands of thought for reflection here. Each chapter does not stand alone; rather, 
each develops progressively, building on what has come before. By approaching the 
synthesis of ideas in this manner, it can be shown how areas often treated separately 
in academic studies are in fact deeply interconnected. 
Chapter Two offered a critical discussion of published works in the relevant 
fields of ballad studies, folklore, expressive arts and ethnomusicology. My position 
was established in relation to the primary scholars in this field, notably Lillis Ó 
 351 
Laoire (hermeneutic approaches to the experience of traditional song, prioritising 
ways of being over ways of knowing), James Porter (developing a theory of ballad 
presence), John Niles (oral narrative in relation to studies of the Maysie), Barre 
Toelken (the ‘essential metaphoricity’ folksong), Lawrence Zbikowski (embodied 
cognitive approaches in conceptualising musical experience) and Judith Becker 
(bridging the gap between arts and science, studies of the ineffable and 
‘extra­musical’ qualities). The central emergent theme of embodiment was 
identified, which opened up new theoretical terrain leading into areas of study that 
join cognition, experience and culture. An argument for interdisciplinary 
engagement to answer the question of the role of song in culture was advanced. 
Chapter Three underpinned the research aims of this thesis philosophically, 
laying the theoretical foundations for the development of ideas. Part One, in stressing 
the philosophy of embodiment, advanced the notion of ‘intersubjectivity’ as the 
existential ground of culture, rather than the solipsism of Cartesian consciousness. 
Through contemporary phenomenology, it was argued that ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are 
not separable entities, but simply words we assign to different yet mutually 
determining moments and modalities of experience. It was shown how 
phenomenology, theories of embodiment and a theory of enaction based in 
hermeneutics can inform ‘radical reflection.’ That our conception of reality is always 
conditioned by our embodied existence had radical implications for fieldwork 
practice. Rather than a pre­given and prescribed ‘method’ which objectifies the 
culture under study, an argument for simply ‘being there’ was advanced, where 
meaning emerges in productive dialogue. Part Two outlined ideas from contemporary 
theories of metaphor and embodied thought, with the mind viewed as an active 
constructor of its own reality. This theory was later applied to the ballad experience 
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in Chapters Six (at the level of figurative language and personal narrative configured 
as metaphor), Seven (the interface between linguistic and musical meaning) and 
Eight (the level of intercoporeal and bodily gesture). 
Chapter Four, ‘Developing a Theory of Presence,’ began to open up the 
discourse to include dimensions of experience rarely considered in this field. Gaps 
and possible openings in Porter’s theory were identified. In taking Porter’s theory 
forward, the need to find a way to talk about presence in embodied terms was 
recognised. To this end, somatic elements of balladry as a relevant and necessary 
field of study were reclaimed. Fieldwork interviews and archival sources of recorded 
interviews with Sheila Stewart (1996) were drawn upon to create and exemplify the 
theory of presence in context. The importance of the aesthetic experience, of the 
‘total somatic experience,’ was emphasised, in order to provide justification for 
exploring Gadamer’s investigation of aesthetic time, where art was seen as form of 
‘play,’ or rather a temporal ‘event’ in which we participate. Reflecting on the idea of 
the ‘space between,’ this chapter explored the idea of a ‘fusion of horizons’ between 
past and present to create new meaning in the present. Here, the idea of the ‘vivid 
present’ of shared experience was introduced 
Chapter Five, ‘Deep Listening and the Ballad Experience,’ built upon ideas in 
Chapter Four but introduced a new dimension: sound and aurality. It encompassed 
the idea of listening as an existential act where both body and mind are engaged, as 
well as to emphasising its participatory nature. This chapter challenged the 
tendencies and consequences of privileging the visual in scholarship, and in 
response, post-phenomenological ideas were developed to inform a theory of ‘deep 
listening’ as co­participation in presence. Examples from my own personal 
experience were used to craft and shape theoretical ideas. It was decided that this 
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approach should be taken in order that the descriptive examples chosen would 
allow for more critical and philosophical questions to be asked. Here I extended 
John Niles’ ideas about the Maysie —whose focus is purely on the ‘wordpower’ and 
narrative dimension of balladry—to include the musical dimension. It was 
hypothesised that the semantic power of ‘words’ expands the awareness of 
possibilities ranging over past, present and future, through the creation of narratives; 
while sounds of music and melody and their intonation focus the awareness of 
‘presence’ in the present through a visceral, embodied experience. The ballad 
experience itself was approached by means of a spatial metaphor.  It was argued that 
sounds themselves create a temporary omnidimensional space, not restricted by the 
material walls. In performance, this space is also created by the participants 
themselves—the flesh of their bodies, their expectations, intentions, memories, 
histories and emotions. The active, transitive, capacity of singing and performance was 
emphasised. 
Chapter Six, ‘Ambiguity and the Productive Power of Metaphor’ explored 
the figurative language and Toelken’s ‘essential metaphoricity’ of the ballad form in 
great depth. The central argument was the idea that when two or more entities come 
together there is a metaphorical process of ‘creative blending’ at work, and it is in 
the liminal space between where new meanings are created. This argument built 
upon and extended Ó Laoire’s work on the productive power of metaphor as well as 
extending ballad scholar David Atkinson’s reception theory for ballad studies ideas 
in the light of theories of embodied cognition, metaphorical mapping and creative 
blending. This was explored on the level of the figurative language of the ballads and 
their ‘essential metaphoricity,’ expanded to incorporate Ó Laoire’s (2005) discussion 
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of personal narratives configured as metaphor. Figurative meaning cannot be said to 
reside entirely within the text as part of its manifest content, but somewhere 
between the text (as it is performed) and the shared constellation of assumptions 
and associations which gets triggered when a singer sings a song before an audience 
at a particular time. Any meaning which emerges does so as a positioning of the song 
in the living present. The relationship between text, melody, experience and meaning 
are also culturally and historically specific, an idea explored in Chapter Five through 
a discussion of the idea of the habitus of listening. That is to say, meaning arises not 
from the ballad alone but from the culturally specific ways in which people grapple 
with ‘texts’ and ‘actively bring them into lived experience’ (Berger 2009: ix).  
(Appendix Two presents a Case Study which gives an example of how this theory 
can be applied.) 
The importance and value of the theory developed in Chapter Six was further 
explored in Chapter Seven, ‘Words, Music, Song,’ which investigated the 
metaphorical mapping between words and music and applied it to melody and text 
interacting in performance. Chapter Seven developed a contemporary theory of 
metaphor for song, looking beyond language to the central idea of the space between 
words and music, song and poetry, proposing that the metaphorical blending of text 
and music creates possibilities for the play of the imagination. This chapter in itself 
is a crucial contribution to the field of ballad studies. Throughout the field’s entire 
history, music has been relegated to a subservient position to text. In the past, where 
music has been studied, it has been chiefly to do with the origins of a particular tune, 
or its relationship to a particular version or variant. Understanding what music is 
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‘doing’ in these ballads is a vital step forward, and something of a revolution in this 
field. 
Chapter Eight developed this theory a step even further, investigating the 
metaphorical mapping from sound to body. ‘Intersubjectivity’ was (re)imagined as 
‘intercorporeality.’ Ideas from Chapter Five about shared musical experience were 
extended in the light of layers of theoretical complexity developed in Chapters Six 
and Seven (theories of creative and conceptual blending). Chapter Eight looked at 
intercorporeal spaces between in performance—the sensory perception of presence—
and the nonverbal dimensions of communication. The idea of ‘intermodal’ processes 
of perception and the sharing of bodily gestures were used to extend Porter’s theory 
of presence. In taking the overall narrative full circle, this chapter revisited ideas first 
introduced in Chapter Four, arguing that in the ballad experience, an intercorporeal 
relationship is built upon sharing simultaneously different dimensions of time. 
Chapter Nine, ‘The Space Between is Where the Maysie Lives’ presents a 
shorter chapter, bringing together ideas and theories developed in the preceding 
chapters, and answering some of the questions not yet answered. The problematic 
notion of ‘transcendence’ in affective encounters was reimagined and reconciled 
with the ontological convictions driving this research. The idea of the non-rational 
dimension of such affective encounters—the shivers and chills of the Maysie—was 
linked to the essential nature of the hermeneutic process, and the essentially 
transformative power of stories in song. Returning to ideas first introduced in. The 
final sections brought the argument full circle, returning to the idea of the vivid, 
deeply moving quality of aesthetic encounters. 
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The methodological drive throughout this work has been a shift from 
representation to experience, a freedom from prescriptive method and a 
commitment to openness through mindfulness and radical reflection. The emphasis 
has therefore been on the development of theoretical models created to understand 
the ballad experience rather than descriptions of the embodied experience in 
question, concentrating on the culturally specific ways in which structures of 
experience contribute to the lived meanings of this very particular aesthetic 
encounter. It should be clear at this stage why I have not presented a collection and 
comparison of personal narrative descriptions of the ‘ballad experience.’ Only now 
are we in a position to be able undertake such a research project, and I look forward 
to a venture of this nature in the future. 
 
Contribution to Scholarship 
This work provides an innovative application of current approaches in 
studies of expressive arts to the field of ballad studies. The utilisation of an original 
theoretical framework opens up a new and previously unchartered direction of 
research. It has explored a dimension of experience that scholars of expressive 
culture (and performers or audiences) are aware of all the time but for which we 
rarely account in research, a dimension which can no longer be ignored. Embodied 
experience cannot be overlooked, and no longer can it be dismissed as idiosyncratic 
or viewed as something opposed to the shared frameworks of culture. Rather, 
embodied experience must now be seen as absolutely central to the process of 
meaning-making in aesthetic encounters. 
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One significant contribution this work has to offer is an insight into where 
apparently archaic expressive cultural forms derive their power to move us, as well as 
an insight into why such traditional forms remain relevant in our contemporary 
world. Understanding the meanings that an aesthetic experience has for those people 
who produce and receive it has always been a fundamental task for scholars of 
expressive culture; from the author to the text, the context and the audience, the 
routes into understanding those meanings have been many and varied. In the past, 
the role of scholarship has been to locate, organise, contextualise and interpret a 
collection of texts, and in so doing, figure out what they mean to those who perform 
and receive them. This research concentrates on how we actively bring cultural 
forms into our lived experience, how we engage with them with both body and 
mind, how we make sense of these experiences and make them meaningful. 
In attempting a paradigmatic shift in terms of the way that traditional song is 
understood, this research itself embodies an alternative to the pre-suppositions 
common to Western twentieth century engagement with the world, highlighted 
early in this chapter. In challenging entrenched cultural and philosophical 
assumptions, this work moves beyond the position that assumes an external, 
objective reality and a separation of subject from object, and opens to a 
phenomenological understanding of being-in-the-world. We are now in a position 
to move beyond outmoded assumptions to a more nuanced understanding of the 
deep structures which are at work in such cultural experiences. 
Another major contribution to the field is the synthesising of a diverse range of 
critical models into one multifaceted interpretative approach. Expressive culture has 
always attracted attention from various disciplines, yet there has been little work 
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that is truly interdisciplinary. By transcending disciplinary separation and 
specialisation, theories of embodiment, cognition, phenomenology, somaesthetics, 
reception theory, and theories of interstitially have here been synthesised into one 
multifaceted and layered approach. Disciplines hitherto perceived as separate camps 
—each with their own take on traditional forms—are seen to be both complementary 
and highly effective when notional barriers are broken down. The cognitive and the 
affective dimensions of cultural experience are seen to be inextricably linked. The 
utility of perspectives in phenomenology and embodied cognition are mutually 
informative, and together they can provide a useful toolbox for scholars of 
traditional song and other expressive cultural forms. 
 
Future Work 
If this work provides a toolbox, what other kinds of aesthetic cultural forms 
are open to this kind of exploration? It is my hope that this work will speak to 
anyone interested in the study of expressive culture—those that work in the fields of 
ethnomusicology, folklore, popular music studies, anthropology, or performance 
studies. That traditional expressive culture has this power must surely be at the very 
heart of future concerns of studies in ballad studies, folklore, ethnology, 
ethnomusicology and all fields that examine such aesthetic encounters. I advocate 
the potential role for phenomenology in the (re)imagining of language and 
experience, exploding dualisms and fostering intersubjective, intercorporeal 
experience. The phenomenological understanding of the ‘world’ is one in which we 
experience our world, and participate in the world(s) of others. As we imaginatively 
embody other beings, it becomes easier to recognise that the perceiver is also the 
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perceived, hence the intersubjective nature of perception. David Abram (1996) 
believes that it is because of our disengagement with the world—by our theorised 
separation and abstraction that divides us from the realms of actual perceptual 
existence—that we have lost touch with our own experience. Future work must ‘fill 
the gaps’ in comprehending expressive culture that has resulted from decades of 
textualising practices. As shown in the survey of literature here, the emphasis is 
slowly moving from representation towards an appreciation of embodied experience. 
If this small exploration of new ideas can provide others with theoretical models to 
apply to other performative genres, then this research will have served a worthwhile 
purpose.   
As has been noted, any attempt to bring about a paradigmatic shift in a field 
of study is often not achieved in isolation. Rather than being entirely new, it would 
seem that the research aims of this thesis reflect something of an emergent zeitgeist 
and fundamental change in the academic landscape: a shift in focus towards the 
recognition of corporeality as a vital part of understanding expressive culture. Out of 
necessity, pursuing this direction of study—opening up new theoretical terrain—
must lead into areas of study that join cognition, experience and culture, with every 
point of entry requiring cross-disciplinarity. Heightened attention to lived 
experience and corporeality will allow scholars to make richer interpretations of 
expressive culture and delve more deeply into their subject matter. Work is needed 






This thesis has attempted a paradigmatic shift in the focus of ballad study, 
moving from ‘representation’ towards ‘experience’ and with an emphasis on 
‘process,’ as opposed to ‘product.’ The development of ideas has been concerned with 
describing how our embodied experience of the world informs the processes of 
meaning-making, how human cognitive capacities are at work in the ballad 
experience and how the structure of the ballad reflects and shapes these capacities. 
One of the central aims has been to find a legitimate way of talking about the 
ephemeral, intangible yet real quality of the ballad experience—conceived of as 
ballad ‘presence,’ —within a secular, humanistic framework. The aim has not been to 
demystify this experience in a reductionist sense, but to offer an interpretation that 
is less about ‘transcendence’ and more about the creative processes present in the 
ballad experience. 
What has been explored has been the construction of bodily and worldly 
realities using musical and narrative resources. The ballad experience is no mere 
response to an aural stimulus, nor is it in any way in a straightforward sense an act 
of symbolic representation. It is, however, invariably, an embodied practice. Cultural 
forms like the ballad have the potential to tap into and resonate deeply and richly 
with our own life experience, leaving us with a vivid and extraordinary sense of 
being. This sense consists of a vividly experienced unity of sound, body, and the 
world as lived. Its resources are sonorous, corporeal, cultural and experiential.   
It was the Maysie who inspired this thesis. I hope it has been shown that a study 
of the ballad experience, the Maysie and the phenomenon of ‘presence’ yields new 
insights into the ways that meaning and affect emerge in performance. One of the 
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central convictions in this thesis is that the significance of such cultural forms to 
human culture is considerably more important than most conventional explanations 
would allow. Part of what I have been advocating here is that we recognise the 
profundity of the somatic presencing moment in human embodied cognition, and 
that we view instances of ballad singing as celebrations of this moment; of our here 
and now, embodied mode of being. Foremost among the reasons why music has 
meaning and truly matters is its participatory, enactive and embodied character, and 
its consequent capacity to highlight the co-origination of body, mind and culture. 
Aesthetic experiences such as the ‘ballad experience’ give us a way of being in the 
world, a way of making sense of it.  
The significance of these points for our understanding of the ballad singing 
experience is momentous, for they suggest that musical experience is about much 
more than symbolic representations of feeling. According to an enactive embodied 
account of human cognition, mind, culture, body and action partake each of the 
other, co-constructing the only ‘realities’ available to human experience, through the 















Appendix One:  
Interview with Stanley Robertson, Edinburgh, July 1 2008 
 
Mairi McFadyen: Hi Stanley, thank you for coming today! 
Stanley Robertson: It’s nice to be here Mairi. 
MM: We’re here to talk about the ballad the Dowie Dens of Yarrow. 
SR: Well, the ballad the Dowie Dens o’ Yarrow, my mither aye tell’d me was a medieaval 
ballad. I never ever learned it fae a book, I just heard it orally sung. And because I was 
brought up by a kind o’ folk, we used to, it was almost like, ken, being intoxicated with the 
ballads. And all these wonderful ballads stay inside you. And if when they’d teach you to 
sing them they used to say the ballads, there’s hundreds and thousands o’ ballads in the air 
and ye ken how they call the waves the micro waves and the radio waves all go through the 
air, and when you want one, you just concentrate on it and [inhales deeply] breathe it down. 
Take it inside you ‘til it becomes part o’ your living soul and then, my auntie Jeannie aye 
ways said ‘tak it oot bonnie’—she doesnae mean tae say that you’ve tae be the finest singer in 
the world tae sing it, she meant to say, sing it with the feeling and love that’s been handed 
down with the oral tradition. So I’ve often been misquoted by scholars. People often think 
Jeannie said ‘tak it oot bonnie, you must sing it good’ but that’s not what she said. An’ also 
amongst my people, ken, none o’ my folk can hardly read or write ye ken, they’re illiterate. 
But they’re literate illiterates, wonderful form of scholaring and teaching and a’ that. And 
they used to say, that in these waves, up here, floats yer melody and down here floats yer 
words, so ye’ve got the melody and the words, and the space that’s in between that is where 
the [maisee] lives, maisee is the Traveller name for the muse. So if you invoke the muse, you 
will have a ballad experience. And you’ll get a shiver, comes down your spine when she’s 
present. And i’m sure you’ve often done that. There’s people come down from the Western 
Isle also have it. People coming down from the Western Isle and you’re Travelling you 
should be quite intuitive about these things. And, this is a ballad I have recently taught a 
class. And when I sing it, I’ll go over the words wi’ ye and  let you know what’s actually 
happenin’ because a lot o folk hear things and they canna quite comprehend what’s actually 
going on the ballad, because sometimes old wording gets [mistrewed] ye can. I’m very very 
fond o’ this ballad. I think I better stand up for this. My Auntie Jeanne said ‘never sit doon 
when ye’re singing a ballad 
MM: What about the ballad story? 
SR: Well ye just ken. It’s some o’ the things that a lot o’ scaldy folk know. Ye ken it’s aboot 
knights, they’re sayin nine gentlemen but they are knights. She dressed him like her ain dear 
knight sae he’s nae made a fool of. Now he was just a poor wee laddie, ken, just a poor wee 
lad, a slim lad. And you could see his hygiene wasna the best cos she’s had tae wash his face 
and kaim his hair. Looked like a [?] But she’s given him colours an’ that tae wear, which 
dressed him up. At least he had the honour to go out. See, he couldna use a lance, he couldna 
use an arra, see he wasn’t trained in the rules o’ armoury. But his trusty sword—he was a 
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ploughboy. And ploughboy could knock the hilts aff o’ trees that stuck in the field, so he was 
a good, he could smack weel, though he was little and slim he could smack weel. And he 
says, and this is a very important part to the actual battle scene, ‘and three he slew,’ so he 
killed three o’ them, and ‘three withdrew,’ now the three that withdrew didnae withdrew 
out o’ cowardice, they withdrew because he made them feel ashamed, ken, the other knights 
fightin’ a bit o’ a laddie. So oot o’ the laws o’ chivalry, they left. And the three he wounded 
sairly. But the false brother john, see he was ashamed o’ his sister, dear lookin’.She’d a’ these 
knights courtin her but she was pickin up wi a ploughboy laddie, and he was shamed. And 
that’s where, he was comin up tae congratulate the laddie and that’s where he sleekitly 
stabbed him in the back. Sayin’ ‘well done now’ and stabbed him maist fouly. So was a false 
brother John. And then, it was an affa shamin’ as well for the father that one o’ these plooboy 
lads had been killed by his son fa was a night, a noble man ye ken. So efter, she has this affy 
dream, this the element o’ the supernatural comin in. She tells her father , ‘o faither dear i 
dream a dream, I dream o’ doul and sorrow,’ doul and sorrow’s aye bad, ye ken. ‘I dreamt that 
I shewed winding sheets’—shewin, that’s the old word for sewin’— ‘I dreamt that I shewed 
winding sheets’ which is burial sheets, shrouds—ken that other ballad, they call it and she 
says 
I will buy my love some flannel 
And I will make my boy some shroud 
And every stitch i put it in it 
The tears would flow down 
And every stitch i put in it 
The tears will flow down 
Cruel fate put an end tae his growin’ 
Cos ‘shewin’ is quite a— ‘I dreamt o—things o’ sadness and old ancient lore is shewing 
windin sheets. Or pulling hair bells or blue bells. Travellers never ever pu’d a flooer. An 
there’s another flooer called neverdie and you were never ever allowed to touch that. I was 
brought up surrounded by  superstitions. Every day o the year there were superstitions. It 
was great fun. Ken ah’ve got mair stories than the days o the year! And ah’ve got mair songs 
than the days o’ the year.  
MM: Well, why do you like this one particularly, would you say? 
SR: I like this as a training ballad. I like to teach it, it’s nae an easy ballad tae sing. Very few 
folk could actually gie it justice. I taught a laddie an ancient ancient version o a song cried 
the great silkie o sule skerry but he didnae know it as a supernatural ballad. But the tune i 
have, is tuneless. And it breaks into a weirdness, but if you listen carefully you will here like 
narrow whales waling through the background ‘cos you’ve that sea effect. And ah taught 
him how to sing it like this 
[sings] 
Now I taught him this version and I’m no kidding you he really caught it. He just caught it. I 
have a jewish friend I think he is, he works at Cecil Sharpe house. So if you’re ever in London 
go and look for this laddie. Wonderful singer and very handsome, pure Adonis to look at as 
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well ye ken. He fell in love with my singing aboot a year ago so I mentored him. Wonderful 
singer he is. Nearly a’ the folk that have taken special time wi me has become expert singers. 
MM: So why is this one a good one to start off with? 
SR: It’s a good yin for the advanced class, fin ah do big ballads, it is big ballads. They did 
twelve ballads at the last class, then I did a course which is smaller songs. Some of the 
smaller songs are harder to sing than the big ballads. Oh aye. See songs like lovely Molly an’ 
a’ that—very very difficult to sing! It’s no the type o’ song that a’body could stand up and 
sing, you’ve got to take inside.  
Ye get some ballads that have natural resting places. And ye get ither verses key to 
reminding the story. Balladry is an art, an old old art, and I was very fortunate to be brought 
up in family. I do like ballads. Folk say to me, ‘fit’s your favourite ballad? And it’s the one I’m 
singing at that particular time. Cos they’re a’ my bairns ye ken. And when I teach folks 
ballads I say, ‘you’re being stewards over my bairn and if you bad use them I’ll come back 
and hunt you!’ I tell them that. But I tell them a story naebody kens aboot the ballads.  
I’ve hundreds o recordings here. Hundreds and hundreds here. I’ve also videos. I just enjoy 
doing what I do. I ken folk singers who wouldna dare teach ye a verse o a ballad. Oh no, 
[posh voice] oh no you can’t do that, that’s my song! I mean it’s me that learned it them in 








Chapter Six Case Study 
This case study displays many of the themes discussed in Chapter Six, which 
developed the idea that the function of metaphor explained and explored by Ó Laoire 
(2005 can be seen as a part of a larger cognitive process at work in cultural 
experience. The idea of ‘gaps of indeterminacy’ is crucial to this argument. Arguably, 
such lacunae require a more personal relationship with the ballad, because the 
subject is obliged to fill in the gaps with their own personal experience. The example 
below explores one person’s personal relationship with one ballad, the ‘Silkie of Sule 
Skerry’ 
. Jean Bechoffer was brought up in Shetland. She moved away and lived in 
England for many years before moving back to Scotland; shortly after moving back 
to Scotland she became involved in the Scottish Folk Revival of the sixties and 
seventies. An American friend gave Jean the Joan Baez Song Book (1977) and in it was a 
ballad called the ‘Selkie of Sule Skerry.’ This song immediately resonated with Jean, 
and continued to do so for many years. It is her song, and her story: 
The selkie ballad is my own favourite ballad certainly. You know I grew up in 
Shetland, but you see at that point, the singing tradition was very dormant. 
There weren’t many songs, there weren’t many singers, I didn’t know them. 
Plenty fiddle music going on!...So the silkie ballad—I sought it out and when I 
moved back into Edinburgh I got in contact with the School [of Scottish 
Studies] and in Tocher I found out a lot about it there. And of course, there are 
many selkie legends which I discovered after. And so it became my favourite 
ballad…And I felt it went so well in the dialect—I usually sing it in the dialect. 
The version I sing is not a particularly long one, but it just tells the whole story 
well enough. I discovered the older tune, which was the tune that was sung in 
Shetland, so I’d sing that tune—it’s very easy to get the two muddled because 
they’re not dissimilar, they’re not; the Bronson tune I think is a misheard 
version of perhaps the one that was original. It’s thought of as an Orcadian 
ballad but there is a version that was collected in Unst. I think I sense in the 
tune a kind of echo of the seal singing. It’s a very powerful tune, especially for 
the last verse. It’s a great ballad, the tune is just, oooh. And I think it is an old 
tune, it’s not a major/minor tune, it just wanders about. It’s unresolved; it’s a 
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strange scale. But I really do identify with this ballad and get upset when I 
think it’s incorrectly performed! 
 
My family weren’t a Shetland family—I was not in touch through my Grannies, 
because we were an incoming family so I didn’t have that contact…That’s why I 
think I got so particularly caught up in [the ballad], but also I think there are 
bits in it about the strength of mother love which is, certainly, something I feel 
very strongly, you know. From my own children, and I lost my own mother 
when I was only seventeen. So, you know, there’s a lot in there that kind of hits 
buttons I think. 
 
Identifying with a song provides people with a mediating context—or ‘space’—to 
comprehend personal experience more deeply. In this case, Jean identifies with the 
experience of motherly love and the memories of losing her own mother when she 
was young. Meanings like this created by individuals build up cumulatively over an 
extended period and can be more intensively interpreted than is possible from a 
single performance. The experiences of our past, our history, the natural world 
around us, deeply personal experiences and the experiences of family and friends all 
play a part in the processes of meaning creation in the ballad experience. The striking 
difference between our idiosyncratic personal narratives and the narratives of the 
song, in Ó Laoire’s view, must constitute what he calls the ‘tensive core’ of the 
metaphor, suggesting that it is this ‘tension’ between the similarities and the 
differences of the two cases which lend the metaphor its expressive power. 
Later in life, Jean began to explore a different level of meaning in this ballad, 
from an academic perspective: 
I thought, why did this ballad arrive? Why did it happen? I’ don’t think I’m the 
only person who’s had this idea but…the selkies may well have been northern, 
Norwegian or even inuit people in kayaks who got drifted by tide or what have 
you away from there, survived the crossing—you know, because Shetland’s 
fairly far north but you can island hop from the Faeroes to Shetland—it’s a long 
way but it’s possible. And they may have arrived in kayaks, and of course, if you 
take the kayak away from them they can’t get away, and the kayaks were made 
of seal skin, so you see where my mind goes? That that’s how the legend may 
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have arisen. It’s not important at one level because the ballad exists for itself, 
but it’s instinct to think of why it might have arisen in that way, and that’s the 
source of one of the selkie explanations. I mean you can see while they’re in the 
water why people might have thought seals were people because they look very 
human in the water—you just see the head and the way they swim. I think it’s 
the anthropomorphic thing, because they are kind of human we try and relate 
to them. The selkie song about the guy who comes, he may well have been and 
Icelandic visitor or something…But it’s also a human myth. The shape 
changers…I need to be careful and not make it too realistic because there is a 
myth element in there as well. That’s what makes it powerful as well.   
 
Such meanings can unfold a world which exists independently of any one enactment, 
increasing their emotional power with every successive performance. In such cases, 
accumulated meanings exceed the ostensive reference in their revelation of another 
world (Ó Laoire  2005: 204). Later in life, Jean began to connect her relationship 
with this ballad to a distant memory, which, in her view, ‘completed her seal story’: 
 
When I was about fourteen I spent a holiday on Papa Stour with a family who 
were teachers there and they were friends of my mother’s…It was 1947, a very 
hot summer and even on Papa the water dried up. It was beautiful weather 
most of the time and I went out fishing with this old man…and—I can still see 
it, the sun was setting, gorgeous red setting sun in the west—and we heard this 
noise. And it was spine chilling! That put the shivers up my spine, certainly. 
And I said to him, “What on earth is that?” and he said “Ah that’s the trowie 
folk.” And I don’t know whether he was pulling my leg or if he was being 
serious—he could have been. He was of a generation.  
 
…Then, of course, many many years later I worked out that it was probably a 
seal, because they do have a song and they like singing. So I reckon that that 
was my sort of first connection to the seal folk. When we on holiday in the 
West—Plockton—we went out on a seal watching cruise with Callum the 
boatman. ‘Guaranteed to see seals!’ So we were out there and right enough and 
there were seals on the rocks. And he said, “now it’s said that if you sing to 
them they will come to you and they will listen. Would any of you like to sing 
to the seals?” So I thought, alright, I’ll pick up the challenge and I said “Aye, I 
will!” And he said, “what will you sing?” And I said “I’ll sing a seal calling song, 
what else?!” So I belted out this song and one of the seals on the rock definitely 
started listening—it didn’t get off his rock and swim to the boat, which would 
have been absolutely brilliant, but it definitely listened. It was just a noise. But 
it was quite a thrilling moment for me! So I got a free whisky…It completed my 
seal story...you know, it sang to me and sixty years later I sang to it! 
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An earthly mither sits and she sings 
And aye she sings ba lilly ba 
Little ken I my bairny’s faider 
Still less the land that he lies in 
 
For Jean, the ballad’s emotional power is increased with every successive 
performance. Artworks, regardless of their age, can endlessly renew themselves by 
taking on contemporary meanings: 
The fact that a work stretches out of a past into the present as enduring moments 
still does not mean that their being is an object of aesthetic or historical 
consciousness. As long as they fulfil their function they are contemporaneous with 
every age (Gadamer 2004: 120). 
 
Through a process of creative blending, past and contemporary reality can be 
experienced together. Gadamer believes that it is in narrative that these become 
unified. In the many worlds of the imagination, time is not subject to the same 
constraints as in the quotidian life experience of the outer world. In our imagination, 
we can travel backwards and forwards in time; we can be in different places and 
times simultaneously; the structure of time appears chaotic compared with that of 
the everyday life-world. Present, past and future seemingly entangle.  
In my view, this case study exemplifies the idea that ballads are not just 
figuratively and linguistically metaphorical: the actual experience of the ballad is a 
metaphorical embodied process, at work on a ‘complex matrix of several levels’ (Ó 
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